

ANCESTRAL FAULT IN ANCIENT GREECE

Ancestral fault is a core idea of Greek literature. 'The guiltless will pay for the deeds later: either the man's children, or his descendants thereafter', said Solon in the sixth century BC, a statement echoed throughout the rest of antiquity. This notion lies at the heart of ancient Greek thinking on theodicy; inheritance and privilege; the meaning of suffering; the links between wealth and morality; individual responsibility; the bonds that unite generations and the grand movements of history. From Homer to Proclus, it played a major role in some of the most critical and pressing reflections of Greek culture on divinity, society, and knowledge. The burning modern preoccupation with collective responsibility across generations has a long, deep antecedent in classical Greek literature and its reception. This book retraces the trajectories of Greek ancestral fault and the varieties of its expression through the many genres and centuries where it is found.

RENAUD GAGNÉ is University Lecturer in Classics at the University of Cambridge and a Fellow of Pembroke College. His publications include two co-edited volumes, as well as various articles and chapters on archaic and classical Greek literature, Greek religion, and the history of classical scholarship.

VISIT...

LANZAROTE
Caliente.COM

ANCESTRAL FAULT IN ANCIENT GREECE

RENAUD GAGNÉ



CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS

University Printing House, Cambridge CB2 8BS, United Kingdom

Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York

Cambridge University Press is part of the University of Cambridge.

It furthers the University's mission by disseminating knowledge in the pursuit of education, learning and research at the highest international levels of excellence.

www.cambridge.org

Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781107039803

© Renaud Gagné 2013

This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press.

First published 2013

Printed in the United Kingdom by CPI Group Ltd, Croydon CR0 4YY

A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication data

Gagné, Renaud, 1976–

Ancestral fault in ancient Greece / Renaud Gagné.

pages cm

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 978-1-107-03980-3 (Hardback)

1. Greek literature—History and criticism. 2. Mythology, Classical. 3. History, Ancient.
4. Heredity. I. Title.

PA3061.G34 2013

880.9'001—dc23 2013005148

ISBN 978-1-107-03980-3 Hardback

Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.

Contents

<i>Acknowledgements</i>	page vii
<i>Note on abbreviations</i>	ix
Introduction	I
1 The theology of <i>progonikon hamartēma</i>	22
<i>De decem dubitationibus circa Providentiam</i>	22
<i>De sera numinis vindicta</i>	39
Confrontations and translations	54
Isaak Sebastokrator	65
William of Moerbeke	70
2 <i>Haereditarium piaculum</i> and inherited guilt	80
<i>Parentum peccata</i>	82
Domestications	90
Grotius	97
Lomeier	112
The scholarship of inherited guilt I	120
The scholarship of inherited guilt II	133
3 The earliest record: <i>exōleia</i> in Homer and Hesiod	159
Hesiod	159
Homer	177
4 Sympotic theologies: Alcaeus, Solon, and Theognis	206
Alcaeus	210
Solon	226
<i>Theognidea</i>	249
5 Tracking divine punishment in Herodotus	275
The oath of Glaukos	278
The wrath of Talthybios	296
The <i>Enagees</i>	306
Croesus and Solon	325

6	Tragic reconfigurations: Labdacids	344
	<i>Seven against Thebes</i>	351
	<i>Antigone</i>	362
	<i>Phoenissae</i>	376
	<i>Oedipus at Colonus</i>	386
7	Tragic reconfigurations: Atridae	394
	<i>Oresteia</i>	394
	<i>Iphigenia in Tauris</i>	416
	<i>Orestes</i>	425
	Conclusion	438
	Conclusion	446
	<i>Bibliography</i>	473
	<i>Index locorum</i>	539
	<i>General index</i>	545

Acknowledgements

It is a great pleasure to thank all those who have helped me write this book over the years. This is the end of a process that began with my doctoral work at Harvard University. My debts are too many and varied to be fully enumerated here. For the generosity and usefulness of their advice, comments, criticism, and encouragement, all of which I have received in greater abundance than anyone could hope for, I want to record my sincere gratitude to Egbert Bakker, Pierre Bonnechere, Jan Bremmer, Simon Goldhill, Jonas Grethlein, Albert Henrichs, Miguel Herrero, Marianne Hopman, Richard Hunter, Nino Luraghi, Gabriella Pironti, Renate Schlesier, Mark Somos, and Yuhan Vevaina. The two anonymous readers of Cambridge University Press have provided very useful suggestions and improvements to the manuscript, and I am grateful to Michael Sharp, Elizabeth Hanlon, and Sarah Roberts for their editorial professionalism and precision. The outstanding copy-editorial work of Jan Chapman has been invaluable.

I have greatly benefited from a term of sabbatical leave from my duties at the University of Cambridge and Pembroke College while working on this book, as well as a research grant from the *Fonds québécois de la recherche sur la société et la culture* (FQRSC) as an Assistant Professor at McGill University. The Fondation Hardt provided funding for a productive and stimulating stay at La Chandoleine. I warmly thank all of these institutions for their support.

Parts of Chapters 2, 3, and 4 have previously been published separately: 'Spilling the sea out of its cup: Solon's *Elegy to the Muses*', *QUCC* 133 (2009): 23–49; 'Atreid ancestors in Alkaios', *JHS* 129 (2009): 39–43; 'Invisible kin: *Works and Days* 280–285 and the Myth of Races', *Hermes* 138 (2010): 1–21; 'The poetics of *exoleia* in Homer', *Mnemosyne* 62 (2010): 353–80; '*Haereditarium piaculum*: aspects of ancient Greek religion in the 17th century', in Bierl, A. and Braungart, W. (eds.), *Gewalt und Opfer. Im Dialog mit Walter Burkert*. Berlin (2010), pp. 115–48. I am obliged to these

presses and editors for their permission to revisit this material here. All of it has been thoroughly rewritten, revised, or updated.

This book could not have been written without the love and understanding of my family and friends, most of whom now know more about ancestral fault than they should. What I owe to my mother, Hélène, Virginie and Héloïse I can never repay.

Note on abbreviations

Abbreviations of journal titles follow those of *l'Année philologique*. Epigraphical abbreviations follow the conventions of the *Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum*. Abbreviations for titles of modern works, ancient works and authors' names correspond to those of the *Oxford Classical Dictionary* and Liddell–Scott–Jones, *A Greek–English Lexicon*.

Introduction

The anxieties of heredity mirror the fears and conflicts of society at any one time. Stains from the past and questions about the length of collective responsibility through generations currently occupy a prominent place in the national consciousness of many countries. Almost seventy years after the fall of the Third Reich, to take the one clearest example, as the last witnesses of the events are disappearing, Germany and Austria remain firmly set in the grip of its many ghosts and the shadow of the Holocaust. If that is a unique case, with no close parallels, other states also share memories that give an important role to the living presence of the violence 'they' inflicted in the past. The destruction of Native American societies in South, Central, and North America can be mentioned in that regard, or the open wounds of the African slave trade in the Atlantic world. The ambivalent legacies of Empire in the United Kingdom, France, Spain, and Portugal, in Holland and Belgium, and, in somewhat different guises, in Turkey, Japan, the United States, and Russia, are a source of shame and even disgust for some as much as they are matters of pride for others. While many will disagree on the evaluation of ancient violence and the understanding of its relevance for the various groups of the present, few will ignore the challenges it poses. Who is responsible for the real, tangible suffering that remains when all the executioners are dead? Are their flourishing families to be marked somehow in later times? Where does *that* abundance come from? How long is the case for historical reparations legitimate? Is it ever legitimate? The past can be a source of culpability, menace, and distress. That is as true now as it has ever been.

The dangers of heredity can also play a significant number of roles at the levels of the family and the individual. The effects of the parents' lifestyle on the health of their children are currently heavily emphasised by medical literature, and the risks of genetic predisposition to disease are well-established factors of fear in the lives of many people. Family history, antecedents, are regularly mentioned at the doctor's visit. Behaviour,

moreover, is often linked in part to heredity in the social imagination, especially criminal behaviour, and the child or the grandchild of the war criminal, the murderer, or the rapist will rarely be allowed to forget the weight of that inheritance; it is impossible to keep track of the number of times this has been dramatised in Western popular culture in recent years. Appearing in a large number of different, often unrelated configurations, they hold that the pain and the transgressions of the past have on the course of the present has a remarkable reach in contemporary society.

That is not about to go away. The ever-growing role of genetics is inscribing generational transmission further at the heart of our understanding of risk. The aggressive new rise of nationalism and ethnic identity politics, the predicaments of multiculturalism, the worldwide expansion and hardening of religious fundamentalism, all promise more instrumentalisations of heredity as a threat. The conflict of generations is a key feature of the accelerating ecological disaster, as we are daily reminded that our children and our children's children will pay for the environmental choices we make now, and the systemic crisis of the economic order is putting great strain on the generational solidarity of states. As national debts become unsustainable burdens, the question of inherited liability continues to occupy ever greater space in our minds and in our cities. The old biblical saying that 'the sins of the fathers will be visited upon the children to the third or fourth generation' now resonates particularly loudly, with an echo that is distinctive to our time.

This is especially true in the economies of post-industrial financial capitalism, in the social structure of countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom. The progressive closing of social mobility, if it is sometimes obscured behind the taboo of class and inspirational popular tales of self-made men and pauper princesses, is a hard fact on the ground. The staggering concentration of wealth in the hands of the few has already reached levels not seen in close to a century, and the oligarchy is fast at work in justifying the divorce of justice and equality with its claims of asymmetrically deserved merit. Inheritance laws are being adapted accordingly, and inherited privilege is institutionalised in society, from the school systems to hiring practices. As the social pyramid continues to grow steeper, being born in poverty is a sentence from which it is becoming harder to escape. While some attempt to contest this order, many others accept or defend it; all, at any rate, are faced with its generational implications. The ominous presence of heredity can take many shapes at the beginning of the twenty-first century, all of them with

profound repercussions on life and imagination. Paths traced before birth, and their legacies of suffering, have rarely been more visible.

That ancient Greece confronted comparable questions and challenges and produced a complex range of responses to them, that the detailed traces of these distant notions can be followed for more than a thousand years, would probably come as a surprise to most non-classicists. That the reception of the same notions spans more than two thousand years, that, century after century, it was highly influential in shaping Western thought on related issues – critical, for instance, in the development of no less a monument of Christian dogma than original sin itself, and instrumental in defining crucial points of early modern political philosophy about the responsibilities of states in time, as we will see – is a fact that has received very little of the attention it deserves. The history of these notions from ancient Greece about the dangers of heredity, both their evolution in antiquity and their many later echoes, is a keystone of Western culture. The present study aims to recover some of its major articulations.

As divine presence plays a determinant role in the relevant record, this book can be described as an essay in the cultural theology of ancient Greece. It is concerned with the many overlapping trajectories of an idea concerning the justice of the gods. Throughout antiquity the notion that individuals and communities could be punished for the crimes of their forebears occupied a central place in Greek assessments of divine action. The common and highly charged Christian term ‘inherited guilt’ that one usually finds in reference to this idea will be used here only to describe modern scholarship on the question. Translating the Greek term *progonikon hamartēma* (προγονικὸν ἁμάρτημα), I will instead call the ancient idea ‘ancestral fault’.¹ This is a concept at the heart of ancient Greek thinking on theodicy, inheritance, privilege, and suffering, the links of wealth and morality, individual responsibility, the bonds that unite generations, and the grand movements of history. It played a major role in some of the most

¹ The term is found in Proclus’ *De decem dubitationibus circa Providentiam* (see pp. 22–9) and his commentary to Plato’s *Cratylus* 395c (93, p. 46, 12–21 Pasquali). It is also attested in a scholion to Euripides (*Hipp.* 833). This προγονικὸν ἁμάρτημα obviously continues a long list of equivalent coinages such as πατὴρ ἀτασθαλίαι (Thgn. 736), ὑπερβασίη πατέρων (Thgn. 740), παλαιγενὴς παρβασία (Aesch. *Suppl.* 265), παλαιαὶ ἁμαρτίαι (Aesch. *Ag.* 1197), τὰ ἐκ προτέρων ἀπλάκηματα (Aesch. *Eum.* 933), ἅτη πατέρων (Eur. *El.* 1306–7), τὰ τῶν τεκόντων σφάλματα (Eur. *F* 980 Kannicht), γονεὸς ἀμαρτὰς (Hdt. 1.91), τὰ τῶν προγόνων ἁμαρτήματα (Ps.-Lys. 6.20), ἀδίκημα προγόνων (Pl. *Resp.* 364c), παλαιὰ ἀδικήματα (Pl. *Leg.* 854b), or τὰ τῶν πατέρων ἀδικήματα (schol. to Hes. *Op.* 284). The continuity spans many centuries. From the archaic period to the end of antiquity, the dominant term used to describe the idea of divine punishment through generations in our sources remained an equivalent of ‘ancestral fault.’

critical and pressing reflections of Greek culture on divinity, society, and human knowledge. Prominent examples of the idea include the generational misfortunes of the Atridae and Labdacids in tragedy, the programmed fall of the Lydian kingdom of Croesus described by Herodotus, or the hereditary pollution of the powerful Athenian Alcmaeonid clan.² Important expressions and echoes of ancestral fault are found in fragments of melic and elegiac poetry, medical texts, forensic speeches, ritual prescriptions, or philosophical treatises.³ Ancestral fault was seen as a major legacy of Hellenic *paideia* for Plutarch and Pausanias under the Roman Empire.⁴ For Celsus, it was a fundamental notion of Greek religion in its opposition to Christianity, and Proclus gave it a methodical, explicit definition in his exhaustive reconfiguration of Hellenism.⁵ ‘The guiltless will pay for the deeds later: either the man’s children, or his descendants thereafter’, said Solon at the beginning of the sixth century BC already, a thought echoed throughout the archaic, classical, Hellenistic, and imperial periods.⁶ The burning modern preoccupation with collective responsibility through generations has a long, deep antecedent in the classical Greek tradition and its reception.

Far from being confined to tragedy, where it is indeed uniquely prominent, the idea is attested in almost all genres of ancient Greek literature. It plays a major role in some texts, a more discreet one in others, but it never fails to mark a distinctive imprint wherever it is found. Saying that someone is receiving divine punishment for the actions of an ancestor is a statement that involves whole programmes of thought about kinship, self, time, and justice; few texts activate such a radical idea at the margins of their message. Much has been written about the occurrences of ancestral fault in individual texts and genres, and excellent short synthetic overviews have been produced.⁷ No extended study, however, has been devoted to the question as a whole since Gustave Glotz’s seminal *La solidarité de la famille dans le droit criminel en Grèce*, a book published in 1904.⁸

The material in question is immense and methodologically difficult to handle properly. The transformations of an idea as thoroughly diverse and embedded in the cultural fabric of society as ancestral fault are motivated

² See pp. 206–10. ³ See pp. 466–8. ⁴ See pp. 56–9.

⁵ See Chapter 1. ⁶ See pp. 226–49.

⁷ Kakridis 1929: 141–68; Dodds 1951: 28–63; Moulinier 1952: 228–41; Lloyd-Jones 1962; 1983; 2002; Bianchi 1966; Dover 1974: 261–63; Gantz 1982; R. C. T. Parker 1983: 199–206; M. L. West 1999; T. Harrison 2000: 112–13; Sewell-Rutter 2007; Giordano 2009: 245–49; Liapis 2013 and Van den Berg (forthcoming) stand out.

⁸ See pp. 134–48.

by a large number of causes that leave no traces in the record and react differently to different contexts. No one work can hope to do proper justice to the massive range of the problem and its many imbrications within larger literary and cultural issues. Exhaustive treatment of all relevant sources and their eventful reception is beyond the reach of any single study. Such a scholarly mammoth of erudition would make for a singularly unreadable book, in fact, without any of this weight necessarily adding much to the value of the research. It would also give an illusion of completeness to a fragmentary record. A leaner, more narrowly circumscribed study focused on a single author or genre will miss the great articulations and the intricacies of the dialogue at play between texts, genres, and institutions. What I propose here instead is a comprehensive approach. The aim is to bring together the various facets of the question in one common investigation of Greek cultural representations. Instead of a complete review of sources, selected material will be presented in detail through case studies. Instead of a sequential narrative with an origin and a plot, the discussion will consist of investigations based on the perspectives of the individual sources. Such a study has to cast a wide net and take into account both diachronic and synchronic aspects of the material. From our fragmentary perspective, any part of the record can make sense only in relation to the whole, a situation that activates the familiar problems of the hermeneutic circle.

Separate parts of that gigantic puzzle are often of little use by themselves. Their significance stands out through combination and contrast with the contours of the big picture and other pieces of the ensemble. The meanings of ancestral fault in Theognis, for instance, are impossible to understand without serious consideration of the Theognidean collection's engagement with contemporary elegy.⁹ Narratives of delayed punishment in classical historiography cannot be read properly without reference to this same elegiac tradition, and tragedy's complex involvement with the same idea is thoroughly grounded in a myriad other texts.¹⁰ The list goes on. The trajectory of such an idea in time is a web of criss-crossing paths. Separated from us by millennia, it is still perceivable through the dialogue of texts with each other and the contrasts between their various formulations. Only a comprehensive approach can identify and use the many links of this web of correspondences and rewritings; the overarching trajectory of the idea is an integral part of its individual expressions. Individual texts respond to other texts, but it goes without saying that they mostly follow

⁹ See pp. 249–74.

¹⁰ See e.g. pp. 373–6.

their own specific logic in adapting the idea to their message. Each relevant passage presents the idea in its own way, as part of a larger framework of meaning. The logic of the text and its relation to other texts need to be considered together, as part of the same enquiry. Part of the difficulty lies in striking the right balance between the individual and the more general, and not reducing the specificity of each expression of the idea to a facet of something else, such as the expression of a belief. Indeed, the texts where ancestral fault is found are usually grouped together in a note or a few pages and referenced as the sources that can be used to reconstruct the composite image of a belief.

But is ancestral fault a belief? Is this book a study in the history of belief? It would be easy to answer affirmatively. A recent anthropological article defines belief as ‘the state of a cognitive system holding information (not necessarily in propositional or explicit form) as true in the generation of further thought and behaviour’.¹¹ In line with that agenda, the great expansion of cognitive research on religion in recent years has placed the social and cultural study of belief on a new footing.¹² No longer reduced to function or structure, dismissed as epiphenomenological noise, or treated as an ancillary to doctrinal theology, the substance of religious belief has come to receive much more sustained attention from scholars in the humanities and social sciences, and it is returning with some force in the study of Greek religion.¹³ The dialogues of literature, anthropology, and history have long moved beyond the brief, isolated, and provocative exchanges of earlier generations in Classics. A broadly defined interest in the theology and the religious world-view of antiquity is replacing the earlier insistence on ritual, function, and social practice in the study of Greek religion, and the research programmes based on the promises of the cognitive grid could easily generate a shared enthusiasm not seen since the heady days of structuralism.

An approach grounded in the cognitive science of religion might present a concept such as ancestral fault as an ideal object of study. Its terms of analysis would easily be deployed to ground novel research on the

¹¹ J. L. Barrett and Lanman 2008: 110.

¹² Prominent examples of this rapidly expanding field of study are J. L. Barrett 1999; 2000; 2004; 2007; Boyer 1994; 2001; E. Cohen 2007; Geertz 2004; Lawson 2000; Lawson and McCauley 1990; McCauley 2000; McCauley and Lawson 2002; Pyysiäinen and Anttonen 2002; Pyysiäinen 2003; Slone 2004; 2006; Sperber 1996; and Whitehouse 1995; 2000; 2004. The *Journal for the Cognitive Science of Religion*, published by the International Association for the Cognitive Science of Religion (IACSR), was just launched in February 2012.

¹³ The two recent and splendid books of R. C. T. Parker (2011) and Versnel (2011) well illustrate the point.

question. Ancestral fault could thus be defined as a 'Minimally Counterintuitive (MCI) Concept', a view that derives its appeal and its specificity from the fact that it stands out from the implicit logic of the 'maturationally natural' expectations of Greek culture and captures the imagination of individuals and collectives with its vast potential for the explanation of misfortune as punishment.¹⁴ The high memorability of the concept and its enormously rich inferential potential, the many applications of its wide relevance for giving meaning to adversity, trace a distinctive imprint around its expressions and evolution through time that make a perfect fit for the kind of analysis developed by the cognitive school. A cognitivist would see ancestral fault as a textbook example of a 'Hyperactive Agency Detection Device' (HADD) at work, for instance, the cognitive system through which hidden causes are perceived and ascribed to a supernatural agency with dispositions and intentions.¹⁵ He would chart its progression as an object of cultural elaboration and its eventual anchoring in the 'practised naturalness' of reflective belief. The cultural scaffolding needed to develop the reflective belief and the 'imaginistic' and 'doctrinal' modes of religiosity that shape its history could be mapped out in detail using these tools, and the other facets of the cognitivist programme similarly applied to the equation.¹⁶ In other words, a ready model is in place that would allow for the study of ancestral fault as a belief along the lines of a currently thriving programme of research with wind in its sails.

Although there is much to be learned from this model for anyone interested in the history of religious ideas, it is in the end a perfectly inadequate tool for the study of a question like Greek ancestral fault. The old criticism of the analytical value of the term belief levelled by scholars such as Evans-Pritchard and Needham is as pertinent now as it was in the 1950s and it cannot be dismissed as easily as it sometimes is with scientific syllogisms.¹⁷ The vast semantic range of the word 'belief', its fundamental ties to conviction and devotion and so many other heirs of the Christian *credo* in the Western imagination make it difficult to limit the connotations of the term to the aseptically neutral definition of belief quoted above. The synchronic and diachronic complexity of culture in movement, moreover, the dynamic rhythms of transformation constantly at work at

¹⁴ For the notion of 'Minimally Counterintuitive Concepts', see J. L. Barrett and Nyhof 2001; Boyer and Ramble 2001.

¹⁵ See J. L. Barrett 2004.

¹⁶ The terms were designed by Whitehouse in his two groundbreaking monographs (2000 and 2004) with historical investigation in mind.

¹⁷ Evans-Pritchard 1956; Needham 1973; cf. Pouillon 1979.

the seams of social life, make the study of collective belief a rather different proposition from the study of individual belief on which the cognitive definition of the term is so often based. The traces it leaves in distant historical records, more importantly, especially ones so fragmentary as those of ancient Greece, where the *ars nesciendi* must keep pride of place, hardly allows for the kind of precision and generalising scope sought by this type of study. And the literary deployment of an idea, with its many levels of perspective and complex games of representation, usually leaves little hold for the efficient assessment of belief. The schematic reductionism applied to the data of much research in the cognitive science of religion ultimately aims for the uncovering of universal categories with cross-cultural relevance; belief is handled there as a broadly defined object of comparison in the search for the general characteristics and the common tendencies of human nature. This book, on the contrary, is interested in the particulars of Greek culture, the forces at play in the many variations of ancestral fault, and the specific characteristics of the messages that express it: the work that the texts do. Belief can be defined differently, of course, but the force of its connotations ultimately remains the same, and I have found it preferable to devise this research without relying on it.

The ancestral fault that the present work sets out to investigate is a Greek cultural concept: 'cultural', in the sense that it was grounded in shared references, symbols and codes enmeshed in language and ritual, political institutions, and literary genres. 'Concept' is used here heuristically. Ancestral fault is an umbrella term used to describe comparable expressions that are often related, but rarely equivalent. Its extant, often elusive expressions are preserved in different forms and different types of texts spread over many centuries. How does one proceed to write the history of such a cultural concept? There is, obviously, more than one valid answer to that question. I should first state that this book is not a study in intellectual history, the social function of 'doctrine', structures of thought, linguistic conceptual history, or political *Begriffsgeschichte*.¹⁸ Neither is it a lexicographical analysis. All these approaches have provided fruitful insights and many useful tools, but the present research follows different aims. It will be concerned with the poetics of ancestral fault, the precise articulations of its pragmatic formulations and adaptations in literature; how the idea is represented; what use it has in this particular text, in that

¹⁸ For prominent examples of linguistic conceptual history, see e.g. J. G. A. Pocock 1971; Dunn 1972; Skinner 1978; cf. M. Richter 1995; for *Begriffsgeschichte*, see M. Richter and Lehmann 1996; Hampsher-Monk, Tilmans, and Van Vrees 1998; Koselleck 1985; 2006.

genre; what role it plays in this or that occasion; what its thematic echoes are, or its aesthetic value. This is a study in the literary and cultural history of representations. It consists of situated, interconnected interpretations of distinctive passages. In what follows, literary texts are not used as sources to be mined for the reconstruction of a separate cultural artefact. They are the direct objects of this study. Literary interpretation forms the core of the book, not the historical reconstruction of belief. In other words, rather than trying to ascertain what people did or what they thought, the discussion will look at what they said. What does ancestral fault specifically express in each individual passage, and how? What are its implications within the text? How does it differ from other similar passages? If literary interpretation can hardly aim for proof or demonstration, the fact remains that literary texts are what we have as evidence for this question, and a positivistic refusal to assess their meaning on their own terms and dismiss the investigation of their echoes and imagery as mere speculation is to condemn our understanding of the ancient Greek imagination to platitudes and impotence. Individual readings of texts are here conceived as open presentations of the material and invitations for further reinterpretation, rather than a search for (rhetorically) safe, buttressed results.

Writing the poetics of such a cultural concept requires an eclectic methodology able to combine many complementary approaches in one account. In this case, the research programme will be essentially concerned with five related issues: (1) the semantic extension of the concept and its grounding in vocabulary, theme, and imagery; (2) the roles and meanings of the idea in the economy of the individual texts where it appears; (3) the significance of these individual expressions in the larger social and cultural contexts that produced them; (4) the continuities and ruptures of the idea's progression over time and genres; (5) the intertextual links coursing through the recurrent expressions of the concept. All these issues will be considered together in each single chapter, and as a whole in the greater architecture of the book. Close readings are combined with generic and chronological synthesis. The goal is to open new perspectives on this one central question of ancient Greek culture. As successive expressions of the idea accumulated in the written record, some formulations stood out from others (each with its own logic), other notable formulations were written over them, and a distinctive series of related texts was progressively constituted in the literary archive.¹⁹ Even millennia later, and with the less than fragmentary record at our disposal, it is possible to identify clear

¹⁹ For the meaning of archive as used here, see A. Assmann 2012 [1999]: 327–32.

trajectories through this archive and recognise patterns of change with a remarkable degree of precision. An intertextual web unites the various expressions of the idea at the restricted level of individual reference, and the more diffuse, open renegotiations of language and culture in movement.²⁰ The gradual expansion of the archive of references upon which later expressions of the idea were written is a process that can be observed to a remarkable degree of detail. The aim is not to make that archive some unlikely key to Greek culture, or to read all of Greek literature through the idea of ancestral fault, but to understand the idea of ancestral fault where it appears in Greek literature. A surprisingly rich record of the seams that link the various expressions of ancestral fault in the textual record is discernible and can be uncovered if we take the time to look for it. Tracking the witnesses of these trajectories through genres and centuries is a vertiginous proposition. Done properly, it can provide a glimpse into the ancient dynamics of Greek culture in movement.

Before we proceed further, however, the major issue of definition must be addressed. How does one circumscribe an idea like ancestral fault or inherited guilt? Where does it begin, and, more importantly, where does it end? This is a question with no easy answer. It is possible to give this or that precise definition, but the distribution of what this definition places at its core, on the one hand, and what it excludes beyond its boundaries lands us back in the middle of the hermeneutic circle. How does the etic precision of the modern analyst escape the accusation of arbitrariness? How does the etic definition reconcile itself with the emic categories of the Greek material? How does the emic configuration of one individual source relate to the different emic configurations of other sources?²¹ The problem of coherence and inconsistency is at the heart of any attempt to understand the Greek religious imagination, as Henk Versnel's 'wayward readings' in Greek theology have reminded us recently.²²

One particularly influential strategy of definition in the scholarship on ancestral fault in recent decades has been to deny that there is actually

²⁰ To which could be added the median horizon of the constellation of other texts activated by the individual statement – the ensemble in which it situates itself. Genette 1982 remains the classical exposition of restricted intertextuality, the study of 'la présence effective d'un texte dans un autre'. Riffaterre 1979 and 1982 influentially redefined the 'Intertexte' as the relevant *corpus* of other texts solicited by the individual passage (cf. Genette's *hypertexte*), and Kristeva 1969 notoriously forged the open notion of intertextuality as the link between the text and 'l'ensemble social considéré comme un ensemble textuel'. As has often been noted, these three models of restricted, median, and open intertextuality are not incompatible with each other, and often impossible to disentangle.

²¹ For 'emic' and 'etic', see p. 22. ²² Versnel 2011.

anything like it in our sources, or to argue it away as an epiphenomenon of little significance. Starting in the middle of the twentieth century, a series of contributions have questioned the importance of the idea as a doctrine of belief, as a significant framework of literature, and, more drastically, as something that has any kind of existence at all. An early contribution in this direction, and one of the most radical, is the discussion of 'pollution héréditaire' in Louis Moulinier's 1952 *Le pur et l'impur dans la pensée des Grecs d'Homère à Aristote*, the first full-scale study of Greek ideas on purification produced in the modern age since Jan Lomeier's 1681 *De veterum gentilium lustrationibus syntagma*.²³

Moulinier sets out to demonstrate that there is no such thing as hereditary pollution *per se* as a cultural category in the archaic and classical periods. His extensive study is a comprehensive, positivistic demolition of earlier tropes of scholarship. Throughout his book he attempts to demonstrate that the empirical complexity of the sources does not allow for any modern reduction; any attempt to bring them into the logic of a coherent system is seen as an intolerable infringement on their particular characteristics.²⁴ In the early archaic age, pollution was in no way a religious idea, according to Moulinier, but something purely physical. If confused ideas of religious decorum before the gods, about the sacred force of pollution, or the rise of new beliefs on interior religious guilt did emerge during the late archaic period, they remained secondary elaborations built onto the central considerations of physical cleanliness. There is no clear pattern or system in the expression of Greek beliefs on purity and purification for Moulinier, just a number of loosely connected ideas. The same is true about the question of ancestral fault.

Showing that the material which pertains to the transmission of crime and punishment through generations does not correspond exactly to Moulinier's definition of what 'hereditary pollution' should be, that is, does not necessarily involve ideas of taint through blood, for instance, or

²³ Moulinier 1952: 228–42; cf. Vernant 1974: 121–40.

²⁴ As Jean-Pierre Vernant wrote in his long and devastating review of *Le pur et l'impur* (1974: 121): 'Selon lui, si l'on s'en tient aux seules données grecques, force est d'y reconnaître une diversité qui décourage toute théorie d'ensemble. Son travail cherche moins à unifier et expliquer les faits qu'à suivre, à travers les textes, les rites, le vocabulaire, et jusque dans la philosophie de Platon, les hésitations d'une pensée complexe, multiple et qui risque de nous apparaître parfois presque contradictoire... Le travail de l'auteur apporte beaucoup pour une analyse historique du pur et de l'impur dans la multiplicité de leurs formes concrètes. Nous croyons cependant qu'il était nécessaire de replacer cette évolution dans le cadre de la pensée religieuse. L. Moulinier ne nous semble pas avoir bien vu qu'une pensée religieuse constitue un système où les notions se définissent et se transforment en fonction les unes des autres, qu'elle est une symbolique dont les formes de logique ne sont sans doute pas exactement les nôtres.'

the belief that the transmission of ancestral fault involves all the descendants of the sinner in shared pollution, he essentially dismisses the entire notion of ancestral fault. He instead argues that the different ideas which have been brought into its modern conception are in fact mostly unrelated. They are, at best, linked by the consideration of the family's objective pollution in the case of one of its members' death. He attempts to show that even when the sources seem to refer to expressions of ancestral fault, they really point to something entirely different. In reference to the famous fragment from Euripides' *Alcmaeon*, for instance, τὰ τῶν τεκόντων ὡς μετέρχεται θεὸς μιάσματα, he writes that τῶν τεκόντων is 'très certainement' an objective genitive, and thus refers to the pollution which stems from crimes committed against parents (1952: 237).²⁵ At the end of his section on 'pollution héréditaire', he writes:

Si l'unité de la famille n'est pas constituée essentiellement par le sang, lorsqu'une impureté l'affecte elle ne s'attache pas à proprement parler au sang et, troisième conséquence, la notion de souillure héréditaire est très difficile à concevoir. En fait, elle n'est pas pleinement attestée chez les Grecs de l'époque classique. Certes, ils croyaient aux hérédités mauvaises, mais ce n'était pas un miasme qui, dans leur pensée, était transmis. Dans le cas des Pélopidès c'étaient les conséquences malignes et fatales d'une première souillure, ce n'était pas elle. Le destin voulait que chaque individu nouveau commît un crime qui le rendit impur. (1952: 234)

The material of ancestral fault in Greek literature, as it does not correspond to Moulinier's precise definition of hereditary pollution, is divided into discrete parts in his book and basically explained away.

Robert Parker's discussion of ancestral fault in his 1983 monograph, *Miasma*, the landmark study of purity and pollution in the contemporary history of Greek religion, is infinitely more nuanced and balanced in its treatment of the question (1983: 198–206). Parker, moving away from the crude empiricism of his predecessor Moulinier, classifies the large body of material concerning ancestral fault in clear analytical categories. These are coherently articulated with each other, and the precise discussion of the author often shows their significance for the social history of early Greek culture, and their place in the system of religious experience. In the nine pages of his analysis he is able to collect and arrange the greatest amount of relevant sources assembled in any one overview since Glotz's 1904 monograph, and to address the issue of its conceptualisation more methodically than had been done before.

²⁵ For F 82 Kannicht, see pp. 97 and 344.

His examination of the sources arranges the material according to genre and context. For Parker, the 'doctrine of inherited guilt' is a question of 'several interrelated ideas . . . not all of them involving Erinyes and curses, which tend to shape into one another, even though they are perhaps theoretically separable' (1983: 198–9). Defending in this way an entirely different take on the question from that of Moulinier, he tries to show how the material of those interrelated ideas can be organised into adequate patterns of classification. In a few broad strokes, Parker shows how the idea of inherited guilt is articulated in elegy, historiography, oratory, and, more prominently, tragedy. He argues that, throughout the development of early Greek religion, 'the basic conception remained the same' (1983: 199), and he discusses its representation as a sign of clear, divine action, or as a ground for accusing divine injustice, noting in the process, against Dodds, that it is not necessarily an expression of anxiety. It can be seen in functional terms both as an idea that 'protects the belief in justice against crude empirical refutation', and as a diffuse, vague threat that could be perfectly controlled in terms of anxiety by simple good luck sacrifices (1983: 202). Parker argues against Dodds and others, and agrees with Lloyd-Jones, in estimating that the doctrine of inherited guilt was probably not a late archaic development, but a belief perfectly adapted to the system of justice of the Homeric period. He does see a probable 'hardening' of the belief in the late archaic era, which he links to the contemporary 'development of the Orphic doctrine of inherited guilt', but he consistently warns against overplaying the significance of this belief in the classical religious world-view of the individual and of the city.

'Few of the ideas discussed so far', he writes, 'would be likely to have much influence on behaviour, except to the extent that individuals might be encouraged, or discouraged, in their crimes by the prospect of the reckoning being postponed to their descendants. They do not, that is to say, isolate a recognisable category of polluted persons, sprung from criminal ancestors' (1983: 203–4). Taking, then, a careful, minimalist position, he emphasises the limited importance of ancestral fault in the determination of behaviour, as opposed to representation, and portrays it as a doctrine of little actual consequence. Ancestral fault is shown as an idea of weak cognitive intensity in the classical period, and something that remains entirely restricted to the 'narrowly religious sphere' (1983: 205). In the wider space of civic religion that Parker attempts to define in his work, 'inherited guilt' is portrayed as a belief of much weaker social range than the 'inherited innocence' of civic benefactors.

The identification of ancestral fault in the plays of Greek tragedy has produced much more polarised views on the issue than for any other genre. An important line of scholarship has tried to show that the 'doctrine of inherited guilt' is either wholly absent from tragedy, entirely secondary to its interpretation, or altogether ill-defined from the start as an operative category. Timothy Gantz, for instance, in his 1982 article in the *Classical Journal*, 'Inherited guilt in Aeschylus', tries to show that there is no real case for reading inherited guilt at work in the extant dramas of Aeschylus. He defines inherited guilt as:

the inheriting of liability for transgressions committed by one's ancestors (whether or not the ancestors are also liable), and thereby paying some arbitrary penalty caused or at least sanctioned by the gods. This penalty may take the form of sudden misfortune in one's life (as Kroisos discovers in Herodotos), or as punishment for a crime which one is compelled by the gods to commit unwillingly (as scholars have argued is the case with Aeschylus' Agamemnon). In any case I do not mean an inherited *propensity* to commit crimes. Such tendencies fall surely within the category of internal mental states over which one is expected to exert control, as contrasted with the external visitations of the gods. In my opinion Aeschylus is not interested in surveying the deeper causes of ἀδικία, but only in establishing its consequences where conscious transgression has occurred, i.e. where a man given a real choice between proper and improper actions chooses the improper ones. (1982: 2)

Gantz tries to demonstrate that there is no indisputable attestation of this principle at work in the plays of Aeschylus. Allowing that 'the concept of inherited guilt did exist in fifth century Greece (as well as earlier)', he nonetheless tries to show in the first half of his article that it is much less widespread and influential in the world-view of Aeschylus' contemporaries than is usually thought (1982: 1). He writes that there is no trace of such a principle in Homeric poetry, and that its first attestation in Hesiod is so unclear that its meaning must remain uncertain. If it does appear in Solon and Theognis, its expressions are witnesses to the deep unease that the poets felt about its implications, to the 'ultimately unsatisfactory nature of inherited guilt as an encouragement to acceptable behavior', and to its eccentricity in the wider belief system of early Greece (1982: 5–6). Ancestral fault is not a central doctrine of contemporary Greek culture, but one rare and possible position among many. Gantz writes that he hopes to have 'demonstrated that this view need not have been mandatory in Aeschylus' time, as it was not in earlier periods. If we are to use the concept as a tool in the interpretation of the poet's thought, then the evidence must come

from the plays, not preconceptions of ideas which all of Aeschylus' world held to' (1982: 7). What matters in the interpretation of the individual author is whether he can be shown to be a 'believer' in the doctrine of inherited guilt; Herodotus, for instance, is such a 'believer in inherited guilt'. The rest of his article tries to show that Aeschylus is not.

Other scholars have written along those lines to show that the question of ancestral fault is in fact not a real issue of tragedy. The most important contribution in this vein is Martin West's 1999 'Ancestral curses', which appeared, fittingly enough, in a festschrift for Hugh Lloyd-Jones. Challenging one of Lloyd-Jones' key areas of interest, 'inherited guilt' in Aeschylus and Sophocles, West tries to show that this idea, if it is even attested at all, plays only a minor role in the work of the two tragedians. Like Gantz, he proceeds in two stages: first attempting to reduce the importance of the idea of ancestral curses in the contemporary world-view of Sophocles, and, secondly, showing that it does not play a central role in any of the extant plays.

The first part of the argument rightly contends that the terminological and conceptual looseness of inherited guilt and ancestral curses as analytic categories in much of previous scholarship has been harmful to their precise evaluation. He then proceeds to explain the problem away by clear analytic division:

Let us now consider inherited or ancestral curses. These have played an important role in the interpretation of tragedy, but the discussion has been bedevilled by looseness of conception, or at any rate of terminology. Critics have often spoken of an inherited curse when what they mean is inherited guilt, or some kind of genetic corruption, or persistent but unexplained adversity. Let us keep these things distinct. (1999: 33–4)

Ancestral curses, inherited guilt, genetic corruption, and persistent but unexplained adversity, are for West entirely different matters. His paper is concerned with the question of ancestral curse only and tries to distinguish it from other forms of ancestral fault (1999: 33–6). By arguing that some passages that could be seen as expressions of ancestral curses are actually related to entirely different categories, such as genetic corruption or unexplained adversity, he in fact ends up explaining away altogether the category 'inherited guilt' used by Lloyd-Jones in his work. The ideas that Parker, for instance, sees as 'concepts which tend to shape into one another, even though they are theoretically separable', West separates entirely; this reduction by analysis results in the most radically minimalist view of ancestral fault in tragedy produced since Moulinier.

West posits an abstract formal typology of ancestral curses in myth as his starting point, a typology largely based on ancient Near Eastern material. He writes that the mythical curses that course through generations can theoretically take two forms: either they are general aetiological stories whose function it is to explain the state or condition of a particular group through the actions of a common prototype, such as the divine curse that falls on the serpent in the Book of Genesis and makes it into a crawling animal, or they are more circumscribed curses that affect the descendants of a specific individual. West tries to show that neither is particularly central to the interpretation of tragedy.

He argues in the first half of the article that ancestral curses *per se* are not attested in early epic:

The fact is that it is not typical for epic to move across generations, and even less to make connections between events in different generations. So long as epic was the principal vehicle of the myths, we should not particularly expect the story of Atreus and Thyestes to be seen as belonging to a chain with the story of Agamemnon, or a causal link to be made. (1999: 37)

He contends not only that the theme of the generational curse was not present in the epic *Oedipodia*, but that it was also absent from the Oedipus plays of both Aeschylus and Sophocles (1999: 37–44). And even if, in Aeschylus at least, the story of the Pelopids is indeed linked through the theme of an ancestral curse, the role of the ancestral curse in the actual structure of the plays is entirely secondary. In the *Agamemnon*, for instance, ‘the curse is introduced subsequently as an auxiliary unifying motif’. By comparing the different versions of the myth that were in existence at the time of Aeschylus and Sophocles, West shows that they do not agree on the exact nature of the ancestral crime behind the curse. This allows him to say:

Comparison between these different versions makes it clear that the inherited curse was not a fixed, primary element in this mythical complex but an accessory motif that could be fitted in at various points, according to the changing horizons of individual authors. (1999: 39)

Nothing is made of those changing horizons, their relation to each other, and the prominent roles they play in the texts where they are found. Ancestral fault can thus be dismissed as an interpretative tool for the plays of Aeschylus and Sophocles. Following an earlier pattern of scholarship, West’s minimalist view takes a hard stance on definition and uses the inconsistencies of the sources to dismiss the notion of ancestral fault. At the end of his article, he writes:

The idea of ancestral curse exercises a dangerous fascination. It found its way by stages into myths where it did not originally belong; and interpreters of tragedy have persistently introduced it where it is not present. It has become, so to speak, one of the inherited curses of scholarship. (1999: 44)

An inherited curse it is. Like all such curses, it will not go away so easily.

The minimalist and critical positions of the past few decades have had the salutary effect of sharpening the debate and challenging long-held assumptions. An inherited curse is not the persistent wrath of a god, and neither one nor the other is necessarily linked to the idea of pollution. In Hesiod, for instance, the idea of generational punishment does not involve any consideration of pollution (*Op.* 280–5). In Homer it is linked exclusively to the context of the oath, while in Solon's *Elegy to the Muses*, it has nothing to do with oaths or 'curses'.²⁶ The idea of 'guilt', whatever meaning we give to that charged word, rarely has a role to play in the tales of punishment under consideration. Continuity through the generations and substitution of one generation for another, moreover, are not equivalent processes of divine punishment. The idea that the 'doctrine of inherited guilt' had a monolithic consistency, that it was a persistent and widespread belief throughout Greek culture, and a necessary part of the web of myth surrounding the stories of the Atreid and Labdacid houses (in tragedy or elsewhere), has been justly battered down. Niall Sewell-Rutter's stimulating 2007 study on inherited guilt in tragedy shows well the value of this critical approach for identifying the relevant material, and its usefulness for analysing the differences and discrepancies that distinguish each source from the other, as well as linking some of them together. As he writes, 'curses and Erinyes have close connections with ancestral transgression and are often found in association with it, but they are not simply facets of it'.²⁷ The renewed focus of this work on the categories in play, its insistence on greater analytical clarity, and the idea that the close scrutiny of the evidence rarely tallies with the grand narratives of research on the question, have done much to improve our grasp on the complexity of the material at hand. But the danger is then to mistake the forest for the trees.

²⁶ See p. 240.

²⁷ Sewell-Rutter 2007: 24. His study focuses on the notion of 'moral inheritance'. At page 48, for instance, in reference to Aeschylus' *Seven against Thebes* and Euripides' *Phoenissae*, he writes that 'What has emerged within the limits of this consideration is a conjunction of inherited guilt with moral inheritance: in both authors, the doomed family's recurrent misfortunes through the generations are mediated not simply through some mysterious supernatural means, but at least in part through the recurrence of traits and modes of behaviour, which help to create the recurrent patterns of doom through intelligible continuities of human character and action.'

Two fundamental problems stand out with the criticism of the minimalist approaches to the study of ancestral fault: atomism and hierarchy. I suspect that few members of the archaic and classical audiences ever insisted on the sharp analytical precision of modern philology in their understanding of generational punishment on the tragic stage or elsewhere. The messiness of the data is part of the nature of the data, not something that needs to be excised, explained away or tidied up. Inherited guilt, whatever that is, inherited curses, genetic corruption, and persistent but unexplained adversity, to use the categories of Martin West, are consistently and thoroughly intertwined in our sources, especially in the tragic tales of the Atreid and Labdacid houses, and it makes little sense to try to separate them from each other. These notions were closely linked and they shared a limited set of words and images in the documents where we find them. They belonged to the same diffuse but distinctive semantic field. At the centre of this semantic field of words and images there is one core idea: divine punishment can be transmitted in time over generations. The atomistic analysis that strives to separate entirely the different types of evidence, or that sees the individual sources as irreducible in their differences, fails to account for one of the central characteristics of the material at hand.

Common to many of the minimalist studies, similarly, is the idea that what matters is whether the notion of ancestral fault 'originally belongs' to a myth or not, and to find out how consistent with each other its various expressions are, and how central to the teachings of the play and the beliefs of its author. Unless you still believe in the old equation of origin with essence in the study of myth, however, there is no valid reason to insist on whether the notion of ancestral fault 'originally belongs' to a myth or not – what matters is what the idea is doing where it is, and how it resonates with the rest of the text as well as with other texts. The trajectories of the relevant material can no longer be conceived of in terms of the linear evolution of 'the doctrine of inherited guilt' but must accommodate a much more complex model of parallel tracks, often conflicting and contradictory, that criss-cross through periods and genres. The 'beliefs' of the ancient authors, more importantly, should not be confused with the voices in their texts, and not only do these 'beliefs' lie beyond the scope of any modern analysis, but looking for them ends up reducing the text to something it is not. The presence (or absence . . .) of ancestral fault in a play will tell us nothing about the 'belief' of Sophocles or the 'teaching' of his tragedy, in other words, but it will say something important about the perspective of that character at that moment in

the play.²⁸ The material is there, and it is abundant. It cannot be dissolved with demands for more analytical precision, or dismissed because it does not fit this preconception of what is important or not, or that evaluation of its centrality in the larger architecture of a text. Repeating that the data is messy and falling back on particulars will not do either. We need to locate the individual sources, in all their complexity, within the relevant synchronic and diachronic patterns.

Much of the minimalist criticism levelled at the notion of inherited guilt in the research of recent decades stems from a reaction against the long tradition of maximalist readings of the material, which saw ancestral fault in essentialising terms as the principle of a monolithic belief with a clear *Begrifflichkeit*. The swing of the pendulum was necessary and inevitable. Like most such reactions, it has gone too far and moved away from the logic of the evidence. It continues to be determined by the narratives it opposes. The solution is not to push back, or plot some chimerical middle line between two poles that could claim the flag of moderation and compromise and reconcile the apparent contradictions, but to rethink the debate altogether and go back to its roots. The first step of this operation must be to take control of the narratives that have shaped the scholarship, to understand their motivations and the forces at play, and gain a better awareness of their echoes and legacies.

The long ideological involvement of *many* centuries of literature and theology with the early Greek ideas of generational punishment, especially the material of tragedy and Herodotus, has to a large extent conditioned what people have been saying about ancestral fault and how it has been conceptualised. Programmes of thought on the question have continued their work long after the reasons for their formulation disappeared. Paying lip service to the presence of this massive – and fascinating – heritage can hardly be deemed sufficient. A lack of understanding of this charged history of reception will severely limit the room for manoeuvre of the scholar looking into the question. The unique position of Greek religion in the history of the Western imagination, especially its crucial role at the very heart of the founts that defined early Christianity, and as a figure of reference to which, century after century, various currents of medieval and modern Christianity constantly returned to give shape to the differences of the past and the present, make the study of a concept such as Greek ancestral fault, so intertwined as it is with the ideas of original sin and biblical corporate responsibility, a necessary confrontation with the very

²⁸ Cf. R. C. T. Parker 2009.

codes we use to define it. It is important to better acknowledge that fundamental specificity of the history and anthropology of Greek religion, to take it seriously as an integral part of the discipline, and to remember that the relevant research and ideological investment in the material started long before the professionalised scholarship of early nineteenth-century Germany. A journey through the *longue durée* of cultural memory is a precondition for understanding any aspect of Greek religion, and ancestral fault is no exception. A deep excavation through reception is needed.

The challenge of the minimalist approaches to the definition of ancestral fault strikes at the heart of the problem. Even if one does not accept the deconstruction that analyses the material away, the problem remains that ‘the looseness of conception, or, at any rate, of terminology’ that has marked the scholarship on ancestral fault mirrors the nature of the sources themselves. Another arbitrary redefinition designed to extend the circumscribed area, reduce it, or move its borders elsewhere, will simply perpetuate the same difficulties. The problem identified by Moulinier, West and others is real, and it cannot be dismissed out of hand or solved with a simple trick. The challenge of definition can only be answered by going all the way back through the history of its formulations in order to uncover the nature of the forces at play in the narratives of scholarship, the important shapes that ancestral fault has been given in both ancient, emic formulations, and in modern, etic interpretations. Only then can a reflexive investigation of the material be made operative. That question must be tackled head-on.

The book is consequently organised in two sections. The first section (Chapters 1–2) traces the receptions of ancestral fault into the modern period, while the second follows the ancient trajectories of the idea from Homer and Hesiod to Plato. The aim of the first section is to show how later antiquity organised the archive of earlier texts and traditions where the idea was found into a coherent conceptual edifice, the doctrine of *progonikon hamartēma*, to chart the many translations of that doctrine into Christian equivalences (I call this the theology of *haereditarium piaculum*), and its various reconfigurations in the professional philology of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (I call this the scholarship of inherited guilt). The first chapter starts from the end, as it were. Built around Proclus’ understanding of ancestral fault, the last and most systematic presentation of the idea produced by pagan Hellenism, it goes back in time through the antecedents of Proclus’ ideas on *progonikon hamartēma*, the various formulations of ancestral fault as an object of explicit theology, chief of which is Plutarch’s *De sera numinis vindicta*, and then follows the medieval receptions of Proclus’ doctrine in the Christianising translations

of scholars from Byzantium and the Latin West. Chapter 2 is mainly concerned with the adaptations of Greek ancestral fault to the theological scholarship of the early modern period, both as an object of appropriation, something that can be made to illustrate Christian thought, and its transformation as a figure of alterity, a false belief that embodies the errors of another time and another place – and thus points to the genuine (Christian) truth by contrast. The chapter ends by looking at some of the main roles that the notion of ancestral fault has played in the research of nineteenth- and twentieth-century scholarship, and the cultural implications, programmes of thought, and ideas about ancient Greek religion that they embody. This section on the receptions of Greek ancestral fault is not an end in itself. It is conceived as an integral part of the idea's history, and a necessary preparation for making sense of the challenges of the second section.

That section seeks to describe the major trajectories of ancestral fault in the implicit theology of the archaic and classical periods. Its chapters follow a largely chronological framework. Prominent and roughly contemporary examples of the concept are contrasted in every chapter, and the results of each chapter locked in a common investigation of temporal change. The long diachronic trajectory of the idea is divided into synchronic moments of shared horizons and reference. Chapter 3 looks at the earliest extant evidence in Homer and Hesiod, and the common grounding of these expressions in the ritual institution of the great oath. Chapter 4 is concerned with the role of the idea in the sympotic poems of Alcaeus, Solon, and Theognis, and its articulation of inheritance and memory in the major ideological struggles of the sixth-century *polis* between *agathoi* and *kakoi*. Chapter 5 investigates the rich and complex attestations of the idea in Herodotus' *Histories*, while Chapters 6 and 7 are concerned with the immensely varied record of tragedy: Aeschylus' *Oresteia* and *Seven against Thebes*, Sophocles' *Antigone* and *Oedipus at Colonus*, and Euripides' *Iphigenia in Tauris*, *Phoenissae*, and *Orestes*. The conclusion offers more brief considerations concerning the role of the idea in the civic reflections of epideictic and forensic oratory, and its reconfigurations in Empedocles, 'Orphic' literature, and Plato's dialogues. It looks at how the different trajectories of the idea ultimately merged into one another and eventually crystallised into the explicit theology discussed in Chapter 1. This book, in other words, aims to trace the eventful history of Greek ancestral fault over some three thousand years.

The theology of progonikon hamartēma

It goes without saying that an idea like delayed generational punishment does not have any clear substance by itself. How, then, can it be properly defined as an object of study? What are the parameters that can allow us to identify it in Greek texts and follow its progressions through time? The answer to this question must first take account of two different but complementary perspectives. It has to look, before anything else, at the Greek categories themselves, to make sense of the ancient classifications of the material, the emic definitions. It also has to consider the categories we use and have been using, and the cultural assumptions they carry, the etic definitions. Like most good things in life, the old anthropological terms ‘emic’ and ‘etic’ have been battered down by deconstructionist critique, and an absolute distinction between them can no longer be maintained.¹ One perspective is never entirely separate from the other. There is also much room for oppositions within categories. But ‘emic’ and ‘etic’ retain their operational use as nominal poles. I will call the ancient Greek perspective ‘ancestral fault’, and the modern perspective ‘inherited guilt’.² The first section of this chapter will look at ancient definitions of the material, while the second will consider some key moments in medieval receptions of these definitions. The study of the modern etic categories will be continued in the next chapter.

De decem dubitationibus circa Providentiam

The Greek perspective can be divided into two main types: implicit theology, by which I mean the recurrent, often diffuse clusters of associations

¹ For the concepts of ‘emic’ and ‘etic’, the debates surrounding their usage, and the serious definitional problems they involve, see, for instance, the collection of papers in Headland, Pike, and Harris 1990. I am using these two terms here as nominally distinct opposites, not absolutes. I am well aware that the perspective of the observer and that of the observed cannot be entirely distinguished in matters of cultural translation such as this one.

² See further p. 3.

linking words, images, and themes from text to text, and explicit theology, the systematic conceptual definitions that often reify the contours of the first in the course of time.³ This chapter is concerned with explicit theology. Taking this story back from the end, as it were, we will start with three examples of explicit ancient definitions of ancestral fault in reverse chronological order: Proclus' *De decem dubitationibus circa Providentiam*, Plutarch's *De sera numinis vindicta*, and Cicero's *De natura deorum*. Ideas are often expressed more clearly when they are used to set up a contrast. All of these discussions of explicit theology are products of specific moments in self-reflexive consolidations of cultural memory, Greek and Roman tradition looking back on its past when challenged from outside or from within.

In the *De decem dubitationibus circa Providentiam*, a propaedeutic treatise that has come down to us only in the late thirteenth-century Latin translation of the crusader archbishop of Corinth William of Moerbeke (1215–c. 1286), Proclus (c. 410–85) confronts ten central issues of Greek thought on divine justice for students of the Neoplatonic philosophical school of Athens.⁴ The treatise is a handbook introduction to the basics of Hellenic wisdom concerning the nature of divine order.⁵ It is a product of cultural consolidation, written by the most prominent philosopher and pagan religious leader of the period, the powerful Diadochus of the Academy, at the time of the final triumph of Christianity.⁶ Its reconfiguration of tradition is part of an attempt to codify the tradition of Hellenism into a coherent whole.

³ Cf. pp. 156–8.

⁴ Proclus' treatise appears in the *Tria opuscula*. This work is composed of three interrelated texts examining the nature of Providence. *De decem dubitationibus circa Providentiam*, the text which concerns us here, is the first treatise of the ensemble. Conceived as a typical exemplar of Neoplatonic *zētēmata*, it is composed of ten questions, and it lays the ground for the other two treatises' more focused philosophical investigations. A short preamble posits the existence of divine Providence on the authority of the Chaldaic Oracles and Plato's *Timaeus* and *Laws*. The first three questions then deal with the nature of Providence and the knowledge which governs its action, while the following three questions are concerned with human perception: the apparent inequality and discontinuity of the uneven retributive actions of Providence in the mortal realm. The next three questions look at the logic governing the concrete application of providential justice, and Question Ten, finally, the 'colophon of the treatise', discusses the role of demonic intermediaries in the regulation of the One's divine justice. It is Question Nine which deals with the principle of ancestral fault. See the editions of Böse 1960 with Westerink 1962; Isaac 1977; 1979; 1982; and Opsomer and Steel 2003; Steel 2007. On Providence in Proclus, see Beierwaltes 1977. The same text was rewritten as a Christian theological treatise by the eleventh-century Byzantine prince Isaac Sebastokrator (see pp. 65–70), and the Greek of that text can sometimes be used to assess the language of the lost original of Proclus (see J. Dornseiff 1966).

⁵ See Isaac 1977: 7–18; Opsomer and Steel 2003: 1–4; Steel 2007: 1–3.

⁶ Athanassiadi 1993.

The penultimate question (ἀπόρημα) of the text is devoted to ancestral fault. Proclus frames the question as follows (58):

Moerbeke: Post hoc autem consideremus nonum, in aliam anomaliam aspicientes, apparentem ex hiis, que a providentia fiunt, quando peccantibus alteris entibus, puta patribus et superioribus hiis, in progenitos dika dicitur cedere.

Sebastokrator: μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο σκοπῶμεν ἕννατον· πῶς τῶν ἀμαρτόντων ἄλλων ὄντων, οἷον πατέρων ἢ καὶ τῶν ἀνωτέρω τούτων, εἰς τοὺς ἀπογόνους λέγεται χωρεῖν ἡ δίκη;

Let us now consider the Ninth Question, turning our attention to another anomaly which is perceivable from the works of Providence, when it is said that, although others have committed the crime, fathers for instance, or ancestors, justice falls upon their descendants.

The following pages of the treatise proceed to describe the notion of ancestral fault, *progonikon hamartēma* (προγονικὸν ἀμάρτημα), and to justify it as a principle of divine justice.⁷ The text of Proclus is the most systematic expression of ancestral fault produced by Greek antiquity.⁸ It is also the last one that has come down to us from a continuous tradition that spans many centuries. How can people be justly punished for faults they have not committed? How can this intractable problem, this paradox at the heart of so much of the ancient tradition, be resolved? If the guilty one is himself punished, what can be the reason for the punishment to extend to his descendants? And if his descendants are punished instead of him, what is the justice of a sanction that falls on the innocent? What might appear as a powerful example of contingency and divine arbitrariness is shown in fact to be a vindication of the Hellenic world-view in the propaedeutic treatise.

The philosopher argues that the notion of ancestral fault is enshrined in sacred books, secret initiations, and purification rites (58):

Moerbeke: Quod autem peccatorum progenitorum dikas sustinere dicuntur quidam, et revelationes et telete manifestant hoc; et etiam lysii quidam dii purgare ab hiis affirmantur.

But it is, however, said that some people endure punishment for the faults of their ancestors, and both revelations and mysteries clearly show this; some liberating divinities are even said to purify from these faults.

⁷ The fact that προγονικὸν ἀμάρτημα also appears in Proclus' commentary (93) to Plato's *Cratylus* 395c (see p. 31), and nowhere else in any of the Byzantine authors of the TLG, clearly indicates that the προγονικὸν ἀμάρτημα of Isaac Sebastokrator's text (58) reflects the text of Proclus.

⁸ Gagné 2010c: 118–19. See the parallel conclusions of Van den Berg (forthcoming), which I was only able to read after this work was completed.

Making sense of the apparent paradox of ancestral fault is presented as a defence of traditional cult.⁹ It also leads to further understanding of hallowed religious forms. In other words, deciphering the logic of delayed providential punishment is for Proclus part of a larger hermeneutics of Greek culture. Three main points stand out. One is that a city or a family is a single form of life (*animal unum*, ζῷον ἓν) that is both more immortal and more sacred than the individual human life.¹⁰ This form of life has one ‘homochronous’ *period*.¹¹ The temporal cycles of these entities function on different levels from that of individual human beings. The actions committed at one moment of this extended life reverberate on all subsequent moments. Bodies, stature, and fortunes change, but the descendants of one extended life are united in common experience (*compassio*, συμπάθεια) with their predecessors. They will justly receive punishment for their crimes (*peccata*, ἀδικήματα). The extended life of a city or a family can be seen as a cord linking all parts of the monad through time, a *funis* – the translation of σείρά, a common fixture of Neoplatonic metaphysical literature.¹² Just as one civic deity (*poliouchus*) presides over the entire life of a city, a single ‘kindred divinity’ (*omognios*) presides over the entire family from generation to generation. Proclus must have heroic ancestors in mind for this second group, or divine powers of kinship.¹³

The link that binds an individual culprit to an individual descendant punished for his crime is based on *similitudo*. Obscure correspondences often bind one element to another element of a whole. To intervene on the hooves of an ox, for instance, fat can be applied to its horns. Medical

⁹ Cf. Festugière 1966.

¹⁰ 59: *dicatur primo quidem quod omnis civitas et omne genus unum quoddam animal est maiori modo quam hominum unusquisque, et immortalius et sanctius.*

¹¹ 59: *et periodus una communis civitatis est et generis, equidem secundum eadem concludens utriusque vitam et mores; hii quidem aliorum, hii autem aliorum, et civitatum et generum, tanquam utique omokhronou (id est contemporanea) ea que in hiis ente vita; et corporum magnitudines et pecunie differentes et figure et motus, tanquam utique una natura per civitatem totam et genus unumquodque eorum que in civitate pertingente, et hanc quidem unam, hoc autem unum faciente.*

¹² 59: *si igitur est, sicut ostensum est, animal unum et civitas unaquaque et genus unumquodque, quid miramur, si ea que progenitorum et usque ad pronepotes exsolvantur et civitatum vita desuper tanquam funem evolvens, una ens, actorum in aliis temporibus aut meliorum aut deteriorum in aliis habet retributionem?* On the process of participation as a vertical movement in Proclus, see Sweeney 1982. On the Latin translation of σείρά by *funis* in philosophical literature ever since the time of Lucretius (2.1153–6), see Radke 1956; cf. Cic. *Div.* 1.56.127; Isaac 1977: 149–50. See e.g. Wifstrand 1957–8 on the fundamental importance of the σείραι linking the different planes of existence together in the system of Proclus. The Golden Chain of the *Iliad* is the central image of this philosophical tradition.

¹³ Ὀμῳγνίος is attested as an epithet of Zeus in Plato, and the θεοὶ ὁμῳγνιοί, also mentioned in the *Laws*, are common figures of classical literature: Pl. *Leg.* 729c; 881d; Soph. *OC* 1333; Eur. *Andr.* 921; Ar. *Ran.* 750; cf. R. C. T. Parker 2005a: 9–36.

knowledge also teaches that one organ can be treated by the excision of another. The medical imagery is taken further, and the work of Providence is compared to that of a doctor able to discern the root of evil before it becomes visible, like the inborn sting of a scorpion, or the venom inevitably found in a snake. In the same way, he says, hereditary iniquity can be perceived by the omniscient One (61):

Moerbeke: Eodem igitur modo et providentia existentes nequitias animabus congenas prioribus peccantibus aspiciens, fert supplicium super ipsis, quamvis non egerint que illi naturam similem habentes, preinterimens malitiam sicut epilepsim suborientem. Ut enim excrescentie extremitatum et nigredines et signa patrum in filiis aut genitis non apparentes repullularunt in horum natis, sic et morum proprietates erumpunt in plus distantibus, quas alii quidem ignotas esse, uni autem omnia cognoscenti et cognoscere dandum et preexterminare; palificare autem similitudinem per hoc quod videtur illis extendere vindictas assequentes hiis que ab illis peccata sunt.

Sebastokrator: τὸν αὐτὸν οὖν καὶ ἡ πρόνοια τρόπον τὰς ἐνούσας κῆρας ταῖς ψυχαῖς συγγενεῖς ὁρῶσα τῶν ἀμαρτόντων πρώτων, φέρει ἐπ' αὐτάς τὴν τιμωρίαν, κἄν μὴ πράξωσιν ἅπερ ἐκείνοι, τὴν φύσιν ὁμοίαν ἐχούσας, προαναιροῦσα τὴν κακίαν ὥσπερ ἐπίληψιν ὑποφουμένην. ὥς γὰρ πολλὰ τῶν σωματικῶν νοσημάτων ὧν ἔσχον πατέρες, ἐν παισὶν ἀφανισθέντα ἀνέκυψαν ἐν τοῖς τούτων ἐγγόνοις, οὕτω καὶ ἡθῶν ιδιότητες ἀναβλαστὰ νοῦσιν ἐν τοῖς πολλοστοῖς, αἱ ἄλλοις μὲν ἄγνωστοί εἰσι, τῷ ἐνὶ δὲ τῷ πάντα γινώσκοντι οὐ μόνον γινώσκονται, ἀλλὰ καὶ προαφανίζονται· δηλοῦσι δὲ τὴν ὁμοιότητα διὰ τοῦ δοκεῖν ἐκείνοις τίνειν δίκας τοῖς ὑπ' ἐκείνων ἡμαρτημένοις ἀκολουθούσας.

In the same way, then, Providence uncovers the defects that souls have in them and that come, through heredity, from the souls that have committed wrong before, and that is why, even if, although they have a similar nature, they have not done what their predecessors have done, still she punishes them, so as to preventively extirpate the evil, as if it were latent epilepsy. For, just as warts, black stains, and hereditary marks, while they are not visible in their children or grandchildren, can reappear in later descendants, particular characteristics of *ethos* can reappear in individuals who are quite distant from each other in time, characteristics unknown to all except the One, to whom it is given to know them and preventively destroy them. And what clearly demonstrates the presence of a similarity is the fact that they believe the punishments that they pay are the consequences of the faults of their ancestors.

The movement of ancestral fault, in other words, emanates from the highest reaches of cosmic causality.¹⁴ Preventive extermination allows

¹⁴ See e.g. Trouillard 1972: 91–109, Meijer 2003 and Butler 2008, with bibliography, for the causal status of the One in Proclus.

divine punishment to heal what is not yet manifest, like latent epilepsy. It identifies its adequate targets through similarity of life. The stains of the body follow the same patterns of transmission as the stains of the soul. The same *mores*/ἥθηα can be punished for different crimes. This similitude of life courses through generations unseen, but Providence, like a doctor, knows when to cut a bad root (*radix maligna*) in advance.

People can thus be justly punished for the faults of their ancestors. Sometimes, however, what seems to be punishment for the faults of another is actually punishment for actions committed by the same *anima* in another life: an idea of 'karmic retribution' that had become so common in later Hellenism that Iamblichus could already make it a theory shared by *hoi polloi*.¹⁵ In *De decem dubitationibus circa Providentiam*, souls are reincarnated within certain families as a consequence of their previous lives.¹⁶ The same soul can, in this way, pay the penalty for a crime it committed in another life, a notion that Proclus fully integrates into his vision of ancestral fault: it is not by chance that the soul comes to share in the fate of the extended life of the family.¹⁷ This reading of ancestral fault through the lenses of metempsychosis is described in the text through an extended theatrical metaphor. *Fatum* is the playwright, souls are the actors, and the extended life of the family, the *tota generis periodus*, the tragedy itself. A soul can thus wear different masks over the course of the play, and the same mask can be worn by different souls (60):

Moerbeke: Et enim in vitis nostris dramati quidem proportionalis tota generis periodus, factori autem huius dramatis fatum, hiis autem qui ad drama faciunt anime, sepe quidem alie et alie, sepe autem eedem adimplentes fatalem hunc funem, sicut ibi iidem sepe ypocrite (id est qui sub larvis) fiunt quandoque quidem Teiresii, quandoque autem Oidipodis dicentes verba.

Sebastokrator: καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς βίοις ἡμῶν δράματι μὲν ἀνάλογον ἡ σύμπασα τοῦ γένους περίοδος, τῷ δὲ ποιητῇ τοῦ τοιοῦτου δράματος ἡ φυσικὴ ἀνάγκη, τοῖς δὲ εἰς τὸ δράμα τελοῦσιν αἱ ἄλλαι καὶ ἄλλαι ψυχαί, πληροῦσαι τὴν εἰμαρτὴν ταύτην σκηνήν.

¹⁵ *Myst.* 4.5; on reincarnation in Iamblichus, see e.g. Dörrie 1973: 130–1; D'Ancona 2006; Broze and Van Liefferinge 2007; cf. Sall. *De deis et mundo* 9; Zhmud 2012 [1997]: 231. For comparative approaches to such 'karmic eschatologies', see Obeyesekere 2002: 79–84.

¹⁶ 60: *neque enim contingentes anime contingentibus associantur generibus neque in civitatibus contingentibus inhabitant. quare, et si non eedem existunt entes, propter eam que secundum dignitatem inhabitationem huic generi coordinate, et debitum generi supplicium secundum dignitatem hereditant.* For the system of metempsychosis in Proclus, see first and foremost Trouillard 1971; 1972; 1980; see also Rosán 1949: 194–8; Grondijs 1960; Dörrie 1973: 122–5; Bozonis 1979; Broze and Van Liefferinge 2007; Wear 2008; 2009.

¹⁷ See Van den Berg (forthcoming): 8.

And in our lives, in fact, the whole cycle of a family's existence is similar to a drama, fate to the author of this drama, and the souls to the characters of a drama, and often some souls and then others fulfil that fateful scene, and often it is the same that do, just as here it is often the same actors that sometimes say the words of Tiresias and sometimes those of Oedipus.

As in tragedy, when one character is punished for the faults of another, the same actor can lie behind both the *prosōpon* of the transgressor and the *prosōpon* of the person being punished, and the same *prosōpon* can hide different actors.¹⁸ Disguised under its costume, its mask and its cothurns, the real identity of the soul remains unseen to the spectators.¹⁹ The soul itself, moreover, can be conscious of its identity under the mask or impervious to it.²⁰ For Proclus, the system of punishment through metempsychosis is perfectly compatible with the idea of ancestral fault, thus bringing together in one coherent synthesis the two modes of post-mortem punishment of the Hellenic tradition. The image of the tragic theatre beautifully illustrates the principle of transmigration that underlies the system, with the difference between masks and actors creating a complex game of identity, and the story of Oedipus providing a perfect example for the transmission of ancestral fault at work. The ancient tales of Labdacid misfortune and the idea of tragic performance, which had long ceased to be a reality in the world of Proclus, are singled out to embody the principle of ancestral fault.²¹ The essence of the problem is to be found in the still-vivid

¹⁸ Puzzlingly, *funis* appears twice in this passage as a translation of the Greek σκηνή, which was certainly the word translated by Moerbeke; *funis larvis* is Westerink's emendation for the *funis larva* of the manuscripts, which the marginal notes of the Vaticanus present as a gloss on κηνή προπέλα, itself rightly equated to σκηνή προσωπεία by Isaac. As Michael Reeve and Stephen Oakley suggest to me, the translation might be explained by a confusion between σκηνή and σχοῖνος or σχοινίον. Cf. p. 25.

¹⁹ 60 : *multo itaque magis easdem entes subduci vindictae omnino necessarium, velut in fune larvis et calciamentis et stolis amictas et putatas alias esse non potentibus videre ipsas nudas*. For the broader theme of individuality and identity in the philosophical system of Proclus, see Butler 2005.

²⁰ The meaning of *eodem entes/easdem entes*; see Isaac 1977: 150. See further 60: *premiat autem providentia animas et honorat propter alias alias et debonorat propter similitudinem vite, et ipsas propter ipsas in aliis vitis propter idemptitatem latentem, aspicientes in fatatam preparationem, permutatam entem. sed hoc quidem nullus utique inconueniens existimabit easdem entes sui ipsarum gratia et honorari et inhonorari, apparentes alias propter vitas alias entes*. On the soul's consciousness of its own identity in Proclus, see Trouillard 1971. The puzzling statement at the end of Chapter 61 (*palificare autem similitudinem per hoc quod videtur illis extendere vindictas assequentes hiis que ab illis peccata sunt* / δηλοῦσι δὲ τὴν ὁμοιότητα διὰ τοῦ δοκεῖν ἐκείνοις τίνειν δίκας τοῖς ὑπ' ἐκείνων ἡμαρτημένοις ἀκολουθούσας) is probably to be read as a reflection of Proclus' views on reminiscence.

²¹ This is the only place in the entire, vast corpus of Proclus where Oedipus is mentioned. Apart from a quotation in the commentary to Plato's *Republic* (I, p. 172), Teiresias also appears nowhere else in the work of Proclus (note that the *Teiresii* of the passage is Boese's correction of the *Peiresii* found in the manuscripts); for the idea of actors and tragic performance in late antiquity, see Webb 2009: 139–67.

memory of the tragic theatre. With these select examples, the short discussion of Question Nine thus aims to solve the apparent paradox of ancestral fault for the students of the Academy in terms they can understand. It has made the ἀπόρημα ‘clear’ (*palam*, δῆλον), even if the philosopher tells us that he has treated the question at much greater length ‘elsewhere’.²² That extended discussion is unfortunately lost.

Another trace of the Diadochus’ engagement with the definition of ancestral fault can be mentioned, however. A scholion to line 284 of Hesiod’s *Works and Days*, for instance, in which Hesiod famously mentions the terrible consequences of perjury on the transgressor’s family (τοῦ δέ τ’ ἀμαυροτέρη γενεῇ μετόπισθε λέλειπται), contains clear echoes of precisely the same ideas on ancestral fault found in Question Nine of Proclus’ treatise:

τὰ γὰρ τῶν πατέρων ἀδικήματα χραίνει καὶ τοὺς ἐκγόνους αὐτῶν καὶ ἐνόχους ἀποφαίνει ταῖς τιμωρίαις· καὶ γὰρ ὀνειδὴ καὶ ἀδοξίαι αὐτοῖς ἐκ τῶν ἀδικιῶν συμβαίνουσι καὶ τίσεις ἐκ τῶν ἀμαρτημάτων ἀπολαμβάνοντες, ὧν ἔσχον ἀδικήσαντες οἱ πατέρες αὐτῶν, συναπολαύουσι τῶν ὀφειλομένων ἐκείνοις κολάσεων. ἄλλως δὲ γινώσκει τὸ θεῖον, ὡς τοῖς ἤθεσιν αὐτῶν ἐμπέφυκε τι τῆς ἀδίκου τῶν γεννησάντων προαιρέσεως καὶ ἡμᾶς λανθάνωσι καὶ εἰκότως ταύτην ἐν αὐτοῖς ὁρῶντες τὴν ῥίζαν ἐκκόπτουσι διὰ τῶν τιμωριῶν καὶ τοῦ μὴ ἐνεργῆσαι κωλύουσιν, ὡς ἱατροὶ προκαθαίροντές τινὰς ὧν ὑφορῶνται νόσους.

Indeed, the faults of the fathers also defile their descendants and reveal them as bound to retribution. For blame and ill repute also come upon them from these wrongdoings, and, inheriting vengeance from the crimes that their fathers committed, they share in the punishments that are their due. Divinity knows, in any case, that something of the unjust inclination of their progenitors grows into their character, even if it escapes our attention, and seeing this root in them, they justly cut it down for vengeance and so as not to let it grow, as doctors preventively purge some sicknesses which they suspect.

That text is obviously related to the discussion of Proclus in *De decem dubitationibus circa Providentiam*.²³ The punishment (κολάσις) inherited by the posterity of the culprit is a legacy of the vengeance (τίσις) transmitted by the ancestor to his offspring, and blame and ill-repute also follow through the generations. The work of divinity (τὸ θεῖον), more importantly, is described as a medical intervention when it punishes someone for

²² 61: *hoc quidem igitur et per hec sit palam; et novi etiam a me ipso in aliis elaboratum*; see Isaac 1977: 150.

²³ See Gagné 2010b: 4, n. 8; Van den Berg (forthcoming): 15. For Hes. *Op.* 284, see pp. 159–76.

something that has not yet been committed. Seeing in the individual the root (ρίζα) of a character (ἥθος) that he has inherited from his forebears can cut it down preventively, because of the inclination (προαίρεσις) of the ancestors for injustice, like the doctor who intervenes on a sickness whose symptoms others cannot yet understand. The scholia to the *Works and Days* are largely based on the lost commentary of Proclus on the Hesiodic poem, and there can be no doubt that the scholion to verse 284 is, at least in part, a reflection of that commentary, and of Proclus' discussion of 'the injustices of the fathers' (τὰ τῶν πατέρων ἁδικήματα) in it.²⁴ This remarkable reinterpretation of the Hesiodic line as an expression of a general doctrine of divine punishment through generations shows the strength of the category of ancestral fault at work in the scholion. It has nothing to say about perjury, the crime at the heart of the Hesiodic passage. The verse of the old archaic poem is readily understood as an allusion to a precise idea of punishment through generations, and the discussion of the passage reproduces the same justification and general vision of ancestral fault as that found in Question Nine of *De decem dubitationibus*. The coherence and consistency of the category at work in the two texts well illustrate the systematic nature of Proclean thought on the question.

A third text can confirm this fact. In his commentary to Plato's *Cratylus* 395c, Proclus returns to the question in very much the same terms.²⁵ The *Cratylus* passage that the Proclean text comments on concerns the etymology of the name Pelops. In a famous section (394e–395d) where the discussion of proper names from tradition moves through the generations of the Atridae, from Orestes to Agamemnon to Atreus, from Pelops to Tantalus, all the way up to Zeus, Cronus, and Ouranos, Socrates explains that Pelops' name derives from *pelas*, as he can only see what is near.²⁶ The proof of this is that he could not 'forecast or foresee' the effect of his crime, the murder of Myrtilus, on his whole *genos*, and the nature of the pain (δυστυχία) with which it would be filled as a result. Socrates' etymology in the passage thus presupposes as an accepted and uncontroversial fact that the misfortunes of Pelops' descendants are consequences of the crime of their ancestor. Consequences that are not spelled out in any detail, it must be noted – there is no mention of a curse in the text. The Platonic passage, it must also be noted, is concerned more generally with the necessity for a

²⁴ On the Proclean material of the scholia to the *Works and Days*, see Faraggiana di Sarzana 1981; 1987; Marzillo 2010: xlviii–xlix.

²⁵ See the stimulating discussion of this passage in Van den Berg (forthcoming): 2–3; 8. See also Van den Berg 2008: 128–31.

²⁶ See Sedley 2003: 80–1; Ademollo 2011: 178–83.

name to correspond to the nature of the individual who bears it, and the force of heredity in this process, the link that binds a name to its origin, is at the centre of the discussion.²⁷ The son of a pious man can be impious, and the son of an impious man can be pious. In each case, the name of the individual must reflect his essence. Those who are born ‘in accordance with nature’ (κατὰ φύσιν) and those who are born ‘contrary to nature’ (παρὰ φύσιν), that is, different from their parents, are both ultimately determined by their own characteristics, however strong the inheritance. The illustration of this principle through the genealogical onomastics of the Atridae, of all people, together with the reference to the generational punishment of the descendants of Pelops in this context, is an apt example of the colourful game of allusive playfulness at work in the *Cratylus*.

Proclus’ discussion takes the playfulness out of the equation to see a direct allusion to the principle of ancestral fault in the passage (93):

ὅτι τὰ κατὰ Πέλοπα (395c) διδάσκουσιν ἡμᾶς πρῶτον μὲν τῶν φαινομένων ὑπερορᾶν καὶ πρὸς τὰς ὅλας τῶν ψυχῶν περιόδους βλέπειν, καὶ οὐκ ἐξ ἅπαντος ἀντέχεσθαι τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ταῦτα μὲν κεχαλᾶσθαι δεῖν, πρὸς δὲ τὰ θεῖα καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν συντόνους εἶναι· καὶ ὅτι τῶν προγονικῶν ἁμαρτημάτων κοινωνοῦσιν οἱ παῖδες τῆς δίκης, καὶ γὰρ αἱ ψυχαὶ διὰ τῆς πρὸς τοὺς ἀδίκους συντάξεως μέτοχοι γίνονται τῆς ἀδικίας, καὶ τὰ σώματα αὐτῶν ἀπὸ σπερμάτων ὑπέστη πονηρῶν, καὶ τὰ ἐκτὸς ἐξημαρτη μένως ἔλαβε τὴν ἀρχήν. τούτων δέ, φησὶν ὁ ἐν Φαίδρῳ (244de) Σωκράτης, ἡ τελεστική δύναται καθαίρειν λύουσα τῶν παρόντων κακῶν διὰ τῆς περὶ τὸ θεῖον λατρείας.

The passage on Pelops (395c) teaches us first to disdain things that are apparent and to look to the universal revolutions of our souls, not wholly to adhere to human affairs, but that we ought to slacken in our attention to them, and to be intensely involved with divine affairs and virtue. It also teaches that children partake of the punishment for their ancestors’ sins. For children’s souls become participants in injustice through their *syntaxis* with unjust persons, while their bodies are instituted from bad seeds and their external goods had their source in sinful conduct. Initiatory rites, says Socrates in the *Phaedrus* (244de), can purify them of these things, since they give release from present evils through service concerning the divine. (trans. DuVick modified).

The crime of Pelops is presented as a *progonikon hamartēma*, another example of the terminology used in the *De decem dubitationibus circa Providentiam*, used here as something that the reader would readily recognise.²⁸ The systematicity of this short passage translates a clear

²⁷ 394d–395a.

²⁸ See n. 7.

understanding of ancestral fault and of the mechanisms of transmission that justify its role in the larger scheme of things. Three complementary forces are at work: souls, bodies, and goods. The framework of the system, in other words, is thorough and comprehensive. The soul of the individual is made into an accomplice/participant of the injustice for a reason, because (διὰ) of its agreement, its συντάξις, with unjust men. That is, the συντάξις of the soul, its placement in that specific body at that specific time, is not a coincidence. As Van den Berg argues, the usage of the word συντάξις does not refer to the simple association of the soul in question with the souls of unjust men, but to the logic of its reincarnation there and then.²⁹ The same association of metempsychosis and generational punishment that lies at the heart of the discussion of ancestral fault in *De decem dubitationibus circa Providentiam* is reproduced in this passage.

Another similarity between the two texts is the idea that bad heredity transmits a dangerous propensity for crime through generation. The descendants of the transgressor are shown to inherit his inclination for crime, and Providence can justly punish their offspring for the wrong they will commit. Rather than the work of Providence in foreseeing the growth of the corruption, the commentary to the *Cratylus* insists on the presence of this corruption in the seeds (σπέρματα) of the progenitor, and the fact that the bodies (σώματα) born from it share in its nature. Just as the immaterial soul inside it, the physical envelope of the individual is determined by inheritance. The text goes further and adds a third element, one not found in Question Nine of the *De decem dubitationibus circa Providentiam*: the external product of the crime, τὰ ἑκτός, that which has been acquired through transgression. The transmission of goods cannot be separated from the transmission of responsibility, and the crime of the wealth's ἀρχή, its original usurpation, does not disappear with the generations – an idea that has many antecedents in Greek literature. This third layer of transmission, together with the other two, makes the individual share (κοινωνοῦσιν) in the crimes of his forefathers. The theoretical apparatus that justifies the idea of ancestral fault, in this text as well as the others, brings various types of explanation together in one internally coherent vision.

If reference to the transmission of wealth as a facet of the *progonikon hamartēma* question does not appear in the *De decem dubitationibus circa Providentiam*, it plays a notable role in another rich Neoplatonic discussion

²⁹ Van den Berg (forthcoming): 3; 8. I do not, however, see how he can understand the *huic generi coordinate* of Moerbeke's *De dec. dub.* 60 (see p. 27) as a translation of συντάξις.

on the matter, the exactly contemporary commentary of Hermias on the *Phaedrus* of Plato.³⁰ The text is found in the lemma to the famous discussion of initiatory madness in *Phaedrus* 244d, which presents the second madness, the ‘initiatory madness’ (τελεστική μανία), as a deliverance from and a protection against the ‘ancient wraths’ (παλαιὰ μηνίματα) sent by the gods against some families, the source of the prayers and propitiatory ceremonies from which come the purifications and expiations that can guard against ancestral fault:

ἀλλὰ μὴν νόσων γε καὶ πόνων τῶν μεγίστων, ἃ δὴ παλαιῶν ἐκ μηνιμάτων ποθὲν ἔν τιςι τῶν γενῶν ἡ μανία ἐγγενομένη καὶ προφητεύσασα, οἷς ἔδει ἀπαλλαγὴν ἠΐρετο, καταφυγοῦσα πρὸς θεῶν εὐχάς τε καὶ λατρείας, ὅθεν δὴ καθαρῶν τε καὶ τελετῶν τυχοῦσα ἐξάντη ἐποίησε τὸν [ἐαυτῆς] ἔχοντα πρὸς τε τὸν παρόντα καὶ τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον, λύσιν τῷ ὀρθῶς μανέντι τε καὶ κατασχομένῳ τῶν παρόντων κακῶν εὐρομένη.

Moreover, when diseases and the greatest troubles have been visited upon certain families through some ancient guilt, madness has entered in and by oracular power has found a way of release for those in need, taking refuge in prayers and the service of the gods, and so, by purifications and sacred rites, he who has this madness is made safe for the present and the after time, and for him who is rightly possessed of madness a release from present ills is found (trans. Fowler).

That is the same passage referred to in Proclus’ discussion of *progonikon hamartēma* in his commentary to the *Cratylus*.³¹ The commentary of Hermias to this passage launches into an extended definition of ancestral fault, ‘how it is that the descendants are punished instead of the ancestors’.³² The transmission of wealth appears as the first element of the explanation, in terms that are reminiscent of the ideas expressed in Proclus’ commentary to the *Cratylus*. The inheritance of wealth that has been acquired unjustly, ‘gold and silver, which have often been amassed out of crime’, also entails the transmission of responsibility for the transgression, and the punishment of the descendants who received this wealth is thus justified.³³ The text goes further and adds that the individual soul is not found where it is by chance but is led to the appropriate *genos* for the

³⁰ In *Platonis Phaedrum scholia* 96.1–97.27 Couvreur. See Van den Berg (forthcoming): 3–4; 9–10.

³¹ See pp. 30–2. Cf. Iambl. *Myst.* 3.10, who ascribes the power of ἀποκαθάρσεις ψυχῶν καὶ λύσεις παλαιῶν μηνιμάτων to Sabazios.

³² 96.7–8: ἀλλὰ πῶς λόγον ἔχει τὸ ἐκγόνους ὑπὲρ προγόνων δίκας διδόναι;

³³ 96.9–11: ἡ μάλιστα μὲν καὶ διεδέξαντο τὰς ἐκείνων κτήσεις, καὶ χρυσὸν καὶ ἀργυρον, ἐξ ἀδικιῶν πολλάκις συναχθείσας, ὃ καὶ ἱκανὸν αὐτοῖς ἐπαγαγεῖν τὴν δίκην;

punishment it deserves.³⁴ Providence, divine nature, and the gods who govern fate weave everything together in order and according to justice. The reincarnation of the *psychē* in that precise body is a direct consequence of its previous actions, what it derives from a previous life.³⁵

In addition to the transmission of wealth and the logic of reincarnation, the text of Hermias also finds a third justification for the idea of ancestral fault in the fact that the *genos* as a whole forms a unity shared by all its generations.³⁶ The continuity (συνέχεια) of the *genos* can be observed (ὁρᾶται), even if *we* cannot see it, as opposed to the gods who govern fate and the demons who received the *genos* by lot. The continuity is based on the communion (κοινωνία) of the seeds and the ‘physical principles’ that the souls and the generations share in time. Just as the cycles of days can appear as so many different lives while one sleeps and forgets what went on before, so with the cycle of years, which can course up to seventy or eighty years for one life, and so with the cycle of lives themselves, which are all united in the same *genos*, even if we mortals are not able to see it.³⁷ The physical continuity of the *genos* constitutes a whole. The passage thus creatively reinterprets the lesson of Solon to Croesus in Herodotus 1, whose text it explicitly cites.³⁸

This third element of explanation is introduced by ἔπειτα δὲ καί, just as the second element of explanation, metempsychosis, is introduced by ἔπειτα δὲ καί a few lines before.³⁹ The first element of explanation, the transmission of wealth, is singled out as the most important with its introduction by μάλιστα μὲν at the beginning of the list (96.9). The order is different, then, but the three elements of explanation of Hermias’ text are exactly the same as the ones we find in Proclus’ commentary to the *Cratylus*. The same pattern of correspondence can be found in the rest of Hermias’ discussion of ancestral fault in the passage. After having discussed

³⁴ 96.11–15: ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ συμπίσχειν αἱ τῶν προγόνων ψυχὰι ταῖς τῶν ἀπογόνων, περιστατικῶς ἀναστρεφόμεναι, οὐδὲ τούτων ἀναξίως ὑπομενόντων τὰς δίκας· συνάγεται γὰρ ὁ ἄξιος τοῦ τάδε παθεῖν εἰς τὸ τοιόνδε γένος, τῆς προνοίας ἐξηρημένως καὶ τῆς θείας δὲ φύσεως καὶ τῶν μοιρηγετῶν θεῶν συνδιαπλεκόντων πάντα ἐν τάξει καὶ κατὰ δίκην.

³⁵ The thought is similar to what we find in Proclus (*De decem dubitationibus* 60; *In Plat. Crat.* 93); see Van den Berg (forthcoming): 8–9.

³⁶ 96.16–18: ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ μία τις συνέχεια ὁρᾶται τοῦ γένους· ὥσπερ γὰρ τῶν σπερμάτων καὶ τῶν φυσικῶν λόγων γίνεται τις κοινωνία, οὕτω δὲ καὶ τῶν τοιῶνδε ψυχῶν καὶ γενῶν καὶ τῶν τούτοις ἐπομένων ἀγαθῶν ἢ κακῶν.

³⁷ 96.20–3: ὥσπερ γὰρ εἰ ἡμεῖς κοιμώμενοι ἐπελανθανόμεθα τῆς προτέρας ζωῆς τῆς χθὲς γενομένης, ἔδοξαν ἂν ἡμῖν πολλοὶ βίοι εἶναι ἐν ἐνὶ ἀνθρωπίνῳ βίῳ, συνεχοῦς οὖσης τῆς ζωῆς ἐν τοῖς ἐβδομήκοντα ἢ ὀγδοήκοντα τούτοις ἔτεσιν, οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἐν τῷ γένει τῷδε ἐστὶ τις συνέχεια ἣν ἡμεῖς μὲν οὐχ ὁρώμεν, οἱ μὲντοι μοιρηγέται θεοὶ καὶ οἱ τὰ γένη κληρωσάμενοι δαίμονες . . .

³⁸ See n. 40. ³⁹ 96.11 and 16.

ancestral fault through the three channels of transmission, it goes on to explain the reasons for the delay at work in its operation, and the nature of the punishment in question (96.23–97.13). That part of the discussion is also reminiscent of Proclus' ideas on ancestral fault, but those expressed in the *De decem dubitationibus circa Providentiam* this time, rather than in the commentary on the *Cratylus*. The main point of similarity is the idea that delayed punishment is a form of healing practised by Providence to cure the body of the *genos*. Just as in Proclus, the usage of medical imagery is applied to the idea of a punishment that falls elsewhere than the crime. But whereas in Proclus the emphasis is on the link that binds the different parts of the body, the text of Hermias reserves its focus for the therapeutic value of delay. It is, after all, a commentary on a passage that describes the healing power of purificatory madness.

A doctor will impose surgery on the patient only when it can cure the disease, and when the patient is ready for it.⁴⁰ The right timing is the key to the successful medical operation, just as it is for the right intervention of divine punishment. The older the crime, the more difficult it will be to wash away, and only the purification of initiatory madness can cure one of the ancient threat of ancestral fault.⁴¹ Prophecies will often prescribe actions that are obscure to us, as the causes are no longer visible.⁴² When the gods intervene to correct the transgression of an ancient crime, they do so not to exact punishment as an end in itself, but for justice to find its

⁴⁰ 96.23–8: ὥσπερ οὖν ἐν ἐνὶ βίῳ τήνδε τὴν νόσον ὁ ἰατρός οὐκ εὐθύς χειρουργία θεραπεύει, ἀλλὰ περιμένει ἄχρις οὗ ἐπιτήδειος γένηται ὁ πάσχων ὑπομεῖναι τὴν χειρουργίαν, οὕτως καὶ ἐν τῷ γένει ποιοῦσιν οἱ ἔφοροι τοῦ γένους δαίμονες, ὥς καὶ Ἡρόδοτος ἱστορεῖ, ὅτι μετὰ πέντε γενεάς ἐξέτισαν οἱ τοῦ Λυδοῦ ἀπόγονοι τὴν δίκην.

⁴¹ 96.28–97.8: τὸ δὲ παλαιὸν ἐκ μηνιμάτων ὅτι τὰ πολυχρόνια τῶν ἀμαρτημάτων δυσκενπιτότερα εἰσιν, ἃ καὶ τελεστικῆς μόντης δεῖται εἰς κάθαρσιν, τὰ δὲ ὀλιγοχρονιώτερα εὐιατώτερα· ὥσπερ δὴ καὶ ἐπὶ ἱατρικῆς ὁρῶμεν, ὀλιγοχρονίων μὲν γὰρ ὄντων τῶν παθῶν καὶ εὐθύς ἀρξαμένων, ἐὰν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τις ἄρξῃται ἑαυτοῦ, ῥᾶον ἀπαλλάττεται, πολυχρονίων δὲ γενομένων δυσχερέστερον, οἷον γὰρ εἰς φύσιν καὶ ἔξιν καθίσταται τὸ κακὸν καὶ γίνεται ὥσπερ οὐλὴ ἐνσκιρρωθεῖσα· οὕτως οὖν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀδικημάτων, ἐὰν μὲν αὐτὸς ὁ ἀμαρτῶν εὐθύς μεταγνῶ καὶ προσελθὼν ἀπολογήσῃται τῷ ἀδικηθέντι, ἀναλύει τὸ ἀδίκημα καὶ ἀνυπεύθυνον ἑαυτὸν ποιεῖ τῇ δίκῃ, ὅταν δὲ πατρός τις ἀδίκημα ἀναλύῃ, ὃν ἥρπασεν ἐκεῖνος ἀγρόν φέρε ἀποδιδούς, ἑαυτὸν τε ἀνυπεύθυνον ποιεῖ τῇ δίκῃ, τὴν τε ψυχὴν τοῦ πρώτους ἀρπάσαντος ἐπικουφίζει καὶ ὠφελεῖ (ταῦτα δὲ καὶ ἡ τελεστικὴ θάττον ἰᾶται), ἐὰν μὲντοι ἀπὸ προγόνων ἀρπάσας τύχῃ τὸν ἀγρόν καὶ ἐφεξῆς ὅλον τὸ γένος χρήσῃται, πρῶτον μὲν ἄδηλον λοιπὸν γίνεται τὸ ἀδίκημα καὶ αὐτῇ δυσισιτώτερον, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ ὁ χρόνος ὥσπερ φυσιοῖ τὸ κακόν.

⁴² 97.8–15: διὰ δὲ τοῦτο πολλὰκις οἱ θεοὶ προφητεύουσι καὶ εἰς τοῦδε τοὺς τόπους ἀπελθεῖν καὶ ἀπολογήσασθαι τῷδε τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, ᾧ μηδέποτε γνώριμος γέγονε, καὶ ἐξευμενίσασθαι τόνδε, ἵν' οὕτως ἰάσεως τύχῃ καὶ ἀποθῇται τὰ δυσχερῆ καὶ παύσῃται ποινιλατούμενος. προφητεύουσι δὲ οἱ θεοὶ οὐχ ἵνα τὴν δίκην ἀνέλωσιν, ἀλλ' ἵνα τὰ τῆς δίκης γένηται καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐπανορθώμεθα. ἡ τελεστικὴ οὖν, ᾧ ἂν ἐγγένῃται αὐτόν τε ἀνορθοῖ τὸν ἔχοντα τὴν μανίαν, καὶ δι' αὐτοῦ καὶ ἄλλους πολλούς σῶζει·

way, and so that we might ourselves be ‘redressed’ (ἐπανορθώμεθα). When initiatory madness cures someone of an ancient crime, it also saves many other people. True healing, the combination of purification and initiation, thus makes the individual ἐξάντης, a word that is etymologised as ‘free from *atē*’.⁴³

This remarkable definition of ancestral fault clearly echoes the ideas found in Proclus. The same combination of souls, bodies, and wealth, the same insistence on the therapeutic work of Providence in healing the *genos* through the generations, all of this is no coincidence. Like Plato in the *Phaedrus*, both authors see ancestral fault illustrated in mysteries, purifications, and prophecy, and they identify a similar gallery of relevant divinities at work in overseeing the delay of generational punishment.⁴⁴ The views of Proclus and those of Hermias on generational punishment are obviously related, and one does not have to search far to find out how. The text of Hermias is a transcription of the lectures of his teacher Syrianus on the *Phaedrus*, whose granddaughter he married, and Syrianus was the predecessor of Proclus as Diadochus of the Academy in Athens, and his beloved master.⁴⁵ Both Proclus and Hermias were close students of the great Diadochus, a towering figure of the time, who has been described as the most important post-Plotinian Neoplatonist.⁴⁶ The similarity of their thoughts on ancestral fault simply betrays their common origin.

If the two are related, however, they are clearly not equivalent, and it is important not to merge one into the other. While in Proclus the main image of Hellenic tradition used to illustrate the principle of ancestral fault is the performance of tragedy and the figure of Oedipus, and the only reference to ‘history’ is the mention of Apollonius of Tyana, the text of Hermias cites Herodotus as an exemplum; the story of Croesus’ punishment for the crime of his ancestor Gyges, interestingly, is there mentioned as something that is familiar enough for a simple allusion.⁴⁷ Another difference between the two is probably in the conception of the continuity of the *genos* through the generations, which is insistently presented as a single living being (ζῶον) in Proclus, but appears rather as a communion

⁴³ 97.25–7: ἐξάντη δὲ λέγει ἀντὶ τοῦ καθαρὸν καὶ ἐξ ἐναντίας, ἣ δέεικετο πάλοι ποινηλατούμενος, ἀντὶ τοῦ ὕγιῃ καὶ ἔσω ἄτης· τὸ δὲ ὦ ἐγκείται δι’ εὐστομίαν.

⁴⁴ In Proclus: *Providentia*; *lysii dii*; *poliukhus*; *omognios*; *fatum*; *Unum*. In Hermias: πρόνοια; θεῖα φύσις; μοιρηγέται θεοί; οἱ τὰ γένη κληρωσάμενοι δαίμονες; οἱ ἔφοροι τοῦ γένους δαίμονες; οἱ θεοί.

⁴⁵ On Syrianus, see still Praechter 1932. On Syrianus and Proclus: D’Ancona and Luna 2000. On Syrianus and Hermias: Moreschini 1992. Note also Moreschini 2009, who convincingly warns against seeing Hermias simply as a transcriber of Syrianus’ thought.

⁴⁶ See the impressive *status quaestionis* in Longo 2009.

⁴⁷ Proclus 60; Hermias 96.23–8 (see n. 40).

of bodies and souls in Hermias. One does not exclude the other, but the emphasis is not at the same place.

These differences of detail show a great amount of family resemblances. The variations on the idea of ancestral fault found in the texts of Proclus and Hermias all belong to the same systematic and coherent theological tradition. The discussions of Syrianus on the matter are lost, as is the extensive treatment of Proclus mentioned at the end of Question Nine of the *De decem dubitationibus circa Providentiam* (see n. 22), but the four texts we have just looked at can give us a fairly good idea of later Neoplatonic thought on ancestral fault. At the end of antiquity, the systematic theology developed by Proclus identified the idea of ancestral fault as one of the fundamental principles governing divine action in time. In consolidating the Hellenic archive as a religion against the onslaught of Christianity, Proclus designed a coherent and unified Hellenic faith, with its authorities, its sense of history, its rituals, and its systematic theology – what Luc Brisson has called ‘la synthèse la plus achevée de l’Hellénisme’.⁴⁸ It is as an element of pagan theology that the principle of ancestral fault was last expressed and codified by late Greek antiquity, the dogma of a system defined by its opposition to the hegemonic Christian creed.⁴⁹ The question of *progonikon hamartēma* is there a discrete, circumscribed problem of theology, a ζήτημα. It consists of an apparent anomaly, an ἀπórρημα, the justice of punishing the descendants of the transgressors, explained by the different temporalities of life, metempsychosis, and the nature of providential preventive medicine. It brings together the languages of heredity, pollution, initiation, character, human knowledge, and divine will in one coherent picture. Above all, the explanations of the philosophers ultimately confirm the validity of the various literary and ritual traditions of Hellenism built on the idea of *progonikon hamartēma*. The influential heads of the Academy and their students saw fit to define the notion of ancestral fault at great length in their work, to justify it and use it as an interpretative tool of traditional Greek wisdom.

Proclus obviously built this particular definition of the idea for the purposes of his own philosophy. His discussion is made to illustrate certain points of the creed, such as the providential omniscience, the healing emanations flowing down from one level of reality to another, psychic purity and metempsychosis, and the idea of a complete underlying

⁴⁸ Brisson 1999.

⁴⁹ See Festugière 1966; Ramos Jurado 1974; Saffrey 1975. On Proclus as a systematic philosopher, see further Beierwaltes 1987.

harmony uniting the various textual and ritual authorities of Hellenism. It uses typical Neoplatonic figures such as the chain of being, philosophical *hieroi logoi*, monads, and the One. The explicit theology of Proclus and Hermias presents the old Greek concept as a coherent principle of theodicy, a fact with certain characteristics, definite causes, and a clear cultural grounding in ritual institutions and literature. This systematic definition of the idea answers the overarching architecture of Neoplatonic Hellenism built by the students of Syrianus in the final days of the Academy. It is a historically situated product of cultural projection. But it also follows the patterns of much older traditions of definition.

This is in part owing to the nature of the material. The discussion of ancestral fault in the *De decem dubitationibus circa Providentiam* presents itself as a sum of knowledge, the culmination of centuries of wisdom. It defines, as Proclus says at the beginning of the treatise, one of the Common Concepts (κοινὰ ἔννοια) grounded in the harmony of Plato and the Chaldaean Oracles, and observed by the many philosophers who have preceded him.⁵⁰ The idea of *progonikon hamartēma* is portrayed by Proclus and Hermias as an object of the long cultural memory of Hellenism. It is proclaimed in ‘revelations and mysteries’ (*revelationes et telete*), and can be cleansed by the gods of purification.⁵¹ It is found in the poetry of Hesiod and the examples of history (*et hoc etiam ab historia manifestum*), such as the life of Apollonius of Tyana, and the old tools of medical literature appropriately describe the logic of its hereditary taint. It is a ‘teaching’ found in the *Cratylus*, the *Phaedrus*, and in Herodotus. The extended metaphor of theatre, masks, and dramatic characters such as

⁵⁰ The entire treatise is presented as an illustration of the Common Concepts locked inside our souls. Proclus tells us that he is not interested in making precise attributions of thought to individual authors, or pointing out the intricacies of subtle philosophical positions in this treatise. This has to be one of the most fascinating justifications of literary borrowing ever produced. There are many who have enquired into the nature of Providence with great attention before him, he says, and he will not seek to distinguish what they have said from his own thoughts in the present discussion. Notwithstanding the myriad questions on and solutions to the matter which have been presented over the ages, his soul wishes to speak and listen of its own accord, ‘turning in back on itself’ to find the truth from inside rather than receive it from outside. Proclus will ‘interrogate himself’, turn the question ‘inside the secret of his soul’ to exercise himself towards a solution of the problem. As long as what he says or writes agrees with his soul, it will be as if the ideas are his own. The reason is that he follows the Common Hermes as a guide. The *Communis Mercurius* places in every soul the understanding of the Common Concepts, the κοινὰ ἔννοια. These Common Concepts are innately known by every human soul even before reflection; the philosopher has simply learned how to remember and unlock this understanding. The text of Proclus illustrates the harmonious conciliation of the Hellenic heritage around the same central ideas. On the Common Concepts in Proclus, an idea drawn from a long Stoic tradition, see Rosán 1949: 172; Saffrey and Westerink, 1968–97, vol. 1: 110; R. B. Todd 1973; Obbink 1992.

⁵¹ There might be an echo to the καθαρμοὶ καὶ τελεταὶ of Plato’s *Phaedrus* 244d in that sentence.

Oedipus or Tiresias, also, connects the discussion of *De decem dubitationibus circa Providentiam* to the tradition of tragedy. Epic, drama, history, and philosophy reflect the same truth as *teletai*, purifications, and prophecy. The ancient material provides the forms of its own explanation. The very contemporary Neoplatonic discussions of Proclus and Hermias define their aim as the illustration of tradition, and that is indeed exactly what they do.

De sera numinis vindicta

The text of Proclus, in fact, continues earlier traditions of definition much more directly. The Diadochus tells us at the beginning of the treatise that his words, as they aim to reveal Common Concepts, might resemble those of other philosophers, as already mentioned earlier. In our case, the resemblance is more than casual. Question Nine of *De decem dubitationibus circa Providentiam* is in fact an almost exact copy of chapters 12–21 of Plutarch's *De sera numinis vindicta*. Even through the Latin of Moerbeke, it is at once clear that almost all the sentences of Proclus' text are taken directly from the treatise of Plutarch. The commentary of Proclus on the *Works and Days* is also probably modelled on a text of Plutarch, his own commentary on the Hesiodic poem, something that is not really acknowledged in Marzillo's discussion of the scholion.⁵² The explicit definition of Proclus is a direct adaptation of the explicit definition of Plutarch. Identical justifications of the concept remained valid over centuries, almost exactly the same words conveying different meanings from one text to the other. Whereas Proclus adapted his discussion to the context of the Neoplatonic system, Plutarch wrote his definition for another consolidation of the Hellenic archive, that of first- and second-century imperial Greece.

The text of Plutarch dramatises a friendly debate between highly educated men at Delphi about the nature of Providence.⁵³ Clearly troubled by the spirited and disorganised accusations of the Epicurean Quietus against the idea of a just Providence, Plutarch himself, Patrocleas, Timon and his brother Olympichus proceed to counter his argument as best as they can. They decide to focus their response on one fundamental aspect of divine intervention in human affairs: the delays of divine justice. Familiar ideas from the Epicurean, Stoic, and Platonist schools are rehearsed to address

⁵² Marzillo 2010: 1–11; cf. Faraggiana di Sarzana 1978; 1987: 22–4. See pp. 29–30.

⁵³ On the identity of the characters in the dialogue, see Vernière 1974: 96–101, with Einarson 1952.

the question anew.⁵⁴ The discussion is divided into three parts. The first (4–11) is concerned with the postponement of vengeance within the span of an individual's lifetime. The second (12–21), the central one, considers the transmission of punishment to the descendants of the transgressor, and the third (22–33), the myth of Thespesios, with the extended anecdote of an Er-like voyage to the underworld, looks at the survival of the soul and the role of metempsychosis in the process, showing that the real punishment, in any case, takes place after death. While the first part of the *De sera numinis vindicta* furnished Proclus with the bulk of his material for Question Eight of the *De decem dubitationibus circa Providentiam*, Question Nine and, to a lesser extent, the other Neoplatonic discussions of ancestral fault mentioned above are rewritings of the second part of Plutarch's treatise.⁵⁵ These pages of the *De sera numinis vindicta* present us with the most detailed exposition of ancestral fault that has survived from Greek antiquity.

The section is arranged as a refutation. A first speech by Timon presents the group with what he describes as the most intractable question at hand, the 'last problem' (τελευταία ἀπορία).⁵⁶ The *aporia* is neatly laid out, just as in Proclus' text. If a man has already been punished for his crime, why would Providence strike his offspring? And if it was unable to inflict punishment in due course, why add injustice to the lot by visiting vengeance on the innocent? Timon portrays this as a widely acknowledged problem that has no issue and no solution, a difficulty that points an accusing finger at Providence. Tradition is used to show the tragic ridicule of the late punishments by divinity through generations. The six *exempla* adduced by Timon to demonstrate the iniquity of the idea of ancestral fault and its complete lack of reason and contradiction with any notion of divine justice constitute a gallery of absurd cruelty (12: 556e–557e).

The list starts, fittingly enough, with the tragicomic death of Aesop, whose murder at the hands of the Delphians supposedly resulted in their outlandish punishments, which lasted until they could find someone to

⁵⁴ On the philosophical structure and grounding of the dialogue, see Soury 1945; Saunders 1993; Krašovec 1993; 1999: 732–7; Baldassari 1994; Helmig 2005; Scholten 2009' cf. Burkert 1996b.

⁵⁵ See the parallel tables in Klostermann 1916: 23–9.

⁵⁶ 556e (12): ἤδη γὰρ ὥσπερ ἔφεδρον ἀνίστημι τὴν τελευταίαν ἀπορίαν, ἐπεὶ ταῖς πρώταις διηγώνισται μετρίως. ἃ γὰρ Εὐριπίδης ἐγκαλεῖ καὶ παρρησιάζεται πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς 'τὰ τῶν τεκόντων σφάλματ' εἰς τοὺς ἐγγόνους' τρέποντας, αἰτιάσθαι νόμιζε καὶ τοὺς σιωπῶντας ἡμῶν. εἴτε γὰρ οἱ δρᾶσαντες αὐτοὶ δίκην ἔδοσαν, οὐθὲν ἔτι δεῖ κολάζειν τοὺς μὴ ἀδικήσαντας, ὅπου δις ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς οὐδὲ τοὺς δρᾶσαντας δίκαιον· εἴτε ῥαθυμῖα καταπροέμενοι τὴν τιμωρίαν ἐν τοῖς πονηροῖς ὅψε παρὰ τῶν ἀναιτίων εἰσπράττουσιν, οὐκ εὖ τῷ ἀδίκῳ τὸ βραδέως ἀναλαμβάνουσιν.

atone for the crime.⁵⁷ That man was Iadmon, three generations later, who was in no way related to Aesop, but the descendant of Aesop's master, Timon tells his friends, following Herodotus (2.134).⁵⁸ Similarly laughable is the claim of the Syracusan tyrant Agathocles to have justice on his side, as a kinsman of the Cyclops Polyphemus, in his designs against Corcyra and Ithaca.⁵⁹ The undue severity of Alexander's destruction of the city of the Branchidae as a price for the role of their πρόπαιπτοι in betraying the sanctuary of Didyma in 494 is related with horror.⁶⁰ Presented as the paradigm of a just divine vengeance in Aelian, it is portrayed as an act of cruelty in Timon's speech. Even worse is the destruction of the city of Pheneos by Apollo for Heracles' theft of the Delphian tripod a thousand years earlier, or the triple destruction of Sybaris through Hera's enduring wrath (μήνιμα), and even more absurd still the servitude of the Locrian maidens, sent by their city to Troy as a price for Ajax's debauchery (ἀκολασία) – a practice, we are told, that was just recently ended.⁶¹ These famous tales from tradition are as preposterous as the customs of the Thracians and the barbarians of the Eridanos, who tattoo their women and wear black because of what their ancestors did to Orpheus and their grief for Phaethon (12: 557d). Whereas these customs are simply silly, however, the enduring wrath of the gods is intolerable and horrific. 'But for what reason should the wrath of the gods at first sink out of sight', asks Timon at the end of his speech, 'like certain rivers, only to resurge later against others, leading in the end to the direst calamities.'⁶² This impasse thus rejoins the critical puzzlement at the beginning of his intervention, where he presented the ἀπορία of ancestral fault as an illustration of

⁵⁷ See Luzzatto 1989. ⁵⁸ See Asheri *et al.* 2007: 337.

⁵⁹ The story is otherwise attested in 'Plut.' *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* 176e–f.

⁶⁰ 557b (12): καὶ τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον οὐδ' οἱ πάνυ φιλοῦντες, ὧν ἔσμεν καὶ ἡμεῖς, ἐπαινοῦσι τὸ Βραγχιδῶν ἄστει συγγέαντα καὶ διαφθείραντα πᾶσαν ἡλικίαν διὰ τὴν γενομένην τοῦ περὶ Μίλητον ἱεροῦ προδοσίαν ὑπὸ τῶν προπάππων αὐτῶν. The story is otherwise attested in Quintus Curtius 7.5.28 and Aelian F 54 (who comments οὐ μὴν ἐκάθευδεν ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ πρόνοια on the event).

⁶¹ 557c–d (12): ἄρ' οὐκ ἀτοπώτερος τούτων ὁ Ἀπόλλων, εἰ Φενεάτας ἀπόλλυσι τοὺς νῦν, ἐμφράξας τὸ βάραθρον καὶ κατακλύσας τὴν χώραν ἅπασαν αὐτῶν, ὅτι πρὸ χιλίων ἔτων, ὡς φασιν, ὁ Ἡρακλῆς ἀνασπᾶσας τὸν τρίποδα τὸν μαντικὸν εἰς Φενεὸν ἀπήνεγκε, Συβαρίταις δὲ φράζων ἀπόλλυσιν τῶν κακῶν, ὅταν τρισὶν ὀλέθροις ἰλάσωνται τὸ μήνιμα τῆς Λευκαδίας Ἥρας; καὶ μὴν οὐ πολὺς χρόνος ἄφ' οὗ Λοκροὶ πέμποντες εἰς Τροίαν πέπαινται τὰς παρθένους, 'αἱ καὶ ἀναμπεχνοὶ γυμνοὶς ποσὶν ἤτε δοῦλαι | ἡοῖαι σαίρεσκον Ἀθηναῖς περὶ βωμόν, | νόσφι κρηδέμνιοι, καὶ εἰ βαθὺ γῆρας ἱκάνοι', διὰ τὴν Αἴαντος ἀκολασίαν. ποῦ δὲ ταῦτα τὸ εὐλογον ἴσχει καὶ δίκαιον; for references to these events, see Vernière 1974: 208–9. For the ritual of the Locrian Maidens, see p. 448.

⁶² 557e (12): καίτοι τοῦτ' ἀβελτερίαν μὲν ἔχει μόνον οὐδὲν δὲ δεινὸν οὐδ' ἀνήκεστον· αἱ δὲ τῶν θεῶν ὄργαι τίνι λόγῳ παραχρῆμα δυσμέναι καθάπερ ἔνιοι τῶν ποταμῶν εἰθ' ὕστερον ἐπ' ἄλλους ἀναφερόμεναι πρὸς ἐσχάτας συμφορὰς τελευτῶσιν;

Euripides' accusation against the gods, that they punish 'the faults of the parents on their descendants'.⁶³ That is the challenge that lays the ground for Plutarch's long and comprehensive answer in defence of the justice of ancestral fault.

Its methodical progression can be followed in three steps. Plutarch first mocks his friend, gently, for having chosen examples that consist mostly of 'myths and fictions' (μῦθοι καὶ πλάσματα), and he disapproves of this bizarre choice of ἀτοπία to illustrate his point (13: 557e–f). The record of tradition cannot be used without examination.⁶⁴ Rather than uncritically collect stories from the fabrications of literature, Plutarch invites his interlocutor to reflect on the logic of concrete, well-known practices from everyday experience. Individuals are indeed honoured by cities for the triumphs and the glorious deeds of their ancestors, as everyone can see, especially himself, a member of the esteemed Opheltiadaï clan, and that is both just and logical, the opposite of the accusations levelled by Timon against ancestral fault. But if hereditary honour is justified, argues Plutarch, something that no one will contest, it follows that so is hereditary punishment, which is based on the same pattern. Anyone who disputes this is simply seeking to quarrel with the gods (13: 558c–d). That simple inference is sufficient to defend and validate the idea of ancestral fault. What remains is to understand its logic, a question that provides the material for the rest of the discussion. That logic can only be reached through further inference, the uncovering of 'the likely and the believable' (τὸ εἰκὸς καὶ πιθανόν), as 'the clear and truth' (τὸ σαφὲς καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια), when talking about divinity, will continue to escape the power of human speech (13: 558d). Trying to understand the nature of delayed generational punishment is like following a thread through a dark labyrinth.

Be that as it may, results can be obtained. A fundamental point of the argument is that correspondences unite like with like through intervals (διαλείμματα) in time and space.⁶⁵ The correspondences that course through space are readily observable and altogether uncontroversial. One part of a body can affect the other, just as what happens to one member of a flock can have repercussions on the entire group. Contagion, more importantly, can make its way through cities, even distant lands, as everybody knows. Powers, δυνάμεις, are demonstrably at work in the

⁶³ F 980 Kannicht: τὰ τῶν τεκόντων σφάλματ' εἰς τοὺς ἐγγόνους (12: 556e); see p. 344.

⁶⁴ See Torraca 1991.

⁶⁵ 558e (14): ἄλλαι τε δυνάμεις ἀφ' ἧς ἔχουσιν καὶ διαδόσεις ἀπίστους ὀξύτησι καὶ μήκεσι δι' ἐτέρων εἰς ἕτερα περαίνουσιν. ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς τὰ κατὰ τοὺς χρόνους διαλείμματα θαυμάζομεν, οὐ τὰ κατὰ τοὺς τόπους.

intervals of space. It should come as no surprise, then, that the same patterns that we can see in space are also at work in the intervals of time, and that, even if we cannot perceive them, certain powers 'have a way of reverting from their furthest points to their origins and effecting a connexion'.⁶⁶ The long delay in the punishment of the Delphians and the Sybarites mentioned by Timon is perfectly understandable in this light.

The connections made by these powers through time are not arbitrary, of course, but they follow clearly determined channels of transmission: cities and families. Just like a living thing, a ζῶον, a city has a clearly defined unity and continuity in time, one that actually changes less through the centuries than the individual changes through the ages of life (15: 559a–c). As long as the city continues to exist, it keeps the responsibility (αἵτια) and the merit (χάρις) of what it has done in the past. The same is true of the family, the *genos*, which is metaphorically imagined as a chain of generations linked to the same origin (that is the image that Proclus will rewrite as a Neoplatonic σείρα), which carries a 'power' (δύναμις) and a congenital 'communion' (κοινωνία) through the generations (16: 559d–560a).⁶⁷ The sharing of responsibility over time in the *genos* is simply an extension of that principle. More, the continuity of the family requires that the wrongs committed by one of its members can be corrected by exacting punishment on another member. Providence acts like a doctor, healing the sickness of one part of the *genos* by applying treatment on another (16: 559d–560a). The criminal character of the transgressor is transmitted to his descendants, and the intervention of punishment thus functions as a cure for the vice of the family, a cure that works not only as a physical remedy on the body of the punished individual, but as an example that affects the soul of the original transgressor with courage or fear through φαντασίαι and can lead to correction (ἐπανόρθωσις) and improvement.⁶⁸ Contrary to what Timon was saying, there is nothing odd, ridiculous, or unjust about this treatment.

Olympichus intervenes (17: 560a–b) and rightly says that Plutarch's argument presupposes the immortality of the soul, its ability to learn

⁶⁶ 558f (14): ἔχουσι γὰρ τινὰς αἱ δυνάμεις ἀναφοράς ἀπὸ τῶν ἐσχάτων ἐπὶ τὰ πρῶτα καὶ συνάψαις ὧν ἡ αἰτία, κἀν ὑφ' ἡμῶν ἀγνοῖται, σιωπῇ περαίνει τὸ οἰκεῖον.

⁶⁷ 559c–d (16): εἰ δ' ἐστὶ [τι] πόλις ἐν πράγμα καὶ συνεχές, ἐστὶ δήπου καὶ γένος, ἐξηρημένον ἀρχῆς μιᾶς καὶ δυνάμιν τινα καὶ κοινωνίαν διαπεφυκυῖαν ἀναφερούσης, καὶ τὸ γεννηθὲν οὐχ ὥς τι δημιουργημα πεποιημένον ἀπὸ ἄλλου τοῦ γεννήσαντος· ἐξ αὐτοῦ γὰρ οὐχ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ γέγονεν, ὥστ' ἔχει τι καὶ φέρεται τῶν ἐκείνου μέρος ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ κολαζόμενον προσσηκόντως καὶ τιμώμενον.

⁶⁸ 560a (16). Note the parallel between this usage of ἐπανόρθωσις and the ἐπανορθώμεθα of Hermias 97 (see n. 42). On φαντασία in Plutarch, see Semenzato 2006.

through lives, after death, something that Plutarch confirms, rehearsing the arguments in favour of the immortal soul in the process, and reminding his audience that the present discussion about Providence and late punishment and the survival of the soul are part of the same vision. This brief aside is used to prepare the reader for the last section of the dialogue, the myth of Thespesios, and show how its exposition of the afterlife and metempsychosis fits within the framework of the present investigation into the workings of late punishment. The punishments of the afterlife and the punishments of ancestral fault through generations are complementary. If the sanctions of the souls in their ‘separate existence in the other world’ are invisible to mortals, says Plutarch, the punishments of their descendants in this world are there for all to see and can thus serve as warnings for the ‘wicked’ (πόνηροι). The two sanctions are simply facets of the same operation. They have different audiences, and different forms of communication. One can only be told through μῦθος, whose pedagogical role is thus reclaimed at the end of the text, and the other, the spectacle of ancestral fault, can be understood through probability, τὸ εἰκός.⁶⁹ It is to that mode that the speech of Plutarch returns in its last chapters on ancestral fault, the third step of the argument (561c–563b).

The medical imagery of the previous chapters is pursued and applied to the effect of the sanction on the descendants of the transgressor. If the culprit can justly be punished through his offspring, as the previous discussion established, a difficulty remains in the fact that these offspring did not commit the crime themselves. How can it be just for innocents to be punished then? The answer is simple: they are not really punished. If their ancestors are indeed punished through them, what they have to suffer is not a punishment, but in fact a cure by the hand of Providence (19: 561c–f). The reason is clear. The crime of the ancestor has become part of the constitutive heredity of his descendants. The character of the transgressor can be transmitted to his offspring, and the ‘inborn similarity of evil’ (κακίας ὁμοιότης συγγενική) that the descendants share with their criminal ancestors, something that can ‘germinate and shoot up in a youthful character’, will often reveal itself in the same crimes, provided that the right conditions are found, unless it is stopped in time.⁷⁰ The key

⁶⁹ 561b (18): ἔχω μὲν τινα καὶ λόγον εἰπεῖν ἔναγχος ἀκηκοώς, ὁκνῶ δὲ μὴ φανῇ μῦθος ὑμῖν· μόνω οὖν χρῶμαι τῷ εἰκότι.

⁷⁰ 561f–562f (19): ἄρ’ οὖν σῶμα μὲν ἔκγονον φαύλου σώματος ἄξιόν ἐστι θεραπεύειν καὶ φυλάττειν, κακίας δ’ ὁμοιότητα συγγενικὴν ἐν νέῳ βλαστάνουσιν ἦθει καὶ ἀναφυσομένην ἔαν δεῖ καὶ περιμένειν καὶ μέλλειν, ἄχρι ἂν ἐκχυθεῖσα τοῖς πάθεσιν ἐμφανὴς γένηται ‘κακόφρονά τ’ ἀμφάνη πραπίδων | καρπὸν’ ὥς φησι Πίνδαρος.

is in the similarity or difference that links the generations of a *genos* in time. Some individuals share the same predispositions as their parents, others do not, and marked character traits, just like physical properties, often skip generations to reappear later. Worse, the ‘hereditary stain of evil’ (ἐγγενὴς κηλὶς τῆς κακίας) is often hidden from view, even to those who actually have it (20: 562b). Its patterns of transmission are invisible to mortals, but not to divinity, which knows the ‘disposition and nature’ (διάθεσις καὶ φύσις) of each individual (20: 562c–d). Its decision to intervene when it does, far from being arbitrary, is designed to cure them, ‘removing the vice, like an epilepsy, before the seizure’ (20: 562d).⁷¹ The intervention of divinity targets the state and disposition of the individual, his potential for crime. It is a proleptic cure, applied only when it has a chance of success, and when it is needed, just like any medical intervention (21: 562e).⁷² The accusation of Euripides, thus, that ‘the sins of parents on the children the gods do visit’, is not defensible, as the crimes of the ancestors only have consequences for their descendants when it is just that they do so (21: 562e). That pattern of explanation of ancestral fault can hardly be described as ‘inherited guilt’.

Plutarch’s speech ends with a direct return to the images used by Timon in his diatribe against ancestral fault, especially that of the underground river, the hidden course of ‘similarity’ (ὁμοιότης) that runs unseen through the generations, only to reappear at a later date in order to bloom and restore the inherited bent of the *genos*.⁷³ The last exemplum is particularly rich, drawn from an event that happened recently in Thebes, the birth of one of the children of Python of Thisbè, who died ‘just the other day’.⁷⁴ Python was said to be a descendant of the *Spartoi*, the fabled autochthonous inhabitants of Thebes, and his child had the mark of a spear on his body, something that points directly to that ancestry, as if its character reappeared ‘from the depths of the earth’. A local occurrence, familiar to all the assembled friends of the dialogue, creates a direct link between the present and the most remote Boeotian past, the primordial days of Thebes, events most remarkably attached to the idea of ancestral fault staged in the

⁷¹ Note the similar mention of epilepsy in Proclus, *De decem dubitationibus* 61.

⁷² The formulation is close to what we find in Hermias 96–7; see p. 35.

⁷³ 563b (21): οὕτω πολλάκις ἦθη καὶ πάθη ψυχῆς αἱ πρῶται κρύπτουσι γενέσεις καὶ καταδύουσιν, ὕστερον δὲ ποτε καὶ δι’ ἑτέρων ἐξήνθησε καὶ ἀπέδωκε τὸ οἰκεῖον εἰς κακίαν καὶ ἀρετὴν ἢ φύσιν. Cf. 557e.

⁷⁴ 563a–b (21): τῶν δὲ Πύθωνος τοῦ Θισβέως παιδων, ὃς ἑναγχος τέθηκε, λεγομένου τοῖς Σπαρτοῖς προσήκειν εἰς ἐξανήνεγκε λόγχης τύπον ἐν τῷ σώματι, διὰ χρόνων τοσούτων ἀνασχούσης καὶ ἀναδύσης ὥσπερ ἐκ βυθοῦ τῆς πρὸς τὸ γένος ὁμοιότητος.

Phoenissae of the same Euripides whose quotation frames the beginning and the end of the speech.⁷⁵ The atavistic mark of the spear brings a notably ancient myth into the observable reality of the group, adding a concrete testimony to the ‘probability’ of the preceding discussion, and preparing the way for the myth of the following speech.

That myth, the report of Thespesios’ travels through the underworld, is presented as a consequence and a continuation of the preceding discussion on ancestral fault, the survival of the soul as a witness to its crimes and their consequences, and the entire eschatological system presented in it ultimately serves that purpose.⁷⁶ The soul of the punished is shown to its ancestors, and the punishments of the wicked forebears (πρόγονοι) are shown to it as well (25) – Thespesios himself even gets to see the punishment of his father.⁷⁷ The image of the souls of the descendants attacking their criminal ancestor, placed at the very end of the text, is the most striking one in that regard:

πάντων δὲ πάσχειν ἔλεγεν οἰκτρότατα τὰς ἤδη δοκούσας ἀφεῖσθαι τῆς δίκης, εἴτ’ αὖθις συλλαμβανομένας· αὐταὶ δ’ ἦσαν, ὧν εἷς τινὰς ἐγγόνους ἢ παῖδας ἢ ποινὴν περιῆλθεν. ὅποτε γὰρ τις ἐκείνων ἀφίκοιτο καὶ περιτύχοι, προσέπιπτεν ὀργῇ καὶ κατεβόα καὶ τὰ σημεῖα τῶν παθῶν ἐδείκνυεν, ὀνειδίζουσα καὶ διώκουσα φεύγειν καὶ ἀποκρύπτεσθαι βουλομένην οὐ δυναμένην δέ. ταχὺ γὰρ μετέθεον οἱ κολασταὶ [πρὸς τὴν δίκην] καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἀπῆγον ὀλοφυρομένας τῷ προγινώσκειν τὴν τιμωρίαν. ἐνίαις δὲ καὶ πολλὰς ἅμα τῶν ἐγγόνων ἔλεγε συνηρτῆσθαι καθάπερ μελίττας ἢ νυκτερίδας ἀτεχνῶς ἐχομένας καὶ τετριγυίας ὑπὸ μνήμης καὶ ὀργῆς ὧν ἔπαθον δι’ αὐτάς.

Most piteous of all, he said, was the suffering of the souls who thought that they were already released from their sentence and then were apprehended again; these were the souls whose punishment had passed over to descendants or children. For whenever the soul of such a child or descendant arrived and found them, it flew at them in fury and raised a clamour against them and showed the marks of its sufferings, berating and pursuing

⁷⁵ See pp. 376–86. For the variety of the myths of the *Spartoi* in Thebes, see still Vian 1963. Dio Chrysostom (*Or.* 4.23) writes that the σημεῖον of a spear on the body served to distinguish those who belonged to the *genos* of the *Spartoi* from those who did not.

⁷⁶ The myth of Thespesios in the *De sera numinis vindicta* has generated a large body of scholarship. See Taufer 2010, with extensive bibliography. Note Alesse 2001; Wiener 2004.

⁷⁷ 566e–f (30): τέλος δὲ τὸν πατέρα τὸν ἑαυτοῦ κατεῖδεν ἕκ τινος βαράθρου στιγμάτων καὶ οὐλῶν μεστὸν ἀναδυόμενον, ὀρέγοντα τὰς χεῖρας αὐτῷ καὶ σιωπᾶν οὐκ ἐώμενον ἀλλ’ ὁμολογεῖν ἀναγκαζόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν ἐφεστῶτων ταῖς τιμωρίαις, ὅτι περὶ ξένους τινὰς μισρὸς γενόμενος χρυσίον ἔχοντας φαρμάκοις διαφθείρας καὶ ἐκεῖ διαλαθὼν ἅπαντας ἐνταῦθ’ ἐξελεγχθεὶς τὰ μὲν ἤδη πέπονθε τὰ δ’ ἀγεται πεισιόμενος, ἵκετεύειν μὲν ἢ παραιτεῖσθαι περὶ τοῦ πατρὸς οὐκ ἐτόλμα δι’ ἐκπληξιν καὶ δέος.

the soul of the other, which desired to escape and hide but could not. For they were swiftly overtaken by the tormentors and hastened back once more to serve their sentence, lamenting from foreknowledge of the penalty that awaited them. To some, he said, great clusters of the souls of descendants were attached, clinging to them like veritable swarms of bees or bats, and gibbering shrilly in angry memory of what they had suffered through their fault.

The complex and detailed eschatological system developed in that last section of the dialogue is entirely absent from Proclus' rewriting of the *De sera numinis vindicta* in his *De decem dubitationibus circa Providentiam*. That is just one of the many differences that distinguish the two extended accounts of ancestral fault. One text is almost entirely based on the other, but the resulting portraits stand miles apart. In addition to the very different integration of metempsychosis to the principle of ancestral fault in the two, which essentially makes the souls of the transgressors witnesses to the punishments of their descendants in Plutarch, but integral participants in the malady of the *genos* through the selections of reincarnation in Proclus, a number of other important points of distinction stand out. One is the nature of the therapy exercised by Providence through generational punishment. In Plutarch it functions as a cure aimed at three different constituencies: the transgressors themselves, who must be healed after death, the descendants who share a 'congenital similarity of evil' with their criminal forebears, who must be cured of their potential for *kakia* before the crime blooms, and the people who witness the punishment, who should be encouraged to virtue through it. In Proclus, while similar considerations are found, and many of the same images, the main point is something much more abstract, based on the Neoplatonic understanding of the emanations that course through the planes of the cosmos. The therapy of Providence is exercised directly on the *genos* or the city, the extended life of the group, which is both immortal and sacred: a unique, higher form of reality composed of many smaller elements. Placed at a different level of existence from that of the individual mortal lives, which all share in it, it is closer to divinity, and susceptible to its direct intervention through the punishment of the individuals. It is not the case that the imagery of healing is central to one and secondary to the other; it simply plays a different role in each text.

Whereas in Plutarch ancestral fault is imaged as an element of the medical τέχνη of Providence looking for a *καίρως*, it becomes a healing emanation from a superior level of reality in Proclus. In Plutarch ancestral fault is a mirror of civic justice and an element of moral exhortation and

social stability in the life of the *polis* and the Empire. Pictured as a philosophical stance in opposition to the renouncement of the Epicurean ascetic, and thus as a justification of the world and a participation in its mechanisms superior to the sterile bickering of a rival School which has stepped out of the *polis*, it is an expression of the philosopher's engagement with the living past and the present of the city, and with the city's place in the Empire.⁷⁸ In Proclus, on the other hand, ancestral fault is a figure of the Common Concepts embedded in our souls and unanimously agreed upon by the true philosophers of the unified Hellenic tradition, and confirmed by the revelations which buttress their thoughts; it is not one philosophical stance in the Hellenic tradition, but the position of true Hellenism against Christianity. It is an object of revelation uncovered through exegesis of the hallowed canon. Cut off from concrete participation in the *polis*, it is a block in the coherent, monolithic, and definitive edifice of Hellenism built by Proclus. Ancestral fault becomes a pagan dogma.

The Neoplatonic programme of Proclus' discussion is reflected in the very systematic nature of the divine order deployed to explain the mechanisms of ancestral fault, with the One, Providence, the gods of the city and the demons of the *genos* all perfectly aligned in their proper place in the hierarchy of the universe. The text of Plutarch, on the other hand, stages a much less methodical understanding of *pronoia*, and its references to individual gods, notwithstanding the prominence of Apollo, considering the dramatic setting of the dialogue in Delphi, are mostly conditioned by the literary and historical sources of the examples at hand, such as the enduring wrath (*mēnima*) of Hera against Sybaris.⁷⁹ Prophecy is mentioned in that dialogue as part of this Delphic staging, and in reference to the survival of the soul, whereas it appears to be a source for the teaching of ancestral fault in Proclus, together with the initiations of the mysteries and the purifications of the cleansing gods. The mention of Apollonius of Tyana also fits with this marked pattern of religious reference in the text of Proclus.⁸⁰

If both Plutarch and Proclus give pride of place to tragedy in the cultural baggage of Hellenism used to illustrate the nature of ancestral fault,

⁷⁸ See Scholten 2009. On the representation of Nero in *De sera numinis vindicta*, see Torraca 1991, Brenk 1987 and Zadorojnyi 1997. For the close interaction of Hellenic education and power in the world of Plutarch, see Stadter and van der Stockt 2002, with ample reference to earlier bibliography. On the protreptic value of Plutarch's treatise, see Gauthier 1995. On his engagement with Epicureanism, Hershbell 1992; Boulogne 2003.

⁷⁹ See p. 41. ⁸⁰ See p. 65.

Plutarch's dialogue cites a much greater number of texts and historical events, and the diversity of its references creates an effect of resonance with the deep baggage of tradition, from Homer and Hesiod to the most popular current proverbs.⁸¹ The dialogic structure of the text presents the meaning of that tradition as a controversial problem, a conflict, and the confrontation of voices that contradict the position of Plutarch and show the oppositions that exist on the question within the philosophical systems constitutes a challenge that must be solved by the educated man. The *paideia* offered by Plutarch to his readers is a sustained effort of reasoning based on deduction and probability, and the ability to navigate the contradictions, inventions, and deceptive appearances of (mostly historical) tradition – the necessity for the proper exercise of balanced judgment. It reaffirms the continuing importance of the past for making sense of the present.

The text of Proclus follows another course. Constructed as a magisterial lesson imparting foundational wisdom to students, it has none of the playful dramatic structure of the *De sera numinis vindicta*, and none of its qualifications about probability. It is a text that proclaims the meaning and the truth of eternal Hellenic tradition before the main challenge of the day, which no longer came from within. The authority of tradition is based on its unity, the harmony of ancient wisdom, a convergence that can be restored through proper exegesis. The discussion of Proclus is constructed as a theological exposition, the religious vision of a Common Concept. In their respective codifications of the Greek heritage, their systematic reconfigurations of the archive, both Plutarch and Proclus chose to make the principle of ancestral fault a central concern of their historical, moral, and religious world-views. They defined it as an element of Hellenic identity based on opposition: one gave it the shape of a cultural principle in the context of Roman rule; the other cast it as the religious dogma of a unified pagan faith in the context of a triumphant Christianity. These efforts of self-reflexive and systematic reinventions of tradition ultimately produced original categories of thought superimposed over the living material of culture. But both also continued earlier and in many cases similar definitions of the question.

The reflection of Plutarch, like that of Proclus, drew directly from other systematic discussions of ancestral fault. This can be seen by the obvious familiarity of the characters in the treatise with the question, the implied familiarity of the audience with the arguments being rehearsed

⁸¹ On the usage of quotations in Plutarch, see Helmbold and O'Neil 1959.

by the proponents of the various philosophical schools in the text, and the many references to earlier literature. Philosophical dialogues and debates between Platonists, Cynics, Stoics, and Epicureans, such as that represented in the *De sera numinis vindicta*, prepared the way for the extensive elaborations of Plutarch. One of these discussions is preserved in Cicero's *De natura deorum*.⁸² There, at the close of the third book (3.90–1), at the very end of the dialogue between the representatives of the various schools, the Academic Cotta finishes his attack against Balbus and the Stoic view of providential justice with a refutation of the idea of ancestral fault:

‘Non animadvertunt’ inquit ‘omnia di, ne reges quidem.’ quid est simile; reges enim si scientes praetermittunt, magna culpa est; at deo ne excusatio quidem est inscientiae. quem vos praeclare defenditis, cum dicitis eam vim deorum esse, ut etiam si quis morte poenas sceleris effugerit expetantur eae poenae a liberis a nepotibus a posteris. o miram aequitatem deorum: ferretne civitas ulla latorem istius modi legis, ut condemnaretur filius aut nepos, si pater aut avus deliquisset?

‘quinam Tantalidarum internecioni modus
paretur, aut quaenam umquam ob mortem Myrtili
poenis luendis dabitur satias supplicii?’

utrum poetae Stoicos depravarint an Stoici poetis dederint auctoritatem non facile dixerim; portenta enim ab utrisque et flagitia dicuntur. neque enim quem Hipponactis iambus laeserat aut qui erat Archilochi versu vulneratus a deo immissum dolorem non conceptum a se ipso continebat, nec cum Aegisthi libidinem aut cum Paridis videmus a deo causam requirimus, cum culpa paene vocem audiamus, nec ego multorum aegrorum salutem non ab Hippocrate potius quam ab Aesculapio datam iudico, nec Lacedaemoniorum disciplinam dicam umquam ab Apolline potius Spartae quam a Lycurgo datam. Critolaus inquam evertit Corinthum, Carthaginem Asdrubal; hi duo illos oculos orae maritumae effoderunt, non iratus aliqui, quem omnino irasci posse negatis, deus.

‘The gods do not take notice of everything, any more than do human rulers’, says our friend. Where is the parallel? If human rulers knowingly overlook a fault they are greatly to blame; but as for god, he cannot even offer the excuse of ignorance. And how remarkably you champion his cause, when you declare that the divine power is such that even if a person has escaped punishment by dying, the punishment is visited on his children and grandchildren and their descendants! What a remarkable instance of the divine justice! Would any state tolerate a lawgiver who should enact that a son or grandson was to be sentenced for the transgression of a father or a grandfather?

⁸² See Pease 1955–9, vol. II: 1214–15; van den Bruwaene 1981.

'Where shall the Tantalids' vendetta end?
 What penalty for Myrtilus' murder
 Shall ever glut the appetite of vengeance?'

Whether the Stoic philosophers were led astray by the poets, or the poets relied on the authority of the Stoics, I should find it hard to say; for both tell some monstrous and outrageous tales. For the victims lashed by the lampoons of Hipponax or the verses of Archilochus nursed a wound not inflicted by a god but received from himself; and we do not look for any heaven sent cause when we view the licentiousness of Aegisthus or of Paris, since their guilt almost cries aloud in our ears; and the bestowal of health upon many sick persons I ascribe to Hippocrates rather than Aesculapius; and I will never allow that Sparta received the Lacedaemonian rule of life from Apollo rather than from Lycurgus. It was Critolaus, I aver, who overthrew Corinth, and Hasdrubal Carthage: those two glories of the sea coast were extinguished by these mortals, not by some angry god who according to your school is entirely incapable of anger (trans. Rackham).

The principle of punishment through generations is presented as a key idea of Stoic thought about the nature of divine involvement in human affairs.⁸³ It is attacked as a complete travesty of justice, something that would contravene the spirit of all human laws.⁸⁴ Cotta describes the very idea as 'monstrous and outrageous tales' fit for tragedy about the Tantalids, such as Accius' *Oenomaus* or *Atreus*, which he cites.⁸⁵ He wonders whether the Stoics derive their philosophy from such poetic nonsense, or whether popular theatre is in fact an illustration of their false ideas. In any case, both are similarly wrong. He proceeds to show this by adducing various examples from archaic poetry, myth, medicine, and history. The victims of Hipponax and Archilochus, he says, have no one but themselves to blame. Aegisthus is alone responsible for his crimes, and so is Paris: 'their guilt (*culpa*) almost cries out to our ears'. Hippocrates is a more efficient healer than Aesculapius. Cities fall because of their rulers, not gods. And so on and so forth. What can seem to some motivated by divine anger is in fact the work of men.

An interesting point about this discussion of the *De natura deorum* is the weakness of Cotta's position on the matter. Any discerning reader will at

⁸³ On the doctrines of providence represented in the text, see Auvray-Assayas 1991; 1999a; 2005; cf. still Krumme 1941.

⁸⁴ On Cotta's style of argumentation, see Ardley 1973.

⁸⁵ Fragment xi of the *Oenomaus* in Dangel 1995. Accius' *Atreus* was a prominent play of the time (Cicero met Accius: *Brut.* 107), and an important antecedent of Seneca's *Thyestes*. See Pociña 2003; Baldarelli 2004; Fantham 2005; cf. Krašovec 1999: 146.

once see that something is not quite right with the statement that the victims of Hipponax and Archilochus are themselves responsible for the iambic abuse they receive.⁸⁶ The daughters of Lycambes were paradigmatic examples of the innocent victim throughout antiquity. Similarly, the assertion that Aegisthus is alone responsible for his crimes, that divine justice can be evaluated through the standards of human justice, or that Aesculapius cannot heal as well as Hippocrates could all be easily countered or contested by most educated interlocutors of Cicero's time. It comes as no surprise, then, when the voice of Cicero himself says that, although Velleius thought Cotta's speech to be the truer (*verior*), 'I felt that that of Balbus approximated more nearly to a semblance of the truth.'⁸⁷ That is the very last sentence of the dialogue, immediately after Cotta's attempted refutation of ancestral fault. The defence of the ideas attacked by Cotta, in fact, is understood by Lucilius as a defence of religion itself:

'Vehementius' inquit 'Cotta tu quidem invectus es in eam Stoicorum rationem quae de providentia deorum ab illis sanctissime et prudentissime constituta est. sed quoniam advesperascit, dabis nobis diem aliquem ut contra ista dicamus. est enim mihi tecum pro aris et focus certamen et pro deorum templis atque delubris proque urbis muris, quos vos pontifices sanctos esse dicitis diligentiusque urbem religione quam ipsis moenibus cingitis; quae deserui a me, dum quidem spirare potero, nefas iudico.'

'You have indeed made a slashing attack upon the most reverently and wisely constructed Stoic doctrine of the divine providence. But as evening is now approaching, you will assign us a day on which to make our answer to your views. For I have to fight against you on behalf of our altars and hearths, of the temples and shrines of the gods, and of the city walls, which you as pontiffs declare to be sacred and are more careful to hedge the city round with religious ceremonies than even with fortifications; and my conscience forbids me to abandon their cause so long as I yet can breathe' (trans. Rackham).

The idea of ancestral fault presented in the *De natura deorum* through the attack of Cotta is again portrayed as a tenet of the traditional faith. It is grounded in Roman culture with a quotation of a tragedy from Accius. The Hellenistic sources used by Cicero might very well have cited a classical tragedy instead.⁸⁸ One of the Greek texts behind the Academic diatribe against Stoicism in Book 3 of the treatise is probably Clitomachus, the student of Carneades, and chapters 90 and 91 are possibly based on

⁸⁶ On the usage of humour in Cicero's representation of Cotta, see Auvray-Assayas 1998.

⁸⁷ DeFilippo 2000. ⁸⁸ See Thompson 1979–80.

that source as well.⁸⁹ The Stoic authorities attacked by the source of Cicero are necessarily older than it is. Whatever the case, the discussion of the dialogue is designed to illustrate the central tenets of the three schools. It is meant to be representative. The portrayal of ancestral fault found in the Ciceronian text is the thoroughly informed, but abridged echo of much older debates.

A fascinating example of such debates can be found in the work of Bion of Borysthenes, for instance, who preceded the Epicureans in his attack on the idea of ancestral fault, arguing that the notion of a punishment through generations was as ridiculous as the statement that an ill grandfather could be cured by a therapeutic intervention on his grandson.⁹⁰ The medical imagery of the apophthegm is particularly interesting, as an early precursor of the image that was to play such a leading role in later discussions of ancestral fault. The fact that Plutarch deems it necessary to argue against it suggests that it still had some currency in later centuries.⁹¹ More importantly, it shows that the idea of ancestral fault was already familiar enough as an explicitly defined notion of philosophical thought on divine action in the later fourth century for it to be attacked frontally in Bion's assault on traditional views of impiety, together with other central aspects of Greek religion, such as sacrifice, prophecy, initiation, or anthropomorphism. Considering that, although Plato recurrently mentions the idea of ancestral fault in his dialogues, neither he nor Aristotle ever directly discusses it at any length in their extant work, the text of Bion suggests that the problem of divine generational punishment first became an object of explicit philosophical debate in the early Hellenistic period, before it was integrated into the Stoic and Epicurean arsenals in their conflict on the nature of Providence.⁹² Perhaps some of it will surface in fragments of Philodemus? Whatever the case, Proclus' discussion in the *De decem dubitationibus circa Providentiam* is clearly the last product of a very long tradition.

The main texts of that tradition that have come down to us are those of Proclus, Plutarch, and Cicero, as we have seen above. These three examples of explicit theology represent three different moments of self-reflexive consolidations of Greek tradition before a challenge from outside or within: Christianity, Roman rule, or philosophical rivals. In these texts,

⁸⁹ See e.g. Krumme 1941; Philipsson 1942a; 1942b; 1945; Pease 1955–9, vol. II: 43–9.

⁹⁰ F 27 Kindstrand.

⁹¹ The apophthegm is cited by Plutarch in the *De sera numinis vindicta* (19: 561c).

⁹² See, for instance, Dragona-Monachou 1976; Dörrie 1977; D. Frede 2002; Powers 2007.

ancestral fault is described successively as philosophical doctrine, *paideia*, or religious creed. It is in that context of apologetical literature, of reactions, that Greek traditions of reflection on the definition of ancestral fault are attested. The record covers close to a millennium, from the early Hellenistic period to the end of late antiquity. It shows a lively, complex, and continuous interest in understanding the nature of ancestral fault, its boundaries, and its justification as a mechanism of divine justice. Pollution, wrath, curses, and persistent, unexplained calamity are thoroughly intertwined in each of these texts. These discussions attest to the cultural relevance and vitality of a long explicit theology of ancestral fault in later antiquity, and the consistency of its language and its referents. The record of this explicit theology is post-classical, as the conditions for such critical and apologetical discussions did not exist earlier, but it is grounded in references to the archaic and classical material. It portrays the question as a principle embedded in fundamental texts and institutions of the cultural canon, such as Hesiod, Plato, history, tragedy, proverbs or medical literature, law and philosophy, mystery cults, and purification rituals. The question is framed as a hermeneutic key into central points of earlier tradition. The explicit theology of ancestral fault organised the vast baggage of texts and institutions, vocabulary, images, and ideas transmitted from the past into one coherent principle of Hellenism. These channels of ancient reception formed an interpretative framework that informed all later readings of the archaic and classical material.

Confrontations and translations

Ancestral fault is a Greek emic category. 'Inherited guilt' is not. The matter is more than one of terminology. The term 'guilt' is not only dangerously imprecise and charged with entire programmes of irrelevant connotations, but it has no real equivalent in the ancient record. The idea that it is 'inherited', moreover, points to a more precise channel of transmission than the one we see in many of our sources. 'Inherited guilt', more importantly, is a direct translation of the earlier German terms *Erbschuld* or *Erbsünde*. These German words for the notion of ancestral fault have been used in philological scholarship from the early nineteenth century to the present day. They are, of course, highly marked theological terms of reference for the Christian notions of original sin and corporate responsibility. *Erbschuld* is a term already used by Luther in this sense, and the *Deutsches Wörterbuch* of the Grimm brothers lists it as a translation of the

medieval *debitum hereditarium*.⁹³ *Erbsünde* is the standard Catholic and Lutheran term for 'original sin'. Both ultimately derive from terms such as the Patristic Latin *haereditarium peccatum*, a composite formation used by pre- and post-Augustinian Church Fathers in reference to the then emergent notion of Christian original sin.⁹⁴ Some will prefer to keep using a Christian theological term over the Greek *progonikon hamartēma* out of habit or conservatism. We have to recognise, however, that the usage of such terms to describe the institutions and discourses of pagan Greek culture is a direct imposition of Christian filters and ideological implications on ancient material. The English 'inherited guilt', like the German *Erbschuld*, the French *péch   hér  ditaire*, or the Italian *colpa ereditaria*, is more than a mere neutral usage transmitted through scholarship. It continues a long history of Christian theology and imposes a complex baggage of associations on the Greek material. We continue to ignore it at our peril. Whatever term we adopt, however, calling the same object with another name will not change anything.

In order to understand something of how this Christian theological baggage has shaped the modern perception of Greek ideas on delayed generational punishment and has contributed to constituting the etic category of 'Greek inherited guilt', I propose here to briefly consider some particularly important aspects of openly religious readings of the question. The matter would require its own extensive study to do justice to the range and complexity of the sources, but this is not the place for such a detailed investigation. A clear understanding of the main stakes and articulations of thought at work, however, is essential to making sense of the way the issue has been framed by earlier research. Serious engagement with reception is a necessary condition for work on material that is so clearly imbricated with the development of modern Western cultural categories. The study of ancient Mediterranean religion is a unique form of cultural anthropology in that it paradoxically involves looking at something that is distinctively both same and other.⁹⁵ Turning the *regard   loign  * of the anthropologist towards this strange mirror, a distant history that has played such a fundamental role in shaping the DNA of Western culture throughout its evolution, generates specific and often overlooked challenges of interpretation. There is a crucial difference between a European investigation of the

⁹³ Erbschuld (*sic*) in Luther: *Schriften*, 34. I. Band, Predigten 1531.24 Drescher; for *debitum hereditarium*, see *Das Deutsche W  rterbuch* s.v. 'Erbschuld'.

⁹⁴ E.g. Ambr. *De Myst.* 1.32; cf. Rondet 1966; Beatrice 1978; Dubarle 1999; Minois 2002: 43–80; see p. 78.

⁹⁵ Cf. the useful term 'das n  chste Fremde': U. H  lscher 1994.

Naven, or an American study on the Polynesian concept of ‘mana’, on the one hand, and research on the ancient Greek idea of ἐλπίς, χάρις, or προγονικὸν ἁμάρτημα.⁹⁶ Another logic is at work. In order to recover the memory of scholarship, to see where we stand when we look anew at this material, what lies under our feet, and attempt to better discern what the other possible positions are, a thorough review of reception is imperative. Scholarship on Greek religion is not an antiquarian pastime and it does not start with Friedrich Creuzer or Christian August Lobeck. A much wider diachronic perspective is needed to make sense of the broad picture. The study of ancient Greek religion has far deeper roots than the professional Protestant scholarship on religious history so brilliantly discussed by Jonathan Z. Smith and others over the years. Scholars often talk about the necessity of moving beyond the ‘culturally determined assumptions’ that condition research on ancient Greek religion and culture, especially the prevalent legacy of Christian filters, yet they seldom define what these assumptions actually are in any detail or disentangle what their precise implications might be. The statement is often used as a rhetorical claim to discredit earlier scholarship and justify the new research as a more adequate rendering of cultural difference. It can also lead to facile deconstruction and claims of perpetual aporia. The aim of the following pages, instead, and more modestly, will be to outline some dominant characteristics and important moments in the history of the etic category ‘inherited guilt’, so that a less predetermined approach to the material of ancestral fault might be better conceived.

In the first centuries of the Christian era, not only was ancestral fault an object of explicit theology discussed by philosophers and authors such as Plutarch, but it functioned as a more general principle of religious thought. A passage from Pausanias can be taken as an example. Pausanias interrupts his geography of Arcadian memory at Book 8 of the *Periegesis* with a rich digression about Philip of Macedon.⁹⁷ Stumbling upon traces of the ancient king in the local calendar and the landscape of Nestane, a mere village, he relates a story about the great Philip’s cautionary wickedness. When he was forty-six, about to embark on his great Eastern expedition, the Macedonian king joyously received an oracle from Delphi stating that the victim was ready for sacrifice. Rather than the Persian, of course, the

⁹⁶ Compare, for instance, the translation of *trokosi* shrine-cult practices as the ‘inherited guilt’ of biblical corporate responsibility, especially Ezekiel 18, by present-day Pentecostal anthropologists and missionaries in Ghana (e.g. Asamoah-Gyadu 2004), to the processes of Christianising translation of Greek προγονικὸν ἁμάρτημα reviewed in the following pages; cf. M. Smith 2008.

⁹⁷ Paus. 8.7.4–8; cf. Diod. Sic. 16.91.1–4; see Moggi and Osanna 2003: 322–4.

god was referring to the Macedonian himself, and Philip promptly perished. Not only did he die, however, but Alexander did not outlive him long, and his descendants died horrible, tragic deaths at the hands of their kin; children boiled in bronze cauldrons and the like. Macedonian power was erased as quickly as it came about. This, Pausanias tells us, was a result of Philip's impiety; more specifically, of his propensity for perjury. He might have demonstrated greater deeds than any Macedonian before or since, but no one in his right mind could call him a good general, we are told, as he continually trampled on the oaths of the gods and broke the trust (πίστις) of men. Victory is nothing in itself:

Φίλιππον δὲ βασιλέων μὲν τῶν πρὸ αὐτοῦ καὶ ὅσοι Μακεδόσι γεγόνασιν ὕστερον, τούτων μὲν πείθεται ἂν τις μέγιστα αὐτὸν ἔργα ἐπιδείξασθαι· στρατηγὸν δὲ ἀγαθὸν οὐκ ἂν τις φρονῶν ὀρθὰ καλέσειεν αὐτόν, ὅς γε καὶ ὅρκους θεῶν κατεπάτησεν αἰεὶ καὶ σπονδὰς ἐπὶ παντὶ ἐψεύσατο πίστιν τε ἠτίμασε μάλιστα ἀνθρώπων. καὶ οἱ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ μήνιμα ἀπήντησεν οὐκ ὀφέ, πρῶτα δὲ ὧν ἴσμεν.

Philip may be supposed to have accomplished exploits greater than those of any Macedonian king who reigned either before or after. But nobody of sound mind would call him a good general, for no man has so sinned by continually trampling on oaths to heaven, and by breaking treaties and dishonouring his word on every occasion. The wrath of heaven was not late in visiting him; never in fact have we known it more speedy.

The wrath of the gods (μήνιμα) saw no delay in punishing the founder of the κοινὸν τῶν Ἑλλήνων, but it also later extinguished his descendants and the power of his kingdom.⁹⁸ This inscription of failed Empire in the remote countryside of Arcadia must have been particularly resonant with an audience living under the Antonine *pax Romana* and the promises of the new Panhellenion. It was even more notable as an example of the cultural capital offered by the Greek literary archive. If only Philip had heeded the story of Glaucos and remembered the verse of the Pythia – ‘If a man keeps his oath, then his family prospers hereafter’, she had told him, ἀνδρὸς δ’ εὐόρκου γενεὴ μετόπισθεν ἀρείων – then his descendants would not have suffered oblivion at the hands of the gods.⁹⁹ The same Hesiodic passage cast as an example of ‘the injustices of the fathers’ (τὰ τῶν πατέρων ἀδικήματα) in Proclus’ commentary to the *Works and Days*, read

⁹⁸ Note 8.7.7: ἐμελλε δὲ ἄρα ὁ δαίμων καὶ τὸ γένος τὸ Κασσάνδρου κακῶς ἐξαμήσειν.

⁹⁹ 8.7.8: εἰ δὲ τῶν ἐς Γλαῦκον τὸν Σπαρτιάτην ἐποιήσατο ὁ Φίλιππος λόγον καὶ τὸ ἔπος ἐφ’ ἑκάστου τῶν ἔργων ἀνεμύνησεν αὐτόν, ‘ἀνδρὸς δ’ εὐόρκου γενεὴ μετόπισθεν ἀρείων’, οὐκ ἂν οὕτω δίχα λόγου δοκεῖ μοι θεῶν τις Ἀλεξάνδρου τε ὁμοῦ τὸν βίον καὶ ἀκμήν τὴν Μακεδόνων σβέσαι. For oracular tales in Pausanias, see Overmark Jul 2010.

in this case through its rewriting in Herodotus 6.86, functions as an index for the idea of ancestral fault, activating a whole range of references to the idea of generational punishment.¹⁰⁰ Even in far-away Nestane, the long cultural memory of the Greek literary landscape described by Pausanias is revealed, yet again, as a key to Empire.¹⁰¹ The notion of ancestral fault, here as elsewhere, is used by the text to make a statement about the solidarity of generations. It combines imperial history and the patterns of tragic myth, Delphic prophecy, divine wrath, curse, and generational politics, and it is designed to be recognised by all.

Pausanias, it is worth noting, also used the Glaukos story in 2.18.2 as a clear and obviously familiar shorthand for understanding the ancestral fault of the Pelopids in the Argolid.¹⁰²

ἐν δὲ τῇ Ἀργείᾳ προελθοῦσιν ὀλίγον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡρώου τούτου Θυέστου τάφος ἔστιν ἐν δεξιᾷ· λίθου δὲ ἔπεστιν αὐτῷ κριός, ὅτι τὴν ἄρνα ὁ Θυέστης ἔσχε τὴν χρυσὴν, μοιχεύσας τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ τὴν γυναῖκα. Ἀτρεά δὲ οὐκ ἐπέσχευεν ὁ λογισμὸς μετρησαί τὴν ἴσιν, ἀλλὰ τῶν Θυέστου παίδων σφαγὰς καὶ τὰ ἁδόμενα δεῖπνα ἐξεργάσατο. ὕστερον δὲ οὐκ ἔχω σαφὲς εἰπεῖν πότερον ἀδικίας ἤρξεν Αἴγισθος ἢ προὔπηρξεν Ἀγαμέμνωνι φόνος Ταντάλου τοῦ Θυέστου· συνοικεῖν δὲ φασιν αὐτὸν Κλυταίμνηστρα παρθένῳ παρὰ Τυνδάρειω λαβόντα. ἐγὼ δὲ καταγνώμαι μὲν οὐκ ἐθέλω φύσει σφᾶς γενέσθαι κακοῦς· εἰ δὲ ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον αὐτοῖς τὸ μίasma τὸ Πέλοπος καὶ ὁ Μυρτίλου προστρόπαιος ἠκολούθησε, τούτοις ἦν ἄρα ὁμολογοῦντα, ἥνίκα ἢ Πυθία Γλαύκῳ τῷ Ἐπικύδους Σπαρτιάτῃ, βουλευέσσαντι ἐπιόρκα ὁμόσαι, καὶ τοῦδε εἶπεν ἐς τοὺς ἀπογόνους κατιέναι τὴν δίκην.

Advancing a little way in the Argive territory from this hero shrine one sees on the right the grave of Thyestes. On it is a stone ram, because Thyestes obtained the golden ram after debauching his brother's wife. But Atreus was not restrained by prudence from retaliating but contrived the slaughter of the children of Thyestes and the banquet of which the poets tell us. But as to what followed, I cannot say for certain whether Aegisthus began the sin or whether Agamemnon sinned first in murdering Tantalus, the son of Thyestes. It is said that Tantalus had received Clytemnestra in marriage from Tyndareus when she was still a virgin. I myself do not want to condemn them for having been wicked by nature; but if the pollution of Pelops and the avenging spirit of Myrtilus dogged their steps so long, it was after all only consistent that the Pythian priestess said to the Spartan Glaukos, the son of Epicydes, who consulted her about breaking his oath, that the punishment for this also comes on the descendants of the sinner.

¹⁰⁰ For line 284 of the *Works and Days*, see pp. 159–76; for Hdt. 6.86, see pp. 278–96.

¹⁰¹ Cf. Musti 1996. ¹⁰² See Musti and Torelli 1986: 271.

Following a pattern of association that is somewhat reminiscent of what we find in Plutarch, Hermias, or Proclus, Pausanias sees the records of tradition as reflections of the same doctrine of divine punishment. The generational misfortune of the Pelopids can be understood through the teaching of the Pythia to Glaukos concerning the effects of perjury on the descendants of the transgressor, the same teaching that was not heeded by Philip in 8.7.4–8; that is, even if the myth of the Pelopid crimes and punishments has nothing to do with perjury. It matters that one example of punishment through generations is equivalent to the other, ‘congruent’ (ὁμολογοῦντα) with it. Pausanias does not know if Agamemnon or Aegisthus ‘first’ committed a crime, but he makes it clear that the murderous acts of one reproduce the murderous acts of his father; and the adultery of the other, the adultery of his father. He refuses simply to ascribe this to their heredity, their *physis*. It is, rather, the consequence of a crime from another generation, that of Pelops, whose agency is identified as the pollution of Pelops, his μῖασμα, and the avenging spirit of his victim, the προστρόπαιος of Myrtilus.¹⁰³ The length (ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον) of its effect through the generations motivates the comparison with the story of Glaukos. The μῖασμα and the προστρόπαιος that ‘follow’ (ἠκολούθησε) the descendants of Pelops are the same thing as the punishment (δίκην) that ‘comes down’ (κατιέναι) on the descendants of the perjurer. Clearly lacking the kind of detailed, explicit theology of generational punishment exposed by Plutarch and his philosophical successors and predecessors, Pausanias more modestly proceeds by analogy and rationalises the logic of a myth through an example of history. The passage, which stems from the physical remains of the tomb of a mythical character, shows how the contemplation of a monument can generate the idea of ancestral fault.

This idea had wide currency in Greek and Roman literature in the first centuries of the Christian era. It appears in many genres and contexts.¹⁰⁴ The Republican dramas of Accius and the Neronian tragedies of Seneca, notably, made ample use of it in their ideologically charged representations of cursed dynasties.¹⁰⁵ The often-repeated claim that the notion of delayed generational punishment is a mere vestige of the archaic period in later sources is obviously groundless. A famous Greek proverb said: ‘The mills

¹⁰³ Cf. 8.14.10.

¹⁰⁴ See e.g. Paus. 1.36.3; 1.37.6–7; 2.18.2; 3.13.4; 5.2.3; 7.15.6; 8.7.4–8; 8.53.3; 9.5.9; cf. Hor. *Carm.* 1.28, 30–1; 3.6; Liv. 10.38.10; 22.53.11; Jos. *AJ* 8.15; Val. Flacc. 4.33–4; Dio Cass. 59.11.4; Val. Max. 1.1; Pers. 2.25; Juv. 13.206; Ael. *VH* 3.43; 13.2; Ath. 552a–b; Tert. *Adv. Marcionem* 2.15.

¹⁰⁵ See Dangel 1987; Rivoltella 1993; Baldarelli 2004; Mantovanelli 2004.

of the gods are slow in grinding, but they grind to fine flour.¹⁰⁶ Like all proverbs, this one is impossible to date precisely, but the Proverb of the Mill first appears in Plutarch as an expression of the traditional ethical wisdom on ancestral fault assembled and consolidated in the *De sera numinis vindicta*. It was also used by Celsus in his own discussion of ancestral fault. In the *True Discourse*, his apologetical defence of Hellenism and attack on Christianity, Celsus attempted to define ancestral fault as a positive element of Greek wisdom:

καὶ ἡμεῖς μὲν ὅ τι ποτὲ περὶ κολάσεως λέγοντες καὶ διὰ τῆς περὶ κολάσεως διδασκαλίας πολλοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων ἐπιστρέφωμεν· ὁ δὲ κατὰ τὸν Κέλσον ἱερεὺς τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος ἢ τοῦ Διὸς οἷα ἀποκρίνεται, κατανοήσωμεν· Ὅψέ, φησί, θεῶν ἀλέουσι μύλοι, καὶ Ἐς παίδων παῖδας, τοὶ κεν μετόπισθε γένωνται.¹⁰⁷

Whatever we may say about punishment, we turn many from their sins just by our teaching of punishment. But let us consider what reply is made by the priest of Apollo or Zeus quoted by Celsus: 'The mills of the gods grind slowly', he says, even 'To children's children, and to those who are born after them.'

The idea of ancestral fault is dressed in the full legitimacy of immemorial tradition in that text. It belongs to the speech of 'the priest of Apollo or Zeus', according to the author, something that gives it grounding in the prestige of sanctuaries and the knowledge of privileged specialists of religion.¹⁰⁸ Quoted from a poem that combines the Proverb of the Mill with an adapted line from the *Iliad* (20.308: καὶ παίδων παῖδες, τοὶ κεν μετόπισθε γένωνται), the statement embodies the weight of tradition.¹⁰⁹ The assurance of punishment ranging over generations is shown as a witness to the power of the gods in this text. Not only is teaching the principle of ancestral fault a testimony to the moral worth of traditional Hellenic religion, but the 'education of punishment', if we can take the words of Origen to reflect the text of Celsus, is shown as an efficient tool in the instruction of morality, as it conditions people to refrain from doing

¹⁰⁶ The afterlife of the proverb is notable: it appears as 'God's mill grinds slow but sure' in the *Jacula Prudentium* of George Herbert (1640), for instance, as 'Gottes Mühlen mahlen langsam, mahlen aber trefflich klein | Ob aus Langmut er sich säumet, bringt mit Schärf er alles ein', in the *Retribution* of Friedrich von Logau (1694) and as 'Though the mills of God grind slowly, yet they grind exceeding small' in Longfellow's 1870 translation. As well as a number of books and short stories, *The Mills of the Gods* is also the title of a 1965 documentary on the Vietnam War.

¹⁰⁷ Origen, *Cels.* 8.40; see Fédou 1988: 98–9.

¹⁰⁸ See G. T. Burke 1981; Pichler 1980; Fédou 1988; Hauck 1989; Hargis 1999.

¹⁰⁹ Cf. Pichler 1980: 177–9.

wrong in the face of certain retribution.¹¹⁰ The words of prophecy embody an authoritative religious lesson. Celsus, like Cicero, Plutarch, and Pausanias before him, like Hermias or Proclus after him, defines ancestral fault as a major doctrine of Greek religion.

It is against that thriving notion of elite and popular religion that Christianity shaped its understanding of Greek ancestral fault. We can see this in the *Contra Celsum*, for instance, where Origen attacks the claims of Celsus on Greek ancestral fault word for word. The reaction of Origen to the passage of Celsus opposes citations from the Hebrew Scriptures to pagan prophecy.¹¹¹ The pagan material is shown to correspond precisely to the old corporate responsibility of Hebrew Scripture, such as the statement that the sins of the father will be visited 'unto the third or fourth generation'. The passages cited by Origen activate a number of verses from the Old Testament to confront the two traditions:

ὅρα δὲ ὅσω τούτου βέλτιον τὸ 'Οὐκ ἀποθανοῦνται πατέρες ὑπὲρ τέκνων, οὐδὲ υἱοὶ ἀποθανοῦνται ὑπὲρ πατέρων· ἕκαστος τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ ἑαυτοῦ ἀποθανεῖται' καὶ τοῦτο 'Τοῦ φαγόντος τὸν ὄμφακα αἰμωδιάσουσιν οἱ ὀδόντες αὐτοῦ' καὶ τὸ 'Υἱὸς οὐ λήψεται ἀδικίαν πατρός, καὶ πατὴρ οὐ λήψεται ἀδικίαν υἱοῦ· δικαιοσύνη δικαίου ἐπ' αὐτὸν ἔσται, καὶ ἀνομία ἀνόμου ἐπ' αὐτὸν ἔσται.' ἐὰν δέ τις ὅμοιον εἶναι λέγῃ τῷ 'Ἐς παίδων παῖδας, τοὶ κεν μετόπισθε γένωνται' τὸ 'Ἀποδιδούς ἁμαρτίας πατέρων ἐπὶ τέκνα ἐπὶ τρίτην καὶ τετάρτην γενεάν τοῖς μισοῦσί με', μαθέτω ὅτι ἐν τῷ 'Ἐξεκλήλ' παραβολῇ' τὸ τοιοῦτον εἶναι λέλεκται, αἰτιωμένῳ τοὺς λέγοντας· 'Οἱ πατέρες ἔφαγον ὄμφακα, καὶ οἱ ὀδόντες τῶν τέκνων ἡμωδίασαν', ὃ ἐπιφέρεται· 'Ζῶ ἐγώ, λέγει κύριος', 'ἀλλ' ἢ ἕκαστος τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ἁμαρτίᾳ ἀποθανεῖται.' οὐ κατὰ τὸν παρόντα δὲ καιρὸν ἔστι διηγῆσασθαι, τί σημαίνει ἢ περὶ τοῦ 'ἐπὶ τρίτην καὶ τετάρτην γενεάν' ἀποδίδοσθαι τὰς 'ἁμαρτίας' παραβολή.

See how much better than this is the saying 'The fathers shall not die for the children, nor shall the sons die for their fathers. Each man shall die for his own sin.' And this saying: 'The teeth of him who ate a sour grape are set on edge.' And 'The son shall not receive the iniquity of the father, and the father shall not receive the iniquity of the son; the righteousness of the righteous man shall be upon him, and the wickedness of the wicked shall be upon him.' And if, as equivalent to the verse '*To children's children and to those who are born after them*', anyone quotes 'Rendering the sins of the father upon the children unto the third and fourth generation of them that hate me', let him learn that in Ezekiel this is said to be a 'parable'; for he finds fault with people who say: 'The fathers ate a sour grape and the

¹¹⁰ Education of punishment: τῆς περὶ κολάσεως διδασκαλίας. See M. Frede 1997.

¹¹¹ See Fédou 1988: 420–74; with Meijering 1977: 127–8; Hauck 1989: 105–35.

children's teeth are set on edge.' And he goes on to say 'As I live, saith the Lord, each man shall die for his own sin.' However, it is not the right time to explain what is meant by the parable about the 'sins' being visited 'unto the third and fourth generation.'

The position presented by Origen is anchored exclusively in the Judaic text, as the grounding of Origen's rebuttal in the ancient and authoritative texts of the Hebrew Bible seeks to counter the accusations of Celsus that Christianity was a denatured perversion of traditional Jewish religion and thought.¹¹² This correspondence between Greek teaching and biblical authority is portrayed as proof of the inferiority of the Greek wisdom, as it continues to defend an idea explicitly rejected by divine revelation. In this polemical discussion against Hellenism, the traditional Greek principle of ancestral fault is shown to be fundamentally opposed to Christian teaching, both as an old concept surpassed by new revelation, and one that can be given new meaning through allegorical interpretation.¹¹³ Origen cites Ezekiel 18 and other passages as texts that should be read as *παράβολα*.¹¹⁴ This allows him to counter the teaching that responsibility can be transmitted through generations with a statement of absolute personal responsibility. Before the *renovatio mundi* of triumphant Christianity, Origen defines the heritage of Hellenism fixed in its form and presented as a vestige of past errors.¹¹⁵ It is surpassed by superior tradition and justice, as well as by more refined techniques of exegesis.¹¹⁶ Ancestral fault is portrayed as the fossil of a failed system. After having been championed by Celsus as a constitutive part of Hellenism defining itself against Christianity, ancestral fault is further portrayed by Origen as an element of the old Greek heritage against which Christianity is in turn defining itself. The opposition between Hellenism and Christianity on the topic is shown as an echo of earlier polemics in the Jewish tradition: a new revelation surpassing the old received wisdom and announcing a new era of divine revelation and personal responsibility. Origen both recognises the Greek idea as the exact equivalent of a concept found in the Old Testament and neutralises it as one that has been abandoned through

¹¹² Origen cites Deut. 24.18; Jer. 31.30; Ezek. 18.3–4; 20; Exod. 20.5; see Krašovec 1999: 128–52.

¹¹³ Note the later adaptation of the same Proverb of the Mill, mentioned by Celsus and criticised by Origen, to apocalyptic Christian discourse against Roman rule and pagan idolatry in the Eighth Sibylline Oracle (9–18). The proverb also appears in Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. math.* 1.287.

¹¹⁴ For *παράβολα* in Origen, see Cocchini 1980; Scarpit 1989; Van Uytanghe 1991. For his allegorical reading of scriptures, see Martens 2008, with bibliography; note Hanson 1959 and Fadabini 1982; cf. Tert. *Adv. Marcionem* 2.15, with 4.15.1 and 4.27.8.

¹¹⁵ See Fédou 1988: 53–139. ¹¹⁶ Cf. Pichler 1980: 220–35; Fédou 1988: 487–95.

further revelation and new exegesis. It is interesting to note that the theme of Greek ancestral fault in Origen is not compared to any notion of original sin, as such a notion plays little part in Origen's interpretation of the Christian message.¹¹⁷

These two modes of understanding, appropriation and rejection, marked all subsequent centuries of Christian reception and scholarship on the question. The many Christianising readings of Greek ancestral fault have of course been far from uniform. What I propose to call theological deixis, the expression of the religious distance established by the speaker with the material described, necessarily establishes such a category in terms of its degree of nearness to or farness from other familiar categories. Analogy, distinction, and evaluation are the main operations in play, with one object assessed as the equivalent of something else. The operation functions as a form of cultural translation. These two modes of understanding follow twin patterns. One consists in bridging the gap between the translated text and the language categories of the reader, bringing the semantic and ideological baggage of the translated text closer to the reader by adapting the text to his frames of reference. The other consists in drawing the text as an object of alterity that can only be understood by the reader through an effort of defamiliarisation; there the text remains, or is cast as, something wholly other. In this process, the translated text does not move towards the reader, but the reader has to move towards the text.¹¹⁸ These two processes, rebaptised 'domestication' and 'foreignisation', have been shown by the work of translation theorists, most notably Lawrence Venuti in his 1995 book *The Translator's Invisibility*, to be guiding principles behind the history of Western translation.¹¹⁹ Although the two are rarely completely separate from each other, as the example of Origen above well shows, the poles are clear.

The long Christian reception of Greek ancestral fault was largely shaped by these related and complementary translating processes of domestication and foreignisation. From the Middle Ages onwards, following on the footsteps of early Christian apology, the meanings of Christian sin, with their implications of temptation, intention, and moral evil, the theological narratives of biblical corporate responsibility and Patristic original sin came to be superimposed on the Greek material of ancestral fault in order

¹¹⁷ See Hammond Bammel 1989; Laporte 1997; Ramelli 2007.

¹¹⁸ The two strategies are famously discussed by Schleiermacher in his 1813 essay *Über die verschiedenen Methoden des Übersetzens*: see Venuti 1991; Bernofsky 1997; Snell-Hornby 2004.

¹¹⁹ Venuti 1995; cf. Pym 1996.

to make it understandable and familiar. Ironically, the systematisation of ancestral fault by Proclus as a dogma of pagan religion against Christianity made the Christian reception of the principle all the more straightforward, as it could approach the material in the form of a clearly defined religious doctrine. Through a long process of domestication, the Plutarchean principle has thus been thoroughly Christianised and made to answer the most familiar frames of reference of the day. A parallel process of foreignisation has led to the reconfiguration of ancestral fault as an object of alterity: the incommensurable belief of an essentially different world. The principle of ancestral fault, in other words, has been reframed in later times as something thoroughly different, eventually to be rejected as an unjust belief incompatible with the modern Christian self and modern 'rational' religion. These reflexes of domestication and foreignisation have largely conditioned the medieval and modern receptions of Greek ancestral fault. Over and above the Plutarchean filter of tradition, these different and complementary programmes of Christian reception have also left their imprint on the modern baggage of the scholarly category inherited guilt.¹²⁰

I will try in what follows to bring out the significance of these two programmes in some detail, the fifteen centuries of Christian reading superimposed on the Plutarchean tradition, in order to better frame what is at stake in redefining Greek ancestral fault. A 'thick translation' is needed to examine the processes at work in transferring the codes of one culture into another.¹²¹ We will start with the first extant Christian translations of the pagan material: the work of Isaak Sebastokrator and William of Moerbeke, two medieval translations of Proclus' text on ancestral fault in the *De decem dubitationibus circa Providentiam*. One tried to integrate the text of Proclus to the requirements of Christian discourse, recasting it as a piece of Christian theology, while the other clearly framed it as a foreign, pagan text. In both cases the translation operated an exegetical annexation, which reduced the translated object to Christian categories, either as Christian teaching, or as an artefact of pagan alterity. These two translations of Proclus' *progonikon hamartēma* perfectly illustrate the twin processes of domestication and foreignisation at work in the reception of Greek ancestral fault. Here, as elsewhere, it is not sufficient to acknowledge the Christian baggage that has shaped the study of Greek religion. It is necessary to know what that baggage actually is.

¹²⁰ Cf. the observations of Hertz's classic 1922 study, with von Fürer-Haimendorf 1974.

¹²¹ See Appiah 2005.

Isaak Sebastokrator

The text of Isaak Sebastokrator directly appropriates the treatise of Proclus for the theology of his day.¹²² In this he continues a long tradition of Christianising the Hellenic Πρόνοια (Providence).¹²³ In his domesticating adaptation of the old treatise, the doctrine of ancestral fault of the Diadochus became a theological position in contemporary Christian theories of sin, a justification of the Orthodox Christian God's delayed method of punishment.¹²⁴ The Providence of the One in Proclus becomes the Providence of God in Sebastokrator; what we see simply as individual *fatum* in Moerbeke becomes 'natural necessity' (ἀνάγκη φυσική) in Sebastokrator; and the sense of ἀμάρτημα (fault) and its cognates is loaded with the meanings of Christian sin. All traces of the text's pagan origins were taken out, starting with the name of Proclus. The operation was so successful, in fact, that it took close to a thousand years for scholars to identify Proclus as the actual author behind Sebastokrator's text.¹²⁵ Gods are rendered as God, and Plato's name disappears. Every mention of Hellenic cult and ritual is taken out of the text, of course, as well as all mythical and religious *exempla*, such as the names of Teiresias and Oedipus, and the story of Apollonius of Tyana.¹²⁶ The first chapter of Proclus' Question Nine is altogether cut from Sebastokrator's text, but there is an important addition to the model of the text – a biblical citation is inserted at the beginning of the passage. At the end of the first paragraph, after the presentation of the paradox, Sebastokrator introduced the sentence:

τὸ δὲ προγονικῶν ἀμαρτημάτων δίκας τίνειν τινὰς τὸ γονεῖς φάγωσιν
 ὄμφακας καὶ τέκνα αἰμωδιάσουσι λόγιον μαρτυρεῖ.

That some pay a penalty for the faults of their ancestors illustrates the *logion*: 'Parents will eat <sour> grapes, and their children's [teeth] will be set on edge.'

The entire passage of Question Nine is thus framed as a witness to the biblical Proverb of the Grapes (here in the version of Jeremiah 31.29–30).¹²⁷

¹²² On Sebastokrator, see Böse 1960; Westerink 1962; J. Dornseiff 1966; Rizzo 1971; Isaac 1977: 23–8; Erler 1979; Magdalino 1987; Opsomer and Steel 2003: 4–7.

¹²³ See Ewing 2005.

¹²⁴ On Byzantine theories of the Fall and divine punishment, see e.g. Meyendorff 1974: 143–9; Aghiorgoussis 1977; Weaver 1985a; 1985b; Cunningham 2006.

¹²⁵ The identification of Sebastokrator's text as a translation of Proclus was first made by Westerink in a letter to Böse (see Westerink 1962).

¹²⁶ Found in chapter 60 of Proclus' 'original' text.

¹²⁷ See Kaminsky 1995: 139–78; Krašovec 1999: 428–50.

It becomes in this way an illustration of the Old Testament passages on the question, which Origen contrasted so violently with the ancestral fault of the Hellenes more than seven centuries earlier. Ancestral fault, *progonikon hamartēma*, is shown as the equivalent of Hebrew corporate punishment in the version of Sebastokrator.

In chapter 59, for instance, the entire section concerning the ontological continuity in time of city and family is omitted, including the discussions of participation through emanation and substance, as well as the mentions of the σείρά. Instead, the shared, common nature of the human race is emphasised by Sebastokrator to explain the continuity of punishment over generations. Adapting the discussion of Proclus on the *animal unum* of city and family, Sebastokrator argues for the shared substance of the entire human race, which is made under the image of God, γενόμενον κατ' εἰκόνα θεοῦ (59). It is the species as a whole that has a kinship with eternity in his text, not the *polis*. Man is a creature of reason (ζῶον λογικόν), says the theologian, and each one of us belongs in common to the larger group of the species (60). The species itself is more comprehensive, longer lived, and more divine than every one of its individual elements. Its superiority derives from its kinship with eternity, which itself exists according to the image of God (59). On the level below, in the same way as the human race is one living being (ζῶον) under God, each individual family is a unique combination of men and bodies in the same species. 'Also one is the family of many men', says Sebastokrator, 'and one the blending of many bodies.'¹²⁸ Each family is subsumed under the more comprehensive, longer lived, and more divine species, and in turn each individual is also subsumed by his family. The family is a common ensemble of lives, the essential unit of participation of the individual in this world below the level of the species. In the text of Sebastokrator, the human race as a whole plays the role of the *polis* in Plutarch and Proclus, and the family is the unit that defines us inside this group.

In this Byzantine rendering of chapter 59 of the *De decem dubitationibus circa Providentiam*, the greater part of Proclus' discussion is omitted in favour of a Christianising image of participation in the justice of God. Sebastokrator does reproduce there the entire discussion of Proclus on therapeutic sympathy (e.g. the cauterisation of the opposite hip) and similitude in the actions of Providence over time. But, instead of involving only the extended groups of family and city, his portrait of participation in sin refers to the entire human species. Man is made in the image of God,

¹²⁸ 59: καὶ γένος πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων ἓν, καὶ κράσις διαφορῶν σωμάτων μία.

but he is only the imperfect reflection of his model. *By nature*, he shares in the common fault of the Fall. His further responsibility inside the group of the family is but one element of his more consequential participation in the larger category of the species. The image of humanity's shared nature as an imperfect image of God is what Sebastokrator translates out of the different ontological levels of Monads and Henads that he found in Proclus. Ancestral fault is an equivalent of original sin in this Byzantine text. It illustrates the common medieval Orthodox picture of original sin, defined not as a state of guilt and shared responsibility, but as the cause of human fallibility.¹²⁹

Another example of the text's strategy of appropriation in adapting Question Nine of Proclus to Christian theology is found in chapter 60, where Sebastokrator radically alters his model. As the theory of transmigration obviously cannot be adapted to a Christian text, it is simply done away with, and chapter 60 is reduced to a short paragraph, which only reproduces the image of the theatre of souls.¹³⁰ Instead of this image expressing the continuity of the roles played by the transmigrated souls in a family over time, it portrays only the continuity of the successive generations in the drama of the family. In the picture of Sebastokrator, it is not *fatum* that is the playwright, but 'natural necessity' (ἀνάγκη φυσική), the same 'natural necessity' that was said to be identical for all 'bodies' at the beginning of chapter 59.¹³¹ That is: the Fall. As the different souls of the drama, submitted to the same physical necessities of the family, reproduce the same play, they can be attributed rewards and punishments through the principle of similitude on that basis.

In the text of Sebastokrator, the entire structure of Proclus' argument from Question Nine of the *De decem dubitationibus* is profoundly transformed.¹³² The alterations made to the text are more thorough than in that of any other Question. A large part is simply cut out, and there are some important modifications added to the text in order to make the discussion compatible with contemporary Christian teaching. It is domesticated as a

¹²⁹ See e.g. Meyendorff 1974: 143–9; Minois 2002: 48–65.

¹³⁰ 60: καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς βίοις ἡμῶν δράματι μὲν ἀνάλογον ἡ σύμπασα τοῦ γένους περίοδος, τῷ δὲ ποιητῇ τοῦ τοιοῦτου δράματος ἡ φυσικὴ ἀνάγκη, τοῖς δὲ εἰς τὸ δράμα τελοῦσιν αἱ ἄλλαι καὶ ἄλλαι ψυχαί, πληροῦσαι τὴν εἰμαρτὴν ταύτην σκηνὴν· ἀθλοθετεῖ δὲ ἡ πρόνοια ταῖς ψυχαῖς καὶ τιμαὶ δι' ἄλλας ἄλλας καὶ ἀτιμάζει διὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα τῆς ζωῆς.

¹³¹ And, it must be noted, that forms the subject of Sebastokrator's second treatise in the *Tria Opuscula*: Περὶ προνοίας καὶ φυσικῆς ἀνάγκης.

¹³² For the patterns of Sebastokrator's adaptations, see J. Dornseiff 1966; Rizzo 1971; Erler 1979. There is no detailed study on Sebastokrator's adaptation of the Proclean original of Question Nine. The observations of I. Böhme 1975 are of little to no use.

document of Christian theology for direct usage in the debates of the day. The pagan dogma of Proclus is recast with no difficulty as an acceptable theological position within the debates of the Eastern imperial Church. This eleventh-century Byzantine translation is the first systematic Christian interpretation of Greek ancestral fault produced after the disappearance of classical paganism. The principle of Proclus becomes there both an illustration of Old Testament corporate punishment, and a reflection of Orthodox original sin.

In the work of Sebastokrator, the text of Proclus is fully appropriated by Christian dogma. The pagan and the Christian traditions are closely integrated in his domesticating translation. At the time when this text was produced, pagan literature had ceased to be seen as an immediate enemy which needed to be actively combated, and it came to be more fully mined for Christian compatibility and prefiguration.¹³³ It was actively used to further enrich and deepen the Christian world-view. Sebastokrator's 'borrowing' is a typical product of his time. The imperial prince wrote in the context of the eleventh-century Byzantine renaissance.¹³⁴ He conceived this text at a time when the highest circles of the imperial court – of which Sebastokrator, the brother of emperor Alexis Comnenus, was an exalted figure – had been actively rediscovering and interpreting the religious value of pagan literature.¹³⁵ The cultivation of Neoplatonic writers played a particularly important role in this process, and great efforts were made to adapt their texts to the new synthesis of Hellenic Christian philosophy. Together with Iamblichus and Porphyry, the interpretation of Proclus played a significant role in this movement, and this is one of the reasons why so much of his work has survived.¹³⁶ Michael Psellos, the towering figure of this eleventh-century renaissance, gives a good illustration of this approach to ancient literature as a material of directly transposable doctrinal value, at the beginning of his *Περὶ τῆς χρυσῆς ἀλύσεως τῆς παρ' Ὀμήρω*:

Ὁ μὲν Ὅμηρος ἴσως μέχρι τοῦ μυθικῶς εἰπεῖν τὰ περὶ τῆς χρυσῆς σειρᾶς προαγαγὼν ἀπηλλάγη, ὑμεῖς δέ μοι παρέχετε πράγματα τὰ τε ὑπερθεῖν οὐρανοῦ καὶ τὰ νέρθειν πολυπραγμονοῦντες τῆς γῆς. καὶ ὁ μὲν τις ὑμῶν τὸ περὶ τὴν χρυσὴν ἄλυσιν, ἕτερος δὲ τὸ περὶ τὴν αἰῶραν, καὶ ἀπλῶς ἄλλος περὶ ἄλλο τι τοῦ μύθου, ἢ περὶ πάντα λιχνεύεσθε σύμπαντες· ἐγὼ δὲ καὶ πρὸς μὲν τὸ χαλεπώτατον τῆς ἀναλογίας ὁρῶν ἀποδειλιῶ, οὐχ ἥκιστα δὲ

¹³³ See e.g. Barber and Jenkins 2006.

¹³⁴ See still the classic work of Lemerle 1971; cf. Niarchos 1981; N. G. Wilson 1996: 148–79.

¹³⁵ Ierodiakonou 2002. ¹³⁶ Podskalsky 1976; Boss and Seel 1987; Bos and Meijer 1992.

ὅτι μὴ Ἑλληνικῶς τὰ Ἑλληνικά ἀλληγορεῖν ἐμὲ βούλεσθε μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἡμετέρας δόξας μεταβιβάζειν τὰ παρ' ἐκείνοις ἀπόρρητα. ἀλλ' εἰ δοκεῖ πρότερον οἰκείως αὐτοῖς ἐπόμενοι Ἑλληνιστὶ ῥαψωδήσωμεν ἢ ἀλληγορήσωμεν, εἴτα καὶ τῷ ἡμετέρῳ ποτίμῳ νάματι τὸ ἄλμυρον αὐτοῖς ἀποκλύσωμεν.

Homer has most probably kept himself from going so far as to make the Golden Chain into a myth; but you keep giving me trouble about this, with your clumsy interest for everything above the sky and under the earth. One of you has a hunger for the Golden Chain, another for the Swing; to put it simply, everyone for a myth, and all for everything. But me, I am filled with fear when I look at the particular difficulty of the analogy, and all the more so because you want me not only to explain allegorically Greek texts in Greek, but also to transpose into our own beliefs what were ineffable mysteries for them. But, if you please, let us first follow them literally, and let us then rhapsodise in Greek or allegorise, and after we will melt their salt into the stream in which we drink.¹³⁷

The backlash against this open Christian usage of pagan Neoplatonic literature was swift and terrible. In the reign of Alexis I Comnenos, a new climate of orthodoxy was rigidly enforced, and the cultivation of pagan theology actively suppressed by the state apparatus.¹³⁸ The theological appropriation of pagan texts became a cause of persecution. In 1082, for instance, John Italos, a student of Psellos and his successor in Constantinople as 'Consul of the Philosopher' ("Υπατος τῶν Φιλοσόφων), was condemned in a high profile trial for heresy and paganism.¹³⁹ The charges against him included paganism and apostasy, and believing in the transmigration of souls.¹⁴⁰ Interestingly enough, one of the central figures responsible for the conduct of the Italos trial was Isaak Sebastokrator himself.¹⁴¹

After the Italos trial, promoting the work of Proclus, let alone adapting his writing to Christian theology, had become a deadly and dangerous proposition. That is exactly the time to which our treatise belongs. This is probably one of the reasons why Sebastokrator is so careful to hide his debt to Proclus in his text, as well as to integrate it more fully into Christian dogma. The text of Proclus is thoroughly domesticated as a document of Christian theology, but it is entirely rewritten in the process to purge it of its foreign elements. Not only is the text of Proclus adapted to Christian thought by recharging its language with new meanings, with cuts and additions, but it is also presented as the illustration of a proverb from the

¹³⁷ *Opusculum* 46 in Duffy and O'Meara 1989–92. ¹³⁸ Clucas 1981.

¹³⁹ See Irmscher 1982; Duffy 1995; Smythe 1996; N. G. Wilson 1996: 153–6.

¹⁴⁰ Gouillard 1985. ¹⁴¹ See Isaac 1977: 21–2; Smythe 1996.

Old Testament and of the doctrine of original sin. The *De decem dubitationibus* of Isaak Sebastokrator shortens and modifies the Proclean ‘original’ of Question Nine more than any other passage in the treatise; it cuts the greater part of Proclus’ argument and completely transforms the nature of its thought.

William of Moerbeke

The other extensive medieval translation of Proclus’ text takes a completely different path. Instead of trying to integrate the text of the *De decem dubitationibus circa Providentiam* into a project of Christian theology, the translation of William of Moerbeke (c. 1215–86) keeps it safely distant by framing it as a foreign text.¹⁴² There is no special effort made to accommodate the discussion of the Diadochus to contemporary dogma, and the text is kept as close to the original as possible. It is interesting to note that the word *culpa* does not appear in the translation of Moerbeke, for instance; the Dominican scholar was more careful on the question than many of his modern successors. One of the very last works of Moerbeke in his old age, the *Tria opuscula* follows a radically literal principle of foreignising translation, and the vocabulary and the word order reproduce the original Greek text to the letter.¹⁴³ The language of Moerbeke superimposes a thin layer of Latin equivalences over the Greek text, forging a number of neologisms in the process; it does not seek to translate it into familiar, elegant Latin, with familiar, Christian categories of thought.¹⁴⁴ Finished just after Étienne Tempier’s condemnation of the 219 propositions in 1277, the translation of Moerbeke does not seek to make the pagan treatise into a Christian text.¹⁴⁵ The text of Proclus is framed as an

¹⁴² On the characteristics of Moerbeke’s translations, see Grabmann 1936; Verbeke 1953; Isaac 1977: 28–35; Böse 1985; Opsomer and Steel 2003: 7–10.

¹⁴³ Opsomer and Steel 2003: 8–10.

¹⁴⁴ In terms of neologisms, there is nothing quite as exciting as the *iustasubpullulatio* of the *In Parmenidem* (used to translate παρυπόστασις; 923, 13) in Question Nine of the *De decem dubitationibus*, but we do find words like *preaspicere*, *preinterimens*, *repullularunt*, *preexterminare* to translate, respectively, προιδεῖν, προαναιρούσα, ἀνέκυψαν, προσφανίζειν; see Opsomer and Steel 2003: 7–10. The verb *palificare*, used to translate the Greek δηλοῦν, is formed on the *palam*–δηλον equivalence, and is a common fixture of Moerbeke’s translations. The words of the passage which Moerbeke noted down in the margins of his autograph, and which are still present in the margins of V, include ὑπούλου, ἀμυσσουσιν (*sic*), σκηνῇ, προσωπέϊα and κῆρας. He later rendered them with the Latin *turgido*, *laxant*, *fune*, *larvis*, and *nequitias*; see Opsomer and Steel 2003: 9–10; Bataillon 1989b.

¹⁴⁵ On the 1277 condemnations, see Wippel 2003, with bibliography.

irreducible object, the foreign product of a foreign world. Nowhere is this clearer than in the translation of Question Nine.

The passages of chapters 58–61 where Proclus mentions elements of pagan religion, such as purification rituals, oracles and mysteries, and reincarnation, are not omitted from the text, as in Sebastokrator, but are all translated in Latin as faithfully as possible. So are the discussions concerning emanation from the One and participation in the various levels of reality. But many other important words of the passage are left untranslated and rendered *tel quel*: *dika*, for instance, is kept in Greek.¹⁴⁶ This is a term that appears four times in the passage. Some Latin equivalent would have been readily available to Moerbeke, a high official of the Papal chancellery with a long experience in manipulating the rich juridical language of Medieval Latin, but the word's precise meaning at the intersection of guilt and sanction, responsibility and justice, would then have been lost. As Carlos Steel has shown, one characteristic of Moerbeke's translation practice, which is far from being the slavish word by word version that some have portrayed, is a precise understanding of the text's meaning; the choice of keeping *dika* untranslated in the text is an illustration of this principle at work.¹⁴⁷ The result is a constant reminder that we are faced with the unfamiliar concepts of a foreign world.

Other words for which Latin equivalents were available, and which Moerbeke also chose to keep in Greek, are *omokhronus*, which he rightly glosses as *contemporanea*, and *ypocrite*, glossed as *qui sub larvis*, a word which he could easily have rendered with *actor* or one of its synonyms but would then have lost the very important reference to the mask.¹⁴⁸ Moerbeke's translation of Proclus' theatre of souls, in fact, is a good example of his technique of defamiliarisation. The technical words for mask, cothurns, and costume are rendered with the Latin equivalents of a Roman theatre that had long ceased to exist by the thirteenth century. The more easily convertible *ypocrites*, on the other hand, is not translated, its foreignness emphasised by the gloss *id est qui sub larvis* ('that is, the one who is under the mask'), even keeping the force of the *ὑπό* with the *sub*; the text thus focuses our attention on a word which would otherwise have been read without a second thought. On that note, it is interesting to point out that, at least since the ninth-century *Commentum Brunsianum* to Terence, many people in the Latin West thought that ancient drama was performed by

¹⁴⁶ *dika* (58: 4x); see also *telete* 58; *lysii* 58; *poliukhus* 59; *omognios* 59; *omokhronou* 59; *ypocrite* 60.

¹⁴⁷ Opsomer and Steel 2003: 7–8. ¹⁴⁸ Chs. 59 and 60.

silent, masked actors who mimed a text read by a *recitator*.¹⁴⁹ The translator's insistence that it is the person who is *under the mask* who speaks the words of the two characters is meant to avoid confusion.

A number of other words were not translated because there are no precise Latin Christian equivalents for them: these are all terms of pagan religious vocabulary which Moerbeke refuses to assimilate to Christian categories, simply leaving them in the original or affixing them with a gloss. In chapter 58 *telete* is kept in Greek next to the translated *revelationes*, and the original λύσεις is also kept as *lysii*. In chapter 59 we find *poliouxhus*, glossed as *id est praeses multitudinis*, and *omognios*, glossed as *id est caput generis*, two other types of divinities irreducible to Christian categories and correspondingly emphasised as foreign by Moerbeke. Like modern anthropologists translating other cultures into their own and choosing to emphasise certain 'indigenous' concepts as particularly significant examples of the irreducible 'otherness' of another society's cultural categories, Moerbeke marks certain words by keeping them in the original and framing them as distant and unfamiliar. This is a translation strategy that can be seen at work throughout Moerbeke's text. What is more significant for our purpose, however, is the frequency of these untranslated words in the passage concerning ancestral fault: there are more Greek terms in Question Nine than in any other question of the treatise, even though Question Nine is smaller than almost all the other questions.¹⁵⁰ Proclus' doctrine of ancestral fault comes out of Moerbeke's translation as a particularly exotic, unchristian element of the text.

The goal of Moerbeke's translation, however, is of course to translate foreign meaning into intelligible terms. Like modern anthropologists putting their fieldwork on paper, he has to resort to the categories of his own culture to describe his material and render the foreign concepts of Proclus into contemporary Latin. Foreignising translation necessarily involves an accompanying process of domestication of the text. In this Latin translation of a text from the Greek *magister paganorum*, the vocabulary of fault and punishment of Question Nine, for instance, is conveyed through the language of Christian sin: release from the faults of ancestors is rendered through 'atonement', *purgare*, ἀμάρτημα and its cognates are systematically translated with *peccatum*, *peccare*, ἀμοιβή with *retributio*,

¹⁴⁹ See Pittaluga 1997; Symes 2003. I am grateful to Benjamin Victor for the reference to the *Commentum Brunianum*.

¹⁵⁰ It takes 6 Budé pages. In comparison, the other nine questions take 6, 5, 16, 8, 8, 12, 9, 14, and 6 pages, respectively.

δίκη in three passages with *vindicta*, συμπάθεια and cognates with *compassio*, *compatientia*, and so on.¹⁵¹ In spite of Moerbeke's extensive effort to translate the text literally, it is readily apparent that the greater part of Proclus' pagan theological doctrine is repackaged into the Christian language familiar to the Dominican scholar.

The translations of Moerbeke were part of a larger contemporary effort of theological domestication of Aristotelian and Neoplatonic philosophy, of which Thomas Aquinas is only the most famous representative.¹⁵² We know that Moerbeke's *De decem dubitationibus circa Providentiam* continued to be read in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.¹⁵³ The pagan text was sought during this time in terms of its contemporary usage for Christian doctrine. It is important to keep in mind that Question Nine of the *De decem dubitationibus* was translated by Moerbeke in a reading context where a Christian notion of ancestral fault was fully conceptualised and intensely debated. Hebrew corporate responsibility and Patristic sources provided a large amount of material on the question, and the issue of punishment through generations was a topic of great interest in the circles of Moerbeke and his readers. The *Concordantia Discordantium Canonum* of Gratian, to take an influential example, the twelfth-century monument of scriptural and Patristic jurisprudence at the basis of Canon Law, devotes the entire fourth *quaestio* of Book I to the issue of the *parentum crimen*.¹⁵⁴ It accepts this category of fault as a legitimate cause of preventive punishment. Similarly, the *Summa Theologiae* of Thomas Aquinas (c. 1225–74), close collaborator of Moerbeke and fellow Dominican, looks at the question of 'involuntary sin' in *quaestio* 108 of Book II, and its description of divine vengeance on the children of the wicked comes surprisingly close to what we find in the passage of Proclus.¹⁵⁵

It famously justifies the punishment of children for the crimes of the fathers as a *vindicta sine culpa, sed non sine causa*.¹⁵⁶ One of the grounds of this apology for delayed divine wrath is that it 'may be considered as a medicine, not only healing the past sin, but also preserving from future sin,

¹⁵¹ *Purgare* ch. 58; *peccatum* 58; 59; 60; 61; *retributio* 59; 60; *vindicta* 59; 60; 61; *compatientia* 59.

¹⁵² See e.g. Conway 1996; 2002; Keys 2006.

¹⁵³ See Grabmann 1936; Imbach 1978; Kristeller 1987: 199; Bataillon 1989a; Boss and Seel 1987; Bos and Meijer 1992. Fifteen manuscripts survive, written between the thirteenth and the eighteenth centuries (see Böse 1985).

¹⁵⁴ On Gratian's *Concordantia*, see Winroth 2000; Kuttner 2004.

¹⁵⁵ On sin in the work of Aquinas, see e.g. Kors 1930; Labourdette 1985; Weithman 1992; Leblanc 1993; Scheppard 1996; Minois 2002: 95–101; te Velde 2005; Otto 2009. Contrast with Kemeny 1991 or Krahmer 2002.

¹⁵⁶ II.ii.108; cf. I.ii.81–2.

or conducing to some good'.¹⁵⁷ As in the treatises of Plutarch and Proclus, this method of healing may be compared to the medical action of the doctor on one part of the body to relieve another, even if 'the medicine of the body never blinds the eye in order to repair the heel'.¹⁵⁸ Children can be punished for the faults of their ancestors on three grounds: because they are the possession of their father, because sin can be reproduced by *imitatio*, and because God may wish to make an example of 'our humiliation or probation'.¹⁵⁹ Even then, the delay 'unto the third and fourth generation' is a function of divine clemency, as it gives time for the descendants to mend their ways.¹⁶⁰ 'Yet should the wickedness of the descendants increase, it becomes almost necessary to take vengeance on them.'¹⁶¹ The similarities between this passage and the texts of Plutarch and Proclus are striking, even if a direct borrowing is chronologically difficult to establish, as we will see below.

The laws of men cannot follow the 'hidden judgments of God', yet they must conform to the spirit of divine law, and the *Summa Theologiae* justifies the punishment of children for the faults of their parents by human law. Thomas Aquinas, it must be said, asserts as a general principle that 'according to human judgment, a man should never be condemned without *culpa* of his own' to punishments such as flogging, death, mutilation, or beating.¹⁶² But he does allow for certain cases where a man may be condemned to a punishment of forfeiture, 'even according to human judgment', *etiam sine culpa, sed non sine causa*.¹⁶³ These punishments, in some conditions, can involve punishment *pro peccato parentis*.¹⁶⁴ This passage was interpreted less restrictively by subsequent readers. In the *Malleus Maleficarum*, for instance, the infamous manual for Inquisitors published in 1486 by Heinrich Kramer and Jakob Sprenger, the two

¹⁵⁷ II.ii.108.

¹⁵⁸ II.ii.108: *sciendum tamen quod nunquam medicina subtrahit maius bonum ut promoveat minus bonum, sicut medicina carnalis nunquam caecat oculum ut sanet calcaneum, quandoque tamen infert nocumentum in minoribus ut melioribus auxilium praestet*; compare with Plutarch, *De sera numinis vindicta* 19. Cf. Ziegler 2001.

¹⁵⁹ II.ii.108.

¹⁶⁰ II.ii.108: *quod autem dominus dicit, visitans peccata parentum in filios, in tertiam et quartam generationem, magis videtur ad misericordiam quam ad severitatem pertinere, dum non statim vindictam adhibet, sed expectat in posterum, ut vel saltem posterius corrigantur; sed, crescente malitia posteriorum, quasi necesse est ultionem inferri*.

¹⁶¹ II.ii.108.

¹⁶² II.ii.108: *et ideo nunquam secundum humanum iudicium aliquis debet puniri sine culpa poena flagelli, ut occidatur, vel mutiletur, vel verberetur*.

¹⁶³ II.ii.108: *poena autem damni puniuntur aliqui, etiam secundum humanum iudicium, etiam sine culpa, sed non sine causa*; see n. 156.

¹⁶⁴ II.ii.108.

Dominicans refer to the discussion of the *Summa Theologiae* in justifying the preventive destruction of the daughters of witches.¹⁶⁵ 'For we know from experience that the daughters of witches are always suspected of similar practices, as imitators of their mothers' crimes; and that indeed the whole of a witch's progeny is infected.'¹⁶⁶

The discussions illustrated by the passages mentioned above from Gratian and Thomas Aquinas are without any doubt important contexts of interpretation in which the discussion of ancestral fault of Proclus was conceived by Moerbeke and understood by his readers. In the translation of Moerbeke, Question Nine of the *De decem dubitationibus* offered an authoritative example of *peccatum sine culpa, sed non tamen sine causa*. But the main figure of reference for the understanding of the Proclus passage was certainly original sin.¹⁶⁷ Original sin, and this already in the discussions of the late antique Church Fathers where it was first conceived of and defined, especially Irenaeus of Lyon, Hilary of Poitiers, and Augustine, had always been thought of in reference to the scriptural passages of Hebrew corporate responsibility; the mention of one involved activation of the other.¹⁶⁸ This is true for instance of the *Summa Theologiae* passage mentioned, section 108 of the second part of Book II. There, Aquinas makes a careful distinction between spiritual and temporal punishment: 'A man is never condemned to a spiritual punishment for another man's sin, because spiritual punishment affects the soul, in respect of which each man is master of himself.'¹⁶⁹ The only spiritual punishment which can be transmitted through generation is original sin, he says, sending us back to his earlier discussion of the topic: he had covered the question at length in sections 82 and 83 of Book I.ii. In these passages also the similarities between the language of the *Summa Theologiae* and the texts of Plutarch and Proclus are readily apparent.

The transmission of the *peccatum originale* in Book I.ii of the *Summa Theologiae* is presented as a transmission of *culpa* through origin and similitude.¹⁷⁰ Without going into the intricacies of original sin in the *Summa Theologiae*, and of the many points of correspondence between

¹⁶⁵ *Malleus Maleficarum* II.i.12.

¹⁶⁶ II.i.13. On the theology of the *Malleus Maleficarum*, see Broedel 2003.

¹⁶⁷ *Summa Theologiae* I.ii.81–4. On original sin in the time of Aquinas, see e.g. Kors 1930; Martorelli Vico 1990; Weithman 1992; Baumanns 1995; Scheppard 1999; MacDonald 1999; Traina 2001; Filipowski 2001; Minois 2002: 81–116; te Velde 2005; Fitzpatrick 2010.

¹⁶⁸ See for instance Beatrice 1978: 123–41.

¹⁶⁹ II.ii.108: *ad primum ergo dicendum quod unus homo poena spiritali nunquam punitur pro peccato alterius, quia poena spiritalis pertinet ad animam, secundum quam quilibet est liber sui.*

¹⁷⁰ I.ii.81–3.

the ideas of Proclus and Aquinas on the topic, we can single out this one element, the image of the group, and by extension of the human race, as one single body, a *corpus*:

Et ideo alia via procedendum est, dicendo quod omnes homines qui nascuntur ex Adam, possunt considerari ut unus homo, inquantum conveniunt in natura, quam a primo parente accipiunt; secundum quod in civilibus omnes qui sunt unius communitatis, reputantur quasi unum corpus, et tota communitas quasi unus homo. Porphyrius etiam dicit quod participatione speciei plures homines sunt unus homo. Sic igitur multi homines ex Adam derivati, sunt tanquam multa membra unius corporis. Actus autem unius membri corporalis, puta manus, non est voluntarius voluntate ipsius manus, sed voluntate animae, quae primo movet membra. Unde homicidium quod manus committit, non imputaretur manui ad peccatum, si consideraretur manus secundum se ut divisa a corpore, sed imputatur ei inquantum est aliquid hominis quod movetur a primo principio motivo hominis. Sic igitur inordinatio quae est in isto homine, ex Adam generato, non est voluntaria voluntate ipsius sed voluntate primi parentis, qui movet motione generationis omnes qui ex eius origine derivantur, sicut voluntas animae movet omnia membra ad actum. Unde peccatum quod sic a primo parente in posteros derivatur, dicitur originale, sicut peccatum quod ab anima derivatur ad membra corporis, dicitur actuale. Et sicut peccatum actuale quod per membrum aliquod committitur, non est peccatum illius membri nisi inquantum illud membrum est aliquid ipsius hominis, propter quod vocatur peccatum humanum; ita peccatum originale non est peccatum huius personae, nisi inquantum haec persona recipit naturam a primo parente. Unde et vocatur peccatum naturae; secundum illud ephes. ii, eramus natura filii irae.

Therefore we must explain the matter otherwise by saying that all men born of Adam may be considered as one man, inasmuch as they have one common nature, which they receive from their first parents; even as in civil matters, all who are members of one community are reputed as one body, and the whole community as one man. Indeed Porphyry says (*Praedic., De Specie*) that 'by sharing the same species, many men are one man'. Accordingly the multitude of men born of Adam, are so many members of one body. Now the action of one member of the body, of the hand for instance, is voluntary not by the will of that hand, but by the will of the soul, the first mover of the members. Wherefore a murder which the hand commits would not be imputed as a sin to the hand, considered by itself as apart from the body, but is imputed to it as something belonging to a man and moved by a man's first moving principle. In this way, then, the disorder which is in this man born of Adam is voluntary, not by his will, but by the will of his first parent, who, by the movement of generation, moves all who originate from him, even as the soul's will moves all the members to their actions. Hence the sin which is thus transmitted by the first parent to his

descendants is called 'original', just as the sin which flows from the soul into the bodily members is called 'actual'. And just as the actual sin that is committed by a member of the body, is not the sin of that member, except inasmuch as that member is part of the man, for which reason it is called 'human sin'; so original sin is not the sin of this person, except inasmuch as this person receives his nature from his first parent, for which reason it is called 'the sin of nature', according to Eph. 2:3: 'We ... were by nature children of wrath' (trans. English Dominican Province).

The spiritual punishment set in motion by original sin is the result of a shared guilt of origin and similitude in the fault of Adam at the Fall. The first impulse of the common ancestor, understood in Aristotelian terms by Aquinas, is the direct cause of the state of sin in which we are all born. We inherit its responsibility by virtue of our shared nature, our participation in the extended body of the species. The *peccatum originale* is transmitted to man through his corrupt origin, as a 'stain', or an 'infection'.¹⁷¹ Such elements of correspondence between the contemporary understanding of original sin and the portrait of ancestral fault in the *De decem dubitationibus circa Providentiam* – and there are many others – were certainly a central point of reference for the interpretation of Question Nine by the readers of Moerbeke. The picture of Greek ancestral fault coined by Moerbeke's translation was without any doubt read in reference to Christian original sin. It was to continue being read in this way for many centuries afterwards.

The discussions of the *Summa Theologiae* on the nature of involuntary sin and original sin are strikingly reminiscent of the passages of Plutarch and Proclus on ancestral fault, in the logic of their argument and their usage of imagery. If the text of the *De sera numinis vindicta* had been available in Latin in the Middle Ages, or the *magnum opus* of Aquinas had not been completed thirteen years before the translation of the *De decem dubitationibus* by Moerbeke in February 1280, a case for direct borrowing might have been conceivable.¹⁷² Perhaps part of the text had been known to Aquinas before the completion of the translation by Moerbeke.¹⁷³ But it could well be that the similarities are rather to be imputed to the common imperial and late antique language of ancestral fault that had infused both the texts of Plutarch and Proclus, on the one hand, as well as the Patristic discussions of corporate responsibility and original sin on which Aquinas grounds his own treatment of the two questions, on the other.

¹⁷¹ I.ii.83; cf. Scheppard 1999.

¹⁷² The date of the translation is indicated on the last page of the manuscript.

¹⁷³ For Aquinas' knowledge of Moerbeke's Proclus, see e.g. Kristeller 1987: 198, n. 36.

The profound similarities between the discussions published by Aquinas in 1267 and that of the Proclus passage translated by Moerbeke in 1280 are possibly not witnesses to any direct contact but could result from a diachronic coincidence in the parallel evolutions of the two related traditions.

The very idea of original sin itself, after all, that fairly late Christian dogma, developed mostly around Romans 5:12, and, following others, defined by Augustine and his successors in the West, must have been influenced, at least in part, by the readily available ideas, words, and images of Greek ancestral fault – something that, for very obvious reasons, has never really been explored. Few scholars of early Christian thought seem to be aware of the importance and abundance of the Greek material of ancestral fault (and its Latin expressions) in the first three centuries of the Christian period.¹⁷⁴ The term for original sin in the Greek Orthodox Church, interestingly enough, is now προπατορική αμαρτία, προπατορικό αμάρτημα, or προγονική αμαρτία. A profound continuity links the ancient Greek and Christian ideas of generational punishment through the much deeper differences that separate them. Whatever the case, and this is certainly not the place to reopen the old debate on the origins of Christian original sin, what is important for us in this context is that the discussion of Proclus, however faithfully translated it could be by such a precise and conscientious scholar as Moerbeke, found itself readily integrated to a set mould of interpretation. The expressions of Greek ancestral fault, when they were rediscovered in ancient literature in the Middle Ages and the early modern period, were recognised as familiar figures and read through the closest available categories.

Moerbeke, then, framed the text of Proclus as a distant, foreign product of paganism, only to recoin it in readily intelligible Christian terms. The end result is a Christianised exotica. Proclus' theory of ancestral fault, contrary to what we find in Sebastokrator's text, is shown as the utterly foreign product of a different world, and the language used by Moerbeke emphasises this 'framing of alterity'. But the passage of Proclus was translated and received in a context that had strikingly similar frames of reference on the question. The Latin terms used by Moerbeke to translate

¹⁷⁴ Beatrice 1978: 243–60, is representative in his interest in the Christian variants of the idea in the 'eresia popolare' with which the Augustinian texts were engaged, and his complete lack of reference to the prominent non-Christian material of Greek ancestral fault that was such a staple of popular and philosophical religion in the entire cultural area of Hellenism within which early Christianity was formed. See also Dubarle 1967; Rondet 1966; N. P. Williams 1929; Alexandre 2004; Steinberg 2005; cf. Ricoeur 1960–3, vol. II: 323–54.

the text impose a heavily Christian meaning on the language of the passage, and the entire text is thus filtered through the contemporary Christian understanding of sin, retribution, and atonement. In its Christian translation, the punishment of Greek ancestral fault becomes the result of a sin, a *peccatum*. This involves, among many other things, its being a moral error, an overwhelming condition of transgression, a disorder of the will, weakness to desire and guilt of conscience, a pollution of the soul, a failing before the commandments of an omniscient God, participation in cosmic evil, and so forth. Whereas Sebastokrator's version strove to integrate the text of Proclus into Christian thought, achieving its result only by cutting a good part of it out and strongly modifying the rest, Moerbeke's translation aims to preserve the status of Proclus' text as the document of another epoch and another religion, even emphasising its alterity by the language it uses – only to end up reinscribing the greater part of it with contemporary Christian meaning. In other words, one strove to Christianise a passage which he ultimately failed to integrate fully into his version, while the other, although he was trying to render the pagan text faithfully in all its strange, distant tone, ended up superimposing a deep Christian filter over its meaning. The same dialectic of domestication and foreignisation is at work in both medieval translators, but on the opposite sides of the spectrum. In both cases, the doctrine of ancestral fault, conceived of by Proclus as part of an apology of Hellenism against Christianity, was reframed entirely in terms of Christian thought.

Haereditarium piaculum *and inherited guilt*

The intertwined dialectic of domestication and foreignisation discussed in the preceding chapter has of course been at work in the Western reception of its classical past from the earliest times of Christianity to the present day. It is a truism to say that Athens and Jerusalem have always been read through each other, but the implications of this process are not always fully disentangled in contemporary cultural history, and 'Athens' rarely stands for 'religion' in the equation.¹ In the case of such a theologically involved topic as ancestral fault, it is imperative that we do this, if we want to move beyond the unwitting reproduction of earlier ideological debates. The ready codifications of the Greek tradition by Plutarch and Proclus, the shocking nature of the ancestral fault paradox, its strong religious roots in pagan myth and ritual, and its many similarities with the corporate punishments of the Old Testament as well as with Christian theories of sin made this reception particularly tense and eventful. Domestication and foreignisation continued to orient the way Greek ancestral fault has been conceptualised and perceived in the later centuries of its modern reception. As this reception is what ultimately determined much of the baggage of perceptions and associations behind present research on the topic, it will be fruitful to continue following the usages of Plutarch's text in later centuries, and the different generations of scholarship that have predicated the modern category of ancestral fault on this text. The first section of this chapter follows that process from the sixteenth century onwards.

The early modern reception of Greek ancestral fault can be divided schematically into two overlapping phases. Both had profound effects on the constitution of the modern perception of the question. In the first phase, the principle of Plutarch was recognised as a reflection of Christian doctrine, and the expressions of Greek ancestral fault were thoroughly Christianised in the process of this framing and its accompanying

¹ See e.g. Pelikan 1997.

translations. Integrated into the early humanistic project that was elevating the classical heritage to the level of canonical authority, ancestral fault was conceptualised as an expression of Christian penology.² The *De sera numinis vindicta*, perceived as 'the testament of antiquity', was read as a manual of Christian doctrine, and the different mentions of ancestral fault in Greek literature, especially in tragedy, were gathered in a web of citations around the core of Plutarch's treatise. The principle of Plutarch and Proclus was seen as a pagan dogma echoing Christian thought on the transmission of sin. As Christian thought changed, so did the interpretations of the Greek idea. In line with a long Christian tradition, Greek ancestral fault continued to be perceived in the modern period as a direct counterpart to the corporate responsibility of the Old Testament, and the inherited stain of original sin. Read through the medieval and early modern theological tradition, it became indexed to the language of Christian programmes on Providence, responsibility, and sin. It could be made to challenge rival Christian authorities on the question, or to confirm others. Seen as an expression of divine justice, it was thought to contribute to the concrete expression of this justice in moral education, and in the practice of human law.

The second phase of early modern reception continued to perceive Greek ancestral fault as a single dogma of antiquity, to see it through Christian lenses, and it continued to predicate its understanding of the question on the reading of Plutarch's treatise – but it rejected its value as a model of thought for the contemporary world. The clearest expressions of this process can be seen in the seminal work of seventeenth-century Dutch humanism, which has traced the path for so much subsequent scholarship on the question. At the dawn of the *Querelle des Anciens et des Modernes*, the prestigious heritage of classical literature carried on being used to challenge the scriptural hold on authority, but in time its overwhelming authority itself came to be challenged by the rise of a more self-conscious modernity. The importance of the first large-scale enterprises of universal cultural comparatism that saw the light at this period cannot be overplayed.³ As Europe came to see the 'savages' of the world through the eyes of the Greeks, it began to look at the Greeks as savages. The consequent foreignisation of the Greek material led to its reframing as a figure of alterity. This is readily apparent in the case of ancestral fault, as we will see in the work of Hugo Grotius (1583–1645) and Jan Lomeier (1636–99).

² For the notion of 'penology', see Saunders 1993.

³ See the essays gathered in Höfele and von Koppenfels 2005.

Pictures of ancestral fault as a degenerate and primitive principle of superstition, a collectivist and irrational belief standing between the self and his freedom, are the ideas that have dominated nineteenth- and twentieth-century research on the question. They are in many ways direct heirs to the earlier debates of the seventeenth-century humanists.

Parentum peccata

The numerous editions of Plutarch's text from the early modern period to the present day are good witnesses to the layers of Christianising reading that have accumulated over the interpretation of Greek ancestral fault in the last five centuries.⁴ As the treatise contains much of the ancient Greek vocabulary concerning ancestral fault, its translations are ideal indicators for us to understand how the Greek ideas have been conceptualised through the many generations of Christian scholarship. As the reception of the treatise has been crucial in shaping the modern perception of Greek ancestral fault, we can also gain precious information on the genealogy of the modern category by looking at how it has been presented through the ages.

Over the centuries of print, the editors of the *De sera numinis vindicta* have, with few exceptions, presented Plutarch's doctrine of delayed punishment in an explicitly Christian light. From the early modern period onwards, a strong tradition of scholarship has portrayed Plutarch's thought as of one of those exceptional pagan minds that were either reflecting Christian belief or completely prefiguring it; the explicitly Christian reading of the *De sera numinis vindicta* is predicated on and reinforced by this tradition. In the generalised Western mining of ancient literature for moral education, the *Moralia* of Plutarch have long occupied pride of place: in time, the Delphic priest came to occupy the role of ethical advisor to the Christian world.⁵ The most widely read ancient author of the modern ages until the devaluation of later Greek literature in the nineteenth century, Plutarch was recast as a contemporary teacher of wisdom, and the interpretation of his writing was adapted to fit the mould.⁶ The *De sera numinis vindicta* has been consistently seen as the jewel in the crown of the

⁴ I have limited myself to the editions of Pirkheimer (1513); Xylander (1572); Wytttenbach (1820–1) [1772]; de Maistre (1816); Hackett (1844); Hackett and Tyler (1867); Peabody (1885); Super (1899); Méautis (1935); De Lacy in De Lacy and Einarson (1959); Vernière (1974); and Görgemanns in Görgemanns *et al.* (2003).

⁵ On the modern reception of Plutarch, see e.g. Berry 1961; Van Marion 2001; Lamberton 2001: 188–97; Guerrier 2012.

⁶ Lamberton 2001: 188–97.

Moralia, and it has consequently been submitted to wave after wave of thorough Christian reframing over the ages.

The focus of the treatise on the nature of Providence and the punishment of transgressions, and its original format as a tool of moral exhortation, made the *De sera numinis vindicta* an ideal object for such an explicit Christian framing. Our text had to remain useful and relevant. It goes without saying that this explicitly Christian choice of reading is pendant to the implicit Christian categories used to translate the language of the text as a domestic product. These many centuries of layered filtering cannot simply be brushed off by the more neutral tone adapted in the editions of the secularised scholarship of recent decades.⁷ The filters of reception have become imbricated with the Greek texts. Only by cultivating an awareness of the nature, the significance, and the baggage of influence of these layers of religious and ideological interpretation can we attempt to look beyond them. The following examples of domestic framing from the prefaces of different significant printed editions of the *De sera numinis vindicta* published in Latin, French, English, and German in the last five hundred years will give an example of the variety, but also the notable consistency, of the Christian appropriations of the text in the modern period.

At the dawn of the Reformation, in late medieval Germany, the question of the transmission of sin through generations continued to be discussed as a pressing concern. The *Malleus Maleficarum*, for example, devotes the entire thirteenth chapter of its second Book to the issue.⁸ The book was first published in 1486 in Cologne, and re-edited in 1490 in Nuremberg. Late medieval Nuremberg is also the city where the *De sera numinis vindicta* was first printed as a separate text (the Aldine *Moralia* had already appeared in Venice in 1509).⁹ The scholar responsible for this edition is the Catholic knight Willibald Pirckheimer (1470–1530), the friend of Erasmus and Dürer, and a once famous soldier, diplomat, and humanist of the Holy Roman Empire of Maximilian and Charles V.¹⁰ This highly influential early Nuremberg edition, *De his qui Tarde a Numine Corripiuntur Libellus*, first printed in 1513 by F. Peypus, and illustrated by Dürer himself, was re-edited a number of times. In the preface to the original 1513 translation of Pirckheimer, the scholar dedicates the edition to his famous elder sister Caritas Pirckheimer (1466–1532), the Reverend

⁷ See Appiah 2005. ⁸ See pp. 74–5.

⁹ Pirckheimer 1513; see Einarson and De Lacy 1951; cf. Criniti 1979.

¹⁰ On Pirckheimer, see Staub and Vogel 1999.

Mother of the convent of St-Clare in Nuremberg.¹¹ The work, he says in the preface, belongs to the type of philosophy which can ‘heal the soul, dissolve empty anxieties, free us from desires, and cast away all our fears’. This philosophy has been given to us by God as a tool against sin. The teaching of Plutarch, *vir gravissimus ac doctissimus*, is a manual of Christian virtue. ‘Ponder the text of this pagan man with great care’, he tells his *suavissima soror*. ‘If you do this, you will learn with certainty that these ancient philosophers sometimes did not stray far from the path of truth.’ All mortal possession is empty and vain, he says, ‘but only virtue is noble, and lasts unto eternity’. This type of marked Christian framing was to accompany the treatise for a long time afterwards.

More than two hundred and fifty years later, for instance, in 1772, the Calvinist Daniel Wytttenbach (1746–1820) wrote that reflection on the delays of divine punishment is fundamental for the thought of a true Christian (1820–I: 297).¹² This is how he justified starting his enterprise, the work which was to occupy all his life, the full critical edition of Plutarch’s *Moralia*, with the *De sera numinis vindicta*. Wytttenbach sees a close correspondence between the text of Plutarch and Christian thought, and he asserts that few texts are more useful for the pious conduct of our individual lives, and even the conduct of states. The present editions of the text are defective, he says, and its language still utterly corrupted, so that even though all praise it, it remains read by few (1820–I: 300–4). This first edition of an enterprise that already aimed to cover the entire *Moralia* is presented as an urgent and useful task of Christian piety (1820–I: 295–9). In this highly influential text, the *De sera numinis vindicta* remains a document of Christian doctrine through and through.

In addition to the rewriting of Plutarch’s text by Proclus in late antiquity, and the medieval rewriting of Proclus’ treatise by Sebastokrator, the text of Plutarch has also been rewritten in the modern period. The essay *Sur les délais de la Justice Divine dans la punition des coupables* (1816) presents us with an extensive Christianisation of the text. This pamphlet was composed by a radical Catholic ideologue of the French revolutionary wars and the Restauration, the reactionary count Joseph de Maistre (1753–1821), a leading figure of the Counter-Enlightenment.¹³ In his ‘edition’ of

¹¹ On Caritas Pirckheimer, see P. S. D. Barker 1995; Deichstetter 1982; Robinson-Hammerstein 2010.

¹² Wytttenbach 1772, re-edited in volume XII of the 1820–I complete edition of the *Moralia*. See Vernière 1974: 124–5, which is altogether invaluable on the reception of the dialogue. On Wytttenbach, see Sandys 1921, vol. II: 461–5.

¹³ See now Rohrbasser 2012 and Frazier 2012. On de Maistre, see Lafage 1998; Lebrun 2001; Boncompain and Vermale 2004; Fisichella 2005.

the treatise, which is explicitly based on the 1572 version of Amyot (*Pourquoy la iustice diuine differe quelquefois la punition des malefices*), de Maistre recast the *De sera numinis vindicta* as a manifesto of Ancien Régime Christianity against the French Revolution and Napoleon. De Maistre wrote his text at the imperial court of St Petersburg and published it in Lyon in 1816; the 'translation' was reprinted no fewer than six times in the nineteenth century.¹⁴ The essay of de Maistre presents itself as a translation of Plutarch, but it is in fact a long ideological improvisation on the model of the Greek original.¹⁵

The ancient text of Plutarch thus becomes an expression of anti-Revolutionary ideology. For de Maistre, the *De sera numinis vindicta* is 'le chef-d'oeuvre de la morale et de la philosophie antique' (1884: 245). It is largely superior to anything we can find in Plato, he says, and it approaches the truth of divine revelation more than any other text from pagan antiquity. This master text reflects the divine truth reached by Plutarch; for the Greek philosopher cannot have been innocent of the Christian message. Having lived 'dans le second siècle de la lumière', he is 'notablement éclairé' and has been recognised since antiquity as one who had heard the teaching of the Gospels (1884: 40).¹⁶ De Maistre sees the vengeful hand of God in the fall of Napoleon, a symmetrical punishment for the earlier sins of the Revolution, and he recognises the calamitous tyrant of the *De sera numinis vindicta* sent to punish the city in the figure of 'Buonaparte'. The principle of ancestral fault, 'le vice héréditaire', is a 'dogme universel' shared by men of all times and places (1884: 43). It 'disgusts reason' at first, but its 'apparent absurdity' is precisely what makes it plausible:

Tout le monde a cru, sans exception, qu'un méchant n'ayant point été puni pendant sans vie, il peut l'être dans sa descendance, qui n'a point participé au crime, de manière que l'innocent est puni pour le coupable . . . On ne peut s'empêcher de se demander 'Comment une opinion aussi révoltante, du moins pour le premier coup d'oeil, a pu devenir la croyance de tous les hommes; et si elle ne serait point appuyée peut être sur quelque raison profonde que nous ignorons?' Et ce premier doute amène bientôt des réflexions qui tournent l'esprit dans un sens tout opposé. (1884: 41)

The combination of experience, tradition, and the agreement of all men contribute to convince us that ancestral fault 'ne présente plus rien qui choque notre raison' (1884: 44). As the revealing title of the translation

¹⁴ In 1838, 1844, 1845, 1862, 1863, and 1884.

¹⁵ Cf. the comments of Méautis 1935: 21–8.

¹⁶ For Plutarch and Christianity, see e.g. Beaujeu 1959; Valgiglio 1985.

indicates, *Sur les délais de la justice divine dans la punition des coupables*, God only punishes the guilty, and guilt can be inherited, like property, valour, and titles. The argument that founds the legitimacy of inherited privilege is the same one that we find behind the logic of inherited guilt. Ancestral fault is a justification of aristocracy. The position we occupy in the world is a function of our hereditary nature. Sooner or later, through the 'secret correspondences' of God's mysterious ways, the imbalances of the world correct themselves, and each one of us finds himself back where he belongs by birth and nature (1884: 46).¹⁷ That is, the *sans-culottes* back at the lowest rung, Napoleon exiled, and aristocracy restored. In the discussions on Providence of the widely admired *Soirées de Saint-Pétersbourg*, de Maistre will later reproduce a number of passages from the *De sera numinis vindicta* concerning ancestral fault and use them in his radical justification of the Catholic doctrines of grace and original sin.

The texts of de Maistre became central references of European monarchist thought, and they had lasting influence on the nineteenth-century understanding of Plutarch's treatise. In his 1935 edition of the text, to take an example, Georges Méautis (1890–1970) still cites de Maistre with great approval, 'un penseur profond, un homme intègre, que l'on a appelé le "théoricien de la Providence"' (1935: 21).¹⁸ Méautis also strives to domesticate the text on his own terms. Echoing Pirckheimer and de Maistre, he mentions Plutarch as 'une âme religieuse et grave', and describes the *De sera numinis vindicta* as the 'religious Testament of Antiquity' (1935: 55). The text expresses 'the highest ideal dreamt by the Hellenic race', and it is reminiscent of Christianity in the nobility of its sentiment. In asking how the treatise can be useful 'pour notre époque', Méautis is led to propose different correspondences between the ancestral fault of Plutarch and the modern Christian age. He compares the tyrant executioner of the *De sera numinis vindicta* to the industrial robber baron, for instance, both as an agent of retribution, and as an example of the power of guilt; writing at the time of the Great Depression, he cites in this line a number of cases of high-profile suicides of leading bankers and industrialists tortured by their conscience (1935: 40). Méautis also sees an uncanny resemblance between the myth of Thespisios and contemporary theosophy, especially its theory of chakras (1935: 70–4).

More interestingly, perhaps, Méautis compares the extended life of the group discussed by Plutarch to the contemporary understanding of racial and national identity through time (1935: 42). Méautis was an author of the

¹⁷ On the aristocratic activism of de Maistre, see e.g. Bradley 1999.

¹⁸ See Vernière 1974: 126.

early 1930s. The responsibility of the individual for the family and the *polis* of Greek ancestral fault is for him comparable to the solidarity of the individual with his 'race' and with his nation. In the same vein, the 'hereditary leaps' described by Plutarch are seen as expressions of the contemporary genetic understanding of heredity. The transmission of depravity and viciousness through generations in the family and the race is the equivalent of the atavism of the 1930s, as it is found in the criminal psychology of the school of Lombroso, and especially the prevalent racist ideology of the day; the preventive extermination of the wicked by God is no more shocking than the widespread practice of eugenics at the time in America and Western Europe.¹⁹ From Proclus to Méautis, Plutarch's principle of ancestral fault has indeed been able to accommodate a wide variety of different discourses.

In the prefaces of Pirckheimer and Wyttenbach, of de Maistre, and Méautis, as we have seen, the *De sera numinis vindicta* is consistently framed as an expression or a prefiguration of Christian belief – however that was understood. These explicitly Christian readings are also manifest in English-language editions of the text. Three American editions of the nineteenth century can illustrate the point. C. W. Super (1842–1939), for instance, explicitly presents the *De sera numinis vindicta* as a prefiguration of Christianity in his 1899 edition of the treatise, *Between Heathenism and Christianity*. Earlier in the century, the Reverend H. B. Hackett (1808–75) recopied the title of de Maistre's translation in his 1844 edition, *On the Delay of the Deity in the Punishment of the Wicked*. He writes in his preface:

It is within the knowledge of the writer that the reading of this very treatise of Plutarch, which we are about to examine, had a salutary effect on the mind of Professor Tholuck, at a time when he was inclined to skepticism, and was among the providential means of leading him to find the best solution of his doubts in the teachings of the Bible.²⁰

This text was re-edited in 1867 by W. S. Tyler, and again the next year.²¹ In 1885 A. P. Peabody (1811–93), in his own edition of the treatise, described the text as:

The most remarkable of all Plutarch's writings, the most valuable equally in a philosophical and an ethical point of view, and the most redolent of what we almost involuntarily call Christian sentiment, is that 'On the Delay of the Divine Justice'. (1885: xxvi)

¹⁹ See e.g. Schafft 2004; Stern 2005; Cassata 2006.

²⁰ Hackett 1844: vii.

²¹ Hackett and Tyler 1868; see Vernière 1974: 126.

Peabody portrays Plutarch as a monotheist and asserts that the treatise is 'decidedly Christian in spirit' (1885: xiv). He goes so far as to say that it is an 'almost manifest transcript of the thought of the Divine Founder of our religion', and it cannot fail to have been influenced by the teaching of the Gospels (1885: xxviii). The principle of ancestral fault is an integral part of this full-scale domestication:

till further, when penalty appears to fall on the posterity or successors of the guilty, and a race, a people, a city, or a family seems punished for the iniquity of its progenitors, Plutarch brings out very fully and clearly the absolutely essential and necessary solidarity of the family of the community, which can hardly fail so to inherit of its ancestors in disposition and character as to invite upon itself, to merit for itself, or at best to need as prevention or cure, the penal consequences of inherited guilt. (1885: xxix)

The expression of this doctrine is 'all the more valuable', says Peabody, 'because it is not written by a Christian' (1885: xxx). The value of this pagan confirmation is that it reinforces the legitimacy of the 'intense stress laid by Christian teaching' on righteous retribution carried on after the death of the wicked themselves. It shows that this is not a 'mere dogma' of Christian Scriptures, but 'equally the postulate of the unsophisticated reason and conscience of developed humanity' (1885: xxii). The primitive stage reached by the Greeks in the evolutionary spiritual schema presented by Peabody, 'unsophisticated reason' as opposed to the 'developed humanity' of modern Christian (presumably Protestant) societies, is a guarantor of the significance of the coincidence. The natural, untutored mind of a pagan thinker can attain the same conclusions as the explicit words of the Revelation. By virtue of human reason, the word of God can reach all through different channels. As for de Maistre, the principle of ancestral fault is not a 'mere dogma', but a 'dogme universel'. The Christian correlation that all these editors saw in the text is of course the concept of original sin, and that of Old Testament corporate responsibility, which is still cited as a direct reference in the notes of the popular *Tusculum* edition of the treatise, for instance.²²

The Christianisation of Plutarch's text is not only apparent in the explicit Christian framing of its many editions, but also in the terms chosen to translate it in different modern languages. As one will expect from the discussion that has just preceded, most editors of the *De sera numinis vindicta* have not shied away from translating the original Greek into openly Christian categories of thought, as the majority of them saw

²² Görgemanns 2003: 333; cf. Krašovec 1999: 737–8.

the text itself to be an illustration of these categories. The discussion of Plutarch, and especially the sections concerning ancestral fault, has come to be entirely recast in a Christian shape. It has continued to be read through biblical corporate punishment and the stain of original sin. The words of the translations have been chosen in reference to Christian codes, and entire webs of Christian associations and meanings concerning such highly loaded themes as Providence, responsibility, and sin have thus become integrated into the body of the text, as if to its DNA. The principle of ancestral fault conceptualised by modern scholars through Plutarch has, in this way and others, been thoroughly Christianised. The following examples, comparing the translations of five key phrases in some Latin, French, English, and German editions, will better show the point:

Ch. 12

- τὰ τῶν τεκόντων σφάλματ' εἰς τοὺς ἐγγόνους
 Pirckheimer: *nati parentum scelera saepe sustinent*
 Wytttenbach: *diis majorum delicta posteris imputantibus*
 Vernière: *les fautes des parents sur leur progéniture*
 Peabody: *visiting the sins of the fathers upon the children*
 De Lacy: *the sins of parents on the children*

Ch. 18

- τοὺς ἐξ ἑαυτῶν κάκα πάσχοντας δι' αὐτοὺς ὀρᾶν
 Pirckheimer: *quam quisquis cernit suos ob sua ipsius male acta pati incommoda, & affligi*
 Wytttenbach: *si quis videat sua culpa suis posteris male esse*
 Vernière: *que de voir sa propre famille souffrir par sa faute*
 Peabody: *to see their posterity suffering on their account*
 De Lacy: *to see one's progeny suffer on one's own account*

Ch. 19

- κακίας δ' ὁμοιότητα συγγενικήν
 Pirckheimer: *malitiae innatam similitudinem*
 Wytttenbach: *malitiae innatam similitudinem*
 Vernière: *une ressemblance héréditaire vicieuse*
 Peabody: *the congenital likeness of wickedness*
 De Lacy: *a family resemblance in vice*

Ch. 20

- ἐγγενῇ κηλῖδα τῆς κακίας
 Pirckheimer: *innatam pravitatis maculam*
 Wytttenbach: *innatam vitii maculam*
 Vernière: *tache originelle du péché*

Peabody: *the native plague-spot of wickedness*

De Lacy: *inherited stain of vice*

Görgemanns: *der angeborene Makel des Bösen*

Ch. 21

- τὰ τῶν τεκόντων σφάλματ' εἰς τοὺς ἐγγόνους οἱ θεοὶ τρέπουσιν
 Pirckheimer: *caeterum non omnia parentum delicta in posteros Deus convertit*
 Wytenbach: *parentum peccata dii in liberos convertunt*
 Vernière: *les fautes des parents reportées par les dieux sur la tête des descendants*
 Peabody: *the gods visit all the transgressions of the fathers on the children*
 De Lacy: *the sins of parents on children the gods do visit*
 Görgemanns: *was die Erzeuger einst verfehlt, das suchen heim die Götter an den Sprösslingen*

This short list of translations makes the Christianisation of the text readily apparent and shows how it has carried through almost unchanged into more recent editions. The faults and transgressions of the Greek text are described as *peccatum*, 'péché', or 'sin', the translators introduce notions of moral responsibility in the text such as *culpa*, 'guilt', 'perversity', or 'vice', while no effort is made to render the specific meaning of more unfamiliar, that is, more unchristian, concepts such as σφάλματα, or μηνίματα, generally associated with the ubiquitous Christianising 'visitation'. More importantly, the translators have almost invariably superimposed references to Old Testament corporate responsibility and original sin in their texts. The two quotations of Euripides, for instance, are rendered almost word for word as the 'Jealous God' utterance of Exodus and Deuteronomy, and the genetic discussion of Plutarch is read as a prefiguration of original sin, with terms such as *innatam vitii maculam*, *malitiae innatam similitudinem*, 'la tache originelle du péché', 'inherited stain of vice', 'the congenital likeness of wickedness', 'der angeborene Makel des Bösen', and so on. The ὁμοιότης of Plutarch becomes 'imitation', and κακία 'wickedness'. The text remained useful because it was made readily recognisable. The same Christian categories used in late antiquity and in the Middle Ages to perceive Greek ancestral fault find themselves reproduced in contemporary translations of Plutarch's treatise.

Domestications

That domestication of the principle described by Plutarch is reflected in the early modern construction of inherited guilt as a category of

scholarship. Grounding themselves largely on the understanding of Plutarch's description in the *De sera numinis vindicta*, humanist scholars of the sixteenth century and their successors in the seventeenth century defined Greek ancestral fault as a doctrine, a dogma of the ancient pagan religion. The principle of Plutarch was read as an article of faith from the old wisdom of the Greeks, an element of belief, or *opinio*. It was used at once both to illuminate ancient texts, and to show their moral worth, their concrete utility. In the critical essays of early modern scholarship, and especially the prefaces and the notes accompanying the programmatic humanist editions of ancient texts, we can perceive this process at work – particularly in discussions concerning tragedy. The following brief notes will serve to illustrate the point.

One of the earliest conceptualisations of ancestral fault as Christian moral wisdom can be found in the work of the great Wittenberg Hellenist and Reformer Philip Melanchthon (1497–1560) and his school. In his 1533 *Enarratio Operum et dierum Hesiodi*, for instance, Melanchthon interprets line 284 of Hesiod's *Works and Days* as the expression of a doctrine similar to that of Hebrew corporate responsibility.²³ In that text Melanchthon reads the Hesiodic verse directly through the lenses of the Old Testament doctrine and presents the idea as an equivalent doctrine on which the Greeks wrote books. The representative example that is singled out is Plutarch's *De sera numinis vindicta*, with the last sentence of the passage reproduced in note 23 a literal translation of the Plutarchean treatise.²⁴ This is the same Hesiodic verse that Plutarch himself and Pausanias (through Herodotus) cite to illustrate ancestral fault, and that is commented on as an example of *progonikon hamartēma* by the Plutarchean and Proclean scholion, which Melanchthon most probably did not know.²⁵

Another noteworthy example is found in Melanchthon's commentary to Theognis. In his 1560 *explicationes* on Theognis 197–208, Melanchthon summarises his Latin digest of the poem by switching directly to

²³ Melanchthon (1852: 214): *Et eleganter dixit ἀμαυροτέρα γενεή posteritas, quae propemodum obliuatur. Neque enim tantum sumitur supplicium de ipso, sed de ipsius etiam liberis; nam illi postea deterius habebunt. Sicut et Mose dicit, quod Deus sumat supplicium de his, qui mandata eius negligunt, in tertiam et quartam generationem. Graeci hac de re libros scripserunt. Et extat libellum Plutarchi de his, qui sero puniuntur a numine, et quaerit mirabiles rationes. Eius verba haec sunt: Plus est diuina negotia considerare homines existentes, quam de musicis disputare, qui non sunt musici, et de re militari, qui eius rei imperiti sunt.*

²⁴ 549: πλέον γάρ ἐστι τοῦ περὶ μουσικῶν ἀμούσους καὶ πολεμικῶν ἀστρατεύτους διαλέγεσθαι τὸ τὰ θεῖα καὶ τὰ δαιμόνια πράγματα διασκοπεῖν ἀνθρώπους ὄντας, οἷον ἀτέχνους τεχνιτῶν διάνοιαν ἀπὸ δόξης καὶ ὑπονοίας κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς μετιόντας.

²⁵ The *editio princeps* of the scholia was published by Trincavelli in 1537; see Marzillo 2010: 77.

German: 'Id est, die straffe erbt auff die kinder.'²⁶ The familiar biblical resonances of the German equivalent make the distant Greek poem a direct counterpart of the language used in sermons. In his commentary on 731–54, more significantly, the Wittenberg reformer presents what he calls the *Querela de Providentia* of the Theognidean text as the equivalent of a scholastic challenge to the justice of divine punishment, and his reference to the parallel position of 'Epicureismus' shows that he has Plutarch's text in mind. Part of the *evangelica solutio* to the problem is to read it in light of biblical corporate punishment.²⁷ The delay is a necessary tool for contrasting *fides* to *experientia*. The text of Theognis, in other words, understood through the explanations of Plutarch, sheds a useful light on the *Textus* of Exodus and Deuteronomy. More, Melanchthon later returns to the punishment of children for the crimes of their parents in the passage and reframes the problem in light of the dogma of original sin.²⁸ The principle of the poem is not a Greek error, but a *universale*. The stain of original sin is what is ultimately at work in the punishment of those who are apparently innocent, and the murders of the past and the massacres of the present are witnesses to the same truth. The real Judgment, the one that will separate the damned from the sinners through eternity, is the time when all will meet their due. The observations of Melanchthon, in other words, reproduce the same combination of generational retribution and eschatological punishment on which the text of Plutarch is based.

We find similar traces of a sustained interest in the nature of Greek *haereditarium piaculum* in the work of Melanchthon's followers. As Michael Lurje has shown at length in his book *Die Suche nach der Schuld* (2004), the Greek school of Melanchthon at Wittenberg abundantly used the 'Erbschuld-Erklärungsprinzip' to make sense of the notion of ἀμάρτημα in Greek tragedy and adapt it to serve the purposes of Christian exhortation. Tragedy was seen by these scholars as an instrument of

²⁶ 1853: 90; cf. pp. 249–74.

²⁷ Melanchthon (1853: 136): *Deus differt poenas, ut concedat spatium poenitentiae, alias haec natura non posset sustinere, si Deus statim effunderet iram in lapsos. Bene confirmandus est animus solutione istius argumenti. Textus dicit: Puniam in tertiam et quartam generationem. Est multo tristius videre posteritatem opprimi poena, quam nos ipsos.*

²⁸ Melanchthon (1853: 136): *Gravior est poena in posteris. David hats wohl gefüllt. Universale est: Atrocia delicta puniuntur atrocibus poenis. Alterum etiam saepe fit, quod boni puniuntur, ut Socrates, Camillus, item multa millia innocentium infantum a Turca interfectorum etc. Respondeo: Totum genus humanum est mersum in peccatum originis, illi etiam habent peccatum, ita Ecclesia. Praeterea ira Dei irritatur peccatis generis humani, ideo venit Turca, ideo bibunt etiam innocentes ex hoc poculo, ut est in Hieremia; sed in altero iudicio fiet integra separatio et glorificatio Ecclesiae, et tota multitudo impiorum habebit aeternas poenas.*

cathartic terror destined to paralyse men with the fear of sin and transgressions, and to lead them to accept redemption. The Reformed scholars of Wittenberg thought that the frightful representations of horror on stage could produce disgust for crime. The even more terrifying portraits of divine retribution falling on the tragic heroes were seen to induce a beneficent awe for the power of God's vengeance. The role of delayed generational punishment in that regard was singled out. A few examples from editions of Sophocles can illustrate the point. In the preface to his Latin text of the *Electra* in his 1546 edition of Sophocles' works, the *Interpretatio tragoediarum Sophoclis ad utilitatem iuventutis*, Vitus Winshemius, a student of Melanchthon, presented the theme of ancestral fault as one of the essential elements of tragedy, a pillar of its moral function.²⁹ For Winshemius, the myth of the play, its *fabula*, illustrates the *doctrina* of delayed generational punishment defined by Plutarch in the *De sera numinis vindicta*. The staging of ancestral fault, the horrible representation of its crimes and its punishments, is designed to provoke an atrocious fear of sin in the spectators. It is a common element of all tragedies, an essential expression of its moral function. Tragedy is made to show how long can be the chain of crimes and punishments that Satan is wont to weave *for one single fault (ex uno delicto)*. In the tragic play, the guilty himself is punished with his children, but the penalty is carried on to his descendants, up to the third and fourth generations. The *haereditarium piaculum* of ancient drama, the recurrent crimes of the House of Atreus, are not only an illustration of original sin, but also a direct expression (*hoc est quod verba . . .*) of the Old Testament corporate responsibility proclaimed by Moses in the Pentateuch.

In the *Argumentum* to the *Oedipus Rex*, to take another example, Winshemius sees the principle of ancestral fault as the motor of the play's action, the key to the understanding of the calamities that beset Oedipus in the narrative of the drama.³⁰ This is, according to Lurje, one of the first modern usages of the story of Chrysippus' rape by Laius to understand the fate of Oedipus and his children in Greek tragedy, even if it is important to remember that this idea was clearly laid out in the *argumentum* to Euripides' *Phoenissae*, which has clearly influenced both *argumenta*.³¹ In the same passage Winshemius cites two other tragic texts to illustrate the *doctrina* of

²⁹ Winshemius 1546: 57–8 (*Argumentum* to the *Electra*); the text is reproduced in Lurje 2004: 100.

³⁰ Winshemius 1546: 4 (*Argumentum* to the *Oedipus Rex*); the text is reproduced in Lurje 2004: 99–100.

³¹ Lurje 2004 : 99; 392.

delayed generational punishment he sees at work in the *Oedipus Tyrannus*: the ancestral curse of the Atridae from the *Oresteia*, and the punishment of Cresphontes' sons in the play of Euripides. The principle of *haereditarium piaculum* can thus be shown to appear in all three tragedians. The various generational punishments of the different cursed families that we see on stage are so many *exempla* of a principle of ancient Greek theology and the moral function of tragedy as a genre.

This ancestral fault of Greek tragedy is thus seen as a unified religious dogma. It is explicitly presented as the same doctrine which is also found in the *De sera numinis vindicta* of Plutarch. It reflects the teaching of Christian belief and its moral function, and it is a central element of interpretation to understand the logic of the dramatic action in individual plays. The reference to the analogy of Christian authorities, and of other Greek texts, creates the image of a familiar and clearly defined principle at work in the wisdom of the ancient plays. We find the same logic in the writings of many other scholars of the day. Georg Rattaler, for instance, another disciple of Melanchthon, sees the principle of ancestral fault at work as an element of moral education in the *Oedipus Tyrannus*, as he writes in the preface of his 1550 *Sophoclis Ajax Flagellifer*.³² The same thought is repeated by Johannes Lalamantius in 1557 in his in the *Argumentum* to the *Oedipus Rex* of his *Sophoclis tragoedias*.³³ In the preface to his 1562 edition of Euripides' *Phoenissae*, Gaspar Stiblinus, also a student of Melanchthon, writes that the horrible punishments staged by the play have the edifying role of showing us the nature of *numinis vindicta*, how it pursues the crimes of the fathers *in liberos & nepotes usque*.³⁴

The example of the 'Erbschuld-Erklärungsprinzip' in the sixteenth-century interpretations of the *Oedipus Tyrannus* shows the importance which ancestral fault had acquired so early on as a shared category of scholarship – in the reading of a text which famously does not even mention it.³⁵ It is a good illustration of how involved the process of religious domestication was in the constitution of inherited guilt as a reading grid. Ancestral fault was of course all the more recognised and discussed in the interpretation of texts that actually mentioned it; a web of analogies and cross-references on the subject, transmitted in numerous editions and commentaries, was thus eventually constituted in early modern scholarship. In the scholarship of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the explicit usage of the material as a tool of moral and religious

³² Rattaler 1550: 7–8; see Lurje 2004: 103.

³³ Lalamantius 1557: 102; Lurje 2004: 105.

³⁴ Stiblinus 1562: 125; cf. Lurje 2004: 100.

³⁵ Lurje 2004: 99–101; 392; see pp. 346–7.

edification soon became outmoded and was eventually pushed to the background; but direct reference to the principle of Plutarch continued to be made and the different relevant passages to be seen as the particular expressions of one single belief of Greek antiquity, a belief which was consistently keyed into seemingly equivalent Christian texts and concepts.

A few examples will better illustrate the point. In the commentary to Matthew 27:25 of his massive *Annotationes in Novum Testamentum*, the passage which has the Jews say to Pontius Pilate: τὸ αἷμα αὐτοῦ ἐφ' ἡμᾶς καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ τέκνα ἡμῶν ('Let his blood be on us and on our children!'), Hugo Grotius presents the concept of ancestral fault as a *mos vetus*, and he adduces reference to other passages in the Hebrew Bible and ancient literature.³⁶ Grotius, as we will see below, devoted much thought to the question of punishment through generations in the different cultures of the world in his *De iure belli ac pacis*. Ezechiel Spanheim (1629–1710), to take another example, in his 1697 *Callimachi hymni, epigrammata, et fragmenta*, in a note to verse 122 of the third *Hymn* of Callimachus, where the wrath of Artemis is said to involve the destruction of the guilty together with their families, writes that the *peccata* of the unjust were not rarely punished *in nepotibus etiam ac tertia generatione* in ancient literature. That, according to him, is a belief that was expressed not only by the old tragedians, but also by many poets.³⁷ He gives a number of references to tragic texts.³⁸ Lodewijk Caspar Valckenaer (1715–85), finally, in his 1755 edition of the *Phoenissae* of Euripides, and his 1768 edition of the *Hippolytus*, looks at the matter in more detail. In his note to verse 833 of the *Hippolytus*, in particular, he discusses the meaning of the words ἀμπλακίαισι τῶν πάροιθ' ἐν τινος at some length. The scholia on the passage have:

ἀμπλακίαισι· ὃ ἐστίν· οὐ δι' ἐμὸν ἀμάρτημα τιμοροῦμαι, ἀλλὰ διὰ πορνικόν· NB ἀμπλακίαισι· ταῖς ἀμαρτίαις τῶν προγόνων· Α ἄλλως· μὴ διὰ τὰς ἀμαρτίας τῶν ἀρχαίων μου προγόνων ἐγὼ ἀνακομίζομαι, ἀναλαμβάνω, τοιαύτην δυστυχίαν· AB

Valckenaer rightly corrects πορνικόν to προγονικόν, which had been *absurde mutatum*, he says, and goes on to explain the meaning of *progonikon hamartēma* in the play with reference to the popular belief, the *vulgaris opinio* of antiquity, in the punishment of descendants for the *maiorum facinora*.³⁹ He gives a number of references from a variety of different

³⁶ Grotius 1641 *ad Matt.* 25.27. ³⁷ Spanheim 1697: 265.

³⁸ E.g. Aesch. *Sept.* 749; *Ag.* 581.

³⁹ Valckenaer 1768 *ad vv.* 826ff.; cf. Valckenaer 1755 (re-ed. 1824) *ad vv.* 941ff.

authors, referring to cases both of human and of divine punishment. A citation from Plutarch's *De sera numinis vindicta* closes the passage: the Euripides fragment τὰ τῶν τεκόντων σφάλματ' εἰς τοὺς ἐκγόνους οἱ θεοὶ τρέπουσιν.⁴⁰ Valckenaer, it can be worth noting, was a teacher of Wyttenbach, and one of the inspirations for edition of the *De sera numinis vindicta*.⁴¹ Discussions of this kind, in tandem with countless others, reproduced and consolidated the category of inherited guilt in the apparatus of scholarship. Inherited guilt remained seen as the principle of Plutarch through and through, and it continued to be recognisable in terms of the relevant Christian material. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the similar notes and links of reference that have accompanied the immense number of prefaces and commentaries to the texts of Hesiod, Solon, and Herodotus, oratory, Plato, tragedy, and, of course, the *De sera numinis vindicta* have reproduced the exact same logic.

In all of these notes, as well as in the prefaces and notes of many other editions over the last five centuries, and up to the present day, we can see the category of inherited guilt taking shape. It was being confirmed as a web of references linking together different passages, and ultimately unified under the umbrella of a single doctrine: the generational punishment defined by Plutarch. Inherited guilt was conceptualised as a dogma of the religion of antiquity that could be referenced by citation, like a passage of the Bible linked to the other relevant passages of the Canon by the appropriate quotes. This reception of ancestral fault as a core doctrine of ancient religion was initially predicated on its usefulness for Christian moral exhortation. It made ancient literature speak a universal truth compatible with Christian teaching, and useful in deterring men from sin by striking the fear of God in the readers of ancient texts. Based on the doctrine defined by Plutarch, it was seen in other genres of ancient literature, especially in tragedy, and made to play the same role of moral exhortation that had been conferred on the *De sera numinis vindicta* by its many Christian editors. It thus ended up taking the function for modern Christianity that Celsus had originally defended for it, and that Origen violently refused in the third century. The innocuous *cf.* of contemporary editions is in many ways the direct heir of this now largely forgotten ideological programme.

⁴⁰ Plut. *De sera numinis vindicta* 21; *TrGF* 980; see p. 42.

⁴¹ Wyttenbach 1820–I, vol. XII, *Preface*.

Grotius

The eminent classical scholar Hugo Grotius (1583–1645), as mentioned above, used Greek ancestral fault as a theological referent in the interpretation of Scripture. Many of the notes on ancestral fault from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries which we saw earlier refer to the Latin translations of two Euripides fragments collected by Grotius in his editions of the *Florilegium* of Stobaeus (1623) and of the fragments of Greek tragedy and comedy (1626) respectively.⁴² First, in his edition of the poetic fragments found in Stobaeus, Grotius translates the fragment from the *Alcmaeon* τὰ τῶν τεκόντων ὡς μετέρχεται θεὸς | μιάσματα as *commissa quae sunt in parentes, haec Deus persequitur ultor*.⁴³ As Valckenaer remarks about this translation in the note to verse 833 of his *Hippolytus*: *vera quidem ista sunt; sed Graecis significantur, ab ipsis parentibus commissa, quae Deus ultor in liberis persequitur*.⁴⁴ Three years after the edition of Stobaeus, however, Grotius again translated what he seems to have thought was the same fragment of Euripides, but modifying the text this time in reference to a comparable fragment from the *De sera numinis vindicta*.⁴⁵ There he renders what he now gives as τὰ τῶν τεκόντων σφάλματ' εἰς τοὺς | ἐγγόνους οἱ θεοὶ τρέπουσιν, the text which has remained the accepted reading of the Plutarch passage, as *in posterorum capita mos Dis vertere culpas parentum*.⁴⁶

These translations were written during the time of Grotius' captivity in castle Loevestein.⁴⁷ As Grotius himself said in a letter of this period to his friend G. J. Vossius, they were designed to prepare the way for his work of political philosophy; the classical scholarship and the political philosophy of the great humanist scholar are as intricately intertwined as Canon Law with scriptural sources. The ambivalence shown by Grotius in his translation of Greek ancestral fault in the two respective editions is a result of his intense reflection on the question at this time. Nowhere is this clearer than in the actual *magnum opus* of political philosophy which also came out of the Loevestein captivity: the *De iure belli ac pacis*, published in Paris in 1625, precisely between the translations of Stobaeus (1623) and of the dramatic fragments (1626).⁴⁸

⁴² These texts are referenced by Valckenaer, for instance; see p. 95.

⁴³ Grotius 1623; Grotius 1626: 422; now Eur. F 82 Kannicht.

⁴⁴ Valckenaer 1768 ad loc. ⁴⁵ Now F 980 Kannicht; see p. 42.

⁴⁶ Grotius 1626: 422. ⁴⁷ On the captivity of Grotius in Loevestein, see e.g. Rademaker 1972.

⁴⁸ Tuck 2005: ix–xxxvii.

The *De iure belli ac pacis*, the masterpiece of natural-law theory at the basis of many central aspects of modern political theory, a text usually presented as a founding document of international law, makes ample use of the *De sera numinis vindicta* in its discussion of punishment.⁴⁹ The treatise of Plutarch played an important role in shaping Grotius' thought about responsibility, free will, and determinism.⁵⁰ As we will see, the great Delft humanist took an altogether different course from that of his predecessors in the domestication of Greek ancestral fault for the modern age, moving far beyond the simple collection of sources and their usage as exhortation for pious conduct – and mostly against it. Grotius brought the Greek material squarely in contact with the building of his new project for modern society.⁵¹ Assessing it with all the tools of scholarship then available, but also with the rudiments of the comparative ethnography pioneered by his generation, and especially the category of the radically unique, independent, and free self that was then being shaped by contemporary political philosophy (notably his own), he explicitly laid out in his influential monument of natural law what was at stake in modern Christian Europe's confrontation with the principle of Plutarch. The end result was to trace the way for the Christian liberal understanding of Greek ancestral fault: the ancient pagan material became unacceptable.

The discussion of Grotius opens the second phase of the early modern reception of Greek ancestral fault.⁵² The Christianising reading of the Greek principle remained unchallenged, and it continued to be perceived as a dogma along the lines of Hebrew corporate responsibility and original sin. But, together with the rejection of corporate responsibility and original sin from the political and civil spheres of modernity, the ancestral fault of Greek literature was morally delegitimised and exposed as an unjust encroachment upon individual liberty.⁵³ In the radical secularist position of Grotius, especially in the first edition of the *De iure belli ac pacis*, the rigid separation between divine and human law – a clear break with the Thomist tradition – is a requisite for the constitution of an independent human sphere of rational, universal justice: natural law.⁵⁴

⁴⁹ On the important role of Plutarch's *De sera numinis vindicta* in Grotius' treatise, see the index to Barbeyrac's text in volume III of Tuck's 2005 edition.

⁵⁰ See pp. 101–3.

⁵¹ Cf. the famous evaluation of Rousseau on Grotius and Hobbes: 'The truth is that their principles are exactly the same: they only differ in their expression. They also differ in their method. Hobbes relies on sophisms, and Grotius on the poets; all the rest is the same.' Tuck 2005: xvi.

⁵² See p. 80. ⁵³ See A. Schubert 2002.

⁵⁴ See Tuck 1979; Lagrée 1991: 19–42; Stumpf 2006: 101–61.

The individual of Grotius is a fundamentally free subject of personal, inner will.⁵⁵ The explicit rejection of Greek ancestral fault from the realm of natural law, as we will see, is a direct expression of the contradictions which now existed between the Plutarchean tradition and the 'naturally' autonomous agent of the modern self then taking shape as a central category of reflection. The position of the *De sera numinis vindicta* could be safely relegated to the realm of divine action and the intricacies of theological considerations, but it had no more place in human justice. In attacking the ancestral fault of the *De sera numinis vindicta*, the Arminian Grotius was aiming at the orthodox Calvinist position on determinism, grace, and original sin.⁵⁶ The *De iure belli ac pacis* perfectly illustrates the profound unease that was to characterise later modern and contemporary readings of Greek ancestral fault. It shows how incompatible the notion of intergenerational responsibility had become with the Western conception of the self as a free, autonomous individual accountable only to his own personal will. That it shows this in a text that actually played a fundamental role in shaping the category of the modern self only adds to the interest of the question.

In the *De iure belli ac pacis*, the Dutch scholar attempts to define the natural law governing the rightful use of violence of states against their subjects, and of states against other states.⁵⁷ The legal codes and juridical ideas of countless peoples are compared for their points of agreement or disagreement on the various questions at hand.⁵⁸ The Bible and Roman Law occupy centre stage, but Greek and Latin literature constitute the core of the authorities adduced by Grotius.⁵⁹ The classical scholarship of Grotius was not some idle pastime of leisure, or the side-interest of an obsolete humanist tradition, as it is still sometimes made out to be in the contemporary research of political historians. Classical scholarship was an integral part of Grotius' juridical, political, and theological project.⁶⁰ The citations of Greek and Latin literature that truffle almost every single line of the *De iure belli ac pacis* play the same role for Grotius that scriptural and Patristic sources played in the *Concordantia Discordantium Canonum* and the *Summa Theologiae*. The rhetoric of the new universal code of law devised by Grotius is grounded first and foremost in the authority of

⁵⁵ Stumpf 2006: 123–44; see Gagné 2010a: 130, n. 51.

⁵⁶ Heering 2004; Stumpf 2006: 71–99; R. E. Olson 2006.

⁵⁷ Nocentini 2005; Tuck 2005: ix–xxxii; Stumpf 2006: 11–69.

⁵⁸ Rademaker 1981: 306–9; Rubies 1991; Wickenden 1993: 142–61; Tuck 2005: xxviii–xxix; Höfele and von Koppenfels 2005.

⁵⁹ Tuck 1979; Lagrée 1991: 55–6; Wickenden 1993: 88–116.

⁶⁰ Tuck 1979.

classical literature. Euripides and Plutarch, Proclus, Virgil, and Tacitus are cited there with the kind of weight which used to be reserved for Augustine.⁶¹ Classical texts could be used in this way to defend and justify any position. They were set up before biblical sources, and also against each other. This is the context in which Grotius made use of the *De sera numinis vindicta*.

Ancestral fault is discussed in chapter 21 of Book 2: *De poenarum communicatione*. This chapter is concerned with the transmission of punishment within groups and over time. It devotes important passages to the definition of ancestral crimes, and the applicability of punishment through generations in a just juridical system. These passages are based in large part on Plutarch's *De sera numinis vindicta*. Chapter 21 is divided into twenty sections covering a number of questions concerning the transmission of punishment. These chapters are themselves divided into two parts. The first part looks at how punishment (*poena*) can be meted out as a consequence of participation in guilt (*culpa*).⁶² The second, in turn, looks at the question of whether punishment can be communicated when guilt is not communicated.⁶³ In the first part, Grotius is interested in determining the extent of the individual's responsibility for the actions of the group (*communitas*), and of the group for the actions of the individual.⁶⁴ How can the guilt of the group be communicated to the actions of the individual who has not himself committed any *delictum*, or the guilt of the individual transferred to the whole of the group to which he belongs? How far does the responsibility for the actions of one member of the group, or of its ruler, extend to the rest of the community? This responsibility, in the thought of Grotius, can only be transmitted through 'penal desert' (*meritum poenae*). Like the familiar Thomist distinction between sins of commission and sins of omission, mentioned in the last chapter, it must involve a personal choice, either to act (*factum*), or not to act (*omissio*). The actions of one element of the community will only involve the responsibility of:

those who command a vicious act, they who give the consent which is requisite, they who assist, who receive the things, or in any other way participate in the crime itself; they who give their counsel towards it, who praise it, who assent to it; those who being bound by their special rights to forbid it, do not forbid it; or being bound by similar rights to give aid to the person who suffers wrong, do not do so; those who do not dissuade when

⁶¹ Lagrée 1991; Wickenden 1993: 90–110. ⁶² Lib. 2, Cap. 21.1–8.

⁶³ Lib. 2, Cap. 21.9–20.

⁶⁴ See especially Lib. 2, Cap. 21.2; 8–10; 12–13.

they ought to dissuade; who keep silence with regard to a fact which they were bound by some right to make known; all these may be punished if there be in them such malice as suffices for penal desert, according to what has already been said. (*De iure belli ac pacis*, Lib. 2, Cap. 21.1. Trans. Whewell)

Similarly, the ruler will only share in the responsibility of his subjects through ‘allowing’ (*patientia*), or ‘receiving’ (*receptus*).⁶⁵ *Patientia*, if he lets some crime happen which he could have prevented, and *receptus*, if by unjustly harbouring a fugitive he should become a participant himself before the eyes of another state. The section contains a lengthy discussion of the rights of supplication, extradition, and asylum, which, it is interesting to note, Grotius published when he was in exile himself.⁶⁶

The entire argument of Grotius, here as elsewhere, rests on the accumulation of exempla from Hebrew Scripture, but mostly from classical antiquity. This usage of successive embedded exempla is reminiscent of Plutarch, and characteristic of contemporary humanist discourse. Here is a typical specimen:

About this sentence of Hesiod: ‘the entire city is often punished for one bad man (*Works and Days* 240)’, Proclus rightly says: ‘as having had it in their power to prevent him, and not having done so (*Schol. vet. in Op. et Dies* 240)’. So in the army of the Greeks, when ... (Lib. 2, Cap. 21.2. Trans. Whewell)

The comment on line 240 of the *Works and Days* comes from the scholia of Hesiod, which mostly transmit material from the lost commentary of Proclus on Hesiod’s poem (Grotius was one of the earliest systematic collectors of ancient fragments).⁶⁷ This commentary, as mentioned in the previous chapter, was itself a large-scale ‘rewriting’ of Plutarch’s earlier commentary on the same poem, a work which is now also lost. But the influence of Plutarch on the argument of the passage is much more direct than this. Plutarch is cited more frequently than any other single author in chapter 21, and the *De sera numinis vindicta* plays a more essential role there than any other work. It appears in the central argument of both halves of the chapter.⁶⁸ In both places, it serves to frame the argument. The material of Plutarch on ancestral fault is domesticated for its exemplary value, and as a clear example of the mechanisms of divine law; but in the human realm it is rejected as contrary to natural law. The ideas of

⁶⁵ Lib. 2, Cap. 21.2–3. ⁶⁶ Lib. 2, Cap. 21.4–6. ⁶⁷ See p. 97.

⁶⁸ See the Barbeyrac index in the third volume of Tuck’s 2005 edition.

Greek ancestral fault are explicitly foreignised in the treatise of Grotius, and the principle of ancestral fault defined in the *De sera numinis vindicta* is thoroughly reinterpreted in the process, as we will now see.

At the end of the first section of chapter 21, Grotius discusses the extension of the group's responsibility in time:

This important question occurs, whether punishment may always (*semper*) be exacted for the deeds of the corporation (*universitas*). So long as the corporation continues, it will seem that it can, because the same body (*corpus*) remains, though preserved by a succession of different particles, as we have shown elsewhere. (Lib. 2, Cap. 21.8. Trans. Whewell)

The corporation forms a single body over time, a *corpus*: a single continuous life of successive moments. The image of the human group as a co-responsible *corpus* is found in Aristotle, Augustine, and Thomas Aquinas already, but not the idea of the extended life as succession of moments.⁶⁹ Grotius' highly influential description of the corporation's continuity in time as the sequence of different moments of the same life is probably taken directly from Plutarch (and possibly also Proclus, whose work he knew well). Contrary to Plutarch, however, and to Thomas Aquinas, Grotius refuses to admit a continuity of group responsibility through time. The corporation can own treasury and the like, he says, and such things can remain liable for the duration of the corporation's existence; but the group is composed first and foremost of free individual members. They are imputable only for their own actions. The possessions of such members, and their lives, cannot be submitted to the punishment of actions committed by preceding generations of the group. For Grotius, there is no justifiable *vindicta sine culpa, sed tamen non sine causa*. Personal responsibility is the only just cause of human punishment. *Culpa* is a function of *meritum*, and *meritum* is a result of choice: *factum*, or *omissio*. Without this choice, the reflection of man's conscience before God, responsibility cannot exist; punishment of the corporation over generations is thus necessarily unjust and contrary to natural law. From the moment when the individual members of the group who bear responsibility as individuals have passed away, all *meritum* of punishment for the group has disappeared.

The principle of inherited guilt cannot be rightly applied in human justice, then. It does not belong to natural law.⁷⁰ A series of examples from the *De sera numinis vindicta* follows, in which Grotius explicitly marks his

⁶⁹ See Tuck 1979; Weithman 1992; Landau 2000; Nocentini 2005; Di Blasi 1999.

⁷⁰ Lib. 2, Cap. 21.12–13.

distance from Plutarch on the question. Following the speech of Timon, the destructions wrought by Alexander on the Persian Empire as punishment for the exactions of the Median Wars five generations earlier are unequivocally condemned.⁷¹ Grotius musters the testimony of Curtius and Arrian, who he (wrongly) says also condemned the injustice of Alexander's actions in destroying the Branchidae and burning down Persepolis; but what he is really seeking with this misquotation from two historians is a countering of Plutarch's position, which attempts to place this event in the realm of *mythos*. The following example is also taken from Plutarch's *De sera numinis vindicta*, again without mention of the quotation. This exemplum is turned in derision:

Everyone sees the absurdity of Agathocles' answer to the complaints of the Ithacans, of damage done by the Sicilians; that the Sicilians had received more damage from Ulysses. (Lib. 2, Cap. 21.8. Trans. Whewell)

The next line continues the confrontation with Plutarch, this time citing him explicitly, but from a different work, the *De malignitate Herodoti*. It furthers the rejection of ancestral fault by turning Plutarch against Plutarch:

And Plutarch, in his book against Herodotus, says that it is very unlikely that the Corinthians should have wished to avenge an injury received from the Samians after three generations. (Lib. 2, Cap. 21.8. Trans. Whewell)

A following remark adds that the continuity of honours carried by descendants for the merits of their ancestors is no justification for punishment over generations, 'for benefits are of such nature, by their matter, that they may be bestowed upon any without injury, but punishments are not'. This is first and foremost a defence of contemporary noble privilege and hereditary honour, of course, but it is also another salvo in Grotius' attack against the ancestral fault of Plutarch, who begins his apology of the principle in chapter 13 of the *De sera numinis vindicta* with an explicit comparison between the transmission of punishment over generations and the transmission of hereditary honour.

The transmission of responsibility to the group is strictly limited to the *meritum* of choice by Grotius, and the possibility of its continuity over generations strongly denied. The first half of the chapter defines common responsibility for punishment in strictly individualistic terms. It posits a radical break between the continuity of the group in time and the personal

⁷¹ Lib. 2, Cap. 21.8; cf. p. 41.

nature of *culpa*. The terms of the debate are framed in reference to Plutarch, and against him. The justice of ancestral fault in human law is strictly refused. As Grotius says at the end of the section, the discussion of Plutarch must be judged to be incompatible with natural law:

Nor is the defense of this or such cases satisfactory, which we find in Plutarch's *De sera numinis vindicta*. For the justice administered by God is one thing, that by men, another, as we shall show hereafter. (Lib. 2, Cap. 21.8. Trans. Whewell)

Grotius continues the same thought in the second section, where he discusses the possibility of transmitted punishment without transmitted guilt. There he looks at transmission through kinship rather than transmission through polity. This section starts with precisions concerning the nature of delictual intentionality, and it ends with a look at the heredity of debts. But the core of the passage is taken by three sections in the middle. In paragraphs 12, 13, and 14, Grotius considers the biblical and classical traditions concerning the transmission of punishment over generations, and he interprets ancestral fault through the distinction between human and divine law, as he hinted at the end of the first section. In human law, just as the extension of responsibility to the group without desert is judged to be utterly unjust, so the extension of punishment through generations without extension of responsibility is deemed to be opposed to natural law:

Having premised these distinctions, we say that no one innocent of delict can be punished for the delict of another. But the true reason of this, is not that which is given by the jurisconsult Paulus, that punishment is instituted for the amendment of men: for it would seem that an example may be made even extraneously to a man's own person, in a person whose welfare affects him, as we shall soon have to show; but because liability to punishment arises from desert: and desert is a personal quality, since it must have its origin in the will, than which nothing is more peculiarly ours: it is, as we may say, *entirely free* (αὐτεξούσιον). (Lib. 2, Cap. 21. 12. Trans. Whewell)⁷²

There can be no punishment in human law that does not involve the free will of the individual, he says, using the same language that he had already coined in the *De iure praedae*. This is one of the famous passages for which Grotius is recognised as one of the conceptual fathers of the modern free self as an individual moral agent.⁷³ Every justification of ancestral fault in human terms is to be condemned. This excludes hereditary slavery, it must be noted, which does not involve punishment, but dominion.⁷⁴ Neither

⁷² See Tuck 2005: xviii–xix.

⁷³ Tuck 2005, p. xix.

⁷⁴ Lib. 2, Cap. 21.14.

the virtues nor the vices of parents can be imputed to their children, declares Grotius with the authority of Patristic and classical sources.⁷⁵ He gathers there a gallery of Christian, Jewish, and classical authors who condemn the Greek custom of extending punishment to the offspring of the guilty, often distorting their thought in the process. He writes, for instance:

The same custom is blamed also by Dionysius of Halicarnassus, who shows that the reason sometimes given is fallacious, that the children will probably be like their parents; since that is uncertain, and an uncertain fear ought not to cause anyone's death. (Lib. 2, Cap. 21.13. Trans. Whewell)

In the passage quoted by Grotius, Dionysius of Halicarnassus does not condemn the practice he reports, however, he simply mentions it, as Barbeyrac notes in his edition.⁷⁶ In misquoting his source this time, Grotius is here, again, seeking the justification of ancestral fault by Plutarch: his discussion of criminal atavism in chapters 19 and 20 of the *De sera numinis vindicta*. Repeating his point again in different terms, Grotius reaffirms that there is no place for the principle of Plutarch in the logic of natural law.

This opposition to ancestral fault in human law, however, is not presented as a disagreement with Plutarch, whose text is behind many counter-examples, but rarely mentioned explicitly in disagreement. The *De sera numinis vindicta* is in fact cited only once with disapproval.⁷⁷ And even there, the text of Plutarch and the Greek experience of the question in general are shown to agree with the position of Grotius. The comparative consensus of peoples attests to the unequivocal statement of natural law: children cannot be punished for the faults of their ascendants. This is a law that pious kings have observed, 'even in regard to their open enemies', and which has been followed by Hebrews, Egyptians, Romans, and Greeks, as Grotius shows with a myriad citations (which are, again, often distorted for the purpose).⁷⁸ Human laws that put children to death for the offences of their fathers are unjust, as are those that similarly punish the relatives of the criminal. The codes of the Medes and the Persians, as described by Curtius and Ammianus Marcellinus, are singled out as examples of such unjust institutions.⁷⁹

⁷⁵ Lib. 2, Cap. 21.12–14.

⁷⁶ Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 8.80; see Barbeyrac's note ad loc. ⁷⁷ Lib. 2, Cap. 21.8.

⁷⁸ Lib. 2, Cap. 21.8; 12–13, with Barbeyrac's comments on source distortion. On 'misquotation' in Grotius, see Somos 2011: Chapter 5.

⁷⁹ Lib. 2, Cap. 21.13.

The Greek material, on the other hand, belongs to the just codes that must be recuperated. The authority of the revered *De sera numinis vindicta* cannot be entirely rejected by Grotius. The justification of ancestral fault by Plutarch is consequently reconciled with justice. It simply does not belong to human law, argues Grotius. It is in the realm of divine law that Grotius relocates the authority of the *De sera numinis vindicta*. In paragraph 14 Grotius looks at the traditions concerning divine wrath through generations:

God indeed, in the law which he gave the Hebrews, threatens that he will visit the impiety of the fathers upon their posterity. (Lib. 2, Cap. 21.14. Trans. Whewell)

He explains this threat of God from Exodus and Deuteronomy through the right of dominion (*ius dominii*), not the right of punishment (*ius poenae*):

But God has the most plenary right of dominion, as over our goods, so over our lives, as his gift; which he may take away from any one, whenever he will, and without any cause. If therefore, he takes away, by an untimely and violent death, the children of Achan, Saul, Jeroboam, Achab, he uses towards them his right of dominion, not of punishment. (Lib. 2, Cap. 21.14. Trans. Whewell)

Grotius is following Aquinas in this discussion of divine law. In the same way as the slaughter of an animal is not a function of a right of punishment, but of a right of dominion of men over beasts, as he said in chapter 11, Grotius asserts that God has full, unlimited dominion over our lives and our goods, at his will. It is the nature of dominion that determines the nature of justice.⁸⁰ The nature of God's retributive actions cannot be measured in reference to human law. As Grotius will repeat later on in the second section:

But this fact on the part of God is not to be imitated by men; nor is the reason alike: because, as we have said, God has a right over men's lives without regarding their faults: but men have such a right only on the ground of a graver fault, and one which belongs especially to the person. (Lib. 2, Cap. 21.18. Trans. Whewell)

God threatens punishment over the third or fourth generations, he observes, but never further.⁸¹ This is because his wrath is aimed at the parents. When he destroys the children of Achan, Saul, or others, it is not

⁸⁰ Lib. 2, Cap. 21.11; 14.

⁸¹ Lib. 2, Cap. 21.14.

because of any shared responsibility, or because of a transmission of punishment, but in order to strike at the heart of the still-living grandparents and great-grandparents who have committed the crime.

It is certain that then they are punished by such a spectacle; for that is more grievous to them than what they themselves suffer, as Chrysostom says, with whom Plutarch agrees: 'that no punishment is more galling than to see one's progeny suffer on one's own account . . .' (Lib. 2, Cap. 21.14. Trans. Whewell)

In matters of divine law, Plutarch is shown to agree with John Chrysostom. Plutarch also appears in the background of another section, where Grotius argues that the New Covenant given to men by God contains no announcement of a divine wrath coursing through generations. As was foreshadowed by the oblique prophecies of Ezekiel 18, says Grotius, which announces the end of corporate responsibility through generations,

The punishments which await the wicked after the end of this life are declared more clearly in the New Testament; therefore in that law there is no threatening of punishment which goes beyond the persons of the offenders: to which especially, though less openly, as the manner of the prophets is, that prophecy of Ezekiel looks. (Lib. 2, Cap. 21.14. Trans. Whewell)

Ancestral fault is not only circumscribed to divine law, but it is relegated to the revelation that predates the announcement of the New Covenant. The New Dispensation has replaced the wrath of God with the fear of Hell, which involves individual choice more clearly than the preceding law. In the structure of the argument, the oblique prophecy of Ezekiel and the eschatological punishment announced by the New Testament closely mirror the function of the myth of Thespesios in Plutarch's *De sera numinis vindicta*.

Plutarch appears more explicitly in another passage to further ground the principle of ancestral fault in the realm of divine law. Grotius declares that God visits his wrath over generations only for particularly grave offences against his honour.⁸² Only the gravest of affronts against him can provoke divine anger over the second or third generation: crimes of false worship, perjury, and sacrilege. The Greek principle of ancestral fault, which Grotius is at pains to dissociate from natural law throughout chapter 21, is in fact concerned with this aspect of divine law, and it finds itself in

⁸² Lib. 2, Cap. 21.14.

full agreement with divine justice. 'Nor did the Greeks judge otherwise', says Grotius, 'for the crimes which were supposed to entail a curse on posterity, which they themselves called ἄγνη, are all of this kind.' A series of examples follows, from Aelian, Strabo, and Gellius. And the entire treatise of Plutarch is called to witness: 'on which question Plutarch learnedly elaborates, in his book *De sera numinis vindicta*'. The *De sera numinis vindicta*, together with the wider Greek testimony on the question, is dissociated from the realm of human law but appropriated for the understanding of divine law. It is read through the categories of personal merit on the one hand, and biblical wrath on the other. In the process of both operations, it is profoundly modified for modern perception.

Plutarch agrees with John Chrysostom in seeing divine wrath as potentially aiming at descendants, as we have seen. He also agrees with Ezekiel 18 in saying that God does not always punish the descendants of those guilty of great crimes against him:

Moreover, though God has threatened this, he does not always use this power, especially if the children turn out eminently virtuous, as it is possible to see in Ezekiel 18, and as Plutarch proves with a number of examples in the location cited. (Lib. 2, Cap. 21.14. Trans. Whewell)

Plutarch further agrees later on with a *scriptor christianus*, who asserts that just as a father can be punished through the suffering of his children, a ruler can be punished by God through the suffering of his people, according to the right of divine dominion:

'It is', as the same writer says, 'as if one who has sinned with his hands were punished through strokes on his back: as Plutarch says, it is no otherwise than when a physician cauterizes the thumb to cure the hip. Why men may not lawfully do the same, we have already said.' (Lib. 2, Cap. 21.14. Trans. Whewell)

This too is taken directly out of Plutarch. In chapter 21 of the *De iure belli ac pacis* Book 2, the treatise of Plutarch is read as a witness of divine law, and as such it can continue to be used as a source of theological authority. But it is entirely separated from the realm of human justice. And this is what Grotius is aiming for in his treatise.

The Greek principle of ancestral fault codified by Plutarch in the *De sera numinis vindicta* is fully exploited by Grotius in his long discussion of collective responsibility. More than that, it provides the essential framework against which Grotius builds his position and defines the shape of natural law on the question. The direct line that goes from The Hague to Nuremberg to Grotius on the history of collective responsibility in

international law is universally recognised. A case should be made for pushing back this line fifteen centuries earlier to include Plutarch and other ancient and medieval predecessors. Through Proclus, Aquinas, and Grotius, the continuous Plutarchean tradition gives an example of a direct line of ancient influence on one of the fundamental modern formulations of collective guilt. To understand such continuing ancient influence on later thought is an important goal, if we are to consider more fully the genesis, the variety, and the richness of the Western heritage on the question. Grotius the editor of ancient texts and Grotius the moral philosopher are complementary *personae* of the same thinker.⁸³ In looking at the tradition of earlier classical scholarship, we are sometimes reminded not only that it was heavily imbricated in the debates of modernity, but that it has remained involved through and through in contributing to define what modernity came to look like. The material of Greek ancestral fault has not only played a major role in successive conceptualisations of the Orthodox, Catholic, and Protestant doctrines of corporate responsibility and original sin but has also been involved in actually shaping one of the most influential challenges to their juridical and political authority in modern times.

This, however, is of course not the direct concern of the present project. What we are seeking here is a better understanding of the layers of Christian interpretation accumulated over the modern perception of Greek ancestral fault. Grotius' usage of the *De sera numinis vindicta* for his definition of collective responsibility is for us a tremendously useful witness of the stakes and the debates at work in the confrontation of modernity with Greek ancestral fault at the dawn of the liberal age. It sheds explicit light on many arguments that have since become implicit categories and presuppositions of perception and scholarship. It must be unpacked.

First, the principle of ancestral fault described by Plutarch is interpreted through the rigid distinction between human and divine law which Grotius the political theologian sets up in his work. It is domesticated for divine law and foreignised from just human law. Grotius co-opts the authority of Plutarch, his exempla, and his thoughts, to define the nature of divine wrath over generations. The *De sera numinis vindicta* is read once more through Hebrew corporate responsibility: Deuteronomy, Exodus and especially Ezekiel 18. It continues to be read as a document of Christian theology, but a theology strictly limited to the transcendent realm of divine action.⁸⁴ In human society there is no ancestral fault, no

⁸³ A point emphasized by Tuck 1979.

⁸⁴ See Lagrée 1991: 274–5; Heering 2004; Nocentini 2005.

transmitted guilt, no logic of delayed punishment, just the absolute dominion of God over men, and his right to strike at sinners through their immediate descendants, as well as at impious kings through their peoples. There is not a hint of a taint or a form of pollution being inherited. The ideas described by Plutarch involve no responsibility for Grotius. Greek ancestral fault is kept entirely distinct from original sin by the Arminian theologian. Ancestral fault is a *ius divinum* which exists outside the logic of human action, and outside human understanding. God's intervention in history is a function of his transcendent will. It is not an element of regular, mechanistic nature. The Greek and the Hebrew traditions are seen as two reflections of this same divine law. By being relegated to the realm of a strictly isolated theology, the Greek principle of ancestral fault is in fact separated from any application in concrete human experience. For the liberal Grotius, it cannot serve as an instrument of morals, as it had for Melancthon, and as it would continue to do in more conservative religious editions of the *De sera numinis vindicta* up to the twentieth century.

The rigid division between human and divine law operated by Grotius is essential for his project – the definition of a concrete mode of action in the just possession of violence. By outlining and circumscribing the realm of transcendent divine law, he aims to isolate the realm of immanent, natural law; the space of human justice in the world, a space which exists on its own terms.⁸⁵ In the space of natural law, *meritum* is the sole condition of responsibility, and it involves the personal choice of inner conscience. *Meritum* is a function of will, which is what belongs most entirely to each person as a separate individual, and which is *absolutely free* (αὐτεξούσιον).⁸⁶ From the guilt of sin involving a *state* of transgression integral to the fibre of human existence defined in Aquinas, we move to the guilt of conscience located in the personal space of individual will. The inner conscience of the modern self becomes the rule of human justice. Contrary to the *Summa Theologiae*, there is no place in this picture for intergenerational retribution. It is accordingly rejected among the unjust laws of men, which Grotius condemns in his work as counter-examples of natural law.

The step which goes from this rejection of ancestral fault from the human sphere to its qualification as primitive alterity in later scholarship is a short one, as we will soon see. The work of Grotius stands at a crossroads for our topic. His foreignisation of ancestral fault is a fascinatingly explicit

⁸⁵ Tuck 1979.

⁸⁶ Tuck 2005: xviii–xix.

expression of the clash between the modern self and Greek ideas on ancestral crimes. In the eyes of the Dutch humanist, Greece remains the reference through, and especially against which the modern West must define itself. Written at the threshold of the *Querelle des Anciens et des Modernes*, the *De iure belli ac pacis* still looks at the Greek material, and particularly at Plutarch, as a source of authority which must be confronted as well as accommodated to contemporary discourse. This is what the text of Grotius does with the *De sera numinis vindicta*.

The foreignisation of ancestral fault in the *De iure belli ac pacis* derives in large part from considerations of relative cultural value. The material of Plutarch is shown to be unjust by confrontation with the opinions of other Greeks, *and of other peoples*. We have to remember that the theory of natural law expounded by Grotius and his circle was based through and through on the considerations of systematic, large-scale cultural comparatism.⁸⁷ The *ius naturale* being immanent to the universe, and originally given in the same measure to all men, it led the scholars who preoccupied themselves with its definition to develop a resolutely comparative approach to the study of world institutions. Long before Fontenelle or Lafitau, the theorists of natural law systematically compared the fables and the customs of the Greeks with the cultures of the 'savages' encountered by European imperialism throughout the globe to uncover the seams of natural theology.⁸⁸ The ancient and foreign cultures of the world had to be described and compared to uncover their universal characteristics, and be submitted to the criticism of *recta ratio* to uncover their worth. The early comparatists produced the first systematic paradigms of universal cultural comparatism since the time of the Alexandrian Library. The dominant method of scholarship was one of systematic compilation of knowledge, exhaustive accumulations of all things similar around set themes in great, encyclopaedic classifications of the world. Hebrew, Greek, and Roman texts, constituted the filter through which all the other records were read, and also the core of the collected material. The confrontation of Jewish and classical texts provided the essential basis for the uncovering of natural law. It also led to the relativisation of their value.

Used as the measure of Europe's foreign alterities, classical culture came to be read through these distant cultures, and in time it came to appear

⁸⁷ See Rademaker 1981: 306–9; Rubies 1991; Wickenden 1993: 142–61; P. Burke 2005; J. Assmann 2005; Tuck 2005: xxviii–xxix.

⁸⁸ See e.g. Kilani 1992: 222–34; Wickenden 1993: 142–52; Tuck 1999; Höfele and Koppenfels 2005; J. Assmann 2005.

more and more foreign itself in the process. The elements of the classical institutions which were studied and did not correspond to the *recta ratio* of the scholar were all the more easily condemned. This is an important aspect of the context in which the ancestral fault of the *De sera numinis vindicta* was foreigned by Grotius in the *De iure belli ac pacis*. Set on the same rhetorical footing as other contradictory Greek texts, as well as of further contradictory material from many other cultural horizons assembled by Grotius in his enterprise, the discussion of Plutarch could only be judged through its conformity to the just *consensus gentium* determined by *recta ratio*. It failed on both counts. The comparative scholarship of seventeenth-century humanism played a large role in the rise of the cultural relativism that led to the loss of classical prestige, and eventually to the defeat of the *Anciens*. This is an important aspect of the radical dissociation of ancestral fault from modernity. It is a process which we can see even more clearly in another product of seventeenth-century Dutch humanism.

Lomeier

The *Epimenides, sive de veterum gentilium lustrationibus syntagma*, of Jan Lomeier (1636–99) was published in Zutphen in 1681 (posthumous second edition 1700). Printed in the same year as Richard Simon's *Comparaison des Cérémonies des Juifs & de la discipline de l'Église, avec un discours touchant les différentes Messes, ou Liturgies qui sont en usage dans tout le monde*, and four years before Spencer's last tome of *De legibus Hebraeorum ritualibus* (1683–5), it was dealing with red hot issues of the day.⁸⁹ Writing from the side of the orthodox Calvinist tradition of seventeenth-century Holland, and against the positions of Grotius and the natural-law theorists, Jan Lomeier set out to attack the idea that original sin can be washed away or purified in any manner by rites of lustration.⁹⁰ It can only be redeemed by eternal divine grace, he argued; belief in the spiritual efficacy of ritual and good works is mere and dangerous superstition. The many similarities between the various ritual practices of the world are not expressions of some eternal truth, but a testimony to Satanic influence. Lomeier gave himself the task of comparing and describing all known idolatrous rituals of purification, and exposing them as the work of the Devil. His treatise reads like a catalogue of the world's follies. Greek ancestral fault is singled

⁸⁹ See Gagné 2010a: 131, n. 52.

⁹⁰ On Lomeier and his first book, the 1669 *De bibliothecis*, see Montgomery 1962.

out as a particularly significant example of this abominable pagan belief in purification; it is defined as an element of the purely exterior, ritualistic, and superstitious religion of the idolatrous past. It is set on the same footing as contemporary 'savage' heathenism, and, of course, Catholic ritual.⁹¹ Lomeier was born during the Eighty Years War against Spain, and he wrote his treatise under the hardened religious climate which would lead to the revocation of the Nantes edict in France, at a time when Zutphen was occupied by the Catholic armies of Louis XIV. In the preface to his work he describes the state of horror and despair in which his city had fallen under the cruel and impious troops of the French Crown. It comes as no surprise that the very last chapter of the *Epimenides* is devoted to the many continuities of *superstitio* from paganism to the 'Romano-Catholic' Church, and the repeated influence of the Devil in its later resurgences.⁹² While the discussion of Grotius illustrates the modern rejection of ancestral fault from the modern redefinition of justice, the *Epimenides* illustrates its rejection from the sphere of a religion redefining itself against everything else. It shows the early reframing of ancestral fault as an element of ritual superstition.

The *Epimenides* is a treatise on the purification practices of all the ancient peoples of the world. Like the *De iure belli ac pacis*, it is comparative through and through.⁹³ It attempts to classify the entire spectrum of ideas and practices, beliefs and rituals, concerning the atonement and the purification of sin attested throughout the lands of non-Christian societies, including the purification of ancestral fault. The great core of Lomeier's material comes from Greek, Latin, and Hebrew texts. More significantly, he collects *comparanda* from the four corners of the globe, quoting customs and practices from the Egyptians, the Babylonians, the Phrygians, the Druids, the Brahmans, the Germans, the Chinese, the Tartar, the Japanese, the Moscovites, the Mohammedans, the Aztecs, Polynesians, and many others.⁹⁴ The treatise organises its material along the lines of descriptive analogy. All the ideas and the rites which are deemed to look alike are grouped under the same broad rubrics. After a few introductory chapters devoted to the etymology of *lustratio*, the definition of purification, and the differences which distinguish *religio* from *superstitio*, Lomeier proceeds to regroup the idolatrous practices of world heathenism in general, and more specifically of ancient *gentiles*, in

⁹¹ Wickenden 1993: 124–7; 185–95.

⁹² Cap. 39: *Lustrationibus gentilium abolitis, aliae in ecclesia Romano-Catholica successerunt*, etc.

⁹³ See Gagné 2010a: 132, n. 56. ⁹⁴ E.g. Cap. 15; 19; 21–2; 29; 32.

broad descriptive categories. The book is a catalogue of rites. The order of the chapters follows no set logic. Every chapter contains a number of loosely related entries. Typical entries include sections on 'lustrations preceding entry into a temple', 'lustrations through fire and water, or through water mixed with honey', 'sacrifice', 'lustrations through human blood', 'human sacrifice', 'cannibalism', 'ritual usages of the egg', and so on. The immediate aim is to show the similarities which exist between all pagan and heathen superstitions, on the one hand, and ancient Judaism on the other.

Lomeier defines the practices of ancient pagan religion as diabolical and empty cult.⁹⁵ In the *Epimenides*, *ritus* is used interchangeably with *cerimonia*, and it refers mostly to religious (or, rather, superstitious) actions and behaviour.⁹⁶ In chapter 16, for instance, Lomeier describes purificatory washing with water as a *ritus*; elsewhere, the same word is used to describe a purification of murder through the mutilation of the dead (e.g. *ritum hunc enarrat Sophoclis scholiastes ad Electram* I. 447). The main interest of Lomeier is not in *ritus* as such, however, but more specifically in *lustratio*.⁹⁷ *Lustratio* involves the performance of religious action, but also thought about its meaning and efficacy. In describing the ancient purification practices of pagan nations, and showing their common origin in the Devil's will, Lomeier is actually discussing the meaning of atonement, one of the central concerns of orthodox Calvinism.⁹⁸ He seeks to show that all attempts at the purification of sin outside the election of grace are vain illusions. There can be no equivalent to baptism as it is understood in the one true faith. The only salvation is the blood of Jesus Christ.⁹⁹ It is the only expiation and the only true sacrifice. All the rites of expiation of the heathens and the superstitious belong to Satan; they have no effect on the salvation of the soul from original sin.¹⁰⁰ This purification can only be reached through the grace of God, who has decided in all eternity who would be saved, and who would be lost. The false rites of purification of the heathens are the clearest expression of the division between the just and the damned.

⁹⁵ E.g. Cap. 1; cf. Cap. 2; 14; 39.

⁹⁶ On the usage of *ritus* in the text, see Gagné 2010a: 134, n. 59.

⁹⁷ He defines *lustratio* in chapter 1 as: *Sacra autem, de quibus agimus, lustrationes, sunt actiones et caeremoniae religiosae, instigante κακοζηλίᾳ Diaboli, obstetricante hominum superstitione ἀθελοθρησκείᾳ a gentibus institutae, & sollemnibus personis, rebus, ritibusque adhibitae peractae, quibus se a peccatis purgare, mala avertere, numenque placare conabantur.*

⁹⁸ See e.g. R. E. Olson 2006. On the central importance of this question in contemporary comparative scholarship, see e.g. Stroumsa 2001b: 99.

⁹⁹ Cap. 15: *Fons sanguis Filii Dei qui nos καθαρίζει ab omni peccato*; cf. Cap. 1. ¹⁰⁰ Cap. 1–3.

For Lomeier, all pagan cult is superstition, 'because they adore false gods with lying cult'.¹⁰¹ Like the other writers of the Protestant apologetical tradition in which he sets himself, he posits a clear division between *religio* and *superstitio*.¹⁰² The similarities between pagan and heathen superstitions reflect on Jews and illegitimate Christianity. The essence of *religio*, as the etymology of its name proves, says Lomeier, who explains it through *religando*, is the bond of grace which links the faithful to God. Religion is a function of *amor*, while superstition is based on *terror*. Superstition has two daughters: polytheism (πολυθεότης), and false cult (ἑθελοθησκεία). By πολυθεότης, Lomeier means the *fabulae* and the *opiniones* of the *gentiles*, while by ἑθελοθησκεία, he refers to their cults and ceremonies; what later scholars would come to call myth and ritual.¹⁰³ Both polytheism and false cult come from the κακοζηλία of Satan.¹⁰⁴ For Lomeier, the similarities which he documents among the pagans and the heathen customs and rites of the world are not expressions of some natural law, but the work of the Devil.

The Devil cannot create: he imitates the work of God, like an ape.¹⁰⁵ He has throughout the ages seduced the peoples of the world to entertain beliefs and perform rituals which were in fact destined to turn them away from God and bring them to worship him instead. All the similarities between the cult practices of the heathen world which Lomeier catalogues so assiduously in his treatise have a common origin in Satanic imitation. They mirror the earlier religion of the Hebrews, but only as deformed, inverted reflections. The use of *tympana* and *cista* in pagan cults, for instance, are echoes of the Arc of the Hebrew rites.¹⁰⁶ In the second edition published in 1700, Lomeier goes to great lengths to show that these rites of the Hebrews are not derived from Egypt, as John Spencer had recently argued in the *De legibus Hebraeorum ritualibus et eorum rationalibus*.¹⁰⁷ On the contrary, he says, the rites of the Egyptians, as old as they

¹⁰¹ Cap. 3.

¹⁰² *Verum religionis & superstitionis discrimen hoc est: religio veri Dei verus est cultus, complectens omnia officia, vero Deo, ex eius mandato, debita: superstitio autem non tantum est cum creatura creatoris loco colitur, sed etiam cum verus Deus colitur modo non legitimo* (Cap. 3).

¹⁰³ Cap. 14; 16; 23; 25; 32; 35; see Muir 2005: 163–201. The term πολυθεότης is already found in John Selden's 1617 *De diis Syris* (Stroumsa 2001a: 3).

¹⁰⁴ Cap. 2. ¹⁰⁵ Cap. 1–2. ¹⁰⁶ Cap. 2.

¹⁰⁷ Cap. 2; J. Spencer 1683–5; *Ritus autem a Mose populo Israëlitico traditos, ab Aegyptiis derivatos esse, eosque paululum hic illic emendatos, & politico scilicet aliquo schemate inscrutatos, Marschami quidem & Spenceri opinio est, quorum hic mea in hoc capite verba respexit: lib.3. de legg. Hebr. ritual. dissert. 5. cap. 1. verum hanc doctissimorum virorum sententiam veru jugulante acuratissime transfixit Clar. Hermannus Witsius, in Aegyptiacis, ut si vel tantillum adderem, Iliadem post Homerum canere jure merito videri possem; on Spencer, see Stroumsa 2001a; J. Assmann 2005.*

might be, are also diabolical deformations stemming from the Devil's persuasion; as are later Jewish superstitions, in fact, stemming from their adoptions of heathen customs and the renewed influence of the Devil after their refusal to recognise the Messiah and the New Covenant. Only the true heirs of the Hebrews, the Christians of the one true (Calvinist) Church, have escaped the *κακοζήλια* of Satan, and have remained faithful to *religio*. There can be no question of ancestral fault being washed away by mere empty ritual. But the anger of God is no fable.

In chapter 5 Lomeier refutes the position of the Epicureans, who say that gods are removed from human concerns, and that they can be neither angered nor placated. According to him, the Stoics came closer to the truth of *religio* with their theories of Providence, but their refusal to admit the anger of God is a distinctive error.¹⁰⁸ 'More pious are those pagan philosophers', says Lomeier, 'who have talked about God not so much in the disputations of the schools, but in the process of honouring the gods with *religiones* in the temples.' By this Lomeier refers to Plutarch, as he explicitly shows a few lines later. In the general condemnation of pagan belief and ritual of the *Epimenides*, Plutarch is singled out as the closest prefiguration of Christian thought to have been produced in the ancient world. God cannot be placated, but he can be angered, 'as we can see in Plutarch's *De sera numinis vindicta*, a book', continues Lomeier, 'in which there are a great many things which can be said and which can be learned by a Christian'. Like his adversary Grotius, Lomeier seeks to appropriate the authority of Plutarch, especially of his revered treatise on divine punishment. As in the *De iure belli ac pacis*, Plutarch's text is seen as a witness to the nature of divine anger. Exactly as in Grotius' treatise, however, the principle of ancestral fault is also dissociated from the realm of human practice.

In the text of the orthodox scholar, ancestral fault is a clear example of *superstitio*.¹⁰⁹ The first thing to note is that the treatise of Lomeier is called *Epimenides*, the name of the archaic Cretan holy man who was said to have purified Athens from the ancestral pollution of the Cylonian massacre.¹¹⁰ The title *Epimenides* does not appear in the first 1681 edition of the book, which is only called *De veterum gentilium lustrationibus syntagma*, but it was added as the main word of the title in the 1700 edition. Ancestral fault is the icon which Lomeier, his friends, or his editor chose to represent the entire realm of superstitions which the book set out to condemn.

¹⁰⁸ Cap. 5. ¹⁰⁹ Cap. 3; 22. ¹¹⁰ Cap. 13; see pp. 312–18.

It is discussed in the middle of the treatise, at chapter 22. This chapter regroups a plethora of purification practices where one person is made to suffer for the expiation of another – perverse reflections of the one true sacrifice of Jesus Christ. The heading of the chapter will give an idea of its varied content:

Caput XXII. Lustrationes per sanguinem humanum. Vulnere sacerdotum Baalis, Aegyptiorum, Bellonae, Cybeles. Mors sontium, vicarium pro aliis: φαρμακοί, καθάρματα, synonyma graeca. ἀντίψυχοι. Privatum, publice: pro principe, pro populo: Decii pater et filius. Menoeceus. Devotio exercituum, urbium, familiarum, & posterorum. καθάρματα. Sinon. Apud Massilienses, Gallos. Paulus. 1. Cor. 4. Christiani. Jonas. Captivi. Exules. Gladiatores. Homo sacer. Securis apud Athenienses condemnata. (Cap. 22)

The principle of ancestral fault is portrayed as a superstition comparable in its essence to the ritual self-inflicted wounds of Babylonian, Egyptian, and Phrygian priests, or the trial of the sacrificial axe at the Bouphonia. It is presented more specifically in the context of *devotio exercituum, urbium, familiarum, & posterorum*. Lomeier conceives of it as analogous to purificatory mutilation, the *devotio* of the Decii, or the rite of the φαρμακός, in the sense that in all of these examples, one was wrongly thought to endure vicarious suffering for the sake of another. Ancestral fault is seen as the belief in a stain which can attach itself to a family, and which must be purified through ritual lustrations. Lomeier refers to it as ‘hereditary pollution’: *haereditarium piaculum*. He uses the word *piaculum* elsewhere in his treatise to translate the Greek ἄγος.¹¹¹ Lomeier goes on to show that the pagan lustrations of ancestral fault, these attempts to purify *haereditaria piacula in familiis*, are diabolical perversions.

He chooses six examples to illustrate his point. The first is the great imprecation of the Amphictyonic oath related by Aeschines in his account of the first Sacred War.¹¹² The second comes from Book 7 of Herodotus, chapter 197.¹¹³ In the cult of Zeus Laphystios at Alos in Phthiotid Achaia, the Achaeans perform human sacrifices to atone for the ancient murder of Phrixus by Athamas and Ino. This is a rite prescribed by an oracle, which Lomeier has shown earlier to be a voice of the Devil.¹¹⁴ The first-born of the descendants of Athamas and Kytissoros, the son of Phrixus, are forbidden to enter the Prytaneum and kept from leaving its premises if

¹¹¹ Cap. 16; 20; 35; e.g. Cap. 32.

¹¹² Aeschin. 3.110–12; see pp. 175–6.

¹¹³ On this cult, see Gagné 2013.

¹¹⁴ Cap. 2–3. For the theme of oracle and diabolical inspiration in early Christian apology already, see e.g. Fédou 1988: 243–9.

they do enter – butchered as they try to leave. The descendants of Kytissoros are punished because their ancestor had liberated Athamas from punishment and brought it upon himself instead. Many of those who flee to foreign lands are brought back to the Prytaneum and led to their deaths in sacrificial processions in which they are decked in crowns and fillets, like animals readied for the altar. Lomeier provides a similarly bloody story as the third example, the story of the Alcmaeonid curse from Herodotus Book 5 and Thucydides Book 1.¹¹⁵ He relates how Cleomenes exiled Cleisthenes and seven hundred Athenian families from the city, the descendants of the murderers, ‘as if they were contaminated by the Cylonian *piaculum*’; and how the Athenians even later dug up the bones of the polluted families and cast them away from their territory.

To these cases of cruel lustrations from history Lomeier adds three examples of people going so far as to curse themselves and their progeny. Some of these examples are taken from Grotius’ *Annotationes in Novum Testamentum* to Matthew 27:25. The first example is the passage of Matthew himself, where, after Pontius Pilate has washed his hands of the blood of Jesus, he sees the Jewish people say: τὸ αἷμα αὐτοῦ ἐφ’ ἡμᾶς καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ τέκνα ἡμῶν (‘Let his blood be on us and on our children!’). The second example is a conditional curse from the constitution of the Smyrnaeans with the typical ritual formula of generational execration ἐξώλης εἴη; and the third, the apology of the Roman senator Rufus to Augustus for his slip of tongue, a story from Seneca which has the senator ask the emperor to let his own words fall on his head and that of his progeny (*Ben.* 3.27).¹¹⁶ Lomeier says, quoting Grotius, that the Jews are not the only people to believe that great crimes remain attached to the descendants of sinners; thus ‘reminding’ his readers in the process that the Jews themselves believe in a curse on their people, believe in ritual expiation of sins, and that these beliefs agree with those of the heathens.¹¹⁷ A section at the end of chapter 22 shows how Christian *religio* differs from such *superstitio*. The section on *haereditarium piaculum* ends with a reference to Grotius, *De iure belli ac pacis* Lib. 2, Cap. 21 and 14. Quoting his opponent twice in the passage, Lomeier ends up using Grotius against Grotius in his attempt to discredit what he sees as the central error of his views. Ancestral fault is a *lustratio* shared by the Greeks, the Romans, and

¹¹⁵ Hdt. 5.70–1; Thuc. 1.126–8. ¹¹⁶ On the formula of *exōleia*, see p. 174, n. 56.

¹¹⁷ Cap. 22: *ad quem locum Grotius notavit, non Hebraeis tantum, sed & Gentilibus hanc fuisse opinionem, magnis sceleribus etiam posteritatem obstringi*. See n. 36; cf. Tert. *Apol.* 21.5; 18; *Adv. Iudaeos* 8.18.

the Hebrews, as the jurist himself has shown, certainly the *moratiores* of peoples if there are any, and yet even Grotius himself cannot admit it to the *ius naturale*. The unacceptable nature of Epimenides is a witness to the unacceptable nature of Lomeier's enemies, including natural-law theory, Socinianism, and Catholicism.

The *Epimenides* functions as a salvo in a theological war. It attempts to look at the nature of the similarities that exist between the rites and beliefs of pagans and heathens. Grotius and the natural-law theorists are derided for defending an absurd position.¹¹⁸ The very first chapter of the book attacks Grotius as a Socinian and mocks his false definition of λύτρον (atonement). If the so-called natural law, 'which could not even be moved by God if he wanted to', is perceived by the observation of different peoples united in common practice, then why is our religion so different from the rites of the world outside? In chapter 14, in a direct address to Grotius, he asks his long-dead adversary why he does not perform sacrifices himself, rites which Lomeier is describing with shocking and colourful details throughout his text, if these are expressions of natural law? For truly they must be so, according to the descriptions of Grotius in the *De iure belli ac pacis*, as Lomeier truculently strives to show. Should Grotius not slaughter bulls as offerings to God, like the figures in oddly familiar late seventeenth-century dress reproduced on the lithography which accompanies this chapter in the second edition of the book? Or fumigate a basin of water, like the other European figure in classicising clothes performing this rite in a different lithography, standing before a peculiar Dutch house with classical colonnade? Could Grotius be such a modern-day Dutch idolater? Grotius and his bishop, says Lomeier, by which he means Arminius and the Remonstrants, are in fact Socinians, *Socinismi inscrutatores*.¹¹⁹

In the midst of such a complete clash of opinions, it is striking to see that Lomeier reached the same conclusion as Grotius concerning the evaluation of Greek ancestral fault. Both continued to appropriate the authority of Plutarch's *De sera numinis vindicta*, quoting it with approval as a description of divine anger, and at the same time both categorically criticised the principle of ancestral fault as incompatible with reasonable human institutions. Starting from radically opposite positions, Grotius and Lomeier arrived at similar results: ancestral fault was to be unreservedly rejected from the reception of the Greek heritage, and the realm of modern Christian practice. It was incompatible with the redefinition of a universal

¹¹⁸ Cap. 14.

¹¹⁹ Cap. 14.

justice of personal freedom, on the one hand, and with the reinvention of religion as a value of absolute historical and geographical distinction, on the other. Whereas one scholar reframed ancestral fault as being opposed to true morality, the other condemned it as an example of the superstitious errors of others concerning vicarious purification. Both normative evaluations of the Greek material reflected their author's views on the meaning of corporate responsibility and original sin, and their responses to the new challenges of ethnographic comparatism. Both show how Greek ancestral fault, even in such radically different perspectives as those of Grotius and Lomeier, had become an unacceptably foreign idea for the new modernity of the seventeenth century. Through comparison with the practices of other peoples, it could be classified and rejected at the edges of savagery. It was recast as the unjust, ritualistic, and superstitious dogma of a distant world.

These two expressions of the questions at stake in the Christian debates of early modernity, one from the secularising camp, the other from the orthodox pulpit, clearly illustrate the widespread process of rejection that led to the near unanimous perception of ancestral fault as something undesirable and foreign. This is a process of dissociation that has continued to the present day. If it has come to be less involved in the confrontation of open theological debate, and ceased to be as explicitly formulated as it was in the seventeenth century, it still lies behind many assumptions of contemporary scholarship. Although it never ceased to be read through the closest available Christian categories of earlier domesticating readings, the principle of ancestral fault has carried on being framed as something alien and wholly other in its translation to modernity. As we will now see, the enduring framing of the Greek material as a distant reality in modern scholarship eventually followed in two strands: Rationalist devaluation, and Romantic idealisation.

The scholarship of inherited guilt I

The progressive marginalisation of original sin in most configurations of Christian thought went hand in hand with the disavowal of inherited privilege. The justification of heredity was to be slowly and painfully dislodged as a prime factor of one's condition in a world where 'all men are created equal'. The triumph of the entirely free individual demanded the narrative of a new history. Michelet, in 1847, could celebrate the French Revolution as the decisive transition:

Ainsi disparaît du monde la fausse solidarité. *L'injustice transmission du bien*, perpétuée dans la noblesse; *l'injustice transmission du mal*, par le péché originel, ou la flétrissure civile des descendants du coupable. La Révolution les efface.¹²⁰

The liberation from aristocratic rights, for him, was intrinsically tied to the rejection of the old inherited stains – Election goes hand in hand with the Fall.¹²¹ Written a year before a new revolution was to sweep away so much of what remained from the Ancien Régime system in Western Europe, these words of liberal hope, in absolute opposition to the thought of someone like de Maistre, embodied the shape of things to come.

The heyday of Plutarch's influence was the early modern period, when he was seen as the voice of Greek and Roman antiquity, revered as a moral authority, and probably more read than any other single ancient author apart from the Bible.¹²² The *De sera numinis vindicta* was considered by most to be his masterpiece. In this context, the principle of ancestral fault could be seen as a direct 'domestic' equivalent of Christian belief. With the victory of the Moderns over the Ancients, the turn of the Enlightenment, and later the rise of the classical Age of Pericles as the pinnacle of the Romantic canon, a summit from which the imperial period was only another step in decline, the *De sera numinis vindicta* came to be relegated largely to the dust of the antiquarian bookshelf.¹²³ It is true that the text of Plutarch did manage to renew itself as a document of faith in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries; but mostly, as we saw earlier, from radical Catholic reactionaries and evangelical Protestants fighting an eccentric rearguard action against secular modernity.¹²⁴ As de Maistre and Méautis themselves acknowledge in their prefaces, as well as Hackett and Peabody, the treatise came to be largely neglected by mainstream interpretation. When it was still read, the text could now be openly dismissed as worthless, foreign obscurantism. The treatise of Plutarch, and the Greek

¹²⁰ P. 36 of the 1847 preface from the 1979 edition (Collection Bouquins) of the *Histoire de la Révolution française*.

¹²¹ See e.g. p. 55: 'La Révolution fonde la fraternité sur l'amour de l'homme pour l'homme, sur le devoir mutuel, sur le droit et la Justice. Cette base est fondamentale, et n'a besoin de nulle autre. Elle n'a point cherché à ce principe certain un douteux principe historique. Elle n'a point motivé la fraternité par une parenté commune, une filiation qui, du père aux enfants, transmettrait avec le sang la solidarité du crime. Ce principe charnel, matériel, qui met la Justice et l'injustice dans le sang, qui les fait circuler, avec le flux de la vie, d'une génération à l'autre, contredit violemment la notion spirituelle de la Justice qui est au fond de l'âme humaine. Non, la Justice n'est pas un fluide qui se transmette avec la génération. La volonté seule est juste ou injuste, le coeur seul se sent responsable; la Justice est toute en l'âme; le corps n'a rien à voir ici.'

¹²² See e.g. Magnino 1992; Lamberton 2001: 188–97.

¹²³ See Méautis 1935: 9–28. ¹²⁴ See pp. 82–90.

principle of ancestral fault with it, came to be seen as the unjust belief of a superstitious religion. David Hume, for instance, railed against this text which advances ‘very wild, absurd, and contradictory opinions’, a dialogue which contains ‘superstitions and wild visions’, and which strongly contrasts with the rational and moral texture of Plutarch’s other work in his evaluation.¹²⁵

The uneasy combination of respect for Plutarch’s treatise and the dissociative rejection of ancestral fault that we find in Grotius and Lomeier had a long posterity. Wytttenbach, as we saw earlier, considered the *De sera numinis vindicta* to be a masterpiece of moral philosophy, a manual of Christian life, and a text of great beauty.¹²⁶ But at the same time he squarely dismissed the central parts of Plutarch’s discussion of ancestral fault as utterly unacceptable in his notes. In the note to chapter 15, for instance, he energetically denies the justice of seeing the continuity of the city as a justification for the continuity of its responsibility, and he breathes a sigh of relief that Plutarch eventually brings the question ‘out of the darkness and into the light’ with his discussion of criminal atavism.¹²⁷ Inherited sin is more readily explained as a transmission of vice and depravity. To be useful, the treatise must fit modern categories: guilt must morally involve the individual.

Editing the same text almost exactly two hundred years later, Yvonne Vernière, in her 1974 Budé introduction, portrays the discussion of ancestral fault that occupies the central third of the treatise as a secondary and ‘episodic’ development in the economy of the work (1974: 108–9). For her, Plutarch’s discussion of ancestral fault is the masking of a ‘droit primitif sous couvert de la religion’, and it plays only an artificial role in the logic of the *De sera numinis vindicta* (1974: 109). Not only is it unjust and logically contradictory, but it is ‘entaché de bizarres superstitions’ (1974: 108–9). The principle of ancestral fault described by Plutarch is the ‘dogme périmé’ of a savage faith which had ceased to be defensible six hundred years earlier. It is the ‘postulat magique de la mentalité primitive’, and it constitutes a foreign, eccentric addition to the more advanced discussions of the two other parts of the text. ‘Logiquement’, says Vernière, ‘la prise de conscience orphique déjà sensible chez Pindare, transmise par Platon et l’Académie, aurait dû libérer Plutarque des solidarités primitives. Mais de telles contradictions sont coutumières aux esprits religieux.’ Like Wytttenbach, she takes some comfort in seeing Plutarch justify ancestral fault through ‘l’atavisme physiologique’, as this at least involves a semblance

¹²⁵ Hume 1987: 461–3; cf. Badelon 2012.

¹²⁶ See p. 84.

¹²⁷ Wytttenbach 1820–1: 396–7.

of individual guilt. Citing Glotz and Dodds, she reproduces the logic of their ideas on ancestral fault: it is the primitive, prehistoric dogma of family solidarity, it is both unjust and superstitious, and it is utterly out of place in the time of Plutarch and the otherwise admirable structure of his masterpiece (1974: 106–9).

In his 1993 study of the *De sera numinis vindicta*'s 'penological' argument, to take another example of this still dominant strand of modern readings, Trevor J. Saunders submits the text to the exigencies of British analytical philosophy and closely scrutinises the treatise for the clarity and the logical consistency of its thought. Reading the text of Plutarch against the background of Plato's *Laws*, and evaluating its argument as he would a modern philosophical work, Saunders severely criticises 'the strange imagination of Plutarch, determined as he is to find any and every justification for "late" punishment, however bizarre' (1993: 86). Later, at the end of his 'assessment', he continues:

Much as I find Plutarch's treatise maddening (his examples are prolix, his language vague, his love of paradox and analogy treacherous), and much as I find some of his ideas perverse and repellent, I cannot but admire the entertainingly urbane range of his discussion, and the sheer invention and ingenuity of his arguments. The *De sera numinis vindicta* is nowadays less well known than it ought to be. It contains serious penology which deserves serious analysis. (1993: 93–4)

An edition of the *De sera numinis vindicta* published two years after Saunders' study provides another clear case of the modern foreignisation which continued to shape the reading of ancestral fault in the text of Plutarch.¹²⁸ In his preface to the 1995 re-edition of Amyot's translation of the treatise, Jean-François Gauthier praises the *De sera numinis vindicta* as a useful book for the 'lecteur d'aujourd'hui', a prescient reflection on the nature of collective responsibility that can still inspire our thoughts on the subject:

La modernité à tort ou non, c'est un autre débat ne dispose plus de la capacité de renvoyer au monde divin l'arbitrage de ses incompétences et de ses conséquences; mais cela ne démode pas pour autant une anthropologie juridique aussi ancienne que celle de Plutarque; pour peu qu'elle ait été bien instruite, elle a encore quelque chose à enseigner sur ce que nous sommes, nous, bien après la mort des dieux grecs, et de quelques autres encore.

In the twenty pages of his introduction to the *De sera numinis vindicta*, however, Gauthier does not have one single word to write about such an

¹²⁸ Gauthier 1995: 7–26.

unmodern sight as the principle of ancestral fault. Again, the treatise of Plutarch is praised as a useful and relevant text, but its discussion of ancestral fault is completely dissociated from the rest of the work and framed as a bizarre and foreign excrescence. In the discussion of Gauthier, it is so unacceptable that it becomes in fact invisible.

This almost unanimous rejection of the principle of ancestral fault in the later modern readings of the *De sera numinis vindicta* is parallel to the larger framing of ancestral fault as a foreign belief in the scholarship of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The Christian readings of earlier centuries continued to furnish the implicit categories of translation of the material in the later modern period.¹²⁹ But the principle of Greek ancestral fault never regained the direct equivalence with Christian domestic understanding it once had in the perception of scholars, the type of recognition that could justify its open domestications in earlier times. Both grounds of foreignisation that we saw at play in the work of Grotius and Lomeier were brought further in succeeding periods. On the one hand, the fading of original sin and corporate punishment after the Enlightenment as central concerns of mainstream Christian religiosity certainly played a role in this later modern foreignisation. This, as we saw, largely went together with the emergence of the modern self, the value laid on the sacredness of personal, individual responsibility.¹³⁰ The continuing devaluation of sacraments and ritual, especially ritual atonement and purification, with which ancestral fault has remained tied to the present day, and the persistent move towards a personal, interior piety of moral rectitude and textual exegesis, especially (but certainly not exclusively) in northern Protestant countries, also contributed in maintaining the isolation of ancestral fault as something utterly foreign.¹³¹

Perhaps more importantly, the constitution of theology, philosophy, history, classical and Semitic philology as separate and independent fields of study in the universities of the early nineteenth century finally consecrated the earlier division of Greek and Roman literature, on the one hand, and the Bible on the other.¹³² The material of ancestral fault ceased to be read systematically through Christian Scriptures, and in time explicit theological disputation was no longer seen as an acceptable part of a now 'scientific' philology. In the same way as it became more strictly delimited from the exegesis of Christian literature, the interpretation of classical culture was also largely separated from the study of other cultures.¹³³

¹²⁹ See pp. 86–90. ¹³⁰ See p. III. ¹³¹ See pp. 127–8.

¹³² See Hülten Schmidt 1985; Olender 1989. ¹³³ See Humphreys 1978: 15–30; Detienne 2005.

The broad horizontal cross-cultural comparatism of an earlier period was continued in the more strictly linguistic work of the new Indo-European comparative philology, but classical philology became enclosed in its own enlarged space, the *Sach-Philologie* which was now made to cover the entire spectrum of ancient culture, and jealously defended from other areas of study.¹³⁴ The debates of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries directly traced the way for the programmes of research of the following two hundred years.¹³⁵ Classical philology itself, in fact, became in many ways an expression of the much broader processes of textual colonisation which came to underlie the paradigm of modern Western cultural translations.

This took place within the context of the same dynamics of essentialising cultural taxonomy that led to the hermeneutic revolution illustrated by the work of Schleiermacher at the turn of the nineteenth century. With the rise of essentialist European nationalisms, past civilisations came to be further idealised as closed semantic units after the Enlightenment.¹³⁶ The cutting-edge foreignisation of the new hermeneutic programme won against the older domestication programmes of direct appropriation. Each individual culture could be perceived as an essentially distinct world of meaning – each one different from our own, and all different from each other. The understanding of a different culture was seen as an act of translation between irreducibles, an intelligible reconfiguration from something essentially other. Its aim was to deepen the understanding of human nature by emphasising the richness of cultural *differences*. Cultural units of civilisation came to be idealised in essential units of meaning defined in reference to their differences from the modern West, and to the lessons they could give it by virtue of their alterity – both as model and as foil. This process was inextricably linked with the constitution of the modern nation-state as the paradigmatic unit of cultural difference. The work of cultural translation moved away from the patterns of domestication of an earlier age, and towards an ever sharper essentialisation of otherness. As Gadamer has argued in *Truth and Method*, this paradigm shift was determinant in the interrelated constitution of history and philology as scientific disciplines.¹³⁷

Civilisations and periods, the units of cultural difference, no longer comparable on a horizontal axis as they had been in the seventeenth

¹³⁴ See Lehmann 1987; Hummel 2000. ¹³⁵ Humphreys 2004.

¹³⁶ See e.g. Koyre 1957; Foucault 1966; Duchet 1971; Gusdorf 1973; Michel 1982; C. Richter 2004; Crouter 2005.

¹³⁷ Gadamer 1975; cf. Olender 1989; Hummel 2000.

century, were reorganised on a vertical axis of comparison.¹³⁸ The numerous manifestations of the human spirit in world history came to be classified by their difference from the modern West. Building on the work of eighteenth-century historiography in tracing the patterns of historical progression, the study of human culture in the nineteenth century generally came to divide civilisations and periods into stages of evolution.¹³⁹ These patterns of evolution portrayed the rhythms of evolution as moving away either from lowly primitive beginnings towards the higher forms of modern development, or from the authentic, formidable, and pure manifestations of natural culture through successive stages of degenerescence. Each civilisation, mirroring 'our own', was seen to have its own patterns of evolution read on the more general understanding of world historical development.¹⁴⁰ The study of these patterns looked more closely into the differences of chronological periods within each culture and placed special emphasis on origins, the movements of rise and fall, and social differences between high and popular belief, artificial and authentic culture.¹⁴¹ The representation of Greek culture and religion as foreign and wholly other would no longer be put in doubt. It was the evaluation of this essential difference which would become a matter of debate. Rationalism and Romanticism long provided the main ingredients of this process of cultural evaluation. The portrayal of ancestral fault is an interesting case in point.

Seen as the doctrine of an essentially different faith, the belief of a foreign moral code and ritual system, Greek ancestral fault was understood in terms of the larger significance attached to the history of Greek religion in the nineteenth-century schemas of cultural difference.¹⁴² The principle of Greek ancestral fault, no longer comparable on the horizontal axis cross-culturally, had to be evaluated within the bounds and on the terms of a greatly complexified Greek culture. It came to be read on the vertical axis of historical time and of social division. Instead of a confrontation with the ideas of different cultures on the same plane, it would now be understood through the divisions of periods and social registers inside Greek culture itself. It started to be seen in terms of its own evolution inside this history, and the question of development became more pressing. In this context, the issue of the belief's origin became a central concern; the fundamental pole of attention was now the classical material, and this was explained

¹³⁸ See Vinken, Soeters, and Ester 2004. Cf. Foucault 1966; Duchet 1971.

¹³⁹ Berg 1982; Kuper 1985; 1988; Bowler 1992; Krech 2000.

¹⁴⁰ Foucault 1966; Copans and Jamin 1978; Stocking 1987. ¹⁴¹ Schlesier 1994.

¹⁴² See den Boer 1979; Schlesier 1994; Humphreys 2004; P. Burke 2005; J. Assmann 2005; Burkert 2006b; Wagner 2006.

largely in relation to the 'belief's presence or absence in Homeric and pre-Homeric times. It was often perceived as an element of popular belief, *Volks Glaube*, as opposed to the high religiosity expressed by Homer.¹⁴³ The explicit role given to the late formulation of Plutarch thus lost its centrality. Plutarch, if he was even cited in these discussions, was now perceived to be reproducing with his description of ancestral fault the belief of popular faith and a much earlier time, or later degeneration.¹⁴⁴

If Rationalism continued the negative devaluation of ancestral fault by confronting it with modern justice and religion, Romanticism generated a new form of exotic idealisation. These two ideological poles are illustrated well in the work of two seminal figures of philological foreignisation, two authors directly responsible for the rupture with the explicitly domesticating programmes still represented by Creuzer.¹⁴⁵ These two scholars are generally seen as the starting points of the modern, scientific study of Greek religion: Christian August Lobeck (1781–1860), and Karl Otfried Müller (1797–1840). The profound difference in character between what preceded and what followed the contributions of this generation is inescapable. But here, as elsewhere, the sharp division between this 'rationale Wissenschaft' and earlier 'romantisch-theologische Spekulation', which is predicated by the aetiological myth of contemporary scholarship, might be overly simplified.¹⁴⁶ For reasons of space, I send the reader to a more detailed study of their views on ancestral fault in *Kernos* 2008.

The portraits of ancestral fault produced by Lobeck in the *Aglaophamus* (1829) and Müller in the *Eumeniden* (1833) are exact contemporaries. These two influential representations of Greek ancestral fault were written at the opposite ends of the new professional German philology of the period; one from the analytic perspective of the Hermann school, the other from the more synthetic approach of *Sach-Philologie*. Although so clearly distinct from each other, the discussions of Lobeck and Müller both remained grounded in the obligatory Judaeo-Christian frame of reference of the period: the Hebrew notion of corporate responsibility ('the sins of the fathers'), and original sin. These categories from the Judaeo-Christian tradition lie behind both authors' framing of the Greek material. The *Begrifflichkeit* of the *avita*

¹⁴³ See e.g. von Nägelsbach 1840: 200; 1857: 34–6.

¹⁴⁴ Von Nägelsbach 1857: 36; a view still defended by Glotz 1904: 560; see Méautis 1935: 20; Watson 1991: 14; cf. the rich account of Greek 'inheritance-guilt' in Kierkegaard 1843.

¹⁴⁵ On Creuzer, Lobeck, and Müller, see Sandys 1921; Momigliano 1983; Stemmerdinger 1973; Münch 1976; Schlesier 1994; Lossau 1995; Blok 1998; Calder and Schlesier 1998; Williamson 2004; Humphreys 2012.

¹⁴⁶ See Burkert 1980: 162–3.

culpa and the *Erbsünde* of the μήνιμα δράκοντος, described by Lobeck and Müller as distinctive objects of study, are entirely conceived through the apparently equivalent notions of the Christian tradition. The meanings attributed to these Christian notions determine the meaning of the Greek material in this operation of religious translation.

The principle of ancestral fault is a perfect illustration of the condemnable pseudo-mystical religion described by Lobeck in his book: an amalgam of the primitive and noble *jura* of the family, the irrational misunderstanding of natural pathology, and the lustral obfuscations of the Eastern impostors, all eventually brought into the artificial configuration of Orphism. Ancestral fault is thoroughly foreignised from positive evaluation in the *Aglaophamus*. For Lobeck, who stands close to Lomeier on the question, ancestral fault is nothing but a superstitious popular belief grounded in the primitive and the irrational, and expressed in late and fictive rites of purification and harmful behaviour. For Müller, ancestral fault is an uncanny and elevated dogma of the most ancient Greek belief. His work is an example of a deeply foreignising translation of the Greek cultural material at the beginning of modern scientific philology; his discussion tries to explain something wholly other. It produces the picture of an exotic and yet strangely familiar object, like a magnified shard of natural, primitive Christianity. Instead of a Rationalist devaluation of ancestral fault such as the discussion of Lobeck, it illustrates an attempt to understand the material through empathy. It is a product of Romantic idealisation. Both currents, Rationalism and Romanticism, continued to shape the interpretation of ancestral fault in later scholarship.

An example is the 1857 *Nachhomerische Theologie des griechischen Volksglaubens* of Karl Friedrich von Nägelsbach, which clearly aligns itself with the views of Hermann and Lobeck but is also markedly influenced by the more essentialist approach of Müller, as well as the cyclical view of history of Hegel.¹⁴⁷ The *Nachhomerische Theologie* sets out to analyse the nature of popular belief in the period following the heroic era of the Homeric epics, and the evolution of the pagan *Geist* in its search for ‘eine Gottheit, eine Versöhnung derselben durch Sühnung der Sünde, ein Lebensglück auf Erden und eine tröstliche Hoffnung für das unbekannte Jenseits’ (1857: 2). It tries to show how this religiosity was expressed by the ‘Greek Nation’ at the time when its fresh spirit was still able to contribute to the ‘welthistorischen Thaten’, and especially how this spirit used itself and broke down under the assaults of doubt and unbelief, superstition, and philosophy.

¹⁴⁷ On von Nägelsbach, see Sandys 1921: 106.

This portrait is designed to provide the Christian reader with an object of reflection on his faith, both as the model of an age when the high poetry of the Greeks manifested the spirit of this popular belief on a level of universal world significance, and as the portrait of a time when Greek paganism became the expression of a religious failure of nerves, which Nägelsbach fears is set to come down upon his contemporaries. In this context, Greek ancestral fault is fully discussed in section 22 of chapter 1. It provides an example of the principle: 'Für den Frevler, der stirbt, bevor er gestraft wird, leidet ein Anderer' (1857: 34). Nägelsbach shows how the dogma of ancestral fault is not present in Homer and is simply mentioned as a natural process in Hesiod. But from the time of Solon onwards, he claims, with a number of examples, it plays a central role in elegy, tragedy, historiography, and oratory, and it becomes a central characteristic of the popular pagan understanding of divinity (1857: 34–8). This, he says, is true up to the time of Plutarch's *De sera numinis vindicta*, which provides the explanatory framework and material for Nägelsbach's discussion. The *Nachhomerische Theologie* presents this ancestral fault as a superstitious error, the vain quest for salvation of mistaken folk-belief.¹⁴⁸

The discussion of Nägelsbach is representative of the second half of the nineteenth century's view of ancestral fault in scholarship: a widespread, superstitious, popular belief, whose meaning can be explained through Plutarch's *De sera numinis vindicta*, and which can be illustrated by different examples taken from a variety of genres.¹⁴⁹ The role attributed to Homer in the expression of this belief, and in the nature of the chronological evolution of the belief 'from the origins to Plutarch', can always be seen to determine the significance it is given by individual scholars. The conceptualisation of ancestral fault on the evolutionary scale will determine how the notion of inherited guilt is defined by the individual author. Depending on how it is defined, it will, alternatively, be seen to 'begin' with prehistoric religion, Homer, Hesiod, or Solon. The main core of contributions on the topic continued to frame the material in the explicit mode of Rationalist devaluation. The two grounds of foreignisation that we saw at work in the discussions of Grotius and Lomeier already, the incompatibility of the free individual self of modernity with

¹⁴⁸ In his treatment of the passage in Herodotus 7.137, for instance, the story of the wrath of Talthybios, he writes: 'Dass der Zorn des Talthybios endlich an Boten ausgeht und nicht eher beschwichtigt wird, als eine blutige Sühne erfolgt, das, meint er, τὸ δίκαιον οὕτω ἔφερε: dass aber diese Sühne gerade die Söhne der verschont gebliebenen Männer traf, daraus wird ihm klar, ὅτι θεῖον ἐγένετο τὸ πρῆγμα ἐκ τῆς μῆνιος' (1857: 36).

¹⁴⁹ See for instance Schmidt 1882: 66–76; 86–92.

ancestral fault, and the association of inherited guilt with superstition and 'mere ritual', continued to play an important part in the negative conceptualisation of the Greek material in the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The chronology of the sources on the question also became much more central than it had been before. With the rise of scientific folklore and national rural ethnology, and especially with the development of the category of the 'primitive' from the earlier *Volks Glaube*, and the great anthropological codifications of the later nineteenth century, especially E. B. Tylor's 1871 *Primitive Culture* and its many successors, linear evolutionist time came to dictate the meaning of periodisation.¹⁵⁰ It was now mostly projected as a teleological movement from the 'not-yet' towards the more advanced present. This inspired scholars to look for primitive survivals, isolate the artificial, unauthentic elaborations, and define the heroic breakthroughs of thought towards the modern. The primitive would eventually come to be valued as a fascinating expression of 'our' own deepest impulses.¹⁵¹ But the influence of Romantic idealisation in the religious evaluation of ancestral fault as a noble, exotic form of alterity, together with its aesthetic role as a central element of the formidable archaic *Weltanschauung*, did persist in inspiring awe and respect for the essentialised difference of the ancient world. One figure stands out in this period for the significance and the influence of his discussion: Erwin Rohde (1845–98).

Rohde defined ancestral fault as an element of primitive belief in his classic 1890–4 (1925) book, *Psyche*. It belongs for him to the common human ground of primitive thought, as he shows in Chapter 12, and as such it is strictly identical with the ancestral fault of Vedic India, for instance, and the corporate responsibility of the Old Testament (1925: n. 65 of Chapter 12). For Rohde, the chronology of the material needs to show that ancestral fault is attested in the earliest strata of Greek thought, a survival of the most ancient stage of culture. In Chapter 12, he is discussing ancestral fault in the context of his treatment of Aeschylus' conception of fate, 'his own ethical and religious convictions', what he calls 'the undercurrent of generalised belief which we may reasonably call the ethic and theology of the poet' (1925: 423). He thus attempts to contrast what Aeschylus does with the myths with what the primitive myths inherited by Aeschylus said.

¹⁵⁰ See Berg 1982; Kuper 1985; Bowler 1992; Kilani 1992: 245–61; Krech 2000.

¹⁵¹ See Dozier 1955; Kuper 1988; Richard 1989.

Rohde argues that the mythical stuff inherited by the playwright, 'what is prescribed by legend':

is a history that deals with the continued operation that deals with the forces of evil and suffering upon several generations of a family, persisting from father to son and from son to son's son. The belief also in such interconnexion of human destinies is prescribed to him from without. That the sins of the ancestors were visited upon their descendants here upon earth was an ancient article of faith especially strong in Attica. (1925: 423)

In the note 65 to Chapter 12, Rohde consequently argues that the idea of ancestral fault is alluded to as early as *Iliad* 4.160ff., and in Hesiod's *Works and Days* 282ff. Not only that, but the justification received by the principle of ancestral fault in Plutarch's *De sera numinis vindicta*, which provides Rohde with his main explanatory framework on the question, is said to be 'quite in accordance with primitive ideas'. The imperial codification of Plutarch is seen as a valid explanation of the old dogma attested in the many archaic and classical examples mentioned by Rohde, who cites the discussion of Nägelsbach for more material, and he argues that it is already present in Homer. The primitive belief of ancestral fault covers the entire span of Greek history; it is in fact a prehistoric survival predating the heroic epics, and it retains a well-defined nature throughout this time. The principle described by Plutarch is a fossil from the most ancient stratum of Greek belief.

Ancestral fault is for him an idea that derives from the emotions generated by ritual. As he shows elsewhere, citing Lobeck, Rohde conceives of ancestral fault as an expression of vengeance from beyond the grave (1925: n. 148 of Chapter 5). The angry ghosts of slain ancestors will not rest until they are vindicated by their kin and their descendants, and their ancient wrath, the παλαιὰ μνηϊματα of the poets, can be seen to send death and disease over generations until anger is atoned for. The Erinyes are the souls of the angry dead coming back to haunt the living 'with a thousand cold hands groping in the night'. Their sphere of action is determined by the influence attributed to the ancestor-cult for the cohesion of the group and its definition as a unit.

To the poet the old ideas of the duty of avenging murder are a very living reality. The right to worship and cult possessed by the souls, their claim to vengeance when they have been violently done to death, their ghostly influence exerted upon the life and destinies of their immediate kinsfolk upon whom the duty of taking vengeance rests — all these things are for him not the obsolete fancies of an older generation but true and awful realities. (1925: 424)

Following the discussion of Plutarch in the *De sera numinis vindicta*, Rohde argues that the principle of ancestral fault is justified by the idea of the family as a distinct unit of identity with one continuous, responsible essence:

This idea of the punishment of the son for the deeds of the father receives its justification acc. to Plu., *Ser. Nu. Vi.* 16, 559D (quite in accordance with primitive ideas) in the unity that belongs to all the members of the same γένος so that in the person of the son it is the father himself, though he may be dead, who is also punished. The idea arises from the deeply ingrained feeling of the unity, solidarity, and continuity of the ancient family cult circle presupposed by the cult of souls. (This is primitive, and meets us, e.g. in India as well: . . .). (1925: 423)

That Aeschylus uses this material as a central element of his plays is an effect of his world and his religious character, which 'had its roots in old and traditional modes of thought'. Rohde sees it playing a determinant role in the work of the poet, as one of the structuring elements bringing the different stories together. He sees it as an essential element of the *Oresteia*, and of the Oedipus plays (1925: 423–6). The crime of Oedipus is a function of the crime of Laius, and the crime of the sons of Oedipus is a continuation of the guilt of their ancestors in the plays of Aeschylus. The primitive belief of ancestral fault is 'prescribed to him by legend', but he allows it 'to run its full course': out of piety, and because the form of the trilogy is 'uniquely adapted' to cover the interlocked tribulations of successive generations (1925: 424–5).

Aeschylus, however, traditional as he might be, is no mere conveyer of primitive belief, but an early agent of classical reason. His work illustrates how the progression of civilisation slowly brings the human mind away from primitive superstition and ever closer to the more elevated ideals of modernity. The traditional belief inherited by Aeschylus, writes Rohde, involved a negation of free will and a thoroughly problematic view of responsibility. How can the tragic hero be predetermined to pay for the crime of his ancestors, and be guilty himself at the same time?

The question is a perplexing and a formidable one, and it was by no means unnoticed by the poet. Behind the external apparatus of myth he finds himself faced by the problem of the freedom or determination of man's will, which, as civilization and culture advance, feels itself morally responsible for every decision. He finds a way out of the difficulty in the view that it is not merely the deed of wickedness itself, but the conscious decision that leads up to the deed that arises out of the family inheritance of crime. The conscious choice and decision, though regarded as necessary, seemed to

demonstrate fully the personal guilt and responsibility of the doer. The cloud of evil that proceeds from the deed of the ancestor casts a dark shadow also over the minds of his son and his son's son. (1925: 424)

Rohde strives to show that divinity urges 'the victims burdened with the inheritance of crime' to commit the deed, in order that they may share in the *guilt* of the fault, and thus participate in its responsibility. The shadow of the ancestor manifests itself in the heredity of the propensity to crime. 'What Aeschylus contributes on his part', writes Rohde, 'is the unswerving conviction that the son and grandson of the sinner are punished for their *own sin too*' (1925: 423). The double determination which Rohde sees at work in the tales of the Labdacids and the Atridae in the plays of Aeschylus is a function of this 'advance of civilisation and culture', which must leave room for the guilt of a morally responsible decision. At the end of the *Eumenides*, 'where Duty and Crime have become inextricably confused', only the salvation of 'divine grace' is able to find a solution to this dilemma of synergy (1925: 425).

Rohde, then, read the principle of Plutarch through and through into the plays of Aeschylus. It is a reflection of the ancestral fault of the *De sera numinis vindicta* that he describes as the belief of the prehistoric, traditional religion, and the treatise of Plutarch provides us with the clear expression of this primitive doctrine. Rohde described ancestral fault in line with the venerable reflexes of foreignisation that had long accompanied the question. Ancestral fault is for him older than Homer (1925: 425). It embodies a stage of religion that knows only primitive rudiments of moral responsibility, and which is expressed in superstitious cults of the dead and bloody ideas of atonement. This belief was not only oppressive but also morally ineffectual, as Rohde shows. Only the 'unswerving conviction' of Aeschylus 'that the son and grandson of the sinner are punished for their *own sin too*' bears witness to the 'contribution' of Aeschylus in the evolution of reason away from the primitive (1925: 423–4). In the *Eumenides* ancestral fault is even elevated to the idea of grace (1925: 425). Following the liminal figure of Aeschylus, further advanced on the progressive ladder of civilisation, the serene fatalism of Sophocles and the radical sophistry of Euripides will leave no place for the primitive principle of Plutarch in this view.

The scholarship of inherited guilt II

The scholarship of the twentieth century has of course built its understanding of Greek ancestral fault on the ground of what preceded it. It carries the ideological reception of almost two thousand years of active

reflection on the topic. It has essentially been shaped by two layers of filters. A first layer is constituted by the monumental codification of Plutarch (and its reinscription by Proclus), which brought together all preceding traditions concerning the transmission of punishment through generations – from the archaic, classical, Hellenistic, and imperial periods – into one single principle of Hellenic culture. The fifteen centuries of involved Christian reception of this principle constitute the other layer. A complex dialectic of domestication and foreignisation has been at work throughout this time, as we have seen, simultaneously to bring the material near, Christianising its description with familiar categories of interpretation, and keeping it far, labelling and often judging it as foreign and unacceptable. On the one hand, Greek ancestral fault has thus come to be read through the Christian categories of guilt and sin, Hebrew corporate punishment, and the various incarnations of original sin. On the other, it has also been framed as an utterly foreign expression of paganism, superstition, the primitive, and collectivism. All of this cultural and scholarly tradition has found itself determining the scholarship of the twentieth century, as we will now see.

Three works stand out: *La solidarité de la famille dans le droit criminel en Grèce* (1904) by Gustave Glotz (1862–1935), *The Greeks and the Irrational* (1951) by Eric Robertson Dodds (1893–1979), and *The Justice of Zeus* (1971) of Hugh Lloyd-Jones (1922–2009). These three fundamental contributions to the understanding of the question form a direct chain: Dodds builds directly on Glotz, and Lloyd-Jones is a reaction to Dodds. Much of the work on the question in the last decades has been a reaction to Dodds and Lloyd-Jones. The term ‘inherited guilt’, used by Dodds as a translation of the ‘*Erbschuld*’ of Rohde and others, and the ‘*responsabilité héréditaire*’ of Glotz, have now come to be generally understood in Anglophone scholarship as a reference to the belief of ancestral fault – as it has been defined by the three authors in question.

In the 1904 publication of his ‘grande thèse’, *La solidarité de la famille dans le droit criminel en Grèce*, Glotz attempted no less than a general social and juridical history of Greece, from pre-Homeric primitive prehistory to the civilised pinnacle of the classical *polis*.¹⁵² In the almost seven hundred pages of densely packed discussion which make up the book, the material of ancestral fault provided the backbone of his evolutionary narrative. As it is now much less widely read than either Dodds or Lloyd-Jones, I will spend a little longer covering its very influential content. Building on the epoch-making historical tableau, the methods, and the insights of his

¹⁵² Glotz 1904; cf. di Donato 1987.

teacher Numa Denis Fustel de Coulanges' *La cité antique*, Glotz wrote a study of Greek law and political organisation which also centred on the evolution of the family structure as the key motor of history.¹⁵³ Unlike Fustel, however, Glotz did not organise his narrative around the importance of ancestor cults, the hearth, and family religion, but on the notion of 'solidarity'.¹⁵⁴ He attempted to show that the development of the notion of personal responsibility out of the earlier primitive collective responsibility of the kinship group was one of the most fundamental achievements realised in the history of Greek civilisation – a primary feature of its evolution. The historical narrative of Glotz in *La solidarité de la famille* proceeds in three stages, corresponding to the three sections of the book. The first stage, 'La famille souveraine', shows the ancient pre-Homeric period of Greece as a primitive era of patriarchal authority and strong collective kinship responsibility (1904: 3–224). The individual exists only as an element of the larger kinship group; he is defined by his solidarity with the group and his responsibilities to it. In the second stage, 'La cité contre la famille', Glotz traces a portrait of the *polis* being constructed on the ruins of the *genos* (1904: 225–402). As the state slowly limits the jurisdiction of the kinship group and appropriates its prerogatives, the individual is given the chance to exist as a person, and experience his rights directly before the state. In the third stage, 'La cité triomphante', the power of the *genos* is definitively broken, the state is the sole guarantor of right, and the individual is free from the constraints of collective responsibility (1904: 403–608). In this triumphal and linear evolutionary narrative, the progression from the oppressive, collective, and primitive law of the family to the enlightened individual freedom of the classical state is shown as the ancient personification of modern individual emancipation. The role of religion as a conservative force of inertia standing in the way of progress to justice is a direct pendant, in the work of Glotz, to the common representation of traditional religion as an obstacle to progress, as it was so often portrayed in the late nineteenth-century positivistic and aggressively modern and secular Quartier Latin in which Glotz evolved. The slow emancipation from the oppressive weight of inherited responsibility is an important element of this narrative in reflections.

That understanding of ancestral fault as a marker of evolution from primitive times to the classical enlightenment is in direct continuity with the rationalist foreignisation of Lobeck and Rohde; Glotz cites both

¹⁵³ Momigliano 1970; Humphreys 1982; di Donato 1987; Somville 1996; Finley 1997; Hartog 2001.

¹⁵⁴ See Finley 1977; Héran 1989; Somville 1996; Hartog 2001.

throughout his work with approval. It also continues in many ways the logic of foreignisation that we saw at work in the discussions of seventeenth-century humanism in the last chapter. As in Grotius, ancestral fault is portrayed as an unjust collective law directly at odds with the 'natural' freedom of the individual and the paradigmatic perfection of classical Greece. As in Lomeier, it is an expression of superstition: cruel and obscurantist belief. Glotz paints the principle of ancestral fault as a product of the most primitive core of human thought. In *La solidarité de la famille*, a razor sharp, cutting edge historical work for the period, closely attuned to traditional philology and the work of the new French sociological school of Durkheim, to German comparative law and *Altertums-wissenschaft*, and to the Victorian British anthropology of Robertson Smith and his followers, Glotz read the material of ancestral fault through a sophisticated evolutionary grid.¹⁵⁵ Like Fustel, and like Durkheim, who was a close collaborator, a major source of inspiration and a member of his thesis jury, and who even wrote an extensive and rather critical review of the book in the 1905 *Année sociologique*, Glotz sees the interaction between family, institutions, and religion as the prime motivating factor of history.¹⁵⁶ Ritual and especially the collective representations of belief are seen not only as projections of a stage of social evolution, but as active agents in its transformation.

Hereditary responsibility was identified by Glotz as one of the defining characteristics of the most primitive stages of human development. It is a part of the totalising family solidarity of that oppressive, and amorphous, social system of absolute alterity that was posited at the end of the comparative spectrum, the furthest point away from the ultimate destination of the modern self and the modern state. His 'wide use of the comparative method', he says, is designed to precisely locate the originality of Greece (1904: viii–ix). It allows him to show how the earliest stages of Greek society, especially the primitive doctrine of family solidarity, were originally typical manifestations of the lowest stages of human evolution, and the radical innovations championed by a triumphant Athens managed to lift Greece to a level that can only be called modern. His narrative shows 'the precocity of Greece in the world, and of Athens in Greece' (1904: x). The Greek material of ancestral fault, as in the systematic comparative work of seventeenth-century humanism, is recognised in the similarly foreign beliefs of the most distant peoples on the comparative chart. In the evolutive paradigm of the period, this results in the identification of

¹⁵⁵ See di Donato 1987.

¹⁵⁶ Durkheim 1905; cf. Reinach 1905.

ancestral fault as a clearly marked primitive belief, and thus as a pre-Homeric, prehistoric survival of the earliest strata of society into Greek culture. This is the process of transformation and survival that Glotz tries to explain in his book.

His evolutionary understanding of ancestral fault continued the long line of foreignising readings of the material, then. It also, as we will see, recognised the familiar forms of Hebrew corporate responsibility, and of Christian original sin, in its narrative of development. It shows an evolution that mirrors the similar development of Jewish and early Christian thought portrayed by biblical scholars at the time of Glotz: the progressive abandonment of corporate responsibility, as witnessed in Ezekiel 18, for instance, followed by the development of universal original sin and personal eschatological punishment.¹⁵⁷ The discussion of Glotz, finally, is largely based on the comprehensive codification of the principle by Plutarch; the kinship group as an extended being in time, and the numerous exempla of the *De sera numinis vindicta*, provide the descriptive framework on which Glotz's portrayal is grounded. The detailed and extensive picture of inherited guilt that is found in *La solidarité de la famille* is a direct product of the long genealogy of Greek ancestral fault: the centuries of Christian domesticating and foreignising translations, and the inclusive, systematic codifications of later antiquity. As the discussion of Glotz was the most extensive treatment of ancestral fault written in the last century, the study on which every subsequent return to the question has either grounded itself, such as that of Dodds, or the discussion against which subsequent work has been conceived, whether consciously or not, it is worthwhile to survey the main lines of its argument. We will look in what follows at the central characteristics of ancestral fault in *La solidarité de la famille*.

In the first section, 'La famille souveraine', Glotz argues that in the primitive stage of civilization, still discernible in the background of myth and of the Homeric poems, Greek society recognised two complementary systems of jurisdiction. The first, which Glotz refers to as the system of *θέμις*, is concerned with family law. The second, identified as *δίκη*, was the system of inter-family justice in primitive law.¹⁵⁸ In the system of primitive *δίκη*, collective responsibility guides the relation between kinship groups.

¹⁵⁷ Cf. the observations of Kaminsky 1995: 16–30 on this narrative; cf. Krašovec 1999: 474–80.

¹⁵⁸ 'Ainsi coexistent deux systèmes: les groupes règlent leurs comptes entre eux suivant la loi du talion; le groupe réprime les fautes individuelles de ses membres en fondant son droit sur la nécessité de la défense sociale et sur l'intimidation. La Grèce primitive connut ces deux sortes de justice. Elle appelle l'une *δίκη*, et l'autre *θέμις*' (1904: 20–1).

The individual does not exist in the *genos* (1904: 19–46). His personality ‘disappears in a collective existence’. In the case of a murder, the active solidarity of the injured group will be set in motion to extract vengeance, and the passive solidarity of the group responsible for the crime will make every single one of its members liable for punishment. This principle ensures an unending cycle of vendetta that is certain to continue in time. The complete extermination of the entire enemy group is a logical expression of this system. As Glotz writes: ‘L’ethnologie fournit d’interminables listes de peuplades où le vengeur du sang a le droit de massacrer la famille entière du meurtrier’ (1904: 165). Worse, the exercise of vengeance does not extinguish its continuous justification. Collective responsibility is ‘eternally hereditary in a family’ (1904: 168). The ‘indefinite solidarity’ of the family in time is an idea that frequently appears in the oldest funds of myth and ritual.

It is, for instance, the framework we find in the stories of the Atreid and Labdacid houses, and the stories concerning the descendants of Phrixos and Kytissoros attached to the cult of Zeus Laphystios (Hdt. 7.197). These ‘terrible charges’ of passive solidarity could not be indefinitely sustained, and the principle of ‘abandon noxal’ consequently emerged, in which the group could dissociate itself from its solidarity with the individual culprit (1904: 171). This is an evolution towards personal responsibility that went a great way in further defining the independently responsible individual, and finding a potential remedy to the transmission of responsibility through time. It is the state we find in Homer already, where ‘les vengeurs du sang ne poursuivent plus nécessairement toute la famille du meurtrier’ (1904: 169). This evolution will continue and eventually result in the fading of passive responsibility, while the active responsibility of the family will remain a principle of Greek justice throughout the historical period and even be extended to the entire social group. But the complete stage of full family solidarity existed only in the primitive, prehistoric period before Homer. It is attested for us in the form of survivals and the oldest strata of epic poetry. ‘Collective responsibility is already in the process of disappearing in Homer’, writes Glotz; ‘it will, however, not completely disappear in successive societies’ (1904: 209).

The second part of the book deals with the obligatory transition period in any evolutive narrative: the passage from remote beginnings to completed process. Entitled ‘La cité contre la famille’, it portrays the dislocation of the *genos* into weak family groups, deprived of their former jurisdictions and submitted to the rising social, political, and juridical competence of the state. The narrative of this section, as of the next, is

centred on Athens, and the figure of Solon comes out of the discussion as the principal figure behind the momentous changes that were to make Athens illuminate the way for the development of Western freedom and individualism.

One of the central points of Glotz's argument in this section of the book is that the retreat of family jurisdiction that came with the collapse of the *genos*, at the beginning of the slow and progressive development of the state as a totalising force, led to something of a spiritual vacuum in the representation of justice (1904: 234). In the face of this generalised anxiety, poets and philosophers contributed to the constitution of a religion of balance and justice that emphasised the regulating and punitive power of the gods. In the absence of the earlier social constraints of the patriarchal family, the patriarchal god took over and ensured the belief in order and equity that is necessary to hold this society together. 'Où les hommes étaient impuissants, surgirent les dieux', writes Glotz (1904: 227). With the decline of the 'patriarchal regime', crimes slowly ceased to be perceived as private offences, 'without yet appearing as social infraction'. The author writes that they eventually came to be seen as 'péchés', sins (1904: 228).

In this world of cosmic justice, the obvious impunity of the criminal was seen as an intolerable offence to the system. The principle of inherited delayed punishment appears to Glotz to be a necessary corrective to contingency. It also, as in Plutarch's discussion, serves as a confirmation of divine power.¹⁵⁹ Following Lobeck and Rohde, and against the views of many others, Glotz sees the 'doctrine of pollution' appearing at this time, a new religious development that moralises and sacralises the ideas of the pure and the impure and charges them with central religious significance. Far from being the primeval primitive belief imagined by many scholars, the 'doctrines of pollution' are seen by Glotz as late archaic developments away from the purely physical ideas of cleanliness that we can still find in Homer; the new beliefs in pollution will eventually become moralised into a concept of guilt, writes the author. As the jurisdiction of δίκη slowly takes over the ancient prerogatives of family θέμις, 'the theory of pollution comes to confirm and complete the old θέμις'. Through belief in pollution, the old family solidarity came to be reconceptualised in religious terms, and in terms of the religious taint carried by the action (1904: 234). The story of Orestes is a case in point. Whereas he was initially represented as the

¹⁵⁹ 'Comment ne pas admettre l'existence du mal auquel on cherchait un remède? De là le principe qui va s'accréditer avec les Grecs et passer à l'état de dogme: à l'égard du criminel, la justice divine est tardive, et c'est par quoi elle l'emporte sur la justice humaine' (1904: 228).

vengeful hero gloriously returned to avenge the murder of the family head in the juridical space of the family, he later becomes the polluted son first and foremost responsible for the murder of his mother. The same type of evolution can be seen in the development of the Oedipus legend.

Glötz traces most of the determinant evolutions of this period to what he sees as the ground-breaking reforms of Dracon, and especially of Solon (1904: 299–302). He portrays Solon as a positive agent of state formation, actively seeking to destroy the last vestiges of power of the *genos*, and especially what remained of the old principle of family solidarity. The emphasis placed by Solon on personal responsibility, the ban on the killing of children by the father or on selling them into slavery, the abolition of slavery for debt or punishment are all seen by Glötz as actively seeking to ‘disorganise and lessen the family.’ Solon, he writes, ‘coupa dans sa racine même: l’abus des peines transmissibles’ (1904: 350). While hereditary slavery for cause of debt remained the norm throughout Greece, Athens alone achieved this fundamental breakthrough towards responsibility and natural justice. It thus manages, for the first time in history, to protect individual freedom and delimit the social space of personal responsibility, ‘une hauteur encore atteinte que par quelques codes des nations les plus civilisées’ (1904: 360). Contrary to other Greek cities, then, Athens has abolished the ‘most odious’ kind of family solidarity inherited from earlier times.¹⁶⁰ This process of dislocation of the *genos* and the accompanying abolition of family responsibility from common law were to be furthered by the Peisistratids and brought to its logical conclusion by the reforms of Cleisthenes. The development of Orphism follows a parallel course for Glötz. He argues that the religious crisis from which Orphism stems is a reflex of the social crisis of the sixth century (1904: 399). Orphism, defined there as a popular religion of personal contact with the divine, consecrated in religious terms the social evolution of the period against the aristocratic privileges of the great Eupatrid families.

It is in the third section of the book, ‘La cité souveraine’, that Glötz defines more fully his understanding of ancestral fault in ancient Greece. This section sets out to show the definitive triumph of the state over the *genos*, the final establishment of full civic sovereignty over what remains of the old family jurisdiction, and the definitive and almost complete collapse of the old principle of family solidarity in the social organisation and the

¹⁶⁰ ‘En interdisant la vente des enfants et l’esclavage pour dettes, a supprimé la solidarité la plus odieuse et la plus durable, celle qui fait retomber la misère d’un homme, sous forme d’esclavage, sur les épaules de tous ses descendants’ (1904: 354).

juridical code of classical Athens. Yet Glotz acknowledges that classical Athens is also the time and place where the greatest number of sources relating to the principle of ancestral fault in divine punishment is to be found in literature. 'Les fautes des parents retombent sur les enfants', he writes, paraphrasing Plutarch. 'Il n'y a pas d'idée morale qui soit plus fréquemment exprimée dans la littérature grecque' in the classical period (1904: 557). The presence of ancestral fault as a fundamental moral theme in classical literature, at a time when, according to Glotz, the social and juridical evolution of Greek civilisation towards personal responsibility had all but destroyed the system of family solidarity which underpinned it, he explains by the crystallisation of the old beliefs in the sphere of religion.¹⁶¹ As the principle of family solidarity collapsed in the social and juridical spheres, it came to be projected on the divine realm and maintained there as a traditional representation of justice, a spiritual force of inertia which maintained in the divine realm what had long disappeared in human law.

If the moral and religious conceptions of the poets and philosophers contributed to refining the rough material of the old religion, bringing it to sublime forms of expression and finding elaborate justifications for its maintenance, they nonetheless always remained attached to the oldest principle of family solidarity. But in their effort to make sense of the old belief, and adapt it to the new social and juridical realities of the developed classical *polis*, they also contributed to shaping the movement towards personal responsibility. Glotz sees tragedy as the 'moral school' of Athens, an important tool in the evolution of juridical ideas (1904: 407). He takes Aeschylus as an example of the progressive conceptualisation of ancestral fault in the classical *polis*. For Glotz, Aeschylus is the enlightened and traditional poet who managed to seam together the oldest strands of Greek culture with the most advanced and evolved forms of development achieved by contemporary Greek culture. He is both 'a ghost from Mycenaean' and a man fully adapted to the stakes of his time. His dramatic usage of ancestral fault in his plays illustrates the point.

In Aeschylus, he says, directly echoing Croiset, the morality of the play is a function of the poet's theology (1904: 410). The belief of the author is

¹⁶¹ 'Tandis que le droit public tendait à retirer à la famille le peu d'avantages qui lui restaient de la solidarité active et à l'écraser sous le poids de la solidarité passive, la religion, loin de protester contre la raison d'état, la justifiait. La continuité de la famille et la responsabilité imprescriptible des descendants pour les crimes des ancêtres, c'étaient là des dogmes que rappelaient à chaque instant les prières et les serments, les légendes pieuses et les fêtes solennelles. Momifiés sans les bandelettes sacrées de la tradition, les principes du vieux temps, reliques divines, inspirèrent toujours aux Grecs une vénération mêlée d'effroi' (1904: 561).

what matters in its interpretation. Aeschylus is a poet of hope and mercy, a deeply religious and optimistic man who paints a world of divine love over and above the terrible hardships that have to be endured by man. This is apparent in the logic of the *Prometheus Bound*, for instance. 'No one', writes Glotz about the author, 'has desired the final liberation of man from collective responsibility more than he.' Even then, Aeschylus remains the traditional poet of a traditional faith, an author deeply attached to the oldest beliefs, even to strands of tradition much older than the poetry of Homer (1904: 408–9). The example of ancestral fault is a case in point. Aeschylus makes it on the one hand the armature of most of his plays, the central principle which governs the movement of fate, the dramatic action of the individual plays, and the articulation of the different plays together in the trilogy. And yet he also insists, more than anyone before him, on the fundamental importance of personal choice in the hereditary continuation of responsibility through generations.¹⁶² What is new in the drama of Aeschylus, an expression in fact of contemporary evolutions in social reality, is that there is no guilt without crime (1904: 579). The gods can push the descendants of the guilty to act, ancestral fault remains suspended over their heads, but they have to commit a crime themselves to become part of its consequences.

The same logic is found in the moral production of classical philosophers. The sophists were able to cast down the idols of the old religion, to question the justice of the old principles which only survived through tradition; Plato, their successor on the matter, widened the charge to include the greater part of the traditional faith in his holistic prescriptive re-evaluation of society (1904: 579–81). He thus rejects family solidarity as a principle of divine justice and human law, grounding the logic of his new system instead on the basis of personal responsibility. And yet, Plato still

¹⁶² 'Oui, il y a des familles vouées au crime et au malheur. Il y a des maisons hantées par un démon redoutable, qui accable une génération après l'autre de maux sans fin. La faute originelle, *πρώταρχος ἄτη*, déchaîne une malédiction, une *ἄρα*, qui prend vie et s'acharne éternellement, avec l'aide des Erinyes, sur les descendants du coupable. L'aveugle et l'implacable puissance poursuit les Labdacides, comme la race d'Atrée. Cette idée d'une fatalité héréditaire, Eschyle la présente sans cesse, "soit en faisant apparaître tout à coup comme une lumière sinistre pour éclairer d'affreuses situations, soit en l'éveillant, au moment des crises pathétiques, comme un pressentiment de mort dans l'âme des victimes désignées". Mais quelle est donc cette justice qui punit les fils pour les pères avec une rigueur imprescriptible? C'est la justice divine. "Hélas! Hélas! C'est Zeus qui a tout voulu et tout exécuté." Le dieu qui a condamné Prométhée est aussi celui qui fait surgir de l'enfer la fatalité à la vengeance tardive, *ὑπερόποιον ἄταν*. Une pareille justice ne convient pas à l'homme. Il la subit, il constate les coups qu'elle frappe; mais pour qu'il l'approuve et soit tenté de l'imiter, il faut qu'à chaque victime qu'elle fait il reconnaisse une faute personnelle' (1904: 410).

allows for the maintenance of family solidarity in a number of cases. One such exception is the case of those whose father, grandfather, and great-grandfather have received capital punishment for high treason.¹⁶³ Aristotle, according to Glotz, arrived at the same results through his dialectic approach, even going further than Plato in his dismissal of inherited guilt (1904: 417–19). If the descendant of the criminal reproduces the atavic crime, the city must show him some leniency, as his act is a product of nature rather than choice. Φυσικὴν εἶναι τὴν ἀμαρτίαν, writes the philosopher, ‘proclaiming the irresponsibility which results from heredity’ (1904: 419).

Not only among poets and philosophers but also in popular culture can the survival of the old family solidarity be discerned as a residual force. It is very much a part of the magical imprecations of the *defixiones*, for instance, and it continues to be part of ‘the passion for vengeance’ which never ceased to animate the persistent cycles of vendetta and family revenge in Greek history. Even in popular culture, as in the writings of the poets and the philosophers, the civilising forces of the classical period can be seen at work. But in Athens the growing importance of forgiveness, pardon, and pity, as valued sentiments of common morality, attest to the highly consequential effect of Athenian φιλανθρωπία in mitigating the old, harsh rules of family solidarity (1904: 423).

This same principle of evolution can be found in the progression of classical Attic law. The collective responsibility of the family remains a standard characteristic of Greek law in cases of treason and sacrilege, writes Glotz (1904: 453). The old logic of θέμις came to be appropriated by the state and by religion, which thus maintained the ancient principle of solidarity as an active force throughout Greek history.¹⁶⁴ This maintenance of family solidarity in the structure of state and religious law is paralleled in the codes of many ‘highly civilized peoples’. It is what we find, for instance, in the corporate responsibility of the Hebrew Bible. It has parallels in the codes of the Egyptians, the Carthaginians, the Persians,

¹⁶³ ‘Quand trois expériences ont mal tourné, on peut tenir pour prouvé que le crime est invétéré dans une famille: à la quatrième génération, il ne reste plus aucun espoir de guérison. Platon est donc loin d’accorder une valeur absolue à la maxime juridique et morale qu’il a lui-même formulée en ces termes: πατὴρὸς ὄνειδος καὶ τιμωρίας παίδων μηδενὶ ξυνέπεσθαι’ (1904: 417).

¹⁶⁴ ‘Si l’État a pris la tâche d’abolir le principe de la solidarité familiale là où il ne servait qu’à donner une satisfaction supplémentaire à la haine ou à la cupidité des particuliers, il l’a, au contraire, préservé longtemps avec le plus grand soin là où il favorisait les intérêts de la société ou de la religion. La même règle qui, en droit privé, était considérée illégale et immorale dès les siècles homériques n’avait pas cessé au Ve siècle d’être exécutoire et sainte dans le droit public et dans le droit sacré’ (1904: 453).

and the Macedonians. It can even be found in the codes which early twentieth-century France maintains in the administration of its colonial empire. What is particular to Greece is the heroic evolution of Athens in the fifth century.¹⁶⁵ This process of Athenian evolution will slowly expunge the principle of solidarity from the codes of the state and the practice of law and minimise its influence in the conceptions of religion.

Glötz shows how the old right of *θέμις* continued to be an important aspect of civic law in cases of high treason. It continued to be used throughout the classical period to justify collective death penalty in cases of action against the state, in the common application of *exōleia*, the extermination of children and family together with the guilty father (1904: 566–73). Glötz shows, with an impressive number of examples, how the typical formula of *exōleia*, ‘may he be destroyed utterly, him, his children, and his *genos*’, before it became a mere figure of execration maintained in the fixed forms of state institutional language, was originally the threat of a real collective death penalty. He also shows how, in Athens, the practice of collective death penalty was slowly abandoned in favour of strictly personal punishment and had almost completely disappeared by the middle of the fifth century. He shows the same process at work in the collective punishment of *atimia*, the loss of civic rights, as well as the confiscation of family goods, the practice of house destruction, the destruction of collective property, and punishment through exile.¹⁶⁶ The Alcmaeonids, for instance, were exiled as a group, and even the bones of their ancestors were dug up (1904: 480–2). The Peisistratids were only banished with their children. Themistocles, finally, was cast out of the country as an individual, and his family was allowed to stay. Through this evolution, and its ‘élans spontanés de miséricorde’, Athens had achieved, even before the revolution of 403, a stage of progress that would be reached by France only in 1789 (1904: 423–4).¹⁶⁷

If the principle of collective responsibility came to disappear almost completely from civil and criminal legislation in classical Athens, it was entirely maintained in religious law, ‘ce résidu de la *thémis*’ (1904: 557–75). The principle of collective responsibility remains a characteristic of divine

¹⁶⁵ ‘Ce qui est particulier à la Grèce, c’est que là, dans une cité unique, il se soit trouvé un peuple qui, sans se soucier d’un intérêt immédiat et bas, a su diminuer peu à peu et réduire à néant une prérogative néfaste. Entraînés par l’esprit démocratique, les Athéniens vont, dans le cours du Ve siècle, expurger le droit public des injustices traditionnelles et l’assujettir au principe qui réglait le droit privé, celui de la responsabilité personnelle’ (1904: 454–5).

¹⁶⁶ See Hansen 1976: 72–4; Connor 1985.

¹⁶⁷ See the comments of Reinach 1905 on that statement.

agency in the exercise of justice. It is already discernible in Homer, in the story of divine vengeance against the children of Niobe for instance, and it will be laid down as a principle with the poetry of Hesiod (1904: 559). From then onwards it will remain a 'dogma' of Greek religion.¹⁶⁸ This dogma of Greek religion, which Glotz clearly understands on the model of Plutarch's discussion in the *De sera numinis vindicta*, is in the classical period the cultural fossil of an earlier stage of social and juridical organisation. Its force of inertia is maintained by a number of factors, including the many aetiologies of ritual grounded in the continued atonement of an inherited guilt, which Glotz meticulously documents, or the pervasive influence of the Delphic oracle, which continued to maintain the old principle of family solidarity throughout its history, as Glotz again shows with many examples. 'Apollon Delphien,' he says, 's'est fait résolument le gardien de la terrible coutume', continuing in his oracles the logic of his Delphic predecessor Themis (1904: 561).

Like the old principle of family solidarity, this religious collective responsibility was also extended to the city. By reproducing a long quotation from Plutarch's *De sera numinis vindicta*, chapter 15, on the extended life of the city, Glotz argues that the same logic of extended continued participation which is behind the principle of inherited family guilt is also at work in the principle of inherited civic guilt (1904: 564–5). He shows how, in both cases, divine law continued to impose on human law the principles of the furthest past. Inherited responsibility, for him, thus becomes a cornerstone of the system of divine justice. There is no limit, either in space or time, to the vengeance of gods. 'The punishment that comes from the gods has no end. Eternal beings avenge themselves eternally' (1904: 568). In cases of sacrilege, divine justice always remembered the solidarity that exists between all the generations of a family.

This is the logic followed by the force of the *ara*, the imprecation (1904: 569–74). Launched against the individual and his family, the *ara* does not stop until it has achieved complete and utter destruction of its target – *exôleia*, extermination of the individual root and branch. The *ara*, argues

¹⁶⁸ 'Si donc le régime de la vengeance privée a fait place dans la religion à la justice, sa disparition n'a pas été assez rapide pour qu'il n'ait pu se survivre à lui-même en son principe essentiel, la responsabilité collective et héréditaire des familles et des cités ... Pour la justice divine, l'individu n'existe pas; la famille, voilà l'être agissant et responsable. Le même homme se prolonge dans le temps et se survit à lui-même de génération en génération (cf. Plut. *Des délais de la veng. div.* 16, 559D–E). Le fils est lié au père, et, tant qu'il y en a, les descendants sont liés à l'ancêtre par une chaîne que rien ne saurait briser. Nulle faute ne peut donc demeurer impunie. Le châtement mérité arrive toujours au bon moment. S'il tarde, il est inévitable; s'il ne frappe pas l'auteur du crime, il est réservé aux enfants du sang criminel' (1904: 560).

Glötz, became in time the divine guarantor of order, the buttress of protection which assures the efficient force of such fundamental institutions as the oath, the political constitution, and the exercise of law. This regularity of inherited guilt in the ever-present divine sanction of imprecations was in time perceived as a law of nature, an element of the regular function of the cosmos. It could be seen as unjust, cause indignation, be attacked or railed against, but it could not be denied. It could also be interpreted, explained, and somewhat softened. This is an evolution that we can clearly discern in Athens, believes Glötz (1904: 579). As the social evolution of the city came to reject the principle of family solidarity in the organisation of the group and the practice of criminal law, the maintenance of this same principle in the representations of religion inevitably became a source of unease, and the evolution of religious conceptions in the classical period eventually started to reject the principle of earlier times.

In Aeschylus, for instance, the old principle of family solidarity now has an equivalence in the personal act of the guilty descendant (1904: 579). The old curse, that is, now exists by reproducing itself in the recurrent acts of the tainted family. 'The gods', writes the author, 'do not punish the son for the crimes of the father, without making him guilty in turn.' This 'theory' becomes that of Greek tragedy itself, believes Glötz. It is the same one that we find in Sophocles, although expressed there with 'more religious tranquillity', and in Euripides, who gives it 'more philosophical precision'. This philosophical precision is also furthered in the work of Plato, for instance, who severely limits the application of inherited responsibility in the system of the *Laws* but still finds a place for it in the religious jurisdiction of the ideal city. Another way to explain and justify the maintenance of ancestral fault in classical thought was the observation of moral heredity, the acknowledgement through theology and early medicine of what 'modern science' studies under the name of atavism (1904: 580). Thus, by elaborating on different aspects of the same doctrine, classical thinkers were able to reground it anew in the developments of contemporary thought, on ideas of the extended life of family and city, of higher understandings of ethics, and more advanced forms of theodicy (1904: 581–2). But this work of modernisation only contributed to perpetuating the oldest strata of primitive belief late in the historical period.¹⁶⁹ The evolution of social organisation and the

¹⁶⁹ 'Quand une philosophie subtile, épurée, affirmait que la doctrine du châtement héréditaire, prenait sa source dans un sentiment élevé de la justice divine, elle ne se doutait pas que la religion se bornait à perpétuer le droit de l'époque primitive, et que les dieux de la Grèce civilisée imitaient ses plus barbares ancêtres.' (1904: 583).

development of ideas on personal responsibility could not fail to influence the representation of divine justice, to transform the perception of divine involvement in the punishment of the guilty. Starting in the sixth century, again in Athens, this took the form of Orphism (1904: 582). Glotz portrays this Orphic eschatology as a more advanced religious expression of Greek paganism, which moved beyond the old stage of family solidarity. This religious projection of Athenian religiosity, which had first developed the principle of personal responsibility, was built over the ancient dogma of ancestral fault, as well as in parallel to it, and against it (1904: 582–7). Its core doctrine of original sin, for instance, in the myth of Zagreus, is the ‘logical continuation’ of the earlier doctrines of inherited guilt (1904: 582). Glotz provocatively argues that it had an important impact on the development of late Jewish and early Christian ideas on the Fall and original sin, an idea that has not had much following, as we have seen earlier.

The theories of post-mortem punishment developed by Orphism, and especially the doctrine of reincarnation, provide a powerful alternative to ancestral fault as a dominant principle of justice, and one that was fully compatible with the higher understanding of personal responsibility. It never left the esoteric circles where it was first elaborated, however; it never caught on as a genuinely popular belief. The principle of family solidarity, in the narrative of Glotz, ‘which came from primitive barbarism’, will always remain the core doctrine of divine justice. More importantly, post-mortem punishment and reincarnation were in fact never designed as alternatives to hereditary responsibility, but as complements to it. He argues that ‘the Orphics’ did not elaborate their system of eschatological punishment and reincarnation against the law of heredity, but in order to explain it (1904: 585–91). With reincarnation, especially, they could explain the logic and the persistence of individual responsibility under the appearance of collective and inherited punishment. The two systems were never in opposition; one never came to replace the other: they functioned on parallel tracks. When we find them interacting, as in Pindar, for instance, they were in fact complementary (1904: 592–3). In this way, then, again the elaborate picture of ancestral fault developed by Glotz in his book, can be seen to reproduce the logic of Plutarch’s *De sera numinis vindicta*.¹⁷⁰ The detailed and extensive picture of inherited guilt that is found in

¹⁷⁰ ‘Plutarque a raison. L’instinct de la justice n’avait pas besoin de s’attacher à la pensée de la vie future et de ses supplices, parce qu’il se satisfaisait, en dépit de quelques doutes, à la vue des châtements transmis des pères aux fils. Et ainsi, dans les temps de la civilisation la plus raffinée, il suffisait aux Grecs de constater certains phénomènes d’hérédité, pour entretenir dans leur cœur le principe de la solidarité familiale, qui leur venait de la barbarie primitive. Prêtres, poètes et philosophes

La solidarité de la famille is a direct product of the long genealogy of Greek ancestral fault. The discussion of Glotz is the most extensive treatment of ancestral fault written in the last century, being either the study on which every subsequent return to the question has grounded itself, such as that of Dodds, or the discussion against which subsequent work has been conceived, whether consciously or not.¹⁷¹

If elaborated in much less detail, the principle of ancestral fault plays an equally central role in E. R. Dodds' *The Greeks and the Irrational*.¹⁷² In the publication of his Sather Lectures, Dodds presented one of the most strikingly original, brilliant, and influential overviews of ancient Greek culture ever produced.¹⁷³ This work, like the *Four (Five) Stages of Greek Religion* of Gilbert Murray, on which it is largely modelled, aims to show the patterns of development that progressively led to the apogee of Greek civilisation in the classical age, and to its eventual decline later under the weight of its inner drive and its past. The classical age is portrayed as a brief and heroic summit of human achievement, a paradigmatic time of heights in which man achieved full understanding of his individuality, his freedom, and rationality.¹⁷⁴ The dark forces of the irrational, which paved the way for the development of this higher rational conscience and eventually brought it down again to the lower registers of fear and anxiety, are the object of Dodds' powerfully evocative study.

The irrational is never defined in the book; we are led to understand what it is through the narrative of the lectures. A deep impulse from the lower, most obscure recesses of the human mind, it represents at once the vital forces of the primitive cultures at the antipodes of modernity, and the dark, residual aspects of primitive passion still lurking in our own psyche. The irrational is a primordial chaos of culture and mind out of

dissertaient avec élégance et conviction sur la puissance divine et la responsabilité humaine; ils employaient toutes les ressources de l'imagination la plus vive et de la dialectique la plus agile à suivre le vol des âmes d'un monde à l'autre monde: ils croyaient leur pensée suprêmement libre . . . Ils répétaient inconsciemment les axiomes ataviques. Ils attribuaient à la divinité un droit qui avait été celui de leurs aïeux et dont eux-mêmes ne voulaient plus' (1904: 597).

¹⁷¹ Paul Fauconnet's classic and influential sociological study *La responsabilité: étude de sociologie* (1920; 2nd edn. 1928), for instance, another work written under the influence and direction of Durkheim, which traces a broad cross-cultural evolutionary movement away from collective punishment, objective responsibility, to the subjective responsibility of the individual will, directly reproduces the ideas and results of Glotz in his treatment of Greek antiquity (something that is particularly apparent in the first half of the book on collective responsibility; note pages 104–6 comparing the similarity of the Greek 'doctrine' to Christian original sin).

¹⁷² Dodds 1951, Chapter 2: From Shame-Culture to Guilt-Culture.

¹⁷³ See den Boer 1979; Mangani 1980; Nelson and Todd 2000; Cambiano 1991; Momigliano 2003.

¹⁷⁴ Dodds 1951: 179–206.

which order emerges.¹⁷⁵ It is the fluid, creative, and primitive cultural matter that leads progressively to the ascent of enlightened civilisation, and against which enlightened civilisation comes to define itself. It is thus both the foundational matter of classical Athens, and its counter-mirror. At the height of the fifth-century Enlightenment, the irrational continued to feed classical civilisation, and it threatened to engulf it once and for all. The later 'reaction' of fear and anxiety represents its definitive hardening against the forces of reason. The irrational which Dodds describes is also the primitive, psychic matter of the individual unconscious. Drawing on the familiar analogy that posits a continuity 'between the mental lives of savages and neurotics', the irrational of primitive culture in Dodds is the same irrational that animates the creative as well as the destructive impulses that feed and threaten the individual rational self (1951: viii). The study of Dodds is not only a cultural history of Greece, but a reflection on the condition of the modern self.

Dodds cast inherited guilt as one of the key expressions of the irrational in the history of Greek civilisation.¹⁷⁶ It is both the majestic, idealised principle of a dark archaic pessimism that we find in Müller, the crushing, formidable dogma of a religion of fear and anxiety, and the expression of the primitive, evolutionary stage on the way towards freedom and individuality described by Glotz. Whereas Glotz made ancestral fault the collective representation of a stage in ancient social evolution, Dodds portrays it as a stage in the development of Greek conscience. For Glotz, it is the fossilised vestige of a primitive time. For Dodds, it is a step away from Homeric childhood and towards classical maturity. In *The Greeks and the Irrational*, inherited guilt is the characteristic doctrine of belief of the archaic era, an element of religion that expresses the entire spiritual climate of an age (1951: 33). It is directly keyed in with the significance that Dodds gives to the archaic age as a period in his wider evolutionary narrative. In his Chapter 2, 'From Shame-Culture to Guilt-Culture', inherited guilt is foreignised as something entirely different from the civilised pinnacle of the classical age (and by obvious extension, of modernity): simultaneously devalued as an obstacle to its flowering, and idealised as a necessary stage in the development of true, free conscience.

As in the work of Glotz, the concept of inherited guilt in *The Greeks and the Irrational* is based in large part on the discussion of Plutarch: as a single

¹⁷⁵ See Mangani 1980; Cambiano 1991; Nelson and Todd 2000; Momigliano 2003.

¹⁷⁶ For a more detailed discussion of its articulation in that masterpiece of scholarship, I refer the reader to an earlier study (Gagné 2007a).

doctrine of belief, in the examples and the language used, such as the image of the mill, and by its explanation through the idea of the family as an extended being co-responsible in time, which Dodds explicitly refers to Plutarch in his notes. His discussion is framed with a clear Christian layer, with repeated and emphasised reference to the harsh law of Hebrew corporate responsibility as a direct equivalent to Greek inherited guilt, and a discussion of Greek archaic guilt as an interior space of troubled conscience and moral conflict that is strongly reminiscent of Catholic representations of sin. More determinant than this domesticating aspect in the representation of the question, however, is the foreignising perspective of the discussion. With the evolutionary narrative of ancient Greece so clearly intertwined with the historical and the personal life of the modern reader in *The Greeks and the Irrational*, the discussion of the material was bound to be framed in direct relation to its contemporary significance. As the characteristic doctrine of the archaic age on its way to the pinnacle of the classical Enlightenment, inherited guilt is loaded with all the narrative baggage that attaches to the framing of the archaic as the 'not-yet' of the classical. Inherited guilt is portrayed as the unjust and superstitious belief against which classical freedom will be shaped, and as the product of deep, pathological impulses from the untamed irrational. As such, it is conceived in terms both of the primitive superstition of Rohde, and of the pathological hysteria and the morbid melancholy of Lobeck. It directly perpetuates older programmes of Rationalist and Romantic devaluations of the material.¹⁷⁷ But for Dodds, inherited guilt is also the prefigurative expression of guilt itself, through which the more advanced inner conscience of the classical age will be able to develop, and the uncompromising belief of a noble and hard faith, which was capable of being raised to great aesthetic heights by its poets. As such, it is also conceived in terms of the Romantic idealisations of Müller. The inherited guilt of Dodds is the expression of both the negative foreign object of contrasting alterity and the idealised foreign object of positive prefiguration. Seen as one of the early markers of social and psychological development of Greek antiquity, it is defined by the larger evolutionary narrative of *The Greeks and the Irrational*. The shocking belief of an ancient past, it is cast as a key to understanding the changes of world-historical significance that led from the primitive alterity of the archaic to the familiar model of the classical Enlightenment. The inherited guilt of Dodds is an expression of contemporary modern society defining itself through the past. Its formulation in *The Greeks and the*

¹⁷⁷ See p. 120.

Irrational is a direct heir, and a direct product, of almost two thousand years of continuous and uninterrupted reflection on the question.

In a number of articles on the topic, and especially in his important 1971 book, *The Justice of Zeus*, Hugh Lloyd-Jones developed a view of inherited guilt that both continued and profoundly modified the conception of his predecessor, E. R. Dodds.¹⁷⁸ There are more differences than similarities between the two in their discussions of the question. Instead of continuing the foreignising devaluation of ancestral fault that we find in Glotz, or the more complex evolutionary position of Dodds, which strikes a middle note between devaluation and idealisation, Lloyd-Jones coined a more radical positive idealisation of the principle as one of the dominant concepts of the great creative period of Greece. In his book, another collection of Sather Lectures, conceived in many ways as an answer to *The Greeks and the Irrational* at twenty years of distance, the 'doctrine of inherited guilt' is given an important role as one of the central beliefs in the common archaic and classical Greek religion that Lloyd-Jones set out to define. While Dodds, as we just saw, framed ancestral fault as the doctrine of the circumscribed time frame of the post-Homeric archaic age, and as a stage in the development towards interior conscience, as well as an element of the collective, irrational barrier standing in the way of Greek society and the free individual self of the classical period, Lloyd-Jones laid the ground for a thorough reappraisal of inherited guilt as a majestic aspect of the Greeks' hard, heroic pessimism. It is something wholly foreign from modern evaluations of justice, and yet familiar in its resemblance to the stern justice of the Old Testament God:

Among men Zeus with the help of Dike and the Erinyes upheld a stern reciprocal justice, recalling the Old Testament but not the New; those who broke this law were destroyed, they and their children after them. From the modern point of view, this is monstrously unjust; but the viewpoint of the Greeks, and other peoples who had similar attitudes to kinship, was different. (Lloyd Jones 1983: 107)

Placing himself squarely in the idealising narrative of the Romantic tradition, he redefined 'the doctrine of inherited guilt' as one of the central pillars of early Greek thought, from before the time of Homer through the entire classical period. A traditional religious precursor of the methodical search for natural causality that will develop in the classical period, the doctrine of inherited guilt in *The Justice of Zeus* is for Lloyd-Jones an

¹⁷⁸ Lloyd-Jones 1956; 1962; 1983; 2002.

element of Greek national greatness, of the simple vibrant religion of immanence which lifted Greece to the highest spheres before the 'reaction' towards transcendence, metaphysics, and mysticism, which he attributes to the age of Plato (Lloyd-Jones 1983: 162–4).

Aiming to show the continuities of Greek thought, where Dodds had emphasised the radical shifts in the evolution of the 'Inherited Conglomerate', Lloyd-Jones argued that the main characteristic of the Greek conception of cosmic justice was natural regularity: an understanding of the world as a hard system of order and meaning, where the perception of contingency is only a matter of human limitation, and where formidable, intractable rules of cause and effect are found behind every event, but on a scale essentially different from our own. Lloyd-Jones showed this religion to be different in its immanent regularity from anything we see in biblical 'suspensions of the laws of nature' (Lloyd-Jones 1983: 183–4). In *The Justice of Zeus*, if anywhere, the mills of the gods grind slowly, but they grind to powder. For Lloyd-Jones, this religion of inexorable justice forms a continuity of belief that united the material of lyric and elegy, early philosophy, science and the sophists, tragedy, and historiography, in the same continuous world-view. The core elements of this religion of immanent justice are present in Homer already, in the *Iliad* as well as the *Odyssey*. The differences that seem to exist between sub-periods, genres, and individual works in the conceptualisations of justice of this early era are all questions of emphasis, not essential differences in belief. He squarely rejects the psychological model of explanation offered by Dodds, but he attempts nonetheless to propose a grand general narrative for the spiritual history of early Greece.

In *The Justice of Zeus*, Lloyd-Jones describes ancestral fault as the foreign, majestic dogma of an idealised Greek faith. The echoes of Plutarch, here as elsewhere, can be seen to determine a good part of the discussion on the question – even if they are only implicitly present in this case. This view of ancestral fault posits a single unified religious principle of justice that courses from before Homer to the time of Plato. Ancestral fault grinds slowly over the generations, as a regular mechanism of nature, and its justice is justified by the 'particular kinship structures of the Greeks': the continuity of the family as an extended being in time (1983: 34). It is repeatedly compared to Hebrew corporate responsibility, and the use of the words guilt and sin, with their moral, interiorised meanings, as well as free will and determinism, carries a loaded baggage of Christianising, domesticating translations with it.¹⁷⁹ But, more emphatically, ancestral

¹⁷⁹ Lloyd-Jones 1983: 59; 77; 107; III; 154.

fault is cast as something dissimilar and distant, thoroughly at odds with modern Christian conceptions of justice: the article of faith of a world different from our own in its essence. This difference is essentialised as something positive. It is as a principle of belief that inherited guilt interests Lloyd-Jones also, the dogma of an idealised stage of Western civilisation. Where Dodds saw it as a step on the way towards freedom and rationality, as well as a barrier to its development, Lloyd-Jones portrays it as an impressive element of the regal Greek religion of systematic justice, the early Greek faith of immanence and natural law; it is a keystone of the Greek understanding of human insignificance. The individual expressions of the idea are of little importance in this context. What matters is the belief of the author, and the author cannot escape his time. In one way or another, the idea itself, the doctrine of inherited guilt, *must* actually be present in the individual text of the period concerning justice – whether it be expressed explicitly, or, sometimes, as in Homer, Hesiod, archaic Lyric, Sophocles, and many others, evoked only in the background through hints and allusions. The many rich, often insightful readings of inherited guilt proposed by Lloyd-Jones have greatly enriched our understanding of the idea. Their excesses have also contributed to the minimalist reaction of the past decades mentioned in the introduction.

The contributions of Glotz, Dodds, and Lloyd-Jones have been the three most systematic and influential attempts to explain the material of ancestral fault in the twentieth century. All three rest largely on the two layers of the long genealogy of ancestral fault that we have reviewed in the preceding pages: the Plutarchean tradition, and the centuries of Christian reception. All three also agree on one important point: ancestral fault is a principle of belief that is on all accounts essential to understanding late archaic and early classical religion and literature. For Glotz, inherited guilt is a primitive survival that kept a determinant cultural force throughout the span of Greek history. For Dodds, it is the characteristic archaic doctrine; for Lloyd-Jones, a central pillar of the entire early Greek world-view.

Many other authors have followed their lead and that of their predecessors and have contributed interpretations of ancestral fault in individual works along the lines traced by these general views of the question. These various contributions, especially the prefaces and notes of critical editions of tragedy and Herodotus, are too numerous to mention here. They will be discussed in more detail in the sections devoted to the different ancient authors involved. Mention must be made of Ioannis Kakridis' 1929 *APAI*,

which devotes an entire chapter to the question of ancestral curses in mythological tales. It is written along the lines of strict classificatory Prussian 'Thematokritik'. Its general ordering of the material of heroic prayers and curses is based on the identification of repeated motifs and patterns. Largely inspired by the approach of Kakridis' teacher Wilamowitz, this book also seeks to link the various tales of mythological ancestral curses to the realities of their precise local regional origin, and to show the influence of the Delphic oracle in organising this variegated material in a structured body of doctrine in the seventh century.¹⁸⁰ It frames the material of ancestral fault with the term ἀρά κληρονομική, the term which, together with equivalent constructions such as κληρονομική μεταβίβαση τῆς αμαρτίας, still defines it in modern Greek scholarship.

W. H. Adkins, in his classic 1960 book, *Merit and Responsibility: a Study in Greek Values*, portrays inherited guilt as a central doctrine in the archaic ethical system of ἀρετή which preceded the rise of full personal responsibility in the later classical period. Basing his view of the question on the discussion of Glotz, he sees inherited guilt as already implicitly present in Homer and Hesiod, and as a widespread elite and popular belief in later times. It is, he says, the only parallel idea to the theory of post-mortem punishment, and 'a formally flawless theory' in the early conceptualisation of absolute justice. It is also deeply unjust and, as such, ultimately unsatisfactory, in universal moral terms. The Greek material is read through Kant. Inherited guilt is for Adkins the product of early, hesitant searches in the direction of real justice, a preliminary stage on the road towards true moral responsibility. It 'does not even raise the right moral questions', he says, 'and until the right moral questions are raised, there can be no hope of a development of the concept of moral responsibility' (1960: 68–70). Another notable contribution along those lines is the discussion of Kenneth Dover in his 1974 *Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle*, who also sees 'the doctrine of deferred punishment' as a direct equivalent to the theories of post-mortem punishment and reincarnation in the archaic period, as a popular explanation of absolute justice, and a belief which was to be replaced eventually by more just and 'civilised' ideas of personal responsibility:

Yet once civilized reflection had begun to suggest that it was incompatible with any notion of justice to hurt an individual because of something which that individual had not himself done, and at the same time the emotional

¹⁸⁰ Kakridis 1929: 141–68.

need to believe in the punishment of wrong remained imperious, the notion of inherited guilt was gradually replaced by the notion that the soul of the offending individual himself would be punished after its separation from the body. (1974: 262–3)¹⁸¹

Dover sees the first explicit enunciation of inherited guilt in Solon and argues that it was sustained in large part by its ‘suppleness’, its capacity to explain much in very simple terms. He has the particular merit of showing in detail how it could be adapted to the varied rhetorical needs of the different contexts that can be found in the orators.

Apart from such contributions, work on the question of ancestral fault, along the lines of the paradigms traced by Glotz, Dodds, and Lloyd-Jones, has focused on more circumscribed areas. It has, roughly, concentrated on four issues: the relation of ancestral fault with the ‘original sin’ of Orphism, the strength of ancestral fault as a belief and an operative principle in purification rituals, its role in the historical system of causality set up by Herodotus, and its role in the individual plays of tragedy, especially in understanding the relation between ‘free will’ and ‘determinism’ on the tragic stage. The 1966 article of Ugo Bianchi, ‘Péché originel et péché antécédent’, is a good example of work on the first question.¹⁸² The discussion of Nilsson’s *Geschichte der griechischen Religion* (vol. 1, 3rd edn, 1969) on the rise of purification practice linked to the influence of Delphi and Walter Burkert’s related idea in his 1977 *Griechische Religion*, that tales of ancestral fault, together with the concept of guilt itself, originate ‘from the practice of ritual, in the figure of impurity’, are influential cases in point of the second question.¹⁸³ The third question is well illustrated in the 1987 work of Catherine Darbo-Peschanski, *Le discours du particulier*, for instance, and, more recently, in Thomas Harrison’s stimulating *Divinity and History: the Religion of Herodotus*. Harrison sees inherited guilt, together with post-mortem punishment and reincarnation, as one of the ‘let-out clauses’ which are necessary to sustain the belief in absolute justice shared by Herodotus and his contemporaries.¹⁸⁴ The fourth question, finally, has generated a large body of observations aimed at identifying the role of inherited guilt in individual tragic authors and individual plays.¹⁸⁵ Apart from identifying the precise mythological

¹⁸¹ Cf. de Ste Croix 1977: 146–7, who compares the Greek idea to Hebrew corporate responsibility (especially Ezekiel 18) and parallels the evolution of the two concepts (i.e. its progressive rejection as the two peoples evolved away from ‘clan solidarity’ and the blood-feud).

¹⁸² Bianchi 1966; cf. Sabbatucci 1981.

¹⁸³ Burkert 1985a[1977]: 77; see also 1987: 19; 1996a: 112; 124–5.

¹⁸⁴ Darbo-Peschanski 1987: 43–83; T. Harrison 2000: 110–13.

¹⁸⁵ See Chapters 6 and 7.

allusions of the plays, and the part played by ancestral fault in orchestrating the different generations of the myths together, much of this work has focused on the significance of ancestral fault in understanding the representation of personal responsibility and tragic fate put on the stage by the individual author.

In most of the discussions of scholarship reviewed above, ancestral fault has been conceived of as a clearly bounded object whose historical progression can be recovered through texts and inference. It is interesting first and foremost as a *belief* that has left traces. The aim of any study that seeks to make sense of this belief is to recover the evidence for it and say something about its historical significance at the time. The individual text is the index to something else. A 'doctrine' with a clear definition, it has a role to play in the grand narrative of Greek culture. Its origins, its social function, and its links to other ideas are carefully assessed and plotted into the larger picture. Disagreement can distinguish one narrative from the other, but they are all traced on the same lines.

Invariably defined in terms of Plutarch's treatise and of the Christian baggage of corporate responsibility and original sin, the 'doctrine of inherited guilt' is ascribed a role in these narratives tied first and foremost to the location of its origins. The material has been organised around the narrative. The relative dearth of the early archaic material, for instance, is creatively interpreted in the best tradition of *horror vacui*, the abundance of the classical material is read mostly as a somewhat eccentric survival (i.e. in terms of the archaic material), and the later sources all but ignored. Periodisation, sequence, and coherence all play determinant roles. The minimalist criticism of recent years has been right to question these narratives and their definitions. But it has ended up attacking the reception of the old principle defined by Plutarch: centuries of involved recodifications of the ancient idea, as ideologically charged with the punctual debates of the day as they are easily deconstructed by later scrutiny. For all its valuable contributions in clarifying the enquiry, and showing what the idea is not, the minimalist challenge has in the end little to tell about what its sources actually say.

The fact is that there is, *stricto sensu*, no such thing as ancestral fault before its description in the explicit theology of post-classical philosophy – and certainly no such thing as a 'doctrine of inherited guilt'; *stricto sensu*, in that 'it' does not have an objective existence beyond the constantly shifting web of references that inscribe each expression of the idea upon earlier such expressions. That existence in the fluid, centreless formulations of implicit theology consists of a dialectic: a confrontation between the situated,

constantly renegotiated forces at play in generating messages based on the proposition that children can be punished for the faults of their ancestors, and our ability to perceive and recognise different manifestations of that proposition as being related to each other. Some might want to call 'it' a meme, others will choose to see a structure of *langue* expressed through the divergences of *parole*, and I suspect that more than a few will continue to favour the identification of a belief. I will refer to the object of this study as an idea, a notion, or a concept. I do not claim that something called 'ancestral fault' can be seen as a neatly circumscribed cultural artefact in itself: it is the situational expression of a traditional idea. It is a notion which is always redefined in terms of a precise context and understood in reference to the relevant structures of meaning which preceded its own expression; a meeting between a culturally charged horizon of expectation and a particular communicative situation. In the spirit of the 'methodological nominalism' of Karl Popper, or the work of 'symbolic interactionism', it is a cultural concept that can be named.¹⁸⁶

A striking proposition on any account, it has a real role to play in any message where it is found. Integrated into the logic of a passage, of a text, an author, a genre, and a historical context, it takes a shape that is appropriate to its function in every individual source. Every one of its expressions is made of a unique network of implications, connotations, and associations. A memorable statement, the idea also stands out as a particularly distinctive position to adopt in any genre or context. Its expressions often quote, refer to, or allude to one another, and even when they do not the proximity of the words, images, and ideas used to give it its shape from one text to the next invariably draw from the same stock. If ancestral fault exists anywhere before its late objective definitions, it is in that long chain of references. The more the written record of literature grew into an archive of authoritative texts, the more bounded the idea became in restricted, median, and open intertextuality, until implicit theology hardened into explicit theology. Whether its ties to earlier statements are inscribed in the referential work that the message puts forward or the shared linguistic fabric that is used, it can always be usefully contrasted to similar expressions from other texts for its contours to fully come out.

The following four chapters will propose situated readings of prominent passages from the archaic and classical texts in which the notion of ancestral fault plays a role. Rather than look at the material from above,

¹⁸⁶ Popper 1957; Blumer 1969; Denzin 2001.

as part of a narrative that uses individual texts to trace the stages of a story, this section of the book is interested in the intricacies of the individual passage, the view from below concerned with the immediate environment of each expression, its ramifications in the text, and its echoes. Rather than use the text as a means to something else, evidence for reconstructing a belief, the aim of this section will be the texts themselves, the thematic patterns and literary complexity of the main passages in which ancestral fault is found. The following chapters are composed of discrete case studies, vignettes of thick readings; a fragmentary approach adapted to our fragmented material. The chapters are arranged according to genre and chronology. The next chapter, unsurprisingly, looks at the earliest attested material in the early archaic period: Hesiod and Homer.

*The earliest record: exōleia in Homer and Hesiod***Hesiod**

From Pausanias to Rohde and Dodds, as seen in previous chapters, passing through Proclus, Melanchthon, and Glotz, lines 280–5 of the *Works and Days* have been portrayed as an important expression of Greek ancestral fault. The passage is generally presented as the first attestation of the idea. Here it is in full (vv. 274–85):

ὦ Πέρση, σὺ δὲ ταῦτα μετὰ φρεσὶ βάλλεο σῆσι
καὶ νυ δίκης ἐπάκουε, βίης δ' ἐπιλήθεο πάμπαν.
τόνδε γὰρ ἀνθρώποισι νόμον διέταξε Κρονίων,
ἰχθύσι μὲν καὶ θηρσὶ καὶ οἰωνοῖς πετεηνοῖς
ἔσθειν ἀλλήλους, ἐπεὶ οὐ δίκη ἐστὶ μετ' αὐτοῖς·
ἀνθρώποισι δ' ἔδωκε δίκην, ἣ πολλὸν ἀρίστη
γίνεται· εἰ γάρ τις κ' ἐθέλῃ τὰ δίκαι' ἀγορεύσαι
γινώσκων, τῷ μὲν τ' ὄλβον διδοῖ εὐρύοππα Ζεὺς·
ὅς δέ κε μαρτυρήσιν ἐκὼν ἐπίορκον ὁμόσσας
ψεύσεται, ἐν δὲ δίκην βλάψας νήκεστον ἄσθθη,
τοῦ δὲ τ' ἄμαυροτέρῃ γενεῇ μετόπισθε λέλειπται·
ἀνδρὸς δ' εὐόρκου γενεὴ μετόπισθεν ἀμείνων.

Perses, lay these things in your heart and give heed to Justice, and put violence entirely out of your mind. This is the law that Cronus' son has established for human beings: that fish and beasts and winged birds eat one another, since Justice is not among them; but to human beings he has given Justice, which is the best by far. For if someone who recognizes what is just is willing to speak it out publicly, the far seeing Zeus gives him wealth. But whoever willfully swears a false oath, telling a lie in his testimony, he himself is incurably hurt at the same time as he harms Justice, and in after times his family is left more obscure; whereas the family of the man who keeps his oath is better in after times (trans. Most).

As the text of lines 274–85 is particularly dense, it will be useful to start by unpacking it.

In this passage *dikē* is presented as the prerogative of men in opposition to animals. It is what traces the boundaries of human conduct. Fish and beasts and winged fowl devour one another, whereas men have to restrain from violence, *biē*, to fulfil the *nomos* ordained by Zeus. Hesiod is not saying that men should not eat beasts, and that beasts do not eat men, of course. ἀλλήλους, here, means 'each other' within the *genos*. Intraspecific 'eating' is the disorder in question, such as the hunger of the 'gift-devouring men' (ἄνδρες δωροφάγοι) and the 'people-devouring king' (δημοβόρος βασιλεύς). This violence is a threat to the entire *genos*. Continuity in time is the overarching theme. The person who 'knowingly' utters 'just things' (τὰ δίκαια) in the group, who 'speaks them in the assembly' (γινώσκων . . . ἀγορεύσαι), will receive *olbos* from far-seeing Zeus, a term better translated here as 'lasting wealth' than simply wealth or abundance.¹ Lasting wealth is predicated on the capacity to understand and to speak justice. It is a question of knowledge and intent, a choice for survival and transmission which distinguishes man from beast. On the contrary, the other man, the one who willingly (ἐκῶν) perjures himself by swearing a false oath in testimony, is responsible for hurting *dikē*, and thus incurably damaging himself and his kin. By breaking the clear boundaries of *dikē* through perjury, a man breaks the basis of lasting wealth.²

The sanction for perjury is marked by its extension in time. The fault of perjury causes a man a wound that can never be healed (νήκεστον ἄόσθη), neither in his own person nor in that of his *geneē*, his descendants. Once perjury is committed, the *geneē* remains forevermore obscure, ἀμαυρότερη. Breaking the oath, choosing *biē* over *dikē*, takes the kin group away from sight, makes it less visible. This lack of visibility is what is 'left' (λέλειπται) as an inheritance, rather than shining, lasting wealth. The perfect tense denotes the lasting state resulting from the crime, and the adverb μετόπισθε emphasises its continuity in the future. The point is further brought home by an elegant chiasmus and a mesodiplosis, a repetition of the same words in the middle of the following line, γενεῇ μετόπισθεν, in the same metrical position, describing the contrasting lot of the man who keeps his oath, and of his descendance afterwards. In complementary opposition to the punishment of the broken oath is the blessing of the one who follows it. As line 285 returns us to line 280 through an ABA ring pattern, the loop is closed.³ Only by avoiding perjury can a man hope to

¹ See De Heer 1969: 32–8; 51–5; Lévêque 1982; cf. Wilamowitz-Möllendorf 1913: 265; Van Groningen 1958: 95; M. L. West 1974: 181; Alt 1979: 391; Manuwald 1989: 9; Nesselrath 1992: 96.

² Perysinakis 1986. ³ See M. L. West 1978: 228–9.

keep what he has acquired, and transmit it to his children. If he does not, his *geneē* will fade away from sight.

This is a statement that the audience would have found familiar at this point in the poem. In the Myth of Races (106–201), one *genos* succeeds another through the consequences of their actions. They are defined, as ‘Races’, by their common relation to justice. A binding solidarity unites them in the face of punishment. Only the first one has been unalloyedly just. The Golden Race lived in the plenty of abundance, bliss, and peace.⁴ Once they were covered by earth, they became the guardians of mortal men, watchers of judgments and cruel deeds. ‘Clothed in mist’ (ἡέρα ἐσάμενοι), they roam everywhere over the face of the earth to watch over men.⁵ This is the ‘royal’ honour they have received from gods. Men of abundance and bliss, they have no grief or pain. The other races, however, have all succumbed to violence and injustice. Like the beasts of line 278, they have destroyed *each other* (ἀλλήλους) through violence within the group. The Second Race, the *genos* of silver, did not know how to restrain its actions. The men were unable to refrain from hurting each other (ἀλλήλων).⁶ In addition to their incapacity to follow the rules of justice, they refused to give honour to the gods. They remained children for the greater part of their existence, unable to live lives of responsible restraint, never fully coming into adulthood. The Race of Bronze, on the other hand, lived only for violence, and it eventually destroyed itself, without leaving name or posterity for the future, an anonymous race perpetually bent on the endgame of death. They ate war instead of bread (146–7). The Fourth Race, however, that of the named Heroes, closer to us in time, the προτέρη γενεή, had a choice between two roads in justice. Some knew only war in life, the poet tells us, and they destroyed each other in Thebes or Troy (156–73). They were covered by death and they disappeared. Others, noble and just, were allowed to live in plenty on the Islands of the Blest. These are the Heroes who live in abundance, ὀλβιοὶ ἥρωες (159). For them, ‘the grain-giving field bears honey-sweet fruit flourishing three times a year’ (167–73). They are living a better (ἀμείνων) life.

The Fifth Men are, as many have observed, entirely different from the first three Races, but not from the Fourth.⁷ The life of absolute plenty that is the lot of the Golden Race is beyond our reach. We can, contrary to the

⁴ *Op.* 109–26; see Calame 2006: 85–142.

⁵ Line 125. The lines are repeated later in the poem, where we are told that there are thirty thousand of these watchers of mortal men, and that no crooked judgment can escape their attention (*Op.* 255).

⁶ *Op.* 127–42. ⁷ Rudhardt 1981; Crubellier 1996: 460.

Silver Race, avoid continuous transgression. We are not bent on complete destruction through war like the Race of Bronze. As the Race of Heroes did, we have a choice. This choice, however, is presented in a much more sombre light than that of the Heroes. The lot of our individual *geneai* in the future is constrained by the lot of our common *genos*. As a result of violence (*biē*), our *genos* is threatened with common destruction in times ahead. When the rule of justice will fall, and all conventions of right and wrong cease to be followed, our race will also be destroyed by the gods. When violence becomes the foundation of right, and lying, envy, and flattery the basis of social relations between men, when son turns against father and reverence disappears, then will the announcement of our imminent destruction be made clear. The crimes of others are the signs of our common fall. Our violence can eventually lead us to annihilation, in the way of the Race of Bronze and of the Heroes who died before Thebes and Troy. When we start aging prematurely, becoming old men at birth, there will be no more reproduction. Like the Race of Silver, whose children were incapable of surviving manhood, we will know that our generation has come to an end.⁸ It will no longer be able to ensure continuity and transmission. When ‘there is no more favour for the man who keeps his oath, or for the just, or for the good’, then we will know that the Race of Iron has entered its last moments.⁹ This is the time when ‘the wicked will hurt the worthy man, speaking false words against him, and will swear an oath upon them’.¹⁰ The crime of perjury is singled out as the sign of future downfall – as in verses 280–5. This clearly stands out: there is no mention of oaths in the narratives of the other Races. As in verses 280–5, we are told that perjury is linked to the punishment of an entire kin group in the account of the Race of Iron. The same distinctive combination of themes is found in both passages. One might be seen to prepare the other. But how closely, in fact, can we compare the *geneē* of lines 280–5 to the γένη of 106–201?

The noun *geneē* has two major meanings in the Hesiodic corpus, as Glenn Most has observed in an important article.¹¹ The first can be described as classificatory. It means generation in terms of kin group,

⁸ See Fontenrose 1974.

⁹ *Op.* 190–1: οὐδέ τις εὐόρκου χάρις ἔσσεται οὐδὲ δικαίου | οὐδ’ ἀγαθοῦ, μάλλον δὲ κακῶν ῥεκτῆρα καὶ ὕβριν.

¹⁰ Lines 193–4: οὐκ ἔσται, βλάψει δ’ ὁ κακὸς τὸν ἀρεῖονα φῶτα | μῦθοισι σκολιοῖς ἐνέπων, ἐπὶ δ’ ὅρκον ὁμεῖται.

¹¹ Most 1997: 111–13; see also Crubellier 1996: 439; Couloubaritsis 1996: 492; and especially Calame 2006: 116.

offspring, descendants.¹² The other is temporal, referring more specifically to generations placed in time.¹³ In both cases, and allowing for the many nuances of the word's usage, the accent is placed on descendance and ascendance. The noun *genos*, on the other hand, has one essential meaning. It is broadly similar to the first meaning of *geneē*, as Hofinger observes, but perhaps less exclusively tied to kinship in its classificatory function: it can mean kind, race, line, kin group, offspring, descendants.¹⁴ The parallels of Homeric diction, where the two terms can actually be used interchangeably (*Il.* 21.157; 186), go in the same direction.¹⁵ To distinguish between species, for instance, *genos* will be used, at least before the *Batrachomyomachia*, where they are already synonyms.¹⁶ To distinguish subgroups within a *genos*, according to Most, *γενεαί* will be used.¹⁷ This observation, based on a particular reading of the Myth of Races, and especially of line 160 of the *Works and Days*, is of great interest for making sense of the emphatic use of *geneē* in our passage. The sentence in question is (vv. 156–60):

αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτο γένος κατὰ γαῖα κάλυπεν,
αὕτις ἔτ' ἄλλο τέταρτον ἐπὶ χθονὶ πουλυβοτείρῃ
Ζεὺς Κρονίδης ποίησε, δικαιοτέρον καὶ ἄρειον,
ἀνδρῶν ἥρώων θεῖον γένος, οἳ καλέονται
ἡμίθεοι, προτέρη γενεῇ κατ' ἀπείρονα γαῖαν.

When the earth covered up this race, too, Zeus, Cronus' son, made another one in turn upon the bounteous earth, a fourth one, more just and superior, the godly race of men heroes, who are called demigods, the generation before our own upon the boundless earth (trans. Most).

If, as Most argues, the word's meaning there is determined by opposition to the *genos* of the preceding line, then we do have to accept temporal, subgroup 'generation' as its strict meaning. The implication is that the Heroes are not presented as a new race in the text, but as an earlier generation within a race: the προτέρη γενεῇ of the *genos* to which we also belong. We would then have four races instead of five (and three in

¹² *Theog.* 871; *Op.* 736; *Sc.* 55; 327; *F* 37 MW. ¹³ *F* 276; 304 MW.

¹⁴ *Theog.* 21; 33; 44; 50; 105; 161; 336; 346; 590; 591; *Op.* 11; 121; 127; 140; 143; 156; 159; 169; 176; 180; 299; *F* 43; 123; 204 MW. See Hofinger 1975 s.v. γένος.

¹⁵ Liddell–Scott, Chantraine, West, the *Lfgre* (Schmidt), and the *Diccionario Griego–Español* all argue for a broad equivalence between the two terms, as have most other scholars. Only once in Homer does γένος mean generation (*Od.* 3.245), however, and this is a suspect passage; see Most 1997: 111.

¹⁶ Lines 23; 25; 263; 291.

¹⁷ Most 1997: 112. The γένη of 106–201, however, as Crubellier (1996: 439) notes, can be seen as subgroups of the human γένος. An archaic example of γένος as a subgroup can also be found in Semonides 7, where we are shown the different γένη of women within the γένος γυναικῶν θηλυτεράων.

other respects).¹⁸ This, I believe, is not the only way to make sense of the juxtaposition of *genos* and *geneē* in lines 159 and 160.

Distinguishing the Heroes' *geneē* from the four other *genē* is an elegant solution to an age-old problem, that of the non-metallic Heroes' place within the series of otherwise metallic races.¹⁹ It rightly dismisses the old idea that the myth of races is a narrative of decline. More importantly, it uncovers symmetry in the text. Is this symmetry, however, different from other attempts to impose order on the passage? How does this solution differ from earlier 'solutions' such as the trifunctional reading of Vernant or the search for 'oriental' antecedents? All try to discipline the text from outside. Within the Hesiodic text itself, the sequence of races is explicit. It is the one which most readers, from antiquity to now, have perceived in trying to make sense of the passage. I can see no valid reason to explain it away on diachronic or semantic grounds. The succession of races is marked as clearly as possible: πρῶτιστα (109), δεύτερον (127), τρίτον (143), τέταρτον (157), πέμπτοισι (174).²⁰ The fourth race is a *genos*: the τέταρτον of line 157 does not agree with *geneē*. The fact that πέμπτοισι . . . ἀνδράσιν, in line 174, does not include the word *genos* is of no consequence for this question. The stage of the 'Fifth Men' is emphatically distinguished from the stage which preceded it and the one which will follow (174–8):

μηκέτ' ἔπειτ' ὠφελλον ἐγὼ πέμπτοισι μετεῖναι
ἀνδράσιν, ἀλλ' ἢ πρόσθε θανεῖν ἢ ἔπειτα γενέσθαι.
νῦν γὰρ δὴ γένος ἐστὶ σιδήρεον· οὐδέ ποτ' ἤμαρ
παύσονται καμάτου καὶ οἰζύος οὐδέ τι νύκτωρ
φθειρόμενοι· χαλεπὰς δὲ θεοὶ δώσουσι μερίμνας.²¹

If only then I did not have to live among the fifth men, but could have either died first or been born afterwards! For now the race is indeed one of iron. And they will not cease from toil and distress by day, nor from being worn out by suffering at night, and the gods will give them grievous cares (trans. Most).

The meaning of πρόσθε θανεῖν is 'died before', in the sense of 'died in a preceding time', not 'died first', in the sense of 'not being born'.²² That distinction between the men who lived before and the men who live now is clearly defined in the following line with an emphatic νῦν γὰρ δὴ. νῦν is emphatically singled out.²³ This clearly cannot refer to the time of Helen or Oedipus (161–8)! What distinguishes the 'Fifth Men' from those who

¹⁸ Cf. also Rudhardt 1981.

²⁰ See Crubellier 1996: 440.

²³ See Crubellier 1996: 441.

¹⁹ See the bibliography in Crubellier 1996: 412, n. 39.

²¹ *Op.* 174–8.

²² See Calame 2006: 115–16.

died before or those who will be born later is that they belong to the γένος σιδήρεον. The *genos* of the Heroes (157; 159) is different from the γένος σιδήρεον (176; 180).²⁴ This means that the *geneē* of verse 160 is not a subgroup of the *genos* of Iron. But what then is the meaning of *geneē* in verse 160?

If it does not mean 'generation', in opposition to 'race, kin group', neither does it have to mean 'race, kin group' in strict opposition to 'generation'. It does not have to have one meaning in opposition to the other. Its sense is not obligatorily opposed to that of *genos*. The etic lexicographical categories imposed by philologists on ancient vocabulary often hide the many correspondences that unite various aspects of an idea within a word in the original language. Without entering into the complex debates opposing 'lumpers' and 'splitters' in modern lexicographical theory, we can simply note the obvious and uncontroversial fact that meaning discrimination is a question of enunciative context. When the context does not give us ground to articulate an opposition between various aspects of a word, it is often the case that they are combined in the utterance. This is particularly true in a language as richly textured and as highly resonant and allusive as that of Hesiod's poetry. The *geneē* of line 160, as the *genos* of 159, is a kin group. It is a reference to the Race of Heroes, as distinct from the Race of Bronze and the Race of Iron. As the Fourth Race of Men, it is also, more specifically, a 'generation', a stage in the comparative time of mortal men. There is nothing problematic about this usage, and thus no need for a solution. Almost a synonym of *genos* in 159, it simply expands its meaning by emphasising the temporal aspect of the word. Comparatively defined as better than the preceding *genos*, the Race just before ours, it is a kin group marked in time by the comparative *πρωτέρη* as different from our own. The *geneē* of line 160 fills the limited and complementary lexical space of the word: it is both kin group and generation.

How does this usage compare with that of the *geneē* in our passage? In lines 284–5 Hesiod is describing the varying lots extended to the *geneē* of

²⁴ It might be significant to note that each γένος is mentioned as such precisely twice in the passage, when it is introduced, and when it is destroyed or hidden: 109 and 121; 127 and 140; 143 and 154–5; 176 and 180; see Most 1997: 109. There are not, as Most writes (p. 111), four destructions of races in the text, but five destructions (see Crubellier 1996: 440). Verses 161–73 are as clear a description of the *genos*' disappearance as the other destructions found in verses 121, 140, 153, and 180. The verbs used in the passage, ὤλεσε and ἀμφεκάλυπεν, are the same ones as used for the destructions of the other four races. Verses 173d–e, of course, are probably an interpolation. See also Calame 2006: 108–14.

the perjurer and of the man who keeps his oath. One becomes 'more obscure', the other becomes 'better'. The performance of justice shapes the lot of the *geneē* in time. These *geneai*, lines of descent, defined by their origin from an individual (τοῦ δὲ . . . ἀνδρὸς δ' εὐδόρκου), are also both 'kin groups' and 'generations' in a way: both are determined by common descent and by placement in time. But, in the context of the passage, the word cannot refer to a 'Race' there, as it does in 160. It is, in that context, clearly the subgroup of a *genos*. Not a horizontal generation in time, but a vertical kinship line. However, if there are clear differences of definition between the *geneē* of 160 and the *geneai* of 284–5, there are also similarities. The obscure *geneē* of verse 284 cannot be understood separately from the 'hidden' and 'covered' *genē* of verses 121 and 138. These two different usages of *geneē* remain usages of the same word placed in strategically related positions of the text. One describes the *geneē* which has preceded us, the προτέρη γενεή. The other refers to the *geneai* which will follow, μετόπισθε. The passages are linked, notably in the correlation between kinship and punishment. The future of the *genos* of Iron is related to the future of the perjurer's *geneē*. The destruction of the family in line 284 belongs to the section's overarching narrative of succession through destruction and kinship punishment. It echoes the Myth of Races. One passage prepares the way for the other. To understand the articulation of descent and punishment in lines 280–5, we have to understand the articulation of descent and punishment also in lines 106–201. A thread links the different levels of kinship in the poem, something which has not received the attention it deserves.

Echoes of verses 213–73 are found in lines 274–85 also. The people of the just city, says Hesiod, those who swear true oaths, see their city flourish, and the people multiply in it (225–37). The Thirty Thousand Guardians, the men of the Golden Race, walk over the earth, 'clothed in mist' (v. 255), and they watch over judgments and cruel deeds (252–5). They are givers of wealth (πλουτοδόται). Contrary to those who live under crooked judgments, and who suffer the hardships of slighted *dikē*, also 'clothed in mist' when she bears evil to those who have driven her out, the just city flourishes in abundance (256). *Dikē* always beats *Hybris* at the end of the race (218). It rewards 'straight' distribution (224–6). Neither war nor famine visit the just city, but its inhabitants live in the plenty of fertile flocks and fields, like the men of the golden age. The men of the just city, more importantly, 'see their women produce children like their fathers'.²⁵

²⁵ *Op.* 235: τίκτουσιν δὲ γυναῖκες ἑοικότα τέκνα γονεῦσι.

They achieve continuity and transmission of lasting wealth. They know the plenty of the Golden Race and of the Race of Heroes, the ὄλβιοι ἥρωες. They live in *olbos*.

The people of the unjust city, on the other hand, see punishment 'being given as a sign' by Zeus.²⁶ That is, Zeus indicates the consequence of injustice through sanction: the loss of property. Punishment is a τέκμαρ (token) of divine order. The visible hand of divine justice can fall on the city for the action of a single member (238–47). The city in which kings administer crooked justice does not escape the perception of Zeus. The entire people can 'pay for the mad folly of their prince'. The 'gift-devouring king', the men of violence, those who, like the eagle of the *ainos* (209), say 'I shall make you my dinner or let you free' (δείπνον δ', αἶ κ' ἐθέλω, ποιήσομαι ἢ μεθήσω), 'grind one another' (251) like the animals of line 278 'eat each other'. Those individuals who harm justice through slander are doing violence to the virgin Dikē herself, who is honoured and revered among the Gods who dwell on Olympus. Those who take bribes and give crooked judgment imperil the survival of the entire community (260–2). Worse, there would be no reason for a man or his son to follow justice if there were no sanction (270–4). This is obviously impossible in a poetic tradition of normative wisdom. Zeus sees all, and all injustice is punished (267–8). Transgressors 'do not pay heed to the vengeance of the gods'.²⁷ The unjust city knows famine and plague, Zeus destroys their army, their walls and their ships, and 'the men perish away'.²⁸ More importantly, their women do not produce children, and their houses become few.²⁹ The unjust city is unable to achieve continuity and transmit wealth through generation. In the city of *hybris*, 'Horkos keeps pace with crooked judgment'.³⁰ The 'crooked justice' (σκολιή δίκη) is the central fault of the unjust community and the unjust king (221; 250; 258; 262; 264).³¹ Perjury, again, is emphatically singled out. Like the *genos* of 180 and the *geneē* of line 284, the city of verses 238–47 is punished as a whole and sees its continuity threatened by perjury. The same pattern of associations is repeated from passage to passage.

²⁶ Lines 238–9: οἷς δ' ὕβρις τε μέμλε κακὴ καὶ σκέτλια ἔργα, | τοῖς δὲ δίκην Κρονίδης τεκμαίρεται εὐρύσπα Ζεὺς.

²⁷ *Op.* 251; cf. 187. ²⁸ Lines 238–47 with scholia.

²⁹ 244: οὐδὲ γυναῖκες τίκτουσιν, μινύθουσι δὲ οἶκοι. See M. L. West 1978: 218, for ancient doubts about the authenticity of these lines, which West rightly dismisses.

³⁰ 219: αὐτίκα γάρ τρέχει Ὀρκος ἅμα σκολιῇσι δίκησιν.

³¹ See also lines 7; 194; 582. The adjective σκολιός does not appear anywhere else in the Hesiodic corpus.

It reappears with some force in lines 320–34, a passage that further defines the necessity of work and effort.³² Squarely focused on the theme of wealth, it warns Perses against the dangers of wrongful acquisition. The possessions (χρήματα) that have been snatched, ἀρπακτά, as opposed to god-given, θεόσδοτα, will be of no real profit (320). Unjust riches are no wealth, ὄλβος (321), a word that cannot be read as a simple equivalent of χρήματα. The ability to keep wealth and transmit it, its duration in the house, is the measure of its value, and the means of its procurement will determine the stability of its retention. The effort of gain and loss functions as an ethicised, zero-sum game under the arbitration of the gods. The ease of the gods' punishment (325: ῥεῖα) is contrasted with the effort of real human gain, yet another example of a recurrent theme in the poem. Transgression will, inevitably, be met by the appropriate return (ἀμοιβήν) in this exchange (333–4). Together with violence, perjury is the tool of the ruinous and temporary gain, the clear referent of ἀπὸ γλώσσης λήσsetai (322).³³ It all too often appears when shamelessness has chased shame away, and when profit, κέρδος, deceives the mind of men, νόον ἑξαπατήσῃ ἀνθρώπων (323–4). Its consequence, more strikingly, is the eventual obscurity of the transgressor and the diminution of his *oikos* by the gods.³⁴ The verb μαυροῦσι directly echoes the ἀμαυροτέρη of line 284, and the verb μινύθουσι directly echoes the μινύθουσι of line 244. Time is the operative force. Inheritance, here as elsewhere in the poem, is a dominant image of mortal striving.

In the Myth of Races (106–201), the Tale of Two Cities (213–73), and the address to Perses of 274–85, as well as in the great warning of 320–34, the breaking of oaths is intimately connected to the punishment of an entire group, and a threat against its continuity in time. Perjury is a sign of the impending punishment looming over the entire *genos* for the crimes of some individuals. It announces the punishment of the entire city for the faults of the kings who deal in 'crooked judgments'. It is the mark of the destruction set to obscure the entire *geneē* of the culprit. The same crime is linked to the same common sanction in the three successive passages. The punished groups are organised in order of decreasing size: from *genos* through city to *geneē*. The degressive sequence Race–City–Family is clear. This correlation is reminiscent of the three main levels of common descent

³² See Marsilio 2002.

³³ It is no coincidence that this is how the oracular poem quoted in Herodotus 6.86 understood λήσsetai; see p. 281.

³⁴ *Op.* 325–6: ῥεῖα δέ μιν μαυροῦσι θεοί, μινύθουσι δέ οἶκον | ἀνέρι τῷ, παῦρον δέ τ' ἐπὶ χρόνον ὄλβος ὀπηδεῖ.

recognised in the classical period, for instance. Fifth-century Athens, to take an example, knows the Tritopatores of a family, the Tritopatores of the city, and the common Tritopatores of humanity.³⁵ Embedded one within the other, these three complementary groups are united in a common pattern of collective punishment in the *Works and Days*. Perjury in the family is perjury in the city. The obscure *geneē* of the perjurer weakens the entire community. Perjury in the city, in turn, announces the future collapse of the entire race, the time when 'the wicked will hurt the worthy man, speaking crooked words against him, and will swear an oath upon them'. The perjury of the family and the perjury of the race are linked. The necessary destruction of one is a reflection of the promised destruction of the other. Both result in the end of transmission within generations. Lines 106–285 are not composed of individual discrete vignettes distinct from each other. The section forms a coherent whole, which would have been particularly clear to the audience through patterns of repetition. The actions of each group of descent reflect on the actions of other groups. A powerful image of cosmic solidarity in crime emerges out of these verses, one in which the choice of the individual involves direct consequences for family, city, and race, and where the individual is affected by the choices of all the other members of the groups that define him: *geneē*, city, and *genos*. No element can be isolated from the other.

The dispute between the brothers Perses and Hesiod is one over inheritance from their father.³⁶ Perses has bribed the gift-devouring kings to get more than a fair share of their inheritance.³⁷ The poem of Hesiod presents itself as an address to Perses in reaction to his unjust breach of transmission.³⁸ What defines the superior man is the ability to consider 'what will be better, later and in the end (τὰ κ' ἔπειτα καὶ ἐς τέλος)' (293–5). If Perses continues in his way of *hybris*, bribery, and perjury, he will see his inheritance disappear. Worse, he will have none to transmit to his children. He will, with wife and child, be reduced to begging from other *oikoi*, even from Hesiod's, to perpetuate his own, and no one will pay heed (396). This is what, in fact, has already happened, the poet tells us (394). The text dramatically shapes its normative and explanatory portrait of justice as a response to the actions of a brother in the attribution of an inheritance, a potent symbol of kin fighting kin, members of a *geneē* fighting each other. At the beginning of the text, its explicit concern is

³⁵ See pp. 447–50.

³⁶ *Op.* 27–43; see Forbes 1950; Van Groningen 1957; Gagarin 1974b; Most 1993; Rousseau 1996.

³⁷ Durán 1999. ³⁸ Cf. M. L. West 1978: 33–40; Nagy 1990: 74.

with the movement of wealth through descent, and the continuity of the family. The biographical framing of brotherly feud informs the entire poem. More, it sets the stage for a prolonged reflection on kin, time, and punishment, and the various temporal cycles that govern our lives. It directs and channels our attention through the progression of the narrative. The unity of the poem is much more than a mere train of paratactic thought, biographical moments, or a succession of binary oppositions. A coherent vision of human continuity in time binds the different episodes of the text. As the voice of the poet intervenes to address his brother, we move from the primeval days of Pandora to the succession of races, the cities of men, and their households. Through embedded thematic repetition, the same pattern of perjury and kin destruction returns to show us how closely intertwined these different levels of our lives are in the eyes of justice. Like that of the king, the transgression of the farmer in the field can have cosmic repercussions, reflecting on the *geneē*, the *polis*, even the entire *genos*. By helping his brother, Hesiod is sending out his wise voice to mankind. A warning for empires and arrogant cities in Pausanias (see pp. 56–9) and Herodotus (see pp. 278–96), lines 280–5 of the *Works and Days* are framed as a warning for peasants in Hesiod, but one that concerns kings also, and all humanity. It makes a distinctive case for the necessity of justice in the world, and its bleak prospects. By rereading the poem through one key passage, we can open a window on previously overlooked elements of its poetic architecture.

Perjury is a common thread uniting all these passages. In the system of justice described in the first third of the *Works and Days*, Hesiod systematically singles out the oath and generational transmission as dominant themes of his image of justice. The man who breaks his oath will see his house disappear and the fruits of his toil dispersed. Like the city punished for the faults of its lying king, or the *genē* of silver and bronze, which were annihilated for their excess and injustice, the *geneē* of the perjurer will fade out of existence. How are we to make sense of the prominence of the oath in this portrait of justice in time? The solution lies partly outside the poem, in the institutional environment of the audience, the open intertextuality of ritual allusion. There can be little doubt that the text reflects the logic of the familiar and contemporary ritual formula of the μέγας ὄρκος, the great oath calling on the destruction of the perjurer and his family, κατ' ἐξωλείας αὐτοῦ καὶ γένους καὶ οἰκίας.³⁹ In a recent discussion Walter Burkert has asserted with some humour that 'it would probably be going too far to say

³⁹ See already the comments of Mazon 1914 ad loc.; M. L. West 1978 ad loc.

that gods were invented for oath taking'.⁴⁰ However that may be, the great oath κατ' ἐξωλείας was the most binding act of communication between men recognised in human society during the archaic period. The great oath was a collective commitment that implicated an entire household in the statement of the individual father, and, by extension, an entire city in the statement of its representative king or delegates.

This specific form of oath, the μέγας ὄρκος of *exōleia*, called on the destruction of the perjurer and his progeny with the formula 'may I perish myself, together with my children and my descendants'. It was widespread in various forms throughout the eastern Mediterranean.⁴¹ One great collective oath of this type taken by the entire citizen body in the archaic period is the famous Theran oath of foundation found in Cyrene.⁴² Inscribed on a marble stele in the fourth century, the text is divided into two parts. The first part is a fourth-century decree of Cyrene concerning the rights of the Theran citizens living in Cyrene, as they have been defined in the original agreement sworn by the common ancestors of the two groups. This agreement is described as a ὄρκιον, and the alleged text of the late seventh-century oath taken by the forebears (πρόγονοι) of the Therans and the Cyrenaeans follows, in which the constitution of the colonising expedition and the conditions of the Libyan settlement are set out. The oath is sealed with a great imprecation:

ἐπὶ τούτοις ὄρκια ἐποιήσαντο οἱ τε αὐτεῖ μένοντες καὶ οἱ πλέοντες οἰκίς
οντες καὶ ἄρας ἐποιήσαντο τὸς ταῦτα παρβεῶντας καὶ μὴ ἐμμένοντας ἢ
τῶν ἐλ Λιβύαι οἰκέοντων ἢ τῶν αὐτεῖ μενόντων. κηρίνος πλάσσαντες
κολοσὸς κατέκαιον ἐπαρεώμενοι πάντες συνενθόντες καὶ ἄνδρες καὶ
γυναῖκες καὶ παῖδες καὶ παιδίσκαι· τὸμ μὴ ἐμμένοντα τούτοις τοῖς ὄρκίοις
ἀλλὰ παρβεῶντα καταλείβεσθαι νιν καὶ καταρρὲν ὥσπερ τὸς κολοσός, καὶ
αὐτὸν καὶ γόνον καὶ χρήματα, τοῖς δὲ ἐμμένοισιν τούτοις τοῖς ὄρκίοις καὶ
τοῖς πλείοσι ἐλ Λιβύαν κ[αί] τ[οῖς μέ]νοισι ἐν Θήραις ἤμεν πολλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ
καὶ αὐ[τοῖς καὶ γό]νοισι.

On these conditions they made an oath, those who stayed here and those who sailed on the colonial expedition, and they cast imprecations on those who should transgress these conditions and not abide by them, whether those living in Libya or those staying in Thera. They molded wax images and burned them with the following imprecations, all of them having come together, men and women, boys and girls: 'May he, who does not abide by this oath but transgresses it, melt away and dissolve like the images, himself, his seed, and his property. But for those who abide by these oaths, for those

⁴⁰ Burkert 2006b: 26. ⁴¹ Faraone 1993 and 2005; M. L. West 1999.

⁴² ML 5; see Meiggs and Lewis 1988: 5; Faraone 1993; Calame 1996 for bibliography.

who sail to Lybia and those who remain in Thera, may there be abundance and prosperity for themselves and for their offspring' (trans. after Graham modified).⁴³

The authenticity of the archaic oath is a notorious matter of debate, which we cannot enter into here, but the general agreement in more recent scholarship has been to see the 'Oath of the Settlers' largely as a reflection of original seventh-century material.⁴⁴ If some formulae and turns of phrase remain suspect of later reworking, the core of the narrative has been shown not to be dependent on the Cyrenaean foundation narrative of Herodotus (4.150–9), and a common source for both accounts seems highly unlikely.⁴⁵ The most probable scenario remains that the text of the decree inscribed on the fourth-century document is indeed a direct reflection of the late seventh-century oath.⁴⁶

This archaic public oath brings together the entire community in a generational imprecation. It presents us with a fascinating portrait of a ritual involving the ceremonial destruction of *kolossoi*: moulded wax images of human beings melting in the fire as the entire assembled city calls on the gods to witness their terrible imprecations of generational *exōleia*.⁴⁷ We have no way of knowing the appearance or size of the individual *kolossoi*, but there can be little doubt that they were shaped in the form of human beings, and even less that their number had a marked communal significance. A plausible scenario is that every *oikos* had to bring a *kolossos* to the ceremony, mirroring the involvement of each individual household in the statement of the oath (ML 5.28–9). I can see little support for the idea that the *kolossoi* represent a perjury symbolically 'evacuated'.⁴⁸ Rather, the symbolic function of the wax statues seems to serve as a substitute for the speakers. This is in fact what is explicitly expressed in the text (ML 5.47–8). The destruction of this human substitute in the ritual is equivalent to the oath sacrifice of other similar documents, an enactment of potential sanction.⁴⁹ The use of heat to melt the wax is in accord with the common use of fire in oath ceremonies.⁵⁰ The irretrievability of the ritual action echoes the absolute nature of the oath statement. Even more significantly, the melting of the wax mirrors the common semantics of liquids used in the *horkos* ceremony. The verb καταλείβεσθαι, used to

⁴³ ML 5.40–51. ⁴⁴ The contribution of Faraone 1993 was fundamental in establishing this point.

⁴⁵ Calame 1996. ⁴⁶ Cf. Faraone 2005.

⁴⁷ ML 5.44; see Létoublon 1989; Faraone 1993; Dickie 1996. ⁴⁸ Létoublon 1989.

⁴⁹ For substitution in sacrifice, see R. C. T. Parker 2013.

⁵⁰ Burkert 1985 a [1977]: 251; Faraone 1993.

describe the flowing of the molten wax, possibly also evokes the image of a liquid poured out as a libation, and of the animal's blood which seeps underground during the oath sacrifice.⁵¹ As the assembly is calling on its own destruction to mirror that of the melting statues, it is making a statement similar to that of the speakers of the great oath in *Iliad* 3: 'may their brains be poured out on the ground just as this wine is'.⁵² In the Cyrene decree, the wax of the *kolossoi* is not only said to be poured down as a libation, but to 'flow down', 'rush down': καταρρέν. The verb, καταρρεῖν, can be used of blood gushing out of a wound, but it is more often associated with rivers or streams flowing down.⁵³ The image of the streams of wax flowing down underground through the fire, as a river plunging into the earth, is reminiscent of 'the great oath of the gods', the Styx. Tapping into the extended semantic register of the *horkos* ceremony, the oath ritual described in the Cyrene decree activates the images of death, libation, and the archetypal Styx oath of the gods in its performance.

In this great public oath, the entire citizen body is assembled to perform the *horkos*. The text specifies that 'men and women, boys and girls' have come together for the performance of the ritual and the utterance of the oath (ML 5.46–7). It does not say what are the precise roles of these individual groups in the ceremony, but the most plausible scenario is to imagine that the ritual action and the utterance of the imprecation were performed by the adult males. The usage of the masculine in the text for the formula of benefaction and execration would thus reflect not only conventions and rules of gender agreement, but also the words of the individual adult male speaker. The presence of women, boys, and girls, on the other hand, was designed to illustrate the complete implication of the community in the *horkos*, and to directly associate the house and the reproductive potential of the speaker with his solemn word – exactly as in later examples of generational oaths, where children could be present for their parents to swear on their heads.⁵⁴ The insistence of the oath ceremony on the generational force of the imprecation is striking, in both the composition of those who are present at the ceremony and the words of

⁵¹ See Casabona 1966: 272. Casabona notes that καταλείβω is not attested as a technical term for libations, but in light of the common usages of λείβω compounds in this sense, we have to consider that the pouring of the libation liquid would certainly fall within the range of associations evoked by the word.

⁵² *Il.* 3.298–301; cf. Krieter-Spiro 2009: 111. See p. 185.

⁵³ Blood: Hom. *Il.* 4.149; 5.870; 13.539; Hdt. 4.187; rivers: Ar. *Ach.* 26; Pax 146; Thuc. 7.84; Xen. *HG* 7.4.29; Dem. 55.10; see LSJ s.v.

⁵⁴ See e.g. Lys. 32.13; Eur. *Med.* 492–5, with Holland 2003; cf. Fletcher 2003: 29. For the rare cases of women swearing oaths on the lives of their children in classical Athens, see e.g. Foxhall 1996: 143–4.

the oath. It is interesting to note that the ritual reflected in the document which we have, if it is genuine, was performed in terms of its continuity in time: it was to be transmitted as a binding statement through the generations, an agreement regulating the present *and future* conduct of the metropolis and its daughter city. Even more notable is the fact that the fourth-century document which reproduced the treaty presents the text as a genuine document that still had enough binding force to be used in a public decree of the assembly and reinscribed in the agora. Whether the 'Oath of Founders' was an original decree or not, it was certainly thought to be so by the citizens of fourth-century Cyrene and still considered to be binding for the descendants of the original participants of the *horkos* ceremony.⁵⁵ The children and descent of the later inhabitants of Cyrene, at more than six generations of distance, were now the pledge of guarantee for the oath of their ancestors. That text is a reflection of the generational oath institution in the early archaic period. As a ritually grounded Greek institution, the generational oath was already familiar to the audiences of early epic.⁵⁶ This is the semantic horizon to which the notion of ancestral fault belongs in Hesiod.

Our passages from the *Works and Days* contain clear reflections of the ritual logic of the generational oath in their poetic images of cosmic justice. One example will suffice to illustrate the point. At the moment of punishment, men of the Race of Iron will be born with grey temples, like the Graiai monsters of the *Theogony*, 'grey-haired from their birth'.⁵⁷ The father will not be similar to his sons, nor the sons to their father.⁵⁸ This τέρας, as Ada Neschke has observed, is a unique event in the Myth of Races, a transformation between generations, within the *genos*.⁵⁹ There can be no such transformation in those other *genē* for which there is no reproduction and no generation. The threat to continuity through generations has a parallel in line 235, however, where we are told that the women

⁵⁵ ML 5.1–22; see Calame 1996: 128–55.

⁵⁶ Apart from the reflections of *exōleia* in Homer, Hesiod (*Il.* 3.298–301; *Il.* 4.155–65; Hes. *Op.* 274–85) and Archilochus (172–81W), many literary texts and inscriptions well into the imperial period reproduce the old oath formula of kinship eradication, the call to generational destruction κατ' ἐξωλείας αὐτοῦ καὶ γένους καὶ οἰκίας. Prominent examples of the 'great oath' of *exōleia* are found in Hdt. 6.86 (see pp. 278–96); Andoc. 1.31; 126; Lys. 1.10; Dem. 54.41; 57.22; 21.119; 59.10; Aeschin. 2.87; 1.115; ML 13; 40; 47; 52; 56; *OGIS* 229, ll. 68–9; 78; *SGDI* 5058, ll. 39–47. On the widespread use of the generational oath κατ' ἐξωλείας, see e.g. Glotz 1901: 752; Glotz 1904: 572–5; R. C. T. Parker 1983: 186; 201; M. L. West 1999. The mid-sixth-century Psoriani tablet (ML 13) is the earliest attested example of an *interpersonal* imprecation of *exōleia* (see O. Hansen 1987, with bibliography). These will become frequent in the classical period and later. For reasons of space, I have kept that dossier out of the present enquiry.

⁵⁷ *Theog.* 271; see Caquot 1974. ⁵⁸ *Op.* 181–2. ⁵⁹ Neschke 1996: 475.

of the just city precisely bear children ‘who resemble their parents’ (τίκτουςιν δὲ γυναῖκες ἑοικότα τέκνα γονεῦσι), in opposition to the unjust city, where ‘the women do not give birth and the houses are diminished’.⁶⁰ Such a correlation between punishment through the birth of monster children, children different from their fathers, and diminished houses, on the one hand, and reward through fertile fields and flocks, abundance of birth and similarity between generations, on the other, is a typical characteristic of the great oath formula. We can take as an example the text of the great Amphictyonic oath cited by Aeschines, supposedly taken at the time of the First Sacred War:

γέγραπται γὰρ οὕτως ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ, ‘εἴ τις τάδε’ φησὶ ‘παραβαίνοι ἢ πόλις ἢ ἰδιώτης ἢ ἔθνος, ἐναγής’ φησὶν ‘ἔστω τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος καὶ τῆς Ἀρτέμιδος καὶ Λητοῦς καὶ Ἀθηνᾶς Προνοίας’. καὶ ἐπεύχεται αὐτοῖς μήτε γῆν καρπούς φέρειν, μήτε γυναῖκας τέκνα τίκτειν γονεῦσιν ἑοικότα, ἀλλὰ τέρατα, μήτε βοσκήματα κατὰ φύσιν γονὰς ποιεῖσθαι, ἦτταν δὲ αὐτοῖς εἶναι πολέμου καὶ δικῶν καὶ ἀγορῶν, καὶ ἐξώλεις εἶναι καὶ αὐτοὺς καὶ οἰκίας καὶ γένος τὸ ἐκείνων. ‘καὶ μήποτε’ φησὶν ‘ὁσίως θύσειαν τῷ Ἀπόλλωνι μηδὲ τῇ Ἀρτέμιδι μηδὲ τῇ Λητοῖ μηδ’ Ἀθηνᾶ Προνοίᾳ, μηδὲ δέξαιντο αὐτοῖς τὰ ἱερά’. ὅτι δ’ ἀληθῆ λέγω, ἀνάγνωθι τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ μαντεῖαν. ἀκούσατε τῆς ἀρχῆς. ἀναμνήσθητε τῶν ὅρκων οὓς ὑμῶν οἱ πρόγονοι μετὰ τῶν Ἀμφικτυόνων συνώμοσαν.⁶¹

For it stands thus written in the curse: ‘If any one should violate this’, it says, ‘whether city or private man, or tribe, let them be under the curse’, it says, ‘of Apollo and Artemis and Leto and Athena Pronaea.’ The curse goes on: That their land bear no fruit; that their wives bear children not like those who begat them, but monsters; that their flocks yield not their natural increase; that defeat await them in camp and court and market place, and that they perish utterly, themselves, their houses, and their whole race; ‘And never’, it says, ‘may they offer pure sacrifice unto Apollo, nor to Artemis, nor to Leto, nor to Athena Pronaea, and may the gods refuse to accept their offerings.’ As a proof of this, let the oracle of the god be read; hear the curse; call to mind the oaths that your fathers swore together with all the other Amphictyons (trans. Adam).

The parallels are striking. The punishment of generations in the narrative of the Iron Race, in the Tale of Two Cities, and in the Address to Perses, like the passages of Herodotus and Pausanias discussed above, all echo the words, ideas, and images of the great oath κατ’ ἐξωλείας. In lines 106–285

⁶⁰ Cf. Crubellier 1996: 444.

⁶¹ Aeschin. 3.110–12; see Daux 1953; J. Davies 1994; Lefèvre 1995; Sánchez 1997; Bolmarcich 2007.

we see the logic of an institution of central importance for the audience creatively expanded and adapted to the logic of a text.

Far from functioning as an abstract doctrine, a systematic conceptualisation of 'inherited guilt' shown to govern the mechanisms of justice in time, divine punishment through generations in this poem remained strictly tied to the specific institution of the oath. The effect of perjury on the continuity of the household in Hesiod is not an innovation of post-Homeric thought, as Dodds and others saw it, an equivalent of Hebrew corporate responsibility, or the expression of a new systematisation of justice in time, but a poetic restatement of a ritual logic. The institution of the oath provided a commonly recognised and deeply meaningful context of ideas, words, and images for the thematisation of justice in time in the poem, and the depiction of broken reciprocity and failed transmissions of wealth through generation. It did not provide the poet with a general, abstract doctrine of justice. Perjury, the greatest crime, leads to the greatest possible sanction there is: the destruction of the line. Ancestral fault in the *Works and Days* is a notion of justice largely determined by a traditional ritual institution. It is of a significantly different nature from what we find in Solon's *Elegy to the Muses*, for instance, or what the old scholion is describing in the language of Plutarch and Proclus.⁶²

The poetry of Hesiod does not attest to the appearance of a radically new doctrine of 'inherited guilt'. But neither does it show the simple perpetuation of a prehistoric, primitive understanding of family solidarity. The application of the traditional imagery of *horkos* to the mechanisms of justice in the *Works and Days* uses the traditional associative patterns and implications of the oath institution to build its own particular image of justice in time. The extension of punishment through generations characteristic of the oath is brought into direct contact with the theme of the king's responsibility for the city in the poem, and the continuity of the generations of men. The problem of the household's perpetuation in time is thought of in relation to the continuity of the city, and of the human race as a whole. The *Works and Days* activates the traditional semantic sphere of the great oath to conceptualise its understanding of collective justice in time. The notion of ancestral fault found in Hesiod uses the theme of generational punishment associated with the oath institution and adapts it to its own particular vision of retribution, so clearly bound to the themes of inheritance and generational continuity. The dramatic setting of the father's inheritance is the pretext for the poetic weaving of a cosmic

⁶² See pp. 27–30.

image of justice in the universe, and the oath institution provided the text with the framework needed for locating the workings of this grandiose portrait.

Homer

This is what we find in Hesiod. How does it compare with Homer? What evidence do we have for the presence of ancestral fault in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*? The question is controversial. Some scholars have argued that, in fact, it only appears in later texts.⁶³ Others see it attested in a broader spectrum of Homeric passages.⁶⁴ Most have identified lines 3.298–301 and 4.155–65 of the *Iliad* as the only relevant passages before Hesiod and Solon.⁶⁵ Which is it? Semantic boundaries play an important role here, obviously, but the matter is more than a simple exercise in definition games, as the entire timeline of any study on the concept ultimately relies on what one does with the Homeric material. First, it is important to restate what is distinctive about ancestral fault. The delayed wrath of Solon's Zeus, the 'ancient faults' (παλαιὰ ἁμαρτίαι) of tragedy, the delayed punishment of Plutarch and other expressions of ancestral fault all involve more than the extension of punishment to the children of the guilty. The execution of an entire family is by itself not necessarily an expression of ancestral fault, of course. The distinctive element which allows us to identify the notion of ancestral fault is the inescapable transmission of punishment through generations in time. This entails delay, extended temporality, possibly the substitution of one victim for another. That is a fundamental consideration to keep in mind if we want to identify where the concept of ancestral fault appears in Homer.

It should be readily apparent that there is an essential difference between the swift and terrible wrath of Artemis against Niobe and her children, or of Ares and Artemis against Bellerophon and his children, on the one hand, and the anger of God 'unto the third or fourth generation' of the Hebrew Bible, the 'sins of the father' lamented by the Hittite king in the famous *Second Plague Prayer of Muršili II*, or the slow wrath of Zeus against

⁶³ Nägelsbach 1857: 34–8; Kakridis 1929: 141; Dodds 1951: 39; Kraus 1977.

⁶⁴ Lloyd-Jones 1983: 7; 37; 44; 170.

⁶⁵ Kirk 1985: 348: 'This is the first general statement in Greek literature of the powerful dogma that Zeus always exacts vengeance in the end, and that it may spread into the transgressor's family. Agamemnon stops just short of saying that a man might die unpunished himself, but that then his descendants will suffer, a refinement developed in Solon and Aeschylus'; cf. Rohde 1925: n. 65 of Chapter 12; R. C. T. Parker 1983: 201.

‘the children of the guilty, or later progeny’ which we find in Solon’s *Elegy to the Muses*, on the other hand.⁶⁶ In one case, the ‘quick’ wrath (μῆνις) of the gods deepens the sanction of the transgressor by striking where it hurts most, meting punishment on children in front of the eyes of their parents, often before the parents are destroyed themselves. It is not a wrath which lasts in time or is defined by delay. Once Bellerophon himself is dead, for instance, the μῆνις of the gods also dies out, and there is no mention of divine anger following his later descendants, such as his grandson Glaukos (6.200–6). The important element of distinction here is the figure of time. The wrath of gods against entire families in the *Iliad* is essentially a statement concerning the god’s awesome force, not the extent of its temporal reach. It involves no association with delay, duration, or substitution. The μῆνιμα of the *Iliad* is not the μῆνιμα of Euripides.⁶⁷ It is not yet, in the words of Hesychius, a ‘lasting wrath’.⁶⁸ Nowhere in early epic is it, by itself, an expression of the notion of ancestral fault. That is a crucial and immediately perceptible difference distinguishing this form of divine punishment against families from the core idea of ancestral fault.

The same is true for interpersonal imprecations in Homer.⁶⁹ Such ‘curses’ play an important role in Homeric poetry. It goes without saying that *ara* prayers occupy centre stage in both Homeric epics – we just have to think of these two central motors of Homeric action, the *ara* of Chryses and that of Polyphemus.⁷⁰ *Arai* can even be launched against children by their own parents in the *Iliad*, such as the *arai* of Amyntor against

⁶⁶ Exodus 20:5: ‘I, the Lord your God, am a jealous God, punishing the children for the sin of the father to the third and fourth generation’; cf. Exod. 34:7; Lev. 26:39; Deut. 5:9–10; 24:16; Ezek. 18; Jer. 32; Num. 16; Josh. 7; Isa. 14:21; 65:6; Lam. 5:7; see e.g. Kaminsky 1995; Krašovec 1999: 128–52. *Second Plague Prayer of Muršili* (CTH 378): ‘Storm-god of Hatti, my lord, Gods, my lords, as it happens, people sin. My father too sinned. He broke (his) word to the storm-god of Hatti. I, on the other hand, did not sin at all. This is how it always happens: a father’s sin (*ŠA A-BI-YA waštul*) passes down (*a-ar-aš*) to his son. To me too my father’s sin passed down. So now before the storm-god of Hatti, my lord, and before the Gods, my lords, I have confessed it: it is true, we have done it. Since I have confessed my father’s sin, so let the storm-god, my lord’s, and the gods, my lords’, their mind be satisfied again (9)’ (trans. van den Hout 2006); see Goetze 1929; Lebrun 1980: 192–239; it has been argued that the Hittite *waštul* might be cognate with the Greek *atē* (Catsanicos 1991: 51–74; but see Kloekhorst 2008). Cf. the Middle Assyrian *Epic of Tukulti-Ninurta I*, where the Babylonian king Kashtiliash knows that his defeat at the hands of the Assyrians is imminent, because of his ‘guilt’, the oath of Shamash, and ‘the plundering caused by my ancestors’, which are presumably all linked (column III: 21–57 with Machinist 1978). For Solon 13 W, see pp. 226–49.

⁶⁷ Eur. *Phoen.* 934; cf. Pl. *Phaedr.* 244d; see pp. 379–80.

⁶⁸ Hsch. s.v. μῆνιμα: μῆνις, ὀργή, χολή, κότος ἐπίμονος, μέμψις. Ἀπίων, μάνης· οἱ γὰρ ὀργιζόμενοι μάνιονται.

⁶⁹ See M. L. West 1999. ⁷⁰ *Il.* 1.37–42; *Od.* 9.526–36. See Giordano 1999: 11–45.

Phoenix, and that of Althaea against Meleager.⁷¹ But in none of these cases does the imprecation also involve the children of their object in its sanction and its transmission in time. These ‘curses’ are not ‘ancestral’, in that they are not carried down through generations. In both intra-family imprecations of *Iliad* 9, the *ara* is not intended to extirpate an entire line in time, or to cover descent in the reach of its punishment in order to make sure that it connects sanction to crime. It seeks and destroys a single individual. Again, it involves no association with delay, duration, or substitution. The authority of parent over child guarantees the effectiveness of the malediction on its target.⁷² It does not make it an expression of the notion of ancestral fault on any account. In the poetry of Homer, as in Hesiod, the idea of ancestral fault can only be said to exist in one specific context: the generational oath. As in Hesiod, the expression of the μέγας ὄρκος of *exôleia* is the semantic horizon to which the notion of ancestral fault belongs in Homer.⁷³

The wrath of Poseidon against the Trojans, for instance, as Lloyd-Jones and Allen rightly point out, implicitly presents ‘a case of divine anger extending over more than one generation’.⁷⁴ Although it is not emphasised as such in the extant Homeric tradition, the wrath of Poseidon against the people of Laomedon, which seeks ‘that the overbearing Trojans may perish miserably in utter ruin with their children and their respected wives’, is indeed a divine wrath that lasts in time.⁷⁵ It is a continuation of the god’s anger against a hated people, an extension of his vengeance against the slight of the former Trojan king on his children and his children’s children. It is not explicitly presented in the text as a form of delayed punishment, but it is characterised by its duration in time and its extension over generations. It will only end with the destruction of the city. Poseidon has already sent for the children of the city before, and his anger will not abate until it is destroyed once and for all.⁷⁶ Contrary to the wrath of Ares against Bellerophon, his wrath has never ceased. He is, from the foundation of the city onwards, a hereditary enemy of the Trojans. We should remember here that, in the implied narrative of the traditional tale, this example of generational punishment is in fact

⁷¹ *Il.* 9.454–6; 565–72.

⁷² See Kakridis 1929: 27; Speyer 1969: 1193–4; R. C. T. Parker 1983: 196–7; cf. *Pl. Leg.* 931b–c.

⁷³ See pp. 170–1.

⁷⁴ *Il.* 5.648–51; 20.144–8; 21.441–60; 24.25–6; Lloyd-Jones 2002: 1–2; W. Allen 2006: 6.

⁷⁵ *Il.* 21.458–60: τοῦ δὴ νῆν λαοῖσι φέρεις χάριν, οὐδ’ μεθ’ ἡμέων | πεῖρ᾽ ὥς κε Τρῶες ὑπερβίαλοι ἀπόλωνται | πρόχυνυ κακῶς σὺν παισὶ καὶ αἰδοίῃς ἀλόχοισι.

⁷⁶ Cf. e.g. Pind., *Ol.* 8.31–52 with schol.; Hellanic. 4 F 26b *FGRH*; Diod. Sic. 4.42; Hyg. *Fab.* 89.

the result of a broken oath. Poseidon talks of an ‘agreed wage’ of which he and Apollo were defrauded by Laomedon.⁷⁷ This ‘agreed wage’ alluded to in the passage refers to the famous tradition of the *horkos* which the Trojan king had struck with the gods, an early tradition clearly implied in the extant text and remembered in later sources. In Hellanicus, for instance, in a passage which echoes the verses of *Iliad* 21, Laomedon is said to have provoked the god by ‘overstepping the oaths’, something that is presented as an equivalent to his reneging on the ‘agreed wage’.⁷⁸ This familiar story is alluded to in the text of the *Iliad*, if only as a ‘palimpsest’.⁷⁹ Even if it plays no part in the economy of the poem, the *Iliad* does not dwell on the causes of that wrath.⁸⁰ Still, in the text of *Iliad* 21 as we have it, the language of Poseidon, who wishes ‘that the overbearing Trojans may perish miserably in utter ruin with their children and their respected wives’, is a direct reflection of the imprecation formula κατ’ ἐξωλείας found in generational oaths. It continues to echo a background tale written over by the definitive, canonical version of the *Iliad*. The imprecation of the oath is the implied agency of ancestral fault in the narrative logic of this episode, and its main semantic referent, even if it is found there only as an allusion. In this passage, as in the other passages of Homer where the concept of ancestral fault can be perceived, the relevant ideas, words, and images all belong to the specific semantic sphere and the institutional connotations of the oath. The complex narrative usage that Homeric poetry makes of the oath is the distinctive context of ancestral fault in the *Iliad*. This brings us to the main passage for our question in the Homeric epics.

The great oath of the armies described in Books 3 and 4 of the *Iliad* is the only explicit attestation of something like ancestral fault in Homer. Rohde saw lines 158–63 of Book 4 as the earliest example of the principle of *Erbschuld*. Kirk described them as ‘the first general statement in Greek literature of the powerful dogma that Zeus always exacts vengeance in the

⁷⁷ 445: μισθῷ ἔπι ῥητῶ.

⁷⁸ Schol. AB *ad* Hom. *Il.* 20.146 Hellanic. 4 F 26b *FGH*: Ποσειδῶν καὶ Ἀπόλλων, πρόσταξαντος Διὸς Λαομέδοντι θητεῦσαι, ἐπὶ μισθῷ τεταγμένῳ τὸ τεῖχος κατασκευάζουσιν. Λαομέδων δὲ παραβὰς τοὺς ὅρκους καὶ τὰς συνθήκας μὴ δοῦς τὸν μισθὸν ἀπῆλασεν αὐτοὺς. ἀγανακτῆσας δὲ Ποσειδῶν ἔπειμψε τῇ χώρᾳ κῆτος, ὃ τοὺς τε παρατυγχάνοντας ἀνθρώπους καὶ τοὺς γιγνομένους καρποὺς διέφθειρεν.

⁷⁹ On the idea of intertextual palimpsests in Homer, see Tsagalis 2008.

⁸⁰ Cf. the single brief mention of the judgment of Paris in the *Iliad* (24.29–30) to make sense of the wrath of Hera and Athena against the Trojans, a fact that did not go unnoticed with the authors of the bT scholia and Eustathius (1337.29–30); see Richardson 1993: 273–8. The mention of Poseidon in that same passage, interestingly, does not mention the cause of his wrath.

end, and that it may spread into the transgressor's family'. The lines in question are spoken by Agamemnon (158–62):

οὐ μὲν πῶς ὄλιον πέλει ὄρκιον αἵμά τε ἀρνῶν
 σπονδαὶ τ' ἄκρητοι καὶ δεξιά ἧς ἐπέπιθμεν.
 εἴ περ γάρ τε καὶ αὐτίκ' Ὀλύμπιος οὐκ ἐτέλεσσεν,
 ἔκ τε καὶ ὁπὲρ τελεῖ, σὺν τε μεγάλῳ ἀπετίσαν
 σὺν σφῆσιν κεφαλῇσι γυναιξὶ τε καὶ τεκέεσσιν.

Yet in no way is an oath of no effect and the blood of lambs and drink offerings of unmixed wine and the handclasps in which we put our trust. For even if the Olympian does not immediately fulfil them, yet late and at length he will fulfil them, and with a heavy price do men make atonement, with their own heads and their wives and their children (trans. A. T. Murray).

As the one potential example of ancestral fault explicitly found in Homer, this passage needs to be discussed in some detail.

The scene of the great oath depicts a bold solemn agreement between the two armies (3.245–313). Paris and Menelaus will fight a duel to the death in the space that separates the two hostile lines of soldiers. Whoever wins will keep Helen and her treasures (3.15–120). The Trojans will also pay a phenomenal compensation to the Achaean host if Menelaus turns out to be the victor, as is widely expected on both sides. As Menelaus prepares to finish off his enemy after a brief battle, Paris is saved by Aphrodite and carried away from the battlefield in a divine mist to his princely chambers, there to wait for Helen in their bed as war prepares to rage anew outside (3.313–461). A council of the gods follows, where Zeus orders Athena to trick the Trojans into breaking the oath (4.1–84). Convinced by the deceitful words of the disguised Athena, the archer Pandarus violates the truce by wounding Menelaus with an arrow, and all soldiers then rush to engage battle in a general melee (4.85–219). To make sense of *Iliad* 4.158–62, we have to situate these lines in the context of the passage, and to consider its position in the larger architecture of the poem.

The scene of the great oath is a cornerstone of the *Iliad*. After the withdrawal of Achilles in Book 1 and the massive panic flight of the Achaean army in Book 2, the truce of books 3 and 4 presents the audience with another preliminary challenge to the expected course of the story. The Trojan War might follow a different path. The solemn oath agreement opens the radical possibility that the conflict could be resolved through single combat. Zeus even raises the prospect that the oath might stand and that Troy should be saved in the end (4.14–19). The decision to trick the

Trojans into breaking the oath signals the din of war instead. Set early in the poem, the programmatic oath scene serves as a new beginning and a point of entry into the long battlefield narratives that will constitute most of the following books of the *Iliad*.⁸¹ Shaped as a fundamental transition moment from the initial set-up to the heart of the monumental epic, it is the last event of the poem before the two armies first meet in battle and the carnage begins. There is no armed engagement between heroes in the epic before the duel of Menelaus and Paris, which serves in a way as a template for all further armour descriptions and battle scenes and their many formulaic variations in the poem.⁸²

The truce of Books 3 and 4 effectively sums up the entire dramatic situation of the Trojan War in one precise moment. As Menelaus fights Paris for the possession of Helen and her riches, it is the very reason for the conflict that is played out anew before the two assembled armies. The claims of each party are to be defended at once by the spear and defined by the characters that hold them. The brash and violent Menelaus, frustrated and unable to find his enemy, is reduced to the impotent rage of the cuckolded husband before the eyes of his wife. He is contrasted in that scene to a lordly, regal Agamemnon, whose immense power will serve to channel the wrath of the vast assembled host in asserting the rights of his brother. The cowardly, soft and unwarlike Paris, on the other hand, is there first defined as a lyre-playing, 'woman-crazy' (γυναιμανής) lover for the audience, hated by his fellow Trojans, and unable to stand his ground in a war he has unleashed by himself.⁸³ Good to his enemies and hateful to his friends, he is the very definition of injustice. His negative character is shaped in direct contrast to that of his noble brother Hector, whose immense valour is shown as the only force able to stand in the way of the Achaean onslaught. As Hector fights on the battlefield to contain the Greek assault, the perfumed Paris is back in his luxurious room, making love to Helen while her former husband rages outside the walls. This captures in one vivid image the essence of the conflict for the audience at the beginning of the poem.⁸⁴ The world of peace, the possibility of agreement between the nations and trust in the oaths, will be definitively shattered with the perjury of the Trojans. The *Iliad* has a deep interest in the nature of community and social bonds, something that is especially

⁸¹ See Tsagarakis 1982.

⁸² 3.330–8, for instance, is the first arming-scene of the poem; see Armstrong 1958; Kirk 1985: 313. Cf. p. 188.

⁸³ 3.39; see de Jong 1987a. ⁸⁴ See Woronoff 1994.

apparent in the great oath scene. The responsibility for the war, the motivation of the army, and the cohesion of the camps are central concerns of the poem's initial set-up. The poem starts with reluctant armies with no discernible cause in a state of disunion. This is the background against which the great oath of Book 3 is staged.

After Hector proposes the truce, Menelaus answers him that Priam himself must come down to perform the ritual (3.105–10). Young men are untrustworthy, and his sons 'reckless and faithless'. The Trojan king must join Agamemnon, the greatest king of the Achaeans, to sacrifice a white ram for Helios, a black ewe for Earth, and a lamb for Zeus (3.103–4).⁸⁵ After the *Teichoskopia* (3.121–244), a simultaneous event shown sequentially, a classic illustration of 'Zielinski's Law', Priam is summoned by the herald Idaeus and agrees to leave the city walls on his chariot to perform the oath in the space that lies between the armies (3.250–8).⁸⁶ Together with his comrade Antenor, he brings with him two lambs, a wine flask, a shining bowl, and golden cups. Once the two men have reached the space ἐς μέσον, where Agamemnon and Odysseus wait for them, the heralds prepare the offerings, mix the wine, and wash the hands of the kings (3.264–70). The scene that follows is one of the most vivid and arresting passages of the *Iliad*. The two enemy kings stand face to face in the no man's land on the battlefield, each one speaking for the army behind him, and a long and uncharacteristically detailed description of the actions and words of the oath ritual unfolds.

After the hands of the kings have been washed, Agamemnon draws the knife that 'always hung by the great sheath of his sword' and cuts strands of hair from the heads of the three sacrificial lambs (3.247–8).⁸⁷ These will be distributed to the 'best of the Trojans and the Achaeans' by the heralds (3.272–3).⁸⁸ The kings of both armies receive the sacrificial hair. It is for them (τοῖσιν) that Agamemnon speaks the solemn prayer of the oath (3.275). Expanding on the original three gods of Menelaus' proposal, he raises his hands to the sky and calls on the gods as the μάρτυροι of the oath.⁸⁹ The hymnic formula of his prayer evokes a combination of deities to 'witness' and 'protect' the statement of the agreement. This combination forms a significant constellation of cosmic powers: Zeus, the Sun, Rivers, and the Earth, and 'those who in the world below take vengeance on men who are done with life, whoever has sworn a false oath'.⁹⁰ If we accept the reading τίνυσθον at line 279, or τείνυσθον, as West does, then

⁸⁵ Kitts 2003. ⁸⁶ See the recent re-evaluation of Zielinski's Law in Scodel 2008b.

⁸⁷ See Kitts 2005: 127–33. ⁸⁸ See Kirk 1985: 303–4; Kitts 2005: 140–4; cf. Faraone 1993: 74.

⁸⁹ *Il.* 275–6; see Kitts 2005: 144–9. ⁹⁰ *Il.* 3.276–80; cf. Burkert 1985a [1977]: 251.

the subject of the dual verb can only be Hades and Persephone. If, on the other hand, we follow the reading *τίνυσθε*, then the formulaic invocation of ‘those below’ would most probably be a direct reference to the Erinyes, as we can see from a closely parallel type-scene in the oath ceremony of *Iliad* 19.⁹¹ The fact of the matter is that the case cannot be resolved on strictly philological grounds. Preconceived notions of what ‘stage’ of religious evolution should be reflected in the text will inform what text we decide to keep in this passage.⁹² What counts for our purpose here is that the invocation refers to underworld powers responsible for punishing the dead. Moving vertically from Zeus and the Sun to Earth and those below it, the invocation of divine witnesses in this great oath casts its net on the entire span of the universe. It brings together the different regions of the cosmos, black and white, male and female, Achaean and Trojan, and activates all imaginable safeguards for its protection. The rivers, streams that flow underground and come back up on the earth, are placed in the very middle of the five members of the formula. They act as a transition point between the two powers in heaven and the two powers below, as well as an index to the stream of Styx, the great oath of the gods.⁹³ Zeus himself, the guardian of *dikē*, is the overseer of the oath, and he is called together with the Sun, ‘who sees everything and hears everything’. The gods, invoked as witnesses and protectors of the oath, will be sure to know of any transgression, and they will sanction perjury among the living and the dead. The three gods who receive a sacrificial victim in the ceremony, Zeus, the Sun, and Earth, will be responsible for overseeing the respect of the oath under the sky.⁹⁴

The terms of the agreement are repeated, and Agamemnon cuts the throats of the three lambs with his dagger. The ‘pitiless bronze’ takes the life of the animals, who are described agonising and writhing in pain with an uncharacteristic emphasis.⁹⁵ As the animals are dying, the kings pour out libations on the ground, and the Achaeans and Trojans all recite this prayer (298–301):⁹⁶

Zeῦ κύδιστε μέγιστε καὶ ἄθάνατοι θεοὶ ἄλλοι
 ὀππότεροι πρότεροι ὑπὲρ ὄρκια πημήνεια
 ὦδ' ἐσθ' ἐγκέφαλος χαμάδις ῥέοι ὥς ὅδε οἶνος
 αὐτῶν καὶ τεκέων, ἄλοχοι δ' ἄλλοισι δαμεῖεν.

⁹¹ *Il.* 19.258–60; see Bollack 1958: 13; Kirk 1985: 305; Henrichs 1989; Giordano 1999: 40; Krieter-Spiro 2009: 104–5; Coray 2009: 112–14.

⁹² Suggestions of a ‘pre-deistic’ ritual in Kirk 1985: 303; cf. Krieter-Spiro 2009: 107–8.

⁹³ See pp. 201–2. ⁹⁴ See the parallels listed in Krieter-Spiro 2009: 103–4.

⁹⁵ See Faraone 1993: 75; Kitts 2005: 151–6. ⁹⁶ See Krieter-Spiro 2009: 110.

Zeus, most glorious, most great, and you, other immortal gods, whichever army of the two will be the first to work harm in defiance of the oaths, may their brains be poured out on the ground just as this wine is, theirs and their children's; and may their wives be made to serve other men (trans. A. T. Murray).

Priam addresses the assembled men before returning to Troy with the carcasses, and Hector and Odysseus measure out the duel ground and prepare the lots for the first throw (310–19). The Achaeans and Trojans, finally, recite another prayer (320–3):

Ζεῦ πάτερ Ἰδηθεν μεδέων κύδιστε μέγιστε
 ὀππότερος τάδε ἔργα μετ' ἀμφοτέροισιν ἔθηκε,
 τὸν δὲς ἀποφθίμενον δῦναι δόμον Ἀΐδος εἴσω,
 ἡμῖν δ' αὖ φιλότητα καὶ ὄρκια πιστὰ γενέσθαι.

Father Zeus, who rule from Ida, most glorious, most great, whichever of the two it is that brought these troubles on both peoples, grant that he may die and enter the house of Hades, but to us may there come friendship and solemn oaths (trans. A. T. Murray).

The friendship and solemn oaths prayed for are to be the lasting possession of both Achaeans and Trojans. They refer to themselves as 'us' (ἡμῖν) in their shared prayer, a group united through ritual contract, as initially envisaged in the formulations of Paris and Hector. This group is defined as οἱ ἄλλοι, here distinguished from the two antagonists of the duel in their solemn agreement and their lack of cause for continued conflict.⁹⁷ The mixing of wine referred to in lines 3.269–70 does not involve water, as the libations will later be described as ἄκρητοι (4.159).⁹⁸ It presents us with the image of Achaean wine being mixed with Trojan wine, as the bT scholia observe.⁹⁹ That subtle ritual figure captures in a few words the essence of the great agreement being struck between the armies.

The specificity of this oath better comes out from a confrontation with similar scenes.¹⁰⁰ In the oath of Agamemnon described in Book 19, for instance, which uses much of the same formulaic language, the Atreid performs the ritual slaughter alone, without a distribution of hair (τρίχες) to participants by the herald, and the assembled *laos* of the Achaeans 'sat in silence where they were, as was right, listening to the king', as the narrator tells us (255–6). In the oath of Book 3, on the contrary, the assembled armies of Achaeans and Trojans are direct participants in the action.

⁹⁷ 3.73; 94; 256; see Krieter-Spiro 2009: 40. ⁹⁸ See p. 187.

⁹⁹ See Kirk 1985: 302–3. ¹⁰⁰ On oath type-scenes in the *Iliad*, see still Arend 1933: 122–3.

The scene of the oath can be described as a comprehensive staging of responsibility. The extended portrayal of the ritual action insists on shared participation. The picture is elaborate. Each king stands before his army as he acts and speaks for his soldiers. The terms of the oath, binding for all, are pronounced by Agamemnon.¹⁰¹ The first gesture of aggression towards the animals is also performed by the Atreid king (3.271–4). This action, as has often been remarked, initiates the sacrifice and first breaks the integrity of the animals without shedding blood. As the hair of the animals is distributed to the chieftains of each host, a chain is formed connecting the assembly of men in one common action.¹⁰² A physical bond between the sacrificial victims and the many leaders of both armies is established. Through the distribution of the *triches*, the metonymic equivalent of touching the *horkia* which is such a common staple of later ritual descriptions of the oath, the nominal whole of each army is included in the actual act of sacrifice.¹⁰³ When the king cuts the throats of the lambs, it is every captain who kills the animal. To reinforce the solidarity of the assembled men in the performance of the sacrifice, the text shows us libations of wine being poured out on the ground by the masses of chieftains as the blood of the animals flows down (3.295–7). Reflecting the movements of the two high leaders at the centre of the battlefield, the many kings of both armies physically enact the successive stages of the sacrifice, from the first cutting of hair to the final gushing of blood from the wound.

Prayers follow the same pattern of communication as actions in this extended ritual scene. As the ‘best of the Achaeans and the Trojans’ replicate the acts of Agamemnon and Priam in the space between the armies, the prayers of the soldiers reproduce the gestures of the chieftains. It is everyman, *τις Ἀχαιῶν τε Τρώων τε*, who invokes the destruction of the perjurers root and branch (3.297), pointing to ‘this wine’ (300) as the icon of punishment awaiting transgression.¹⁰⁴ The anonymous soldiers of the host (*τις*) give their collective voice to the *ara* of the oath’s sanction.¹⁰⁵ Just as the wine of the warlords embodies the blood spilled by the two high kings, the words of the soldiers perform an equivalent operation through

¹⁰¹ See Bouvier 2002 : 282–3.

¹⁰² *Il.* 3.272–3; see Kirk 1985: 303–4; Kitts 2005: 140–4; cf. Faraone 1993: 74.

¹⁰³ See e.g. *Ar. Lys.* 186; *Dem.* 23.68; *Antiph.* 5.12; *Pl. Leg.* 753d; *Paus.* 3.20.9; 4.15.8; with Stengel 1910: 80–5; Burkert 1985a [1977]: 251; Faraone 1993: 68.

¹⁰⁴ See Krieter-Spiro 2009: 110.

¹⁰⁵ *Il.* 3.297; note the usage of the iterative in this respect. In the four supplementary verses of the ‘wild’ papyrus *P.Hibeh* 19, extra emphasis is added to the imprecation of the troops by the mention of the thunder sent by Zeus to confirm his acceptance of the oath; see de Jong 1987b.

personally binding speech-acts. The link that connects the actions of Priam and Agamemnon with that of the leaders of the Trojans and the Achaeans thus also reaches all the soldiers of the army. The prayers of the soldiers, in turn, involve each member of every individual warrior's household. The wives and the children of the assembled men are included in the great contract that is sealed by word and ritual on the battlefield.¹⁰⁶ The fathers and husbands of the armies have the authority to directly implicate the lives of their absent and voiceless dependants in their solemn declaration of *exōleia*. This powerful scene orchestrates a communion of innumerable groups, one that channels the same resolution through the various levels of authority that structure the armies. The agreement that results from this ritual creates a temporary community, an image of the society of 'friendship and trusty oaths' wished for by all.¹⁰⁷ It vividly constitutes the 'us' of line 323 as a concrete possibility, a fleeting vision of an impossible union between peoples, defined in large part by contrast with the very real consequences of the imprecation.

That alternative scenario is utter and complete destruction. Once the truce is broken, the terrible terms of the generational imprecation cast by the soldiers of both armies are irremediably set in motion, and the idea of peace altogether disappears. A world of *pistis* between Achaeans and Trojans is shattered once and for all to make place for cohesion formed by opposition. Instead of a single 'us' distinguished as ἄλλοι from the two combatants of the duel, the two groups that stood behind their respective kings are now more clearly defined and demarcated, each one fighting together with one of Helen's husbands against mortal enemies on the other side. What remains is the *pistis* of the right hand, the handclasp of the fellow soldier (4.159). The solemn words of the oath, instead of establishing a community of friendship, consolidate the two opposing armies and consecrate their opposition with the most sacred bond imaginable. There can be no question of unity or motivation after the violation of the truce. At 9.17–28, when Agamemnon calls for a general retreat as he did in Book 2, the Achaean army will refuse to flee and it holds firm.¹⁰⁸ There can, more importantly, be no question of cause and responsibility after the breaking of the treaty. While in Book 1 Achilles could still say the Trojans are not ἄτιοι when it concerns him (1.53), the aggression of Pandarus now makes all Trojans unquestionably 'responsible' (ἄτιοι) from the perspective of the assembled Achaeans. Every single Achaean soldier is

¹⁰⁶ 3.300–1; see Krieter-Spiro 2009: 111–12.

¹⁰⁷ 3.73; 94; 245; 252; 256; 269; 280; 323; 4.157.

¹⁰⁸ See Hainsworth 1993: 61–2.

now personally involved in the core reason for the fighting, and concerned to make sure that the oath is not 'sterile'. Independently of their initial motivations, the cause of the chieftains is now part of the narrative we have seen unfold. The beginning of the poem had placed hesitation and lack of motivation at the centre of its action. The oath of Book 3 orchestrates a new scenario of responsibility through shared vengeance. The staging of a powerful cause for the union of the Achaean army in battle prefigures the return of Achilles. Through the theme of the oath, the scene gloriously dramatises the transformation of a quarrel between two men into a massive world conflict. Perhaps the great oath scene of the *Iliad*, in fact, reflects in some way the traditions of the great oath of the suitors attested in other archaic texts as an underlying cause of the Trojan War.¹⁰⁹ Whatever the case, the doubts and uncertainties dramatised at the beginning of the poem make place for many books of enthusiastic war lust after the truce has been broken. For all intents and purposes, the beginning of the poem functions as the beginning of the war on a narrative level, and the oath scene serves as a comprehensive staging of cause and responsibility. The long beginning of the poem, the narrative set-up of the *Iliad*, ends with the arrow of Pandarus.

For the Achaeans, the blame is clear, and all Trojans are now responsible for the perjury. The Trojans will continue to wonder who has really broken the truce. For the audience, the picture takes on a different colour, as we have been shown that Pandarus shot his arrow only after having been convinced to do so by a disguised Athena. She herself had been sent by Zeus to make the Trojans break the oath. This privileged access into the realm of the gods offers a superior level of knowledge to the kaleidoscope of perspectives that the auditor has to consider.¹¹⁰ In the divine assembly scene at the beginning of Book 4, the gods are portrayed as using the oath as an instrument of their will in manipulating human action and resolve.¹¹¹ While we already know that the gods have agreed to let the truce collapse and Troy be destroyed once and for all, the Achaeans and the Trojans are still depicted as being unsure whether Zeus wants war or peace after Paris disappears from the duel.¹¹² The formula ὥδε δέ τις εἴπεσκεν Ἀχαιῶν τε Τρῳῶν τε is used there one last time as an expression of the temporary state of agreement between the two armies (4.85). Fundamental differences of outlook on the question between the various characters and the audience are emphatically brought to the fore afterwards as the conflict is made

¹⁰⁹ On the oath of the suitors, see e.g. González García 1995.

¹¹⁰ See Van Erp Taalman Kip 2000; cf. W. Allen 2009.

¹¹¹ See p. 191.

¹¹² 3.85–8.

to resume over the broken truce, and they will continue to distinguish the two armies and the gods. The theme of the oath allows the poet of the *Iliad* to weave a masterful thread of narrative perspective about cause, consequence, and time over a large section of the poem. It is in that context that we find lines 4.158–63.

After Menelaus is hit by the Trojan arrow as he searches for Paris on the battlefield, Agamemnon immediately recalls the terms of the oath (155–68):

φίλε κασίγνητε θάνατόν νύ τοι ὄρκι' ἔταμον
οἷον προστήσας πρὸ Ἀχαιῶν Τρωσὶ μάχεσθαι
ὥς σ' ἔβαλον Τρῶες, κατὰ δ' ὄρκια πιστὰ πάτησαν.
οὐ μέν πωας ἄλιον πέλει ὄρκιον αἵμα τε ἀρνῶν
σπονδαί τ' ἄκρητοι καὶ δεξιαὶ ἧς ἐπέπιθμεν.
εἴ περ γάρ τε καὶ αὐτίκ' Ὀλύμπιος οὐκ ἐτέλεσεν,
ἔκ τε καὶ ὁπὲρ τελεῖ, σύν τε μεγάλῳ ἀπετίσαν
σύν σφῆσιν κεφαλῇσι γυναιξί τε καὶ τεκέεσσιν.
εὖ γὰρ ἐγὼ τόδε οἶδα κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμόν·
ἔσσεται ἡμαρ ὅτ' ἂν ποτ' Ὀλῶλῃ Ἴλιος ἱρή
καὶ Πρίαμος καὶ λαὸς ἐυμελίῳ Πριάμοιο·
Ζεὺς δέ σφι Κρονίδης ὑψίζυγος αἰθέρι ναίων
αὐτὸς ἐπισείησιν ἐρεμνὴν αἰγίδα πᾶσι
τῆσδ' ἀπάτης κοτέων· τὰ μὲν ἔσσεται οὐκ ἀτέλεστα·

Dear brother, it was for your death, it appears, that I swore this solemn oath, stationing you alone before the Achaeans to do battle with the Trojans, since the Trojans have thus struck you, and trodden under foot the oaths of faith. Yet in no way is an oath of no effect and the blood of lambs and drink offerings of unmixed wine and the handclasps in which we put our trust. For even if the Olympian does not immediately fulfil them, yet late and at length he will fulfil them, and with a heavy price do men make atonement, with their own heads and their wives and their children. For I know this well in my mind and heart: the day will come when sacred Ilios will be laid low, and Priam, and the people of Priam of the good ashen spear; and Zeus, son of Cronos, throned on high, will himself shake over them all his dark aegis in anger for this deceit. These things will not fail fulfilment (trans. A. T. Murray).

The central point of his statement is that divine punishment is inevitable. The Trojans are now collectively guilty of perjury, of ἐπιπορκία, having trampled (πάτησαν) the formal ceremonial agreement.¹¹³ The horrible

¹¹³ See Benveniste 1969: 169, with the reservations expressed there about the etymological link of the word to trampling. What matters for our purpose is that this is how the word was understood in the archaic period: Alc. 129.23 V; Hippon. 115.15 W; cf. Faraone 1993: 70, with Katz 1998: 194–5. On the correspondence between 3.299 and 4.147, see Krieter-Spiro 2009: 111.

consequences of perjury had been dramatically enacted by all parties to the oath and vividly presented to the audience in the extended ritual scene of Book 3. By stepping on the 'trustworthy oaths', the Trojans have become perjurers and placed themselves in the power of the ritual so memorably performed just before. In the narrative logic of epic justice, we are led to think that the overwhelming punishment staged by the ritual sacrifice and the *arai* of the army will necessarily engulf the Trojans as a whole. Agamemnon now brings them back to attention and lists the powers that will drive them to effect. The key word is ἄλιον, which means 'useless', 'ineffective', an adjective commonly applied to missiles and speeches.¹¹⁴ Agamemnon denies that an oath can be ἄλιον.¹¹⁵ Barrenness is ominously transferred to the still living, doomed perjurers, and the fertile blood of the sacrifice now augurs murder. Priam had to come down from Troy to cut the oaths, because his sons are themselves reckless and faithless, while an old man can look to 'what is before and after' when performing such a solemn act. The children of Priam, ἄπιστοι as they are, would not be able to refrain from 'overstepping the oaths of Zeus' (3.106–7).¹¹⁶ But the oath of Priam will be transgressed, like the one of his father Laomedon before him.¹¹⁷ Troy has already been punished and destroyed once because of perjury. Again, we are made to expect that Priam and the Trojans will be punished for this new perjury, together with their sons and the sons of their sons. The next time Priam comes down from Troy into the plains, in fact, it will be to carry back the body of his son at the end of the poem.

The strength of the oath rests on the blood of rams, the unmixed libations, and the right hands which performed the killings, and in whose force the army will now have to trust (ἐπέπιθμεν) to protect the ὄρκια πιστά.¹¹⁸ The slaughter of the animals, its ritual commentary through wine and prayers, and the comradeship in arms of the victims of perjury are the agents of the punishment that will destroy those responsible for the transgression. One does not exclude the other – they are combined as symbolic equivalents. The *ara* of the oath, the conditional self-imprecation that each warrior of the Trojan and Achaean army had cast upon himself during the ceremony, is not imagined as an impersonal agent here but is rather carried by these interlocked forces. These forces, in turn, are supported by the will of Zeus. The oaths are not without effect, in Agamemnon's speech, because Zeus 'fulfils' them through blood, wine,

¹¹⁴ See Laser's entry in the *Lfgre*. ¹¹⁵ *Il.* 4.158–69; see Kitts 2003.

¹¹⁶ See Krieter-Spiro 2009: 48–9. ¹¹⁷ See pp. 179–80.

¹¹⁸ Cf. *Il.* 2.114; 3.73; 94; 245–56; 269; 280; 323; 4.157; 7.351; 19.191; 22.262; *Od.* 24.483.

and the hands of men. It is the anger of the god that ultimately animates all the other agencies of punishment and carries them to their final purpose of destruction in that view.

This description of causality is a salutary reminder of the complexity of the portrayal of divine justice in the *Iliad*. It is there remarkably more intricate than the ‘double determination’ so often mentioned in modern scholarship.¹¹⁹ The picture is even more elaborate if we consider it from the angle of narrative perspective. The words of Agamemnon convey his personal understanding of perjury and punishment after the wounding of Menelaus. The fact that his perception of Zeus’s reaction is in complete disagreement with the actions of the god that we have just seen would not have escaped the audience. It is indeed hard to imagine that Zeus could be angry at the ‘deceit’ of the Trojans, when we know from a few lines earlier that the god himself has caused the deception (ἀπάτη) to take place. Agamemnon is clearly mistaken in his evaluation of divine action, and we are meant to see it.

He is, however, right in his understanding of the consequences of Trojan perjury. His words directly echo those of the gods. Hera, like the Achaean king, refuses to accept that her actions could be ‘useless’, ‘ineffective’, her πόνος to be ἄλιος and ἀτέλεστος (4.26). She repeats this at 4.57. Her aim is the complete destruction of the city she hates (4.51–67). In order to achieve this aim, she urges Zeus to ‘arrange it that the Trojans are first in defiance of their oaths to work evil on the triumphant Achaeans’.¹²⁰ Perjury is the means of her goal. The destruction of the city, in the logic of her intervention at the divine council, passes through the transgression of the oath. In order for Priam’s city to be levelled, Hera must make sure that the Trojans are first to violate the *horkia*. This is what she demands of Zeus, and this is what Zeus sends Athena to do once he agrees to let the city fall (4.70–2). In the speech of the gods, the transgression of the Trojans is presented as the initial and necessary step in the march towards total annihilation. That is a fascinating – and much overlooked – example of the various means and the complex mechanisms of divine intervention found in the *Iliad*. It is important to note that the gods do not simply act to renew battle between the armies. They incite the Trojans to renew battle through the perjury of a great oath of destruction. To impose their resolution on mortals, the gods are shown using ritual as an instrument. The *Iliad* stages gods enacting their will through the provocation of ritual transgression.

¹¹⁹ Lesky 1961a is a classic treatment of the question; cf. Versnel 2011: 163–79.

¹²⁰ 4.66–7: πειρᾶν δ’ ὥς κε Τρῶες ὑπερκύδαντας Ἀχαιοὺς | ἄρξωσι πρότεροι ὑπὲρ ὅρκια δηλῆσασθαι.

The terms of the ritual imprecation described in Book 3 are reflected in both the divine assembly and the speech of Agamemnon at the beginning of Book 4. Hera insists that her toil serve evil, κακά, to Priam and his children (4.28). Zeus ominously repeats this a few lines later. What have Priam and his sons done to bring about such anger, he asks? 'If', he continues, 'you were to enter inside the gates and the high walls and to devour Priam raw and the sons of Priam and all the Trojans besides, then perhaps you might heal your anger.'¹²¹ The insistence on Hera's will to destroy Priam and his sons in the passage is striking. Aristarchus was right to deny that the poem was making a reference to the Judgment of Paris here.¹²² Zeus is bringing attention to the extreme, all-consuming anger of the goddess towards the king and his children. That total anger is portrayed in the most terrifying terms imaginable as something so severe and excessive that it cannot be explained or placated, a hunger that must be healed through devouring. It is a wrath that reaches far beyond all norms of divine action – a fair pendant to the terrible sanction of the great oath.

The oath of *exōleia* was a powerful symbol of community extermination grounded in the religious imagination and the ritual, institutional reality of the audience. Throughout the poem, there is a discreet, admittedly tenuous, but perceptible narrative of allusions and references linking the fate of Troy and the eventual eradication of its generations to the perjury of Book 3. The oath can function as an index to the future or the past in the narrow time-depth of Homeric poetry.¹²³ It can serve the same kind of narrative-shifter role as prophecy and oracle. The *horkos* of Achilles in Book 1 of the *Iliad* both announces the suffering of the Achaean army, for instance, and Achilles' doom as the perjurer who rejoins battle. The elaborate and striking rituals sometimes portrayed in the descriptions of *horkos* can also stage the future sanctions of transgression for the audience.¹²⁴ These type-scenes can conflate different narrative times in the present of narration. The sacrifice of the epic oath should be seen not only as a reflection of religious *realia*, but as a narrative device in its own right. The enactment of the *horkos* ritual by the poet serves as a proleptic activation of future punishment for its transgression. This makes for the opening of a deep range of pathos and expectation-play, as the audience is being led back towards a punishment it has already witnessed. When the

¹²¹ 4.34–6: εἰ δὲ σύ γ' εἰσελθοῦσα πύλας καὶ τεῖχεα μακρὰ | ὦμόν βεβρώθοις Πρίαμον Πριάμοιο τε παῖδας | ἄλλους τε Τρῶας, τότε κεν χόλον ἐξάκῃσαι; cf. the famous example of another raw-flesh-eating divinity punishing perjury in Alc. 129.

¹²² See Kirk 1985: 333–4.

¹²³ See e.g. the comments of Reuter 1991 on oaths and narrativity.

¹²⁴ Kitts 2003; cf. Testart 1991; Pageard 1991; Billacois 1991 a and 1991 b.

oath involved in the agreement is a generational oath, the proleptic staging of punishment allows the poet to project a distant future in the present, and to frame the beginning of its action in reference to its end. This is what we find in the *horkia* scene of *Iliad* 3.¹²⁵

Through the perspective of the Achaeans, the oath of Book 3 is able to foreshadow the final destruction of Troy for the audience. Agamemnon directly links the perjury of the Trojans to the destruction of Ilion: 'For well I know this in my head and in my heart, there will be a day when sacred Ilion will be destroyed, and also Priam and the host of Priam of the ashen lance.'¹²⁶ The future extermination of the Trojans, the thorough destruction of their city, is just a matter of time, and it is explicitly presented there as a punishment for perjury in the perspective of the Achaeans. This is a theme which will be brought back to the attention of the audience a number of times. In Book 4, for instance, even before the event, we see the gods themselves plotting the perjury of the Trojans in Olympus, making sure that they will violate their *horkia*.¹²⁷ Immediately after the wounding of Menelaus, Agamemnon is shown exhorting his troops to prepare for battle against 'those who were the first to work violence in defiance of their oaths', shouting to the eager soldiers that the men will be eaten by vultures, and their wives and children carried away in Achaean ships.¹²⁸ Not long afterwards, Idomeneus, leader of the Cretans, tells Agamemnon 'to urge on the other long-haired Achaeans so that we may fight very soon, since the Trojans have made our oaths of no effect. Death and woes shall be their lot in future (ὀπίσσω), since they were the first to work violence in defiance of the oath.'¹²⁹

From the perspective of the Trojans presented in Book 7, however, the oath has not been broken but simply brought to naught. It 'has not been fulfilled by Zeus', in the words of Hector. Instead, he says to the Achaeans, the Son of Cronus, 'with evil intent, ordains a time for both armies, until either you take well-walled Troy, or yourselves are vanquished beside your sea-faring ships'.¹³⁰ Through this focalisation, the audience is shown alternative modes of interpretation, the possibility that Ilion will not fall, and that the battle might still take any direction – that we also do not really know what will happen.¹³¹ The scene also raises the possibility that Hector

¹²⁵ Faraone 1993: 76; Kitts 2003; 2005; W. Allen 2006: 3–6.

¹²⁶ *Il.* 4.163–5: εὖ γὰρ ἐγὼ τόδε οἶδα κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμόν· | ἔσσεται ἡμαρ ὅτ' ἄν ποτ' ὀλώλῃ | Ἴλιος ἱρή | καὶ Πριάμος καὶ λαὸς ἐϋμμελίῳ Πριάμοιο; cf. n. 145.

¹²⁷ *Il.* 4.67; 72. ¹²⁸ *Il.* 4.234–9. ¹²⁹ *Il.* 4.265–71. ¹³⁰ *Il.* 7.67–72.

¹³¹ See the discussion of de Jong 2004: 151–60 on the contrasting focalisations of different speakers referring to the same events; cf. Kullmann 1968.

is blinded by his temporary success; the oaths have been broken, Troy will fall, but the possibility of Trojan victory is only raised in the absence of Achilles. The same ambiguity of perspective is raised later in the book, when Antenor tells the Trojans that they should give back Helen and her treasures to the besieging army, because there is no possibility of success, no hope of victory in battle, 'having proved false to our trusty oaths'.¹³² Paris' answer to his speech will not mention the oaths, and neither will that of Priam, raising the temporary possibility, like his son Hector, that the gods might still give victory to one side or the other. The possibility that Priam, 'peer of the gods in counsel', the king 'with good intent', might be right, adds to the colour and the depth of expectations, which allows the poet to keep the audience guessing and contemplate alternative outcomes. The ultimate knowledge that he is entirely wrong adds to the dramatic pathos of the Trojan stance of resistance against inevitable doom.

One of the functions of the oath in foreshadowing the future destruction of Troy is this creation of narrative ambiguity. The open-ended imprecation of the oath can play the same role as prophecy in laying down 'Homeric misdirections'.¹³³ One of the characteristic and most fascinating aspects of divine justice in the *Iliad* is how it is presented through the many prisms of many perspectives. We are rarely allowed a glimpse behind the particular sights of particular human characters. Even the scenes which show the audience direct speeches and actions of the divine characters do not always give us privileged information, above the knowledge of human characters, but often contribute in opening new and more complex narrative and theological possibilities instead. Conflicts between the gods, and the remote, often enigmatic figure of Zeus standing within and above the fray, usually leave the course of action running towards an open-ended *telos*. The patterns and meaning behind the actions of the gods are not always perceptible to the characters of the narrative, or, more importantly, to the audience, but they are systematically referenced in the background throughout the epic. Through forty days of war we are given fragments of the world's history, past, present, and future. That there is an order behind the din of battle is never really in doubt, but we are kept guessing through and through as to what it is. The world of Homer is not always a chaos of contingency. If the two jars of Zeus in the *Iliad* are beyond the sight of men, it does not mean that 'the father of gods and men' distributes arbitrarily from them, as Achilles says.¹³⁴ As Zeus himself asserts at the

¹³² *Il.* 7.351–2.

¹³³ See J. Morrison 1992.

¹³⁴ *Il.* 24.527–33; see W. Allen 2006: 12–15.

beginning of the *Odyssey*, ‘it’s astonishing how ready mortals are to blame the gods. It is from us, they say, that evils come, but they even by themselves, through their own blind folly, have sorrows beyond that which is ordained.’¹³⁵ Our own tragic ignorance is dramatised in the text.

The ambiguous figure of the generational oath in Book 3 participates in this logic of narrative plurality. The oath of armies in the *Iliad* is an important theme orchestrating the presence of divine justice in the affairs of men, but, like other expressions of cosmic order in the poem, its precise nature is never explicitly brought to the fore. Its effect is to trace a hint and keep the audience guessing. It opens a horizon of expectation. After the description of the ritual, for instance, and of the *ara* prayers uttered by both armies, the primary narrator-focaliser tells us that the prayer was not received by Zeus.¹³⁶ More precisely, we hear that Zeus did not grant it to them *yet*: οὐδ’ ἄρα πῶ. The particle πῶ is central to the meaning of the verse, and to the entire sense of the oaths scene, as it qualifies the refusal of Zeus in time.¹³⁷ It is addressed to the primary narratee-focalisee. We expect the oath to be broken. We know that transgression will be sanctioned. We know that Troy will fall eventually. But Zeus will not accomplish the sanction *yet*. There is no question that he will defend the oath and chastise the transgressors, but the time when is left open. Everything will remain possible within the scope of the epic’s action, until Zeus at last decides to ἐπικραίνειν the *ara* upon the perjurers. The certitude of eventual sanction, although it is emphatically indeterminate, will remain part of the framework in which the action of the epic is set after the breaking of the oath in Book 4.

The curses of literature are inexorable. Agamemnon, as we have seen, knows that ‘there is no way that an oath is of no effect’.¹³⁸ The πῶς here once more points to the fact that the oath inevitably finds its way to punishment. The strength of the blood given to the gods above, the wine poured to the gods below, and the ‘trustworthy hands’ of the army which is now in the right, will in the end sanction the force of the *horkia*. ‘For even if the Olympian does not immediately fulfil them, yet late and at length he will

¹³⁵ *Od.* 1.32–4: οἷον δὴ νῦ θεοὺς βροτοὶ αἰτιόωνται. | ἔξ ἡμέων γάρ φασι κακ’ ἔμμεναι· οἱ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ | σφῆψιν ἀτασθαλίῃσιν ὑπὲρ μόνον ἄλγε’ ἔχουσιν.

¹³⁶ *Il.* 3.302: ὥς ἔφαν, οὐδ’ ἄρα πῶ σφιν ἐπεκραίνε Κρονίων.

¹³⁷ Krieter-Spiro 2009: 112. It is interesting to note that the verse for *Il.* 3.302 contained in the ‘wild’ papyrus *P.Hibeh* 19 does not express the ‘subtle comment’ of the οὐδ’ ἄρα πῶ σφιν ἐπεκραίνε formula. In that version Zeus simply responds to the oath with a thunderbolt: ὥς ἔφαν εὐχόμενοι, μέγα δ’ ἔκτυπε μητιέτα Ζεὺς. See Kirk 1985: 308–9. This might be a simple interpolation, as Kirk and others believe, or reflect late alternative rewritings of the passage.

¹³⁸ *Il.* 4.158: οὐ μὲν πῶς ἄλιον πέλει ὄρκιον αἶμά τε ἄρῶν.

fulfil them, and with a heavy price do men make atonement, with their own heads and their wives and their children.’¹³⁹ The oath marks the certitude of punishment, but also its indeterminate location in future time. The here and now of immediate human action is contrasted to the extension of divine reach in time. Gods act *late*, but they strike with a heavy hand through generations. Their vengeance comes ‘with a great price’. If it is not fulfilled now, αὐτίκα, it will inevitably be thoroughly fulfilled later (ἔκ τε καὶ ὀψὲ τελεῖ), with a great toll on the perjurer. Not only will it strike the head of the perjurer, but it will destroy his entire household, his wife and his children. The extension of punishment to wife and children in time is a function of the generational oath’s particular nature as an institution and a form of utterance. Like the Oath of Founders in Cyrene, it is a collective commitment which implicates the entire households of individuals in the statement of the individual father.¹⁴⁰ It activates a totalising logic of absolutes, extermination of descent, and the open-ended temporality of divine action. Its delay goes hand in hand with its weight. The punishment of a man through his household in the logic of the great *horkos* is an expression of the severity of its sanction, as well as the long time of divine gaze. Sanction will be fulfilled in the indefinite future, one day (ποτε). In the eyes of men and gods, the Achaean army is in the right in the perspective of Agamemnon. Troy will fall. But the question of when remains open, allowing the story to unfold.

Idomeneus raises the same themes later on in the book.¹⁴¹ The Trojans have vainly spilled the oaths. From now on, he says, ‘death and woes shall be their lot in future, since they were the first to work violence in defiance of the oaths’. The heavy emphasis on the future sanction of Trojans, with ὀπίσσω and ἔσσετ’, is linked to their past transgression: they were the *first* to commit perjury. Their transgression of the oath, like the initial rape of Helen, is a first offence, something which implicates punishment ‘for us and our children afterwards’ (ὀπίσσω).¹⁴² Like the death of Achilles, the fall of Troy is a recurrent theme of the poem’s allusion to the *telos* of events which lie beyond the scope of its own narrative. The many foreshadowing

¹³⁹ *Il.* 4.160–3. ¹⁴⁰ See pp. 171–4.

¹⁴¹ *Il.* 4.266–71: Ἀτρεΐδῃ, μάλα μὲν τοι ἐγὼν ἐρίηρος | ἑταῖρος ἔσσομαι, ὥς τὸ πρῶτον ὑπέστην καὶ κατένευσα· | ἀλλ’ ἄλλους ὄτρυνε κάρη κομόωντας Ἀχαιοὺς, | ὄφρα τάχιστα μαχώμεθ’, ἐπεὶ σύν γ’ ὄρκι’ ἔχευαν | Τρῶες· τοῖσιν δ’ αὖ θάνατος καὶ κῆδε’ ὀπίσσω | ἔσσετ’, ἐπεὶ πρότεροι ὑπὲρ ὄρκια δηλήσαντο.

¹⁴² *Il.* 3.160. See also 24.17–18, which uses for the rape of Helen the same language used by Agamemnon for the perjury of the Trojans and their expected punishment.

layers of Troy's fall in the narrative, together with the more direct allusions to its future destruction, will continue to mention the lot reserved to wives and children. The slaughter of Troy's children during the sack of the city was an important element of tradition.¹⁴³ In the *Iliad* the figure of Andromache with her child, for instance, can function as a sign of the carnage ahead (ὀπίσσω).¹⁴⁴ In front of his wife and child, Hector repeats the words of Agamemnon announcing the punishment of the Trojans for perjury: 'for well I know this in my head and in my heart, there will be a day when sacred Ilion will be destroyed, and also Priam and the host of Priam of the ashen lance'.¹⁴⁵ The repetition of these lines allows the audience to understand one scene through the other. Through a variety of means, the intrusion of future events in the present of the narrative is repeatedly framed in the poem as punishment for breaking the great oath. The sanction of *horkos* is one visible thread in the order of justice with which the will of Zeus is accomplished. It is the collective, absolute, and open-ended punishment of a generational *ara*. Exhaustive in its scope and delayed in accomplishment, it will be translated to children in time. Hector will not live to see Astyanax being thrown against the walls of Troy, but his own fall at the hands of Achilles already points to the future death of his child. As the son of Priam himself, in turn, he fulfils the generational imprecation that the Trojan king had called upon himself in Book 3. The delay of punishment within the text announces the delay of punishment beyond it. The open and iterative nature of rhapsodic performance allowed for many modes of reference to alternative versions and extra-narrative events. The extended temporality of the oath opened room for a potent play of perspectives in that direction.

Delayed punishment of kin is staged as a pattern of justice in the description of the oath ritual itself, as well as its later reactivation in later passages. It is a recognition of systematic causal order in time. It acts late in the open-ended future. In the Homeric system of divine justice, the generational oath opens an extent of duration which allows the poet both to portray a world of ultimate order and symmetry, as well as to create a narrative space of uncertainty and indeterminacy where everything temporarily becomes possible during the scope of epic action. The inclusion of wives and children in the sanction of the oath's transgression in the *Iliad* is not only an expression of the awesome power of divine punishment, a radical extension of its force, as in the wrath of Artemis against Niobe and

¹⁴³ See e.g. Alc. 298.14 V; Thuc. 7.29.5. ¹⁴⁴ *Il.* 6.450–5; see Graziosi and Haubold 2010: 207–8.

¹⁴⁵ 6.447–9 4.163–5; see n. 126; cf. 4.45–6 and 24.27–8. See Stoevesandt 2008: 144–5.

her children, but also a factor of its delay in time, and of the inescapable link between transgression and punishment in all circumstances. The inclusion of wives and children in the delayed action of divine sanction for perjury is an entirely different idea from the boasts against wives and children by warriors on the battlefield. This ritual formula is predicated on the idea of delay. The sanction of the oath strikes late, but it cannot miss. Under the watchful eye of divine witnesses, it will, one day, catch the perjurer and his children. With the help of Hades and Persephone or the Erinyes under the earth, it will also punish him after death. There is no escaping the power of the oath. Its delay in time, as well as its extension to household and generation, is echoed in its continued force in the afterlife. In the system of social reciprocity of the Homeric world, the oath is the overdetermined guarantee of certain sanction in the case of a breach of conventions. It is the force which can re-establish the balance of failed trust in equal exchange. The mechanism of a zero-sum game of direct reciprocity between transgression and sanction, it brings delayed punishment to children as part of its action against their fathers. It plays a prominent role in Books 3 and 4 and is reflected through different perspectives in later books. This reflection forms an overarching, thematic continuity in the epic.

That being said, the theme of the generational oath plays little more than a minor role in the larger economy of the poem. It never comes back on the centre stage after Book 4. The causal power of the generational oath is not a backbone of the *Iliad* narrative, nor a keystone of its theological apparatus. It exists, in our text of the epic, as another latent theme. The fall of Troy in the *Iliad* ultimately remains a 'tragic' event beyond human understanding. It never becomes something like the straightforward, harsh and just punishment of the Hebrew god for Nineveh or Jerusalem. Beyond rare hints of order, the world of the *Iliad* ultimately remains opaque. Contingency rules the poem.¹⁴⁶ There is no place in the Homeric epic for a direct and clear causal framework in time such as the perjury of Šuppiluliuma in the Hittite *Plague Prayer of Muršili*. After Books 3 and 4 the latent theme of the great oath of the armies plays only secondary roles of foreshadowing and perspective play. It is not a causal armature. Like the oath of Laomedon and the causes of Hera's great wrath, it exists under the narrative, almost outside the poem. The great oath of Book 3 does, however, provide a noticeable line of temporal meaning through the logic of ritual transgression and punishment, and myriad refractions of Troy's imminent fall for the audience. It opens gaps and links between the

¹⁴⁶ See Grethlein 2006b, with bibliography on the controversies surrounding the question.

perceptions of primary and secondary characters. It traces a coherent thread throughout the entire length of the *Iliad*, the hint of a closed ritual order in time which goes against the grain of the poem's obscure order. The echoes of this tension contribute to the great depth of perspective set in motion by the text.

This limited staging of delayed generational punishment remains confined to the semantic sphere of the oath. It is strictly determined by the specific force of the generational *ara* of the oath as a collective, absolute, and open-ended sanction in time; it does not function as a causal system of punishment by itself. In the *Iliad*'s social system of personal reciprocity, the oath involves the entire household in the sanction of *horkos*, not exclusively children as the line of continuity in time, and not further descent. The delay is part of the temporal reach of the oath, but not the essence of the idea behind its sanction. Time is an important element of the passage, but not its determinant characteristic. The main point of the generational oath is still that the punishment of children is an extension of the father's punishment, not a substitution for it. In the face-to-face social economy of Homeric justice, a man can commit his wife and his son to his solemn word, but no more.¹⁴⁷ Ancestral fault there, if we can call it that, is a strictly delimited notion of reciprocity between households. The gods will not punish through generations beyond this context.

The oath of *exōleia* was a familiar institution in archaic Greece, and it has historical antecedents in both Indo-European and Near Eastern traditions.¹⁴⁸ The complex antecedents of the Homeric material should remind us not to treat the *Iliad* as an absolute 'origin' in the history of the idea. The great oath of Books 3 and 4 comes at the end of a long process of cultural transmissions and adaptations, and it is grounded in the shared, common knowledge of immediate reception. The *Iliad* used it as a ritual marker to anchor the drama of the great truce in the institutional imaginary of the audience, and dramatise narrative perspectives on the future. The great oath, however, only appears as a latent theme in later books, a trace of discrete allusions. A mere thread of references, it is written over to the edges of the poem, like the oath of Laomedon in Book 21. There is no place for the guiding line of ancestral fault in the contingent, largely open-ended outlook of the poem. Like the great truce of Book 3 in the story of the text, the stability of ancestral fault functions as an alternative reality of order in the smoke and fury of the *Iliad*, a foil to the progression of the narrative.

¹⁴⁷ Cf. Gherchanoc 1998; Bonnard 2003.

¹⁴⁸ See e.g. M. L. West 1978: 228; 1997: 124–6; Giorgieri 2001; Faraone 2005.

The great oath provided early epic with a powerful institutional framework to structure central narrative interactions between time, causality, and justice. In the monumental poems of Homer and Hesiod, the oath of *exōleia* functions as a binding force of society. Presented as the ultimate act of language linking man to community, the μέγας ὄρκος of epic offers the audience the raw, naked spectacle of the fragile words that lie at the foundation of order. That picture is embedded in a larger thematic nexus of early hexametric poetry. In the *Titanomachia*, for instance, a lost cyclic poem of the seventh or sixth century, the centaur Chiron was shown as having given humans the art of *horkos*.¹⁴⁹ Like sacrifice and 'the forms of the gods', the oath appears here as one of the pillars of civilisation, a defining knowledge of humanity. It is through this knowledge that the tribes of men have originally been led to justice. In the world of order won over conflict depicted in that epic text of primeval battles, the oath is cast as the fundamental condition of life with others. But the mention of *horkos* was often attached to much more sombre associations; the power of the oath was popularly conceived of as a dread and frightful manifestation of divine order in the early Greek world-view. The Erinyes 'under the earth take vengeance on a man who has sworn a false oath', says the poet of the *Iliad* (3.279).¹⁵⁰ Hesiod writes in the *Works and Days* that fifth days are to be avoided as unkindly and terrible, 'for it is on a fifth day, they say, that the Erinyes assisted at the birth of Oath (Horkos), whom Strife (Eris) bore as a bane to perjurers'.¹⁵¹ Earlier in the same poem, we also hear that Horkos runs together with wrong judgment, and in the *Theogony* (226–32) the poet also presents Horkos as the most abhorrent of Strife's many offspring; worse than painful Toil, Forgetfulness, Famine, tearful Sorrows, Fighting, Battles, Murders, Manslaughters, Quarrels, Lying Words, Disputes, Lawlessness, and Ruin, it is Oath 'who most troubles men upon earth when anyone wilfully perjures himself'.¹⁵² That power must be harnessed by Zeus to establish his rule. The allegiance of Styx, daughter of Okeanos and Tethys, to the last cosmic sovereign is one of the cornerstones of the poem's succession narrative. Her children Zēlos and Nikē assure diligence and success to her power. They have been 'brought forth in the house'.¹⁵³ Her children Kratos and Bia, on the other hand, have no house of their own apart from Zeus, 'nor any dwelling nor path

¹⁴⁹ F 11 Bernabé; see Lebedev 1998.

¹⁵⁰ Il. 3.279; cf. 19.260. See Johnston 1992; 1999: 251–64. For an early discussion of the connection between oaths and Erinyes, see already Müller 1835: 159; 189. Cf. Bollack 1958: 13.

¹⁵¹ *Op.* 804. ¹⁵² *Theog.* 226–32. ¹⁵³ *Theog.* 386–8.

except that wherein the god leads them, but they dwell always with Zeus the loud-thunderer . . . They live with him always.¹⁵⁴ Often mentioned in early literature and so memorably represented in the *Prometheus Bound*, Kratos and Bia incarnate the raw power of Olympian compulsion, the imposition of violent constraint that is the ultimate guarantee of Zeus's sovereignty, as he himself so often reminds his brothers and sisters in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. Whereas Kratos and Bia personify the infliction of violence *on* the individual in the maintenance of cosmic order, Styx, 'the great oath of the gods', embodies the self-regulating recourse to this order *by* the individual. In the *Theogony* the oath of Styx is presented as nothing less than the embodiment of the authority conquered by Zeus over preceding and later generations. Through the illocutionary speech-act of the oath, the personal agent links his action to the terrible foundations of the universe. Breaking this vow thus entails transgressing a cosmic boundary, with all the implications this has in terms of cosmic punishment.¹⁵⁵ The disgust inspired by Styx and Horkos is a function of their effective capacity to constrain and hurt the immortals to the quick.

The two main mentions of Styx in the *Theogony* frame the central part of the poem.¹⁵⁶ The first (383–403) is placed before the Hymn to Hecate (411–52) and the birth of Zeus (453–91), thus breaking the chronological sequence of generations that structures the text to offer a vision of the final Olympian cosmos. The second (775–806) describes the course of the dread river in the underworld. Styx flows in Tartarus, in the prison of the Titans. Its home is the primeval chasm of origins, the bottomless place where the former lords of the universe now suffer the yoke of Zeus. Housed on their lofty peak, the young gods of the new order will only swear the dread oath from below with terror. Like Hesiod's Horkos, the Styx of archaic poetry is a πῆμα, a suffering to men and immortals alike. The oath which the gods swear by the river is an object of fear and awe.¹⁵⁷ It is inescapable, even for divinity. The μέγας ὄρκος of the Styx is the common bond of divine community. In the world of Eris governed by Zeus, it is the seam that holds everything together. The divine powers called on as witnesses to the *horkos* of the gods in epic are almost always the same: Heaven, Earth, and Styx – the three areas of the universe.¹⁵⁸

Sanction for perjury is accordingly shown to embody the harshest possible punishment. Styx is 'the strongest and the most awful oath for

¹⁵⁴ *Theog.* 384. ¹⁵⁵ Giordano 1999: 32–5. ¹⁵⁶ See Clay 2003: 132.

¹⁵⁷ See e.g. *Il.* 2.755; Hes. *Theog.* 231–2; Paus. 8.2–3.

¹⁵⁸ E.g. *Il.* 3.274–87; 15.36–7; 19.258–60; *Od.* 5.184–5; *Hymn. Hom. Apoll.* 85–6; see Hirzel 1902: 23–40.

the blessed gods'.¹⁵⁹ Many scenes of archaic epic show the gods themselves swearing the fateful oath on the underworld water, offering to take the oath, or asked by others to take it.¹⁶⁰ The lot of the perjuring deity is imagined on the model of social death.¹⁶¹ The god is extirpated from the company of his fellow divinities and exiled from the group. The rigid sleep that paralyses him for nine 'long years' takes away his wits and his breath. That *kōma* hides the life of the immortal. The shackle of breathless torpor that lays him down is notable for its length. It also points to the gestation cycle necessary for the god to return to life. His reintegration into society will take the form of a veritable rebirth. During the time of unlife, the god cannot partake of nectar and ambrosia, or participate in the assemblies of the gods. In other words, he has, for all purposes, temporarily lost his divine *timai*. The strife that leads to perjury thus generates a cosmic crisis, the withdrawal of a divinity from a system founded on the balanced distribution of honour. The disappearance of a god from the divine assembly is no simple matter. Just like the withdrawal of Demeter or Hephaistos, the exile of the perjurer god creates a situation of unrest in heaven. While in no way a threat to the sovereignty of Zeus, it is a cause of severe instability on Olympus, a sign of the *eris* that still lies at the heart of the world won over the Titans. The divine perjurer is completely separated from the group. That rejection is marked by its severity and its duration. It affects the very balance of the cosmos. In other words, it translates in the divine sphere the same logic found at work in the human μέγας ὄρκος. The great number of parallels between the two spheres is no coincidence.

In the early archaic period, the immediate kin group remained the principal unit of social life. The individual of that period was first and foremost a member of the household. The bond of a community, the bond of an alliance, was essentially conceived of as a union of households. As the pivot of the basic kin unit, the father embodies the essence of authority. He can speak for the group. He can commit the entire household to his word. The father can bind wife and child, property, slaves and animals to a solemn declaration. He can strike the μέγας ὄρκος. The union of households into community rests on the delegation of speech. Just as the father speaks for the *oikos*, the *basileus* can speak for the households of his territory. The 'kings' of Homer and Hesiod do not embody the sovereign

¹⁵⁹ *Il.* 15.37–8; *Od.* 5.185–6; 10.299; Hes. *Theog.* 793–806; *Hymn. Hom. Apoll.* 85–6; *Hymn. Hom. Herm.* 518; Pind. *Ol.* 7.65.

¹⁶⁰ See the references and bibliography in Callaway 1993.

¹⁶¹ *Theog.* 775–806; see still Hirzel 1902: 171–5.

voice of a nation. The sceptre held by the archaic king is a gift of Zeus, in that it consecrated the transmission of strength through generations. 'Nourished by Zeus', the king holds the sceptre from his father as the emblem of his superior might. Soaked in the blood of many Thersites, the royal sceptre embodies the inequality of birth and household. Heirs to the strength of their father, favoured by the gods from whom they descend, some are born more powerful than others. Their ability to command, however, is neither absolute nor entirely coercive. Like that of Zeus, it is based in large part on assent.¹⁶² The sceptre is also the emblem of the king's legitimate right to speak his authority in the *agora*.¹⁶³ That right ultimately rests on the power of the oath. It is through the oath that Achilles leaves the community of the Achaeans, violently throwing the sceptre on the ground, and it is through the oath that Agamemnon will welcome him back.¹⁶⁴ Behind the power of the king, the right of the sceptre, lies the assent of the sworn statement, the right of the adult male to speak for himself and his household. The great oath of *Iliad* 3 is a masterful tableau of the entire Homeric power structure. It brilliantly illustrates the logic of delegation at work from the individual soldier to the great king performing the oath ritual before the entire army. As Agamemnon and Priam proclaim the solemn words for their respective communities, it is each king, each chieftain, each soldier who swears the great oath. The ritual movement of the king channels the delegated voices of each household in the army. Its true power is the statement of *tis*, that is, each father in the army: ὧδε δέ τις εἴπεσκεν Ἀχαιῶν τε Τρώων τε.

The fragile words of assent are protected by the severe sanctions of the oath. Whether the etymology of *horkos* points to *herkos*, enclosure, or to the ritual manipulation of objects designed to symbolise the looming punishment, the oath remains a word defined by the guarantee of a bulwark.¹⁶⁵ In the economy of linguistic exchange of archaic Greek poetry,

¹⁶² Cf. Haubold 2000: 20–4. ¹⁶³ See Bouvier 2002: 273–5.

¹⁶⁴ 1.233–46; 19.249–68, with Edwards 1991: 264–5.

¹⁶⁵ Emile Benveniste ties the etymology of the verb ὀμνύναι to the Sanskrit root *am-* and reconstructs an original meaning of 'to grasp, to solidly hold the sacralizing object' (1969: 166). He rejects the etymological connection between ὄρκος and ἔρκος (see also Leumann 1950: 79–92). 'Ὀρκος, for him, is the 'force of punishment' itself, 'the vengeful power of perjury'. The derivation of the term for the solemn oath statement from the ritual act which codifies it is in fact a common occurrence in IE languages. The English 'oath' and the German 'Eid', for instance, both derive from the PIE *oi-to- through the Germanic **aithaz*; the suffixed o-grade *oi-to- itself derives from the verbal root *ei-, 'to go', a possible reference to the act of walking between the two halves of slaughtered animals which is found in many oath rituals of the IE cultural area (Benveniste 1969: 165; Mallory and Adams 1997: 408–9; see also Hellmann 1931: 202–3; Eitrem 1947; Masson 1950; Kümmel 1967: 151–2; Pritchett 1971: 196–202; Faraone 1993: 71). But this etymology is not universally accepted.

the oath functions as a loan. The word offered by the speaking party is accepted in return for a conditional threat. Sanction must be proleptically presented as a deposit safeguarding the loan. A blessing crowning the truthful word often complements the ‘curse’.¹⁶⁶ The person who swears an oath cannot offer what he does not have to the power of the *ara*. One does not swear by the head of another man, of course, although the possibility probably made for good comic material. The lot of one’s life was the most common stake. For the great oath, however, something more was needed. The speaker’s life was not enough. Everything he owned was not enough. The man who committed to the great oath had to offer everything he had authority over, and ever would. Two forces are at play: severity and time. The entire household of the speaker is involved in the statement. His wife and children, land, animals, slaves, property, absolutely everything is included. The speaker commits the extent of his authority to his word. The lives of all those under his care are his to offer. More, the complete uprooting of continuity is set in motion. The speaker offers not only his children to his word, but the very possibility of survival through time. The aim is total and definitive eradication. The utter destruction of the household is a matter of absolute rejection from the community.

That is the context in which we find the idea of delayed generational punishment in the early archaic period. The institution of the great oath provided the framework for reflection on the temporality of kin and justice. The extension of the sanction to the children of the perjurer, on the one hand, and the broad reach of the *ara* in time, on the other, created a distinctive space for thinking the punishment of children for the faults of their fathers. The earliest Greek expressions of ancestral fault are direct adaptations of the ritual logic of the μέγας ὄρκος. The mechanism of *exōleia*, the extension of punishment to the household activated by the great oath is not in itself an expression of the idea of ancestral fault,

Another school of thought on the etymology of the word ὄρκος, energetically defended by Jean Bollack in particular in a 1958 article, argues that the word actually does come from ἔρκος, enclosure, as the ancient grammarians themselves believed (Bollack 1958; see also Hiersche 1958; Rollant 1979; Torricelli 1981; van den Bruwaene 1981; Lazzeroni 1989). Bollack bases his argument on the morphological trajectory of Rolf Hiersche (1958), as well as on a daring reconstruction of the archaic symbolism of the Styx, which he presents as a cosmic enclosure encircling the world and the word of the solemn oath in its ring. Whatever the ‘original’ meaning of the word might have been, the two fields of reference for the Greek oath explored by Benveniste and Bollack, ritual manipulation and cosmic enclosure, both remained active in the semantics of archaic and classical *horkos* (Lazzeroni 1989). See further Beekes 2010: 1103–4.

¹⁶⁶ See e.g. Watson 1991: 3–4. The most usual formula is εὐορκούντι μὲν μοι πολλὰ ἄγαθ’, ἐπιορκούντι δὲ τὰ κακὰ ἀντὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν (Glotz 1901: 752).

however. Archilochus 172–81 W is a good example of a narrative centred on the μέγας ὄρκος where the destruction of children for the fault of their father is not a form of delayed generational punishment.¹⁶⁷ If the elements of time and transmission are not singled out in the narrative, the punishment of a perjurer's children should not be seen as a manifestation of ancestral fault. That distinction is more than a simple matter of taxonomy or heuristics. Just like the destruction of Niobe's children by Artemis, or the slaying of Bellerophon's sons, the suicide of Lycambes' daughters is first and foremost an expression of absolute severity, the total retribution of extirpation, something fundamentally different from delayed punishment through generations. On the other hand, the great oath of *Iliad* 3, to a certain extent, and *Works and Days*, more clearly, place the generational destruction of the *ara* in a larger temporal frame, in the setting of a reflection on the unfolding of justice in time. The complex narrative architecture of the monumental epics could make full use of the temporal potential of the oath. The oath could be portrayed there as a resonant emblem of divine justice in epic time. It becomes something more, something qualitatively different from the destructive *ara* of *exōleia*. As the only example of delayed generational punishment in the early archaic period, this adaptation of ritual to text constitutes the earliest attestation of ancestral fault in ancient Greek literature. As such, it presents itself to us as the initial link in a long chain of written tradition. In *Iliad* 4 a contrast is made between the immediate and the future punishment of man, wife, and children. In *Works and Days* 280–5, contrary to *Iliad* 4, the emphasis of punishment is placed squarely on the future (μετόπισθεν) of the *geneē*. The principle of ancestral fault which we see at work in late archaic and in classical literature from the time of Solon onwards is impossible to imagine without the type of generational justice attested in the poetry of Hesiod. In the *Works and Days* we can already see the extended temporality of the oath generalised to the conduct of divine justice in time. But we have to wait for the upheavals of the sixth century, texts that express the dissolution of the old aristocratic symbolic order, for the period of the triumphant and monetised *polis*, before we see this notion of justice separated from the direct reciprocity of the oath and made into an armature of justice in time, a systematic principle of punishment through generations. That will be the concern of the next chapter.

¹⁶⁷ See Gagné 2009d.

Sympotic theologies: Alcaeus, Solon, and Theognis

In the early archaic period, the idea of ancestral fault is confined to the realm of the oath in our sources. That is no longer true in the sixth century, where we see it play a much more prominent and varied role, even if the record of this moment in the trajectory of ancestral fault is often frustratingly fragmentary. We have to work with glimpses. The story of the Alcmaeonid ‘curse’ is a good example of the new situation, notwithstanding the fact that we can only catch echoes of it through much later texts.¹ Our main witness is Herodotus 1.61 and 5.70–3. Thucydides’ version (1.126–7) and Plutarch, *Life of Solon* 12 are also of prime importance.² After what seems to have been a failed *coup d’état* in Athens around 630, we are told that the partisans of the powerful aristocrat Cylon, the well-born leader of a *hetaireia*, took refuge at the altar of the *Semnai Theai*.³ They were butchered by the men of another leading aristocrat, Alcmaeon, whose *genos* stood to lose much in the establishment of another man’s tyranny.⁴ The Alcmaeonids remained major players in the power struggles that continued to shake the city in the following generations.⁵ At some point during that time, the idea that the Alcmaeonids had been tainted by sacrilege, that they were polluted, *enageis*, began to circulate in the city.⁶

¹ Thomas 1989: 144–54; 261–81 remains the best discussion of the various written and oral traditions concerning the curse of the Alcmaeonids; see also Moulinier 1946; Jacoby 1949: 366–7; Rhodes 1981: 79–84; Hornblower 1991: 202–10; Lavelle 1991; Nenci 1994: 261–8; Ellis 1994; Samons 1998–9; Johnston 1999: 279–87; V. Parker 2004.

² Add Ar. *Eq.* 445–6; Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 1 and 20.2; Diog. Laert. 1.109–15. See pp. 307–15.

³ For the topography of the events, see Harris-Cline 1999. For the date, see e.g. Piccirilli 1977: 148–53; Lambert 1986; Hornblower 1991: 204–6; Valdés Guía 2002a; cf. Moulinier 1946; Mastrocinque 1978. For archaic *hetaireiai*, see still Calhoun 1913; Ghinatti 1970.

⁴ See e.g. Ellis and Stanton 1968.

⁵ See for instance J. W. Williams 1951; 1952a; 1952b. For a re-examination of the kind of group constituted by the Alcmaeonids, see Agoratsios 2006; cf. Rhodes 1981: 70.

⁶ For the contested etymology, the history and meaning of the notion of ἔργος, its relation to the notion of μίσμος, and its role in the Alcmaeonid tradition, see Chantraine and Masson 1954; Rudhardt 1958 (especially pages 41–8); R. C. T. Parker 1983: 5–12; Burkert 1985a [1977]: 270–1.

It was said that the *genos* was impure, that it was the object of divine wrath, that it was 'held' by the stain of past crimes. This was obviously not an idea shared by everyone in the fragmented world of Athenian factions, as the Alcmaeonids kept the highest possible profile in the city through a good part of the century. Even when they were exiled, they were clearly pure enough for the Delphians who harboured them in their city, and for the Athenians to welcome them back when the Peisistratids fell.⁷ That taint was used as an instrument by the enemies of the Alcmaeonids throughout the sixth and fifth centuries. Ostraka from the Kerameikos, some still unpublished, refer to it.⁸

Conflict with the Peisistratids, the aristocratic family that finally won the tyranny over other Eupatrid families, seems to have been a major driving force behind the continued diffusion of that story. When Peisistratus married the daughter of the powerful Alcmaeonid leader Megacles, Herodotus tells us, he refused to have intercourse with her because he did not want to have further children, and because 'the Alcmaeonids were said to be *enageis*' (1.61).⁹ It was the Peisistratids who later pushed for the Alcmaeonid exile, and they even convinced the Athenians to dig up the graves of the polluted *genos* and ritually cast the bones out of the territory.¹⁰ Herodotus (5.72) mentions the banishment of seven hundred Athenian households (ἐπίστια), a massive figure.¹¹ The idea that the Alcmaeonid line was polluted as a whole remained a rallying point of politics in Athens and outside into the later fifth century and the Peloponnesian War.¹² In a famous elegiac couplet on an ostrakon from the Kerameikos, Xanthippus, the father of Pericles, is described as one of the ἀλειτηροί.¹³ His brother-in-law, Megacles, the brother of his Alcmaeonid wife Agariste, is mentioned as both ἀλειτηρός and Κυλόνε(ι)ος in the Kerameikos ostraka, something that proves once and for all that the

⁷ Cf. R. C. T. Parker 1983: 17: 'In this case, it seems that pollution had soon ceased to be an actual source of religious anxiety, and become instead an inherited disgrace, one factor among others in the general reputation of the family, which enemies would denounce and friends ignore. The explanation here is political, but other factors too could cause concern about pollution to appear spasmodic or unpredictable.'

⁸ Raubitschek 1947; R. C. T. Parker 1983: 270; Siewert 2002: 134–9; cf. Stein-Hölkeskamp 1989: 154–67.

⁹ 1.61: οἷα δὲ παῖδων τέ οἱ ὑπαρχόντων νενηιέων καὶ λεγομένων ἐναγέων εἶναι τῶν Ἀλκμεωνιδέων, οὐ βουλόμενός οἱ γενέσθαι ἐκ τῆς νεογάμου γυναικὸς τέκνα ἐμίσγετό οἱ οὐ κατὰ νόμον.

¹⁰ Hornblower 1991: 210; 224–5; Nenci 1994: 261–8, with references and bibliography; see p. 304.

¹¹ See Nenci 1994: 266–7. ¹² See Hornblower 1991: 202–10.

¹³ Raubitschek 1947; Meiggs and Lewis 1988: 42; Figueira 1986: 261–3; Siewert 2002: 134–9. With Meiggs and Lewis, I take the ἀλειτηρον of the ostrakon as a genitive. For the form ἀλειτηρός, as opposed to ἀλιτήριος, see Raubitschek 1947: 259, n. 12 and Blanc 2003; cf. still Hatch 1908: 157–65.

ἀλειτηρός references point directly to the Cylonian events, and very probably to the *agos*.¹⁴ The same term, it is worth noting, is also found in Thucydides 1.126.11 in relation to the curse of the Alcmaeonids, and in Aristophanes, *Knights* 445–6.¹⁵ The word, which usually connotes a danger to the community, eventually came to be closely linked to the notion of pollution. The *Suda* explains the adjective *alitērios* as: ἀνόσιος, ὁ ἐνεχόμενος μιάσματι καὶ ἐξημαρτηκῶς εἰς θεοῦς. Ἀριστοφάνης Ἰππεῦσιν· ἐκ τῶν ἀλιτηρίων σέ φημι γεγονέναι τῶν τῆς θεοῦ. As R. C. T. Parker writes (1983: 270), it is ‘one of the strongest terms denoting a religious offender’. Being ἐναγεῖς καὶ ἀλιτήριοι was something you could inherit from the crimes of your ancestors over many generations.¹⁶

The belief that the entire city had been polluted by the Cylonian massacre seems to have gained currency early on, and the services of the Cretan purifier Epimenides were reportedly sought to cleanse the *polis*.¹⁷ The ritual specialist Epimenides, often counted as one of the Seven Sages, could have been linked to Solon and his reforms; he certainly was in later tradition.¹⁸ His purification of Athens is alternatively placed around 590 or 500, and there is a very distinct possibility that it took place at another date, or hides an event of a completely different nature, or, perhaps, never took place at all.¹⁹ We have no contemporary references to any of these events, and the stories reflected in our sources are instrumentalizations of traditions that had been circulating in a charged environment of civic conflict for generations.²⁰ What actually happened, and, more importantly here, what people said about it, will continue to escape us. Only the most

¹⁴ 16; Siewert 2002: 104–6; Duplouy 2006: 93–4.

¹⁵ Thuc. 1.126.11: καὶ ἀπὸ τούτου ἐναγεῖς καὶ ἀλιτήριοι τῆς θεοῦ ἐκέينوί τε ἐκαλοῦντο καὶ τὸ γένος τὸ ἀπ’ ἐκείνων; Ar. *Eq.* 445–6: Πά. ἐκ τῶν ἀλιτηρίων σέ φημι γεγονέναι τῶν τῆς θεοῦ; cf. the scholia to the passage. See also Eupolis 103 Kassel–Austin (F 96 Kock); Aeschin. 3.157; Lucian, *Iupp. trag.* 36.

¹⁶ Cf. Hatch 1908: 262: ‘Finally, ἀλιτήριος is used three times in Andocides of a youth who squandered his father’s property in luxurious living. The young man is here thought of as an avenging spirit and his misdeeds as harrowing and harassing the father’s mind. This metaphorical use of ἀλιτήριος is connected with its application to the divinities who seek vengeance upon murderers; but it presupposes a more general use of the word in the sense of *evil spirit* without restriction to the special case of homicide’; see also Saïd 1978: 346–8 and Blanc 2003.

¹⁷ On Epimenides, see M. L. West 1983: 45–53; Strataridaki 1991; Federico and Visconti 2001. See Raubitschek 1947: 261–2, who argues that the term ἀλιτήριοι was probably found in Hellanicus of Lesbos, and that it ‘may have been used by Epimenides’. See p. 317.

¹⁸ Plut. *Solon* 12; Diog. Laert. 112–13; see e.g. Pörtulas 1993–5; Valdés Guía 2004.

¹⁹ Pl. *Leg.* 642d; Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 1; Plut. *Solon* 12; Diog. Laert. 110; see Jacoby 1950: 310–11; 318–20; Dodds 1951: 141–2; M. L. West 1983: 45–7; Federico 2001; Pörtulas 2002; Valdés Guía 2002b. For the possible link between ‘Epimenides’ and the Athenian Bouzyges, see M. L. West 1983: 45–6; Visconti 2001; Valdés Guía 2009.

²⁰ See p. 317.

enthusiastic positivists can claim to believe that we might somehow be able to reconstruct the events of the Cylonian conspiracy and the discourses surrounding the Alcmaeonid pollution through the narratives of Herodotus, Thucydides, and Plutarch. I do not think that the many knots in all these embedded threads can ever be untied. But some important facts do stand out.

First, there can be no doubt that the ritual pollution of the Alcmaeonids became a major political and religious issue sometime in the first half of the sixth century. The agreement of so many independent sources on this central point is clear enough. The fact that this pollution was thought to persist over generations seems unquestionable. The *agos* remained attached to a particular kinship group over more than a century. It was, further, obviously thought to be contagious, dangerous for the city as a whole, and it required major measures of purification, such as the excavation of the Alcmaeonid tombs, or the spectacular ritual services of the international holy man Epimenides. As an *agos*, the pollution threatened the entire community.²¹ The *agos* is something that the *polis* chases out of its borders: ἄγος ἐλαύνειν.²² It is distinct, though not entirely separated, from the divine wrath produced by the sacrilege. With the 'curse' of the Alcmaeonids, we have a striking example of the idea of ancestral fault taking centre stage in the political upheavals of a prominent late archaic city. The enduring force of the pollution brought the threat of punishment on the heads of the transgressor's descendants over many generations. No oath is involved in this sixth-century expression of delayed generational punishment.

It is all the more remarkable to consider that the other main expressions of ancestral fault found in the contemporary record, the texts of Alcaeus, Solon, and Theognis that are discussed in this chapter, do not limit themselves to the semantic field of the oath. Although the echoes and continuities must not be ignored, the difference from the picture found in Homer and Hesiod is notable. In Alcaeus, the idea is tied to the crimes of the Atridae. In Solon, it becomes a regular principle of divine justice. In Theognis, it is essentially framed as a matter of heritage and responsibility. Our three main witnesses all come from the literature of the symposium. Each one presents us with a different facet of the broad significance invested in the notion of delayed generational punishment by the poetic battles of the sixth-century aristocratic banquet.

²¹ Cf. R. C. T. Parker 1983: 10.

²² See e.g. Thuc. 1.126–8; 2.13; cf. Soph. *OT* 97–8.

Alcaeus

The poetry ascribed to Alcaeus, an aristocratic warrior of the great city of Mytilene, belongs to the world of civic conflict that rocked the cities of Lesbos at the end of the seventh and the beginning of the sixth centuries.²³ As the community grew in size and social complexity and the old power bases shifted into new positions, the hereditary elite was engaged in constant conflict for access to rule and privileges. Sometime in the second half of the seventh century, the well-born Eupatrid clans rejected the ruling dynasty of the Pentilid 'kings', who claimed descent from Pentilos, the son of Orestes and Erigone, and the city descended into a protracted period of civic strife between rival aristocratic families.²⁴ United in factions, sworn *hetaireiai* of peers fighting for common success against other factions, the clans strove for supremacy over a progressively more assertive *dēmos* that must have grown impatient with the many bloody episodes of that civic drama, as various actors rose and fell and wove the ideological perspective of their cause in their songs and actions. Alcaeus was a major figure in the violent power struggles of the time.²⁵ The actual details of the political movements of these days will remain forever lost to us, as most, if not all, evidence for them ultimately comes from the poetry of Alcaeus himself, and the illusion of precision displayed by some historians who have worked on this material rests on very shaky ground. That being said, the events that stand out in our fragments give us a certain idea of the political narrative that was presented in the texts. We are told that Alcaeus' brothers had been involved in the overthrow of the tyrant Melanchros, perhaps between 612 and 609.²⁶ He himself further participated in a failed attempt to end the rule of Myrsilos, the Pentilid tyrant who had recovered the power of his family shortly thereafter with the help of other Aristocrats, and he was briefly exiled in consequence.²⁷ He then devoted the rest of his life to unsuccessful struggles against the successors of the Pentilids at the helm of the city. Much of that time seems to have been spent in renewed exile.²⁸

²³ See e.g. Mazzarino 1943; Steffen 1967; N. Spencer 1995; R. Osborne 1996: 189–97.

²⁴ For Pentilos and the Pentilids, see F 75; 302b V; Hellanic. *FGH* 4 F 32; Arist. *Pol.* 1311b; Paus. 2.18.5; 3.2.1; 5.4.3; Strabo 9.2.3; 9.2.5; 13.1.3; schol. Lycoph. 1374; Steph. Byz. s.v. Πενθίλη; see still Page 1955: 149–50; Liberman 1999: xvi–xvii; cf. Delcourt 1998.

²⁵ See still Gallavotti 1948; cf. Liberman 1999: xiv–xxiii; Gentili and Prato 1988–2002, vol. II: 31–41.

²⁶ Diog. Laert. 1.74; cf. F 414 V.; see Liberman 1999: xvi; M. L. West 2003.

²⁷ Myrsilos is named at F 70, 129, and 332 V. In a stimulating article, Dale 2011 argues that Myrsilos is not the name of a separate individual, but the (originally Anatolian) title of a ruling function.

²⁸ See e.g. F 70; 129; 452 V; schol. to F 6 V; Page 1974: no. 267. Mazzarino 1943; Page 1955: 197–208; Liberman 1999: xviii–xxiii.

The poetry of Alcaeus consists mostly of songs intended for performance at the symposium, where the values of the *hetaireia* were projected and confirmed among the assembled peers drinking away the night together, and where the enemies of the group were reviled for their opposition to those values, or the betrayal of their principles.²⁹ The *astoi* of the city fail to understand these codes.³⁰ The symposium sealed the great bonds of camaraderie that lay at the heart of the closed group. Drink and merriment were praised, as well as the joys of love.³¹ The proper codes of distinction required for the acceptable enjoyment of these pleasures were celebrated in tones of high aesthetic elevation. Hymns to the gods placed the gatherings and revelries under the watchful eye of the proper powers above, and justice itself was shown to protect the noble cause of the self-proclaimed ἀγαθοὶ καὶ ἐσθλοὶ in the ideal order of things.³² This liturgy of sympotic friendship required a certain time-depth. It had to postulate continuity over a long period of time, and articulate genealogy accordingly.³³ The common deeds of friends were compared to the models of valour deployed by their fathers and their ancestors, and mythical paradigms were activated to exhort or warn against a course of action. 'Myth' and recent past are inextricably enmeshed in those songs, and Troy itself is never far away. The struggles against dynasts and tyrants and other *hetaireiai* took centre stage in this poetic programme, as the political upheavals of the day reflected the great aspirations and the recurrent frustrations of the friends gathered to share wine and songs. *Monarchia*, the rule of one, is opposed to the ideal of power shared between noble peers.³⁴ Tyranny, the ultimate prize, is the great adversary.³⁵ Every friend can suddenly become an enemy in this struggle within the elite. Blame is one of the tropes of Alcaic verses, and Pittakos is the prime target of this charged invective.³⁶

A powerful member of that aristocratic elite for whom Alcaeus claims to speak, Pittakos became the embodiment of everything Alcaeus opposes

²⁹ The classic study remains Rösler 1980. See also the notable contributions of Rossi 1983; Aloni 1983; Henderson 1999; Liberman 1999: xxiv–xxxi and Nagy 2007, with bibliography.

³⁰ F 43; 348 V; cf. Arist. *Pol.* 1285a–b. ³¹ F 332; 338; 346; 347 V; see Liberman 1999: lvi–lvii.

³² F 344; 346c; 307–10; 384; 386; 449A V; cf. F 325; 327; 354 V; see Page 1955: 244–72; Liberman 1988; 1999: lv–lvi.

³³ See pp. 232–3.

³⁴ The word is first attested in Alcaeus: 6a.27 V; *P.Oxy.* 2734 F 12a.5 SLG S271a.5.

³⁵ 70; 75.13; 76; 306.7; 348.3 V; *P.Oxy.* 2734 F 12a.6 S271a.6 SLG; see Mazzarino 1947: 194; Berve 1967: 91–5; 572–5; de Libero 1996: 314–28; Parker 1998; Lentini 2002; cf. Duploux 2003.

³⁶ Porro 1996 argues that the Pittakos and the Myrsilos poems were collected together in the Aristarchean edition. In addition to the Pittakos poems, see also F 38a; 42; 283; 298 V. On invective in Alcaeus, see e.g. Theander 1952; M. Davies 1985.

in his poetry.³⁷ He had fought together with Alcaeus' brothers against Melanchros and joined forces with the Alcaic *hetaireia* in an attempt to overthrow the Penthilid Myrsilos.³⁸ It seems that Pittakos eventually 'betrayed' the side of his former allies and became a partisan of Myrsilos, perhaps even sharing power with him over Mytilene at some point.³⁹ In any event, he married a daughter of the Penthilid clan and eventually obtained complete power over the city after the death of the tyrant.⁴⁰ Pittakos, according to Aristotle, was elected as *aisymnētēs* by the *dēmos*, an arbitrator charged with restoring order to the city and laying the new legal foundations of life in common for all citizens.⁴¹ Whatever the precise nature of his power, he exercised sole rule for ten years, his hold on the city solidly entrenched in popular support, his legitimacy unaffected by the ineffectual challenges of Alcaeus and his *hetaireia*. What was probably a popular song calls him *basileus* (Page, *PMG* 869).⁴² His legislative activity was key to the establishment of political order in Mytilene following what Strabo called the 'dissensions' (δισσοστάσιαι), and the city remembered him as a father of the constitution.⁴³ Later biographical tradition presents us with an image of Pittakos as one of the Seven Sages, famous for his *gnōmai*.⁴⁴ As the wise reformer who gave Mytilene its fundamental laws, the *aisymnētēs* who put an end to civic strife and the threat of tyranny, he was cast as a foundational lawgiver. Pittakos, in so many ways, is the Solon of Lesbos. But he is also, in fact, the first ruler to have been called a τύραννος in our extant record.⁴⁵ For Alcaeus, he is just another despot, or a mad pretender to the old throne of the Penthilids. Worse, he is the enemy from within, the peer who has abandoned his friends and his group to embrace everything they ever fought against together.⁴⁶ As such, he is portrayed as the absolute foil to friendship, the negative of everything the *hetaireia* celebrated at the symposium. Pittakos takes on the mantle of the

³⁷ See still Schachermeyr 1950; cf. Visconti 2004.

³⁸ Diog. Laert. 1.74; *Suda* s.v. Πιττακός; schol. to Alc. 114 V. For Myrsilos as a Kleanaktid, see schol. to Alc. 112, with Page 1955: 174 and Bauer 1963.

³⁹ F 70; 129 V; see Page 1955: 161–9.

⁴⁰ Diog. Laert. 1.81; see Mazzarino 1943: 67–8; Cf. F 5 V, with Liberman 1999: liv (n. 182) and 23.

⁴¹ Arist. *Pol.* 1274b; 1285a; Diog. Laert. 1.75; Page 1955: 235–40; Romer 1982; Hölkeskamp 1999: 219–26.

⁴² Kakridis 1931 implausibly argued that it refers to another Pittakos, a magical king of the dwarves who lives underground and oversees the mineral riches of the earth.

⁴³ Strabo 13.2.3.

⁴⁴ Pl. *Prt.* 343a; Diod. Sic. 9.11; Strabo 13.2.3; Diog. Laert. 1.75; 77; Plut. *Septem sapientium convivium* 147b *et passim*; cf. Thiel 1938; Wehrli 1973. For the Pittakeia, see Raubitschek 1958. See e.g. von Heintze 1977 for visual representations of Pittakos as a wise man.

⁴⁵ See Dale 2011: 21. ⁴⁶ F 306g; 429 V.

ideal enemy; he is the mirror opposite of the faithful companion. The inversed values of the group are thus projected on him. The invective deployed by Alcaeus against his enemy makes fire out of all wood. It portrays him as the antithesis of the healthy, measured warrior of the aristocratic group, as we can see from this passage of Diogenes Laertius (1.81.4):

τοῦτον Ἀλκαῖος σαράποδα μὲν καὶ σάραπτον ἀποκαλεῖ διὰ τὸ πλατύπουν εἶναι καὶ ἐπισύρειν τὴν πόδε· χειροπόδην δὲ διὰ τὰς ἐν τοῖς ποσὶ ῥαγάδας, ἃς χειράδας ἐκάλουν· γαύρηκα δὲ ὡς εἰκῇ γαυριῶντα· φύσκωνα δὲ καὶ γάστρωνα ὅτι παχὺς ἦν· ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ζοφοδορπίδαν ὡς ἄλυχνον· ἀγασυρτον δὲ ὡς ἐπισεσυρμένον καὶ ῥυπαρόν.

Alcaeus nicknamed him *σαράπους* and *σάραπτος* because he had flat feet and dragged them in walking; also ‘Chillblains’, because he had chapped feet, for which their word was *χειράς*; and Braggadocio, because he was always swaggering; Paunch and Potbelly, because he was stout; a Diner in the Dark, because he dispensed with a lamp, and the Sloven, because he was untidy and dirty (trans. Hicks).

Pittakos is the physical incarnation of the vices against which the valour of the sympotic group is defined.⁴⁷ Every aspect of his being is a source of blame in the *Στασιωτικά*, the ‘Songs of Rebellion’ (Strabo 13.2.3).⁴⁸ The kinship ties of Pittakos, in particular, are cast as prime witnesses of his repulsive nature, and every one of his roles in the web of kin and the lines of descent is darkened by accusations. It is in that context that we find echoes of ancestral fault in Alcaeus.

Alcaeus was famous for insisting on high birth (*εὐγένεια*) as a matter of praise.⁴⁹ In the fragment 6 V, the famous poem of the ship of state, his exhortations to steadfastness urged the *hetaireia* to ‘remember the past’ trials (11: *μνάσθητε τὴν πάροιθα ν[. . .]*).⁵⁰ The new challenges of the day demand the same courage. The ship of state is moving through time; ‘now’ (12: *νῦν*) and ‘then’ (11: *πάροιθα*) are emphatically united as equivalent courses. One wave follows the other (1). The storm of today requires the same skill that steered the ship past the last one. The heirs of revolution have inherited the responsibility of continuity in their struggle against *monarchia* (27). Their generation is now at the helm, and, like their fathers (17: *πατέρων*) before them, they must bring the ship to port. Each one must be *δόκιμος*, that is, steadfast. Dishonour is the sanction of failure (13).

⁴⁷ See for instance Cortina 1994.

⁴⁸ See Theander 1952; Liberman 1999: 1–liv.

⁴⁹ ‘Plut.’ *Nob.* 2 (v 617 Wytténbach) T 25 Campbell.

⁵⁰ See Page 1955: 179–97; Rösler 1980: 126–34.

That shame would fall directly on 'our' noble parents lying under the earth' (14: ἔσλοισ τόκης γὰς ὕπα κειμένους). The continuity of the group's glory, its δόξα, is a matter of survival for the *polis*. The fathers are the witnesses of the struggle, the virtue of the *genos* (26) the measure of worth. Throughout the fragment, the accent is placed on 'we', the collective continuity of the aristocratic group, the shared claim to nobility of birth; the *hetaireia* can speak of its common ancestors in opposition to those of its enemies and inferiors. The language of kinship is the key bond of the group. The movement of the ship at sea is contrasted with the immobility of the tombs that anchor the noble ancestors of the *genos* in the land, and that make the past a lasting monument to inspire the battles of the present. Myrsilos, whose name appears in the margins of the papyrus fragment for verse 31, is the descendant of the enemies against whom the worthy fathers of Alcaeus and his friends had fought.⁵¹ The new struggle repeats the old one. Just like the waves of the storm, the threats to stability reproduce the same forms over time.

Alcaeus talks of 'our fathers' elsewhere (F 394 V: πατέρων ἄμμων), and he knows that we 'learn from (our) fathers' (F 371 V: ἀπ πατέρων μάθος). He longs for his ancestral land, where 'my father and father's father have grown old' (F 130B V).⁵² He sings that only the crest of the noble-born can wound on the battlefield (F 427 V). Contrary to the well-born friends of Alcaeus, who 'constantly brought back his own lineage and that of his whole native city to the ancients', the pedigree of Pittakos is repeatedly put into doubt.⁵³ Pittakos is a κακόπατρις or κακοπατρίδης.⁵⁴ His mother is described disparagingly in fragment 72 V, where we catch glimpses of a symposium gone bad:

...].[
ἐν[...].λα[.]....[
λάβρωσ δὲ συν στεῖ[.]...[.]εἰαπ..
πίμπλεσιν ἀκράτω [...].π' ἀμέρα.[

⁵¹ See also Heraclitus, *Alleg. Hom.* 5 Buffière (Lieberman 1999: 86).

⁵² See also F 339 V.

⁵³ Favorin. *De exil.* 9.2: πολλὸν γὰρ ἐκά[στω ἐγγυτέ]ρω ἐν ἡ αὐτός τις οἰκεῖ ἐν ἡ οἱ πρόγονοι | αὐτοῦ ὥκησαν, τοῖς δ' ἐξ ἐμοῦ γενησομένοις ἡ αὐτὴ αἰτία καὶ | πολὺ δικά[ιοτέρα τῇν] ἐμὴν ἀναγκαίαν ἐνδίαίτησιν πατρίδα | ποιεῖν[...]. φ8[8 ll.]ς ὑπεδέξατο φεύγοντα. τοῦτο ὁ Λέσβιος Ἀλκαῖος λέγει, ὁ [νῆρ περὶ] [γ]ε τὴν πατρίδα φιλοστοργότατος, καί[τοι αἰεὶ ἐς [τ]οὺς ἀρχα[ίους τὸ] αὐτοῦ γένος ἀναφέρων καὶ ὅλης τῆς πατρίδος τῆς ἑαυτοῦ. See Page 1955: 169–79; Gentili 1965: 207. On the questionable pedigree of Pittakos: 67; 68; 72; 75; 76; 106; 148 V. On the contemporary ideology of inherited virtue, see e.g. Stein-Hölkeskamp 1989: 124–7; 134–6; Duplouy 2006: 36–57.

⁵⁴ F 67; 75; 106; 348 V.; the word is also found in Theognis 193. There is no good reason to say that κακόπατρις means 'man without a homeland' (so Cobet in the *New Pauly*); it refers to the pedigree of the man. Following LSJ, I read it as 'base-born'. See Mazzarino 1943: 38–52; Wackernagel 1953: 858–9; 1165; Page 1955: 169–79; Bauer 1963; Kurke 1994: 67–92.

καὶ νύκτι παφλάσδει ...αχθεν,
 ἔνθα νόμος θάμ' ἐν.[.].νην.
 κῆνος δὲ τούτων οὐκ ἐπελάθετο
 ὦνηρ ἐπεὶ δὴ πρῶτον ὀνέτροπε,
 παίσαις γὰρ ὀννώρινε νύκτας,
 τῷ δὲ πίσθω πατάγεσκ' ὁ πύθμην.
 σὺ δὲ τεαύτας ἐκεγόνων ἔχηις
 τὰν δόξαν οἶαν ἄνδρες ἐλεύθεροι
 ἔσλων ἔοντες ἐκ τοκῶν . . .;

... and furious with ... (they) fill (it) with neat wine, which by day and night boils splashed with winedrops (?), where the custom is frequently to ... But that man did not forget these things when first he created a disturbance, for he kept whole nights awake, and the bottom of the jar went on ringing. Do you, the son of such a mother, have the reputation that free men of noble parentage have ...? (trans. Campbell).

The beginning of the song is lost, but there is little doubt that Pittakos is named there, and the symposium scene designed to reflect his origins. It is a symposium that, somehow, involves his mother. The gathering of the poem is a perversion of normal symposium rules. Unmixed wine is drunk, and the festivities last into the day. The measure that characterises the ideal of the feast is lacking. The polite game of *kottabos* is mentioned, where a drop of wine must be shot into the hole of a pot – only it takes the form of unruly splashings in the text. Nothing allows us to positively identify the κῆνος of line 7. It is impossible to say whether he is the father of Pittakos, the father of Pittakos' mother, her unknown lover, or somebody else entirely. There is no convincing reason to believe that the scene of fragment 72 points to Thrace, although that is not impossible.⁵⁵ What is certain is that, in whatever guise, this setting represents an inversion of acceptable sympotic behaviour. It is motivated by a strategy of invective. The sexual imagery of lines 7–11 is transparent. The πυθμήν of line 10 refers to the bottom of a jar on a first, literal level. That is its usual meaning. It is not hard to see how it can be read as a graphic sexual image, 'as (κῆνος) kept whole nights awake, and the bottom of the jar went on ringing'. The exact meanings, and connotations, of the verbs ὀνέτροπε and ὀννώρινε are not entirely clear.⁵⁶ Pittakos' mother is shown as a compromised woman, the promiscuous reveller of unbridled banquets. The conclusion is merciless: 'do you, the son of such a mother, have the reputation (δόξα) that free men of noble parentage have?' The group of

⁵⁵ Cf. the arguments of Page 1955: 172.

⁵⁶ See the political reading proposed by Liberman 1999: 50–1.

the *hetaireia*, engaged in its own polite, aristocratic banquet as it hears the song, exults in the contrast.

Pittakos' father, in turn, was mocked extensively in the songs of Alcaeus. He was possibly portrayed as a Thracian outsider there, although no extant fragment points in that direction.⁵⁷ Based on the information of Douris of Samos (76 F 75 Jacoby) and the *Suda*, the Thracian origin of Pittakos' father is almost universally presented as a historical fact. I believe question marks need to be added to that 'fact'. Pittakos is indeed attested as the name of a Thracian king in Thucydides (4.107), but that Pittakos would not be the only Thracian king with a Greek name. The information of Douris can have only one source, and that is Alcaeus himself. It is hard to imagine how one could take any statement of Alcaic invective against Pittakos as an objective fact. Alcaeus, in his portrayal of Pittakos as a base-born man (κακοπατρίδης), probably presented Pittakos as the son of a Thracian. That in no way means that Pittakos was the son of a Thracian. Whether he was or not is ultimately beside the point. It does matter that such a characterisation probably played a role in Alcaeus' negative portrait of his enemy.

The *Suda* mentions Kaikos as one of the possible names of Pittakos' father.⁵⁸ That name is well attested in Lesbos and in Asia Minor.⁵⁹ Most of our sources, however, are in agreement in presenting his father as Hyrras or Hyrradios.⁶⁰ Again, we have to imagine that the information of these documents ultimately depended on the verses of Alcaeus. Following di Benedetto and Gallavotti, I believe that we do not have to accept them at face value. The names 'Hyrras' or 'Hyrradios' are nowhere attested in the *Lexicon of Greek Personal Names* outside the Pittakos/Alcaeus tradition. The lexicographers, more importantly, knew that 'Hyrradios' could mean obscure, ἄδοξος – that is, the opposite of noble.⁶¹ It might have referred to some infamy transmitted 'from one of the ancestors', or, more directly, to bastardy. In any case, the mention of Pittakos as an ὕρραον παῖδα in

⁵⁷ See Mazzarino 1943: 68–9; Page 1955: 171–4; di Benedetto 1955; Burnett 1983: 112.

⁵⁸ *Suda* s.v. Πιττακός; see Mazzarino 1943: 48. ⁵⁹ Zgusta 1984: § 506; *LGPV* V.A: 235.

⁶⁰ F 129; 298 V; see also 289; 306 Aa7; 383 V, with Dale 2011: 19–21.

⁶¹ Hesych. s.v. ὑρράδιος· ἀπὸ τίνος τῶν προγόνων, ἄδοξος, ἢ εἰκαῖος; cf. s.v. συρράδ(ι)ος· νόθος, μικτός, εἰκαῖος; s.v. ὕραξ· μέγδην· ἀναμίξ; Theogn. C. 2.23,22 s.v. Ὑρράδιος; on the tradition of 'Hyrras' or 'Hyrradios' as the father of Pittakos, see Callim. *Epigr.* 1.2; Diog. Laert. 1.74; Dion. Thrax, *Arts. Gramm.* p. 25.8 Uhlig; Hdn. *Herod. Techn. rel.* 3.2 p. 858.25 Lentz; Prisc. *Inst.* 2.65.16; schol. in Dion. Thrac. (*Gramm. Graec.* III Hilgard) p. 573.13; *Suda* s.v. Πιττακός. Di Benedetto 1955: 103–4 and Gallavotti 1970: 23–6, both argue for an equivalence between ὕρραος and νόθος; cf. Dale 2011: 19–20. Liberman 1999: 221 considers the equivalence implausible, but he unfortunately does not say why.

fragment 129 or as a Ὑρράδ<1>ος in 298 is not necessarily a reference to the name of his father being Hyrras, as later tradition has thought, and is very possibly a derogative term concerning the origin of his birth.

Whatever his name, the father of Pittakos, and probably the father of his father also, are shown in fragment 68 V to have been responsible for grave crimes:

...
 ...[.].[.].[.].[.].[.].[.].
 οὐκ ἄ[.]ταίσει
 πρᾶυ λάβολον πάτερ' ἀγκ[
 κᾶτι τ[ὸ]ν κήνῳ πάτερα[
 τωῦτ[ο.] ὠναίσχυντος ἐπ[
 μι[τ]τος ἄλιτρον.

... will not deceive ... gentle ... father worthy of stoning ... and moreover
his father ... the same ... the shameless man ... wicked hateful object
 (trans. Campbell).

These crimes made Pittakos' father worthy of stoning.⁶² He was a criminal who deserved the most inglorious execution at the hands of the community. Pittakos' grandfather, in turn, was marked by a shamelessness that contrasts with the honour of the sympotic group's ancestors. A true offspring of this corrupted stock, Pittakos is described as μῖσος ἄλιτρον.⁶³ The hatefulness of his person is given a marked religious dimension. The word μῖσος is a particularly strong indication of divine disfavour.⁶⁴ The adjective ἄλιτρός, more significantly, is more generally associated with an offence against the gods. Broger correctly emphasises the connotation of the phrase with his 'gottverhasstes Scheusal'.⁶⁵ The word has the same religious connotation as the cognate ἀλιτήριος. Pittakos is an object of hatred for the gods. Although ἄλιτρον does not *necessarily* involve pollution, either ritual or ethical, it points to a lasting state of wickedness against the gods.⁶⁶ The enmity of Alcaeus and his group reflects the gravity of the transgression embodied by the wretched tyrant. That hatred is grounded in past generations.⁶⁷ The fragmentary commentary on this poem preserved

⁶² This has been compared to the λαβολίῳ of F 298.3 V; see Liberman 1999: 47.

⁶³ See Mazzarino 1943: 69; Pippin Burnett 1983: 200. Cf. F. Ferrari and Pontani 1996.

⁶⁴ See e.g. Aesch. *Ag.* 1411, where it is associated with ἀραί; Soph. *Ant.* 760; *Phil.* 991; cf. Aesch. *Eum.* 73; Soph. *El.* 289.

⁶⁵ Broger 1996: 164; cf. Van Groningen 1966: 148. Campbell translates it as 'wicked hateful object', while Liberman has 'haïssable et néfaste'.

⁶⁶ See the entry in the *LfggrE* and Hatch 1908: 162–5, who reviews ten usages of the term before c. 300 BC; cf. Blanc 2003.

⁶⁷ Cf. Plut. *Solon* 12.2: ἐκ τούτου δὲ κληθέντες ἐναγεῖς ἐμισοῦντο.

in *P.Oxy.* 2307 mentions Pittakos and the family of Myrsilos.⁶⁸ It might allude to the crime of Pittakos in the poem as being his allegiance to the tyrant, the ancestral enemy of the *hetaireia*. Whatever crimes Pittakos himself was shown to have committed in the poem, however, the point of the fragment that has survived is to articulate them with the actions and with the character of his πρόγονοι. It is interesting to note that in Thucydides 1.126 and Aristophanes, *Knights* 445–6, which both refer to the curse of the Alcmaeonids, the state of being ἀλιτῆριος is explicitly presented as something that can be inherited through the generations.⁶⁹ The disgusted reproach that engulfs Pittakos in fragment 68 reflects the continuity of transgression linking him to the previous generations of his line. The crimes of Pittakos continue the transgressions of his fathers. The punishment that will surely find its way to him answers the punishment deserved by kin and activated by his own actions. The responsibility implied by ἄλιτρον makes Pittakos the heir of ancestral faults that stretch back at least two generations and that constitute a heredity of disgust. The fact that the poem ends with the emphatic μ[ι]σος ἄλιτρον places the entire weight of continuity in crime on the shoulders of the tyrant.

There is worse. Pittakos, like the Lycambes of Archilochus (173W), has broken the great oath of aristocratic convention.⁷⁰ The most extensive reference to this event in the poetry of Alcaeus is the famous fragment 129:

[...].ρά.α τόδε Λέσβιοι
 ...]... εὔδειλον τέμενος μέγα
 ξῦνον κά[τε]σσαν ἐν δὲ βώμοις
 ἀθανάτων μακάρων ἔθηκαν
 κάπωνύμασσαν ἀντίαν Δία
 σὲ δ' Αἰολήϊαν [κ]υδαλίμαν θεόν
 πάντων γενέθλαν, τὸν δὲ τέρτον
 τόνδε κεμήλιον ὠνύμασσ[α]ν
 Ζόννυσσον ὠμήσταν. ἄ[γ]ιτ' εὖνοον
 θυμὸν σκέθοντες ἀμμετέρα[ς] ἄρας
 ἀκούσατ', ἐκ δὲ τῶν[δ]ε μόχθων
 ἀργαλέας τε φύγας ῥ[ύ]εσθε·
 τὸν Ὑρραον δὲ πα[ῖ]δα πεδελθέτω
 κήνων Ἐ[ρίν]νυ[ς] ὥς ποτ' ἀπώμνυμεν
 τόμοντες ἄ..[]ν..
 μηδάμα μηδ' ἓνα τῶν ἐταίρων
 ἀλλ' ἢ θάνοντες γὰρ ἐπιέμμενοι
 κείσεσθ' ὑπ' ἀνδρῶν οἱ τότε' ἐπικκ[.]ην

⁶⁸ See Liberman 1999: 106; 209.

⁶⁹ See pp. 309–10.

⁷⁰ See Gagné 2009d.

ἥπειτα κακκτάνοντες αὐτοῖς
 δᾶμον ὑπὲξ ἀχέων ῥύεσθαι.
 κήνων ὁ φύσκων οὐ διελέξατο
 πρὸς θῦμον ἀλλὰ βραϊδίως πόσιν
 ἔ]μβαις ἐπ' ὀρκίοισι δάπτει
 τὰν πόλιν ἄμμι δέξ[.]..[.]ί.αις
 οὐ κὰν νόμον [.]ογ[.]..[.]
 γλαύκας ἀ[.]..[.]..
 γεγρά.[
 Μύρσιλ[ο

... the Lesbians established this great conspicuous precinct to be held in common, and put in it altars of the blessed immortals, and they entitled Zeus God of Suppliants, and you, the Aeolian, Glorious Goddess, Mother of All, and this third they named Kemelios, Dionysus, Eater of Raw Flesh. Come now, with gracious spirit hear our prayer, and rescue us from these hardships and from grievous exile; and let their Avenger pursue the son of Hyrras, since once we swore, cutting ... never (to abandon?) any of our comrades, but either to die at the hands of men who at the time came against us and to lie clothed in earth, or else to kill them and rescue the people from their woes. But Pot Belly did not take to their hearts; he recklessly tramples the oath underfoot and devours our city ... not lawfully ... grey ... written (?) ... Myrsilos ... (trans. Campbell).

I see no good reason to believe that this text was written for recitation at the sanctuary of Messa.⁷¹ The deictic force of τόδε can be conjured in any location. Like the imprecation epodes of Archilochus and Hipponax, this sympotic text of invective channels aggression against the common enemy. It also emphasises the transgression and the punishment of the group's foe, Pittakos, with images of eating: he is called φύσκων, Pot-Belly, a man swollen by his unchecked gluttony, and one who now 'devours' the city – δάπτει τὰν πόλιν – through his crime.⁷² The verb used there, δάπτειν, is usually associated with wild beasts, such as wolves. The crime itself is not portrayed as an attempt to exercise a new form of power over the city more than a breach of the loving solidarity of the banquet, a transgression of the duties of the aristocratic group, and the resulting excesses that came out of it. The triad of the famous sanctuary can be evoked anywhere. The alliance of Pittakos with Alcaeus and his friends was the object of a formal oath sworn on the 'cutting' of an animal sacrifice, a ritual of *horkos*. The participle τόμοντες in this context possibly alludes to the τόμια, the genital

⁷¹ See L. Robert 1960. Cf. Page 1955: 161–9; Rösler 1980: 191–204; Pippin Burnett 1983: 157–62; Meyerhoff 1984: 211–35; Watson 1991: 63–6; Liberman 1999: 61–2; Nagy 2007; Bachvarova 2007.

⁷² See Rosen 1988.

parts of the castrated animal on which the participants of the formal *horkos* could swear the formal oath.⁷³ Like Lycambes and the eagle of the Archilochean epode (172–81 W), like the enemy of the *Strasbourg Epode* (Hipponax 115 W), Pittakos was formerly a *hetairos* of the group of *agathoi* at the banquet.⁷⁴ Like all of them, Pittakos has now broken away from his oath. He ‘recklessly trampled the *horkia* underfoot’. The *persona* of Alcaeus in this poem invokes three gods to assist in the punishment of the perjurer: Zeus of the Suppliants, Aeolian Hera – the Glorious Goddess, the Mother of All – and Dionysus Kemelios, the Eater of Raw Flesh.⁷⁵ The Erinyes of these gods, or of those who have died in the fight, the text is not clear, are to assist in the agency of the imprecation. As in Homer (*Il.* 3.279; 19.260) and Hesiod (*Op.* 804), the Erinyes are linked to the *ara* of the oath, and they function as the agents of destruction visiting the sanctions of the imprecation on the perjurer.⁷⁶ Their action might also have involved the descendants of Pittakos, but there is no trace of this in the extant text. The aristocratic poet speaks as a descendant of those who have established the great common sanctuary of the three gods, and the altars which it holds.

Those who have sworn the oath are the descendants of those who have founded the sanctuary. The altars involved in this oath were those where the ‘cutting’ of the *horkos* sacrifice would have taken place: the three gods invoked are the three witnesses of the oath, the typical triad of the μέγας ὄρκος – possibly the divinities of the ‘epichoric oath’ of Mytilene.⁷⁷ Like the three elements of the oath which has been sworn, and the three gods involved, the *persona* of the poet makes a threefold request, as Anne Pippin Burnett remarked: ‘listen to our prayer; save us from suffering and exile; see to it that the Fury pursues the oath-breaker’, incidentally identified here as an ὕρραον παῖδα.⁷⁸ The ‘prayer’ in the text is named as ‘our’ *arai*. The imprecation which the poet calls upon his enemy by invoking the gods of his fathers is the curse of the oath that the former *hetairos* has

⁷³ Stengel 1910: 80–5; Nilsson 1969 [1944]: 149; Burkert 1985a [1977]: 251; see also the critical remarks of Casabona 1966: 220–7, and Faraone 1993: 68 (n. 37), who both make a hypercritical case *against* the usage of cut genitalia in the oath ceremony. The fact that the usage of severed testicles in oath ceremonies ‘is completely unattested in the better documented Near Eastern sources’ proves absolutely nothing for the Greek material, and the association between τόμα and ἔντομα in the scholiasts and lexicographers identified by Stengel hardly seems like a ‘confusion’, especially in light of the (not entirely problematical) passage found in Dem. 23.68.

⁷⁴ Hipponax 115.15–16 W: ὅς μ’ ἠδίκησε, λ[ι]ξ δ’ ἐπ’ ὀρκίοις ἔβη, | τὸ πρὶν ἑταῖρος [ἐ]ών. On the attribution of the *Strasbourg Epode*, see Watson 1991: 56–62; Giordano 1999: 55–6.

⁷⁵ On the triad Zeus–Hera–Dionysus, see Picard 1946; Bachvarova 2007.

⁷⁶ On the meaning of κήνων, see Liberman 1999: 213–14.

⁷⁷ For references to the ‘epichoric ὄρκος’, see Glotz 1901: 748–50. ⁷⁸ Burnett 1983: 156–63.

broken. It is the plural *arai* of the group involved in the perjury of one of its members. As in the narrative of the epodes of Archilochus and Hipponax, the enemy of the group in the fragment of Alcaeus is identified by perjury, his rejection of the conventions of the oath that defines the gathering of the symposium. Pittakos, the object of the imprecations launched by the poet Alcaeus in this text, is a man who tried to transform the sympotic society from inside. His transgression of the rituals that form this group is the basis of the imprecation that the poet can launch against the former comrade of the symposium. As in the epode of Archilochus, and the Strasbourg poem, it is the power of the *horkos*, and of the divine agents who uphold its sanctity, which justifies the *ara*.

There is little doubt that the great oath sworn by the members of the *conspiratio* involved the full formal apparatus of ritual sanction and punishment of the μέγας ὄρκος. The imprecation κατ' ἐξωλείας was a standard part of that staging of perjury, and a powerful poetic tool of attack against Pittakos' political standing as a dynast. It would be surprising if it had played no part in the text of Alcaeus. It is worth noting that the biographical tradition tells us that Pittakos' brother died without issue, and that his own son was killed.⁷⁹ The children of the tyrant become liable to punishment for the fault of their father, exactly as he had become a μ[ι]σος ἄλιτρον through the transgressions of his forebears (πρόγονοι). This can be made to project time forward, just as fragment 68 opens the past to the view of the audience. An *ara* extended to household and generation would have allowed the poet to develop the severity and temporal depth of the punishment he described in the song. Unfortunately, the other fragments of Alcaeus that mention Pittakos' perjury are similarly lacunose.⁸⁰ The role that the generational imprecation might have played in these poems cannot be reconstructed.

One text that does explicitly show the effect of Pittakos' crimes on others is the long fragment 298 V.⁸¹ The collective danger of sacrilege is the main theme of that text. Seized by madness, paying no heed to the sanctity of sanctuaries, Ajax raped Cassandra at the altar of Athena, and as a consequence the wrath of the goddess fell on the entire Achaean army, wreaking havoc and destruction on the ships as they attempted to sail home.⁸² The sacrilege of Pittakos, the transgression that the poem reads through the crime of Ajax, threatens the same fate on the unsuspecting

⁷⁹ Diog. Laert. 1.81. ⁸⁰ F 167; 306g V.

⁸¹ Page 1955: 283–5; Tarditi 1969; Meyerhoff 1984: 140–55; Pardini 1995.

⁸² See Neblung 1997: 15–17.

city.⁸³ As the counterpart of Ajax, his life is a constant source of danger. Calamity, an *atē*, is suspended over mortals. Only the execution of the transgressor could avert the threat. The theme of the *μ[ί]σος ἄλιτρον* is not far from the image.

Sacrilege at the altar leading to a dreadful menace falling upon the entire community, necessary atonement – the parallels with the contemporary situation of the Alcmaeonid *agos* are worth noting. Probably more significant is the means of execution singled out by Alcaeus as the way to deal with Pittakos. Those who commit injustice must not only lose their lives, they must be disgraced, and that involves putting something heavy on their necks and killing them by stoning. The recurrence of stoning, also found in fragment 68 in relation to Alcaeus' father, is perhaps not a coincidence.⁸⁴ As in fragment 68, moreover, the poem functions by a juxtaposition of times. The distant past of the Trojan War is shown as a direct equivalent of the present. One warns about the other. As the fault of a single man destroyed the Greek fleet, punishment will fall on the city for the crime of the sacrilegious traitor. The failed *nostos* of the Achaeans echoes the exile of the *hetaireia*. Because of his appetite, his uncontrolled desire, the former member of the alliance is the source of common disaster. The mythical past is the paradigm of a looming catastrophe.

An even more direct link between myth and present is made in fragment 70. The text can be quoted in full:

...
 [][]...χ...[
 π.[.]τωι τὰδ' εἶπην ὁδ.υ..[
 ἀθύρει πεδέχων συμποσίω.[
 βάρμος, φιλώνων πεδ' ἄλεμ[άτων
 εὐωχήμενος αὐτοισιν ἔπα[
 κῆνος δὲ παώθεις Ἀτρεΐδα[.]...[
 δαπτέτω πόλιν ὥς καὶ πεδὰ Μυρσί[λ]ω[
 θὰς κ' ἄμμε βόλλητ' Ἄρευσ ἐπιτ.ύχε..[
 τρόπην· ἐκ δὲ χόλω τῷδε λαθοίμεθ..[
 χαλάσσομεν δὲ τὰς θυμοβόρω λύας
 ἐμφύλω τε μάχας, τάν τις Ὀλυμπίων
 ἔνωρσε, δᾶμον μὲν εἰς αὐάταν ᾄγων
 Φιττάκωι δὲ δίδοις κῦδος ἐπὶ ῥ[α]τ[ον].

⁸³ On the correspondence between the actions of Pittakos and Ajax, see Tarditi 1969. The reference to sacrilege found in the margins of F 59 V. in *P. Oxy.* 1360 F 12, ἀν(τι τοῦ) ἱεροσυ[λ], might be related to this fragment or to F 129 V; see Liberman 1999: 99.

⁸⁴ See p. 217. Again, the parallel with the Cylonian story is worth noting, considering how important a role the theme of stoning plays in the Alcmaeonid traditions; see Mastrocinque 1978; Rosivach 1987: 247–8; D. S. Allen 2000: 206.

... to say this ... the lyre, sharing in the banquet, makes merry, feasting with empty braggarts ... them. But let him, married into the family of the Atridae, devour the city as he did in the company of Myrsilos, until Ares is pleased to turn us to arms; and may we forget this anger; and let us relax from the heart eating strife and civil warring, which one of the Olympians has aroused among us, leading the people to ruin, but giving delightful glory to Pittakos (trans. Campbell modified).

These verses do not come from a poem of truce. The text is clearly sarcastic in tone, as evidenced by φιλώνων πεδ' ἄλεμ[άτων] (l. 5) and the verb δαπτέτω (l. 8), for instance.⁸⁵ The 'forgetting of anger' invoked in these verses, echoing the merriment of the sympotic event in which they are performed, can in the end only be the result of final victory over the 'tyrant'.⁸⁶ The emphasis of the passage on the marriage alliance of Pittakos with the Atridae is without a doubt meant to cast the statesman in a dark light.⁸⁷ In the world of the sympotic invectives launched by the *persona* of Alcaeus against his enemy, the actions of Pittakos embody all that is contrary to the aristocratic ethics of camaraderie traced by the poet. In opposition to the group of ἑταῖροι gathered at the Alcaic symposium, Pittakos belongs to a symposium of 'empty braggarts', a 'them' (αὐτοισιν) clearly distinguished from the 'us' (ἄμμε; λαθοίμεθ'; χαλάσσομεν) of the poem's performance community.⁸⁸ The opposition of perverted and ideal symposium is reminiscent of fragment 72 V, although the tone is starker. In fragment 70 V the anti-symposium of bastard tyrants is involved in 'devouring' the city (δαπτέτω πόλιν), an animal appetite of destruction that leads to 'the ruin of the people' (δᾶμον μὲν εἰς αὐάταν ἄγων): *atē*. The savage feast of the enemy is a calamity for all.⁸⁹ As the animals of Hesiod and Archilochus who devour one another (*Op.* 276–8; Archil. 172–81 W), the tyrant consumes the city through 'intestine discords': battles within the tribe. The unmeasured perversion of his banquet is a cannibalistic feast of kin. This is presented as a contrast to the measured commensality and the communal benefactions of the poet's comrades, of course. Pittakos is the potbelly, the one who eats in the dark. The performance context of the poem, the aristocratic banquet, serves as the background against which the enemy's transgression of aggressive eating generates its meaning.

⁸⁵ Pippin Burnett 1983: 173–6. See also Rösler 1980: 165; Stehle 1997: 234–7. Cf. F 129.23 V.

⁸⁶ Rösler 1980: 169; see pp. 210–11.

⁸⁷ See the comments of Rösler 1980: 163 and Stehle 1997: 235. Note *contra* Kurke 1994: 73.

⁸⁸ On the meaning of φιλώνων πεδ' ἄλεμ[άτων], see Liberman 1999: 210.

⁸⁹ Cf. the δάπτει τὰν πόλιν of F. 129 V.

It seems that the marriage of Pittakos was derided elsewhere in the poetry of Alcaeus.⁹⁰ In fragment 70 the acquisition of an Atreid wife is another element in the negative representation of Pittakos as the enemy of the aristocratic *hetaireia*. A noteworthy fact in that regard is that Xanthippos, the father of Pericles, could be described as being one of the ἄλειπτοί in an ostrakon from the Kerameikos because of his marriage to an accursed Alcmaeonid woman, as mentioned at the beginning of this chapter.⁹¹ Instead of acquiring the prestige of a noble line, Pittakos now possesses the stain of an Atreid alliance. That brings to mind Herodotus' story that Peisistratus refused to marry an Alcmaeonid wife so as not to participate in the pollution of their *genos*, a very serious weight to bear as a political leader, as the later examples of Cleisthenes and Pericles can attest.⁹² Peisistratus and Alcaeus are almost exact contemporaries. The fact that Pittakos has 'acquired an Atreid' wife from the Penthilid clan is an element in his characterisation as an enemy of the elite symptotic group's values.

It can be argued that descent from the Atridae was already a source of negative associations at the time of Alcaeus. Just as the symposium of Pittakos and his friends is a reverse image of the true aristocratic gathering embodied by Alcaeus and his comrades, the ancestry of his marriage is a corruption of alliance in true nobility. This fragment portrays descent from the Atridae, in the actual world of the audience, as a form of taint which contrasts with the virtue of a desirable union. The Penthilids, whose family Pittakos has married into, were named after the son of Orestes.⁹³ In fragment 70 this functions as an element of the poet's dark representation of his enemy. Rather than calling Pittakos a Penthilid, linking him to Orestes' innocent son, Alcaeus refers to him as an Atreid, shifting the emphasis on a different ancestor. Rather than portraying the marriage in the traditional language of aristocratic honour, he points to its destructive

⁹⁰ See e.g. F 5 V. The trouble incurred by the lawgiver because of this marriage became a theme of the wisdom tradition attached to him; see e.g. Diog. Laert. 1.80. On the meaning of παῶθεις, see Page 1955: 236.

⁹¹ Raubitschek 1947: 259–60; Meiggs and Lewis 1969: 42; Figueira 1986: 262; Duplouy 2006: 93–4; see p. 207.

⁹² See pp. 306–7.

⁹³ Strabo 13.1.3; Paus. 2.18.6; schol. to Alc. 70.2 (where Πένθιλον is a supplement, however); cf. Sappho 17 V, where τὰν ἀράτων does not necessarily refer to a prayer. That poem is unfortunately too fragmentary to contribute much of value to the present discussion, but the close association between ἀρά and Ἀτ[ρείδαι] in a contemporary Lesbian text does deserve mention. On the Penthilids, see p. 210. For an example of a family still claiming descent from the Atridae in early Hellenistic Cyprus, see *ABSA* 56 (1961) 9.16 (late fourth–early third century BC): πρόγονοι δ' ὀνομαστοὶ ἀπ' [ἀρχ]ῆς ἔκγονοι Ἀτρειδᾶν Ἑλλάδος ἀγεμόνων.

power for the entire community. Through its orchestration of theme and language, the poet directs our attention to the negatively charged, dangerous aspects of his enemy's marriage. Pittakos probably married into the Penthilids with the idea of political advantage. Alcaeus strategically turned this on its head and reframed the symbolic value of an ancient line as a weakness and a threat.

The negative associations attached to Atreid descent in the poem derive in all probability from the mythical events and the crimes represented by the family of Tantalus.⁹⁴ It is interesting to speculate that the poem might even have played on the homonymy of the tyrant Myrsilos with his namesake Myrtilus in the legends of the Pelopid cycle, the charioteer whose actions are at the centre stage in later narrations of the causes behind the 'ancestral curse' of the Atridae.⁹⁵ The fact that the Penthilids are identified as Atridae and not, say, Pelopids or Pleisthenids, is also notable and potentially significant. The reference to Atreus is immediately followed by the image of Pittakos eating the city in an unholy feast. Could that have functioned as an allusion to the feast of Thyestes? The question is worth asking, but it cannot be answered. Whatever the case, the mention of the Atridae in fragment 70 of Alcaeus is another possible hint of ancestral fault in archaic melic poetry.

The ancestry of Pittakos' bride is an element of invective in the poem of Alcaeus. It is more than possible that this negative connotation referred to the ancestral woes of the Atridae. What the agency of this ancestral fault would have been in fragment 70, however, whether it was portrayed as transmission through a 'curse', pollution, wrath, or some form of heredity, or as the result of any specific agency for that matter, cannot be determined with the present state of the text. The fragment, at any rate, might very well be the oldest extant witness to the connection between a great House of myth and the idea of ancestral fault. The fact is that before Aeschylus, no extant text directly mentions the idea of hereditary calamity falling upon the descendants of Pelops or Labdacus, as we will see in Chapters

⁹⁴ The fact that the Atreid in the fragment is the wife of Pittakos seems to argue against the idea of a Homeric echo pointing to the conflict of Agamemnon and Achilles, as Lentini 2000 suggests; cf. also Lentini 2002. Cf. another possible reference to Atridae in F 401 M Liberman (*inc. auc.* 27 LP).

⁹⁵ The first attestation of the role of Myrtilus in the tale of Pelops is found in the work of 'Pherecydes': 3 F 37 *FGH* F 37 Fowler; see also Soph. *El.* 509; Eur. *Or.* 992; 1548; Pl. *Crat.* 395c; cf. Triantis 1992; Gantz 1993: 541–3; Finglass 2007: 247–8. It might be relevant to note that the character of Myrtilus is not only one of the central figures associated with the 'curse' of the Atridae, but also the main agent of the marriage between Pelops and Hippodameia, a fitting parallel to the theme of the poem. For the different attestations of the name Myrsilos and its cognates in and around Lesbos and Anatolia, see Bremmer 2008: 317, and the impressive collection of evidence gathered in Dale 2011.

6 and 7.⁹⁶ One piece of evidence that has, so far, not played its role in this discussion is the fragment 70 V of Alcaeus. The text opens the possibility that the story of hereditary/contagious Atreid misfortune was already current in the time of Alcaeus. Its *terminus ante quem* in the poetic tradition would thus be anterior to the end of the seventh century, indicating that it might have had a part to play in some lost epic poem(s) circulating at the time. It could, in any case, be seen as an active element of the web of myth shared by the aristocratic *hetaireia* of the Mytilenean poet. The poem of Alcaeus is, in this reading, an example of a creative engagement with an idea that was already in place, although one that was clearly not shared by all. The sustained attack of Alcaeus against the kinship ties of his enemy found ideal fodder in the Atreid stain. The paradigmatic value of myth becomes a concrete presence through genealogy and a source of danger through invective. This is a direct parallel to the precisely contemporary significance of the Alcmaeonid *agos* in Athens. The most prominent extant expression of ancestral fault from that period, however, belongs to Solon.

Solon

Solon of Athens is also a contemporary of the Lesbian Alcaeus. Archon in 594/3, he orchestrated a profound restructuring of Athenian laws.⁹⁷ A powerful figure from the noble Eupatrid class, he fought the stranglehold of his fellow aristocrats on land ownership and the control of the civic institutions and thoroughly transformed the nature of political participation in Athens. Through his laws on debt, inheritance, trade, and bondage he broke the back of hereditary privilege.⁹⁸ Solon's legislative reforms opened a share of the city to those who were not 'well-born' and laid the groundwork for the constitution of later archaic Athens as a community of citizens with equal rights. Later tradition saw him as the father of traditional law and the ancestor of Athenian democracy.⁹⁹ Like Epimenides and Pittakos, with whom he came to embody the figure of the wise, pre-democratic legislative reformer in Greek cultural memory, Solon was cast as one of the Seven Sages.¹⁰⁰ Like other hallowed men of that group, he

⁹⁶ See pp. 347–9.

⁹⁷ See Ruschenbusch 1966; Martina 1968; Oliva 1988; Scafuro 2006; Noussia-Fantuzzi 2010: 19–44.

⁹⁸ See Foxhall 1997; Lape 2003.

⁹⁹ See, for instance, Nawratil 1942; Mossé 1978; 1979; M. H. Hansen 1989; Szegedy-Maszak 1993; Domínguez Monedero 2001; Gehrke 2006; Bakola 2008; Fantuzzi 2010.

¹⁰⁰ References and bibliography in Noussia-Fantuzzi 2010: 9–17; for the Seven Sages at the symposium, cf. Gagné (forthcoming c).

was also a voice of wisdom poetry. Through the few poems and the many fragments of his verses that have come down to us, we can see the clear lines of an ideological programme and the aspirations of an agenda of social reform.¹⁰¹ Ownership of land, debt, servitude, and inheritance are inextricably linked in the Solonian social project.¹⁰² Solon's poetry is an integral part of his political programme. It grounds the acts in thought. The *persona* of the wise legislator and the song of the poet merge into one another.¹⁰³ Considering the importance of heredity in Solon's fight against aristocratic privilege, it comes as no surprise to find it as an important theme of his poetry. Ancestral fault, in fact, plays a prominent role in his masterpiece, the *Elegy to the Muses*.¹⁰⁴

The elegy is seventy-six lines long, the longest extant piece of archaic Greek poetry, after Semonides' seventh fragment, to have come down to us outside the hexameter traditions.¹⁰⁵ It was one of the most influential poems of the later archaic period on later antiquity.¹⁰⁶ Apart from line 34, the received text, transmitted through a citation of Stobaeus, is in fairly good condition.¹⁰⁷ The passage with which we are concerned, lines 25–32, divides the poem in two:

τοιαύτη Ζηνὸς πέλεται τίσις· οὐδ' ἐφ' ἐκάστῳ
 ὥσπερ θνητὸς ἀνὴρ γίγνεται δόρυχολος,
 αἰεὶ δ' οὐ ἐλέηθε διαμπερές, ὅστις ἀλιτρών
 θυμὸν ἔχει, πάντως δ' ἐς τέλος ἐξεφάνη·
 ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν αὐτίκ' ἔτεισεν, ὁ δ' ὕστερον· οἱ δὲ φύγωσιν
 αὐτοί, μὴδὲ θεῶν μοῖρ' ἐπιούσα κίχῃ,
 ἦλυθε πάντως αὐτίς· ἀνάτιοι ἔργα τίνουσιν
 ἢ παῖδες τούτων ἢ γένος ἐξοπίσω

¹⁰¹ Irwin 2005. ¹⁰² See for instance Cassolà 1964 and 1973 and Stehle 2006.

¹⁰³ Oliva 1988; Martin 2006.

¹⁰⁴ The bibliography on the *Elegy to the Muses* is massive. I single out the following titles for their particular relevance to the discussion of this chapter: Wilamowitz-Möllendorff 1913: 257–75; Reinhardt 1916; Linforth 1919; Perrotta 1924; Jaeger 1966 [1926]; Römisch 1933; Maddalena 1942; Vlastos 1946; Lattimore 1947; A. W. Allen 1949; Masaracchia 1956; Büchner 1959; Hamilton 1977; Spira 1981; Maurach 1983; Roisman 1984; Eisenberger 1984; Christes 1986; Poetscher 1987; Manuwal 1989; Nesselrath 1992; Loeffler 1993; Anhalt 1993; Noussia 2001a: 187–222 and Noussia-Fantuzzi 2010: 127–202; Stoddard 2002; Mülke 2002; Almeida 2003; Irwin 2005: 165–9; Lewis 2006: 78–82. Versnel 2011: 201–12 offers a particularly stimulating challenge to the old debates of scholarship on the text (see n. 160).

¹⁰⁵ We have no reason to believe it is not complete; see Mülke 2002: 232; Stoddard 2002: 150.

¹⁰⁶ See e.g. Radici Colace 1989; Crates of Thebes' parody of the elegy's proem (*Suppl. Hell.* 359) is a particularly interesting example of this reception; cf. Noussia-Fantuzzi 2010: 139–40. Considering the prominence of the *Elegy to the Muses* in the literary horizon of the classical and Hellenistic periods, the surface has just been scratched by scholarship on the question.

¹⁰⁷ For line 34, see Noussia-Fantuzzi 2010: 169.

Such is the vengeance of Zeus. He is not, like a mortal man, quick to anger at every deed. But one who has a sinful heart never escapes the notice of Zeus, for in the end, without fail, he is revealed. One man pays his due at once, another later. And those who themselves flee and escape the pursuing destiny from the gods, for them vengeance always comes at some other time, without fail: then the innocent pay the penalty – either the children of the guilty, or later progeny (trans. Gerber).

These lines articulate the two main parts of the elegy. The first part, the beginning of the poem, starts with an invocation to the Muses: ‘Resplendent daughters of Memory and Olympian Zeus, Pierian Muses, hearken to my prayer!’¹⁰⁸ The locutor, speaking in the first person singular, asks the goddesses for felicity (*olbos*) from the blessed gods and a noble reputation from all men.¹⁰⁹ After further demanding to be bitter to his enemies and sweet to his friends (v. 5), he also expresses a wish for material wealth and then moves on to assert that wealth which is unjustly acquired is a source of inevitable punishment (vv. 3–13). Wealth that is given by the gods remains steadfast in time, ‘secure from the lowest foundation to the top’, but the wealth acquired through violence will bring the inescapable vengeance of Zeus, a *tisis*, which is compared to a spark that grows into a raging fire, or the violent spring wind that chases the clouds of winter (vv. 9–24). ‘Such is the vengeance of Zeus’ (τοιαύτη Ζηνὸς πέλεται τίσις), says the poet, and he proceeds to describe the principle of ancestral fault: Greek gods take their time. A man may escape punishment himself, but in the end, even after his death, punishment will come to strike his children or his later descendants.

With verse 33 the poem takes a different turn.¹¹⁰ In this clearly demarcated second part of the elegy, the locutor, who is now speaking in the first person plural, evokes the empty hopes of men and portrays their futile desire to always change their condition (13.37–43 W):

¹⁰⁸ 13.1–2 W: Μνημοσύνης καὶ Ζηνὸς Ὀλυμπίου ἀγλαὰ τέκνα, | Μοῦσαι Πιερίδες, κλυτὲ μοι ἔυχόμενῳ. For this prayer to the Muses as a typical invocation at the aristocratic symposium, see Bowra 1938: 91; Anhalt 1993: 19; Mülke 2002: 240–1. Wilamowitz-Möllendorff 1913: 263 and Römisch 1933: 44–7 see it as a formulaic piece of tradition. For the links of this invocation to Hesiod’s *Theogony*, see Harriot 1969: 48; Matthiessen 1994: 401; Blaise 2005: 36–8; Noussia-Fantuzzi 2010: 130–1.

¹⁰⁹ See De Heer 1969: 32–8. On the all-important distinction between ὄλβος, χρήματα, πλοῦτος, and κέρδεα in the poem, see Noussia-Fantuzzi 2010: 144–6, with references and bibliography. On the ethics of helping friends and harming enemies alluded to here, see e.g. Blundell 1989: 26–59.

¹¹⁰ This is a fact often remarked on in scholarship on the poem. Note Römisch 1933: 27–37; Nesselrath 1992; Anhalt 1993; Noussia 2006: 152–4; Noussia-Fantuzzi 2010: 133 and 166–8; Versnel 2011: 201–12, with extensive bibliography; see n. 143.

χῶστις μὲν νοῦσοισιν ὑπ' ἀργαλέησι πιεσθῆ
 ὡς ὑγιῆς ἔσται, τοῦτο κατεφράσατο·
 ἄλλος δειλὸς ἑὼν ἀγαθὸς δοκεῖ ἔμμεναι ἀνὴρ,
 καὶ καλὸς μορφὴν οὐ χαρίεσσαν ἔχων·
 εἰ δέ τις ἀχρήμων, πενίης δέ μιν ἔργα βιᾶται,
 κτήσασθαι πάντως χρήματα πολλὰ δοκεῖ.
 σπεύδει δ' ἄλλοθεν ἄλλος·

Whoever is oppressed by grievous sickness believes that he will be healthy. Another man of low estate thinks that it's high and that he is handsome, though his form is without beauty. If someone is lacking means and is constrained by the effects of poverty, he thinks that he will assuredly acquire more money. Everyone has a different pursuit (trans. Gerber).

He follows with a picturesque description of the attempts of various professions to make gains or to ward off evil – the seaman and the peasant with his curved plough; the craftsman and the poet, who has received the gifts of the Muses and ‘knows the measure of desirable knowledge’; the seer of Apollo and the healer of Paean with his medicine, φάρμακα (vv. 43–62). All end up failing miserably. Fate, *Moira*, gives good and bad alike to all men; and there is no escaping the gifts of the gods, for no one knows what is ahead. The just man can suffer and fall into ruin, the unjust prospers: it is all the same. There is no limit to the desire for wealth. And ruin takes all.

How does this all fit together? The problem of the poem's ‘unity’ has been a central question of scholarship ever since the nineteenth century.¹¹¹ There are two voices in the poem, one for each half of the elegy: the ‘I’ of the poet (vv. 2; 3; 8) in the first half, and a collective ‘We’ (vv. 33; 36; 72) in the second part. Each voice expresses a thoroughly distinct portrait of justice. On the one hand, the ruin of verse 13, *atē*, is portrayed as a just divine punishment, while the ruin of verse 75, *atē* again, seemingly appears

¹¹¹ See, for instance, the formulation of Colesanti 2003, with bibliography. Note Linforth 1919; Perrotta 1924: 256–60; Jaeger 1966 [1926]; Puccioni 1957: 118. A variation on this is to say that the lack of coherence of the text is a reflection of a primitive mind, a product of archaic, paratactic style, or of the dynamics of oral composition. See for instance Wilamowitz-Möllendorf 1913: 265; Linforth 1919: 105–8; H. Fraenkel 1924: 70–4; Lattimore 1947 and A. W. Allen 1949 (who can be seen as precursors of Versnel); Van Groningen 1958: 94–7; and Vetta 1999: 93. Versnel 2011: 201–12 rightly remarks, as part of a more general polemic against the ‘philological craft’, that scholars of the poem have tended to fall in one of two camps: either criticising the poem for its incoherence and lack of unity, or bringing all its parts together by all means, however unlikely sometimes, in analytical agreement. His own solution is predicated on the idea that the poem, the product of ‘gradual shifts in the train of thought during the process of composition’ (p. 206), as opposed to a ‘holistic, preconceived composition’, is able to accommodate seemingly incompatible statements in ‘peaceful coexistence’.

as arbitrary, purely random chance. That is a fundamental problem for understanding the meaning of ancestral fault in our text. In the first half of the poem, verses 1–32, distributive punishment awaits for every crime in a clearly ordered sequence of symmetry. Zeus will have his vengeance. The rules of justice are harsh, but immutable; πάντως ὕστερον ἦλθε δίκη, says the poet.¹¹² In the second part of the text, however, verses 33–76, we see a world of contingency, inscrutable chance holding sway. All men, with their mouths agape in expectation, are fooled by empty hopes. There is danger in every action, and no man can know where any beginning will lead in the end – whether one is righteous in his doings or not.¹¹³ *Atē* literally takes hold of a man and brings him down without warning. The passage that concerns ancestral fault is placed precisely at the juncture between the two parts of the poem. The ‘I’ voice of the poet ends with this passage before the collective voice starts its tale of despair. Making sense of the fundamental contradiction between the two voices of the poem is a precondition for understanding the role of ancestral fault in the text.

The *Elegy to the Muses* is a symptotic poem.¹¹⁴ To appreciate the elegy’s virtuoso engagement with the archaic conventions of poetic form and meaning, we have to replace the text in the semantic register of its nominal performance context. There are numerous echoes of symptotic imagery in the text. The sentence of lines 9–10, for instance, usually translated as something like ‘wealth which the gods give remains secure from the lowest foundation to the top’ (Gerber), can also read, from a symptotic perspective: ‘the wealth which the gods give continually *attends* a man, *from the bottom of the cup to its lip*’.¹¹⁵ The primary, unmarked meaning of πυθμήν

¹¹² Line 8: ‘Retribution assuredly comes afterwards.’ See Gagarin 1974b and Noussia-Fantuzzi 2010: 148–9 on the connotations of δίκη in the poem.

¹¹³ 13.74–6 W; I take the αὐτῶν of v. 75 as referring to κέρδεα; see Maurach 1983: 25; Nesselrath 1992: 94–7; Sicking 1998 [1984]: 7–18; Mülke 2002: 327–8; Irwin 2006: 60–1; Noussia-Fantuzzi 2010: 201–2.

¹¹⁴ See Biellolahwek 1940: 27–30; M. L. West 1974: 14; Spira 1981: 187; Loeffler 1993: 33; Mülke 2002: 240–1; Irwin 2005: 32–3; 199–220; cf. Vetta 1983: xvii–xix; Bowie 1986: 18–21; Rosen 1988; Melissano 1994; Noussia 2001b; Stehle 2006; Blaise 2006.

¹¹⁵ 13.9–10 W: πλοῦτον δ’ ὃν μὲν δῶσι θεοί, παραγίγνεται ἀνδρὶ | ἔμπεδος ἐκ νεύτου πυθμένος ἐς κορυφήν. The term πυθμήν has a notoriously wide range of related meanings. As Hesychius defines it, the word means: τὸ ὑποκάτω τῆς λεκάνης, καὶ παντὸς σκεύους. γένεσις, ἀρχή, ῥίζα. καὶ τῆς μήτρας τὸ ἄνω μέρος. καὶ ἀριθμὸς τις παρὰ τοῖς γεωμετρικοῖς. There have been many discussions concerning the precise meaning of this passage: e.g. Wilamowitz-Möllendorff 1913: 259; Linforth 1919: 165; Massa Positano 1947: 30–2; Solmsen 1949: 107; Masarrachia 1958: 209–10; M. L. West 1974: 77; Mülke 2002: 255–9. This is a potential sense that does not question ‘the traditional meaning of πυθμήν as “bottom of the sea”’, as Noussia-Fantuzzi 2010: 151, but functions as a possible, additional level of reference in performance. I do not translate line 10 as ‘from the bottom of the cup to its lip’ but say that this is one of the ways in which the line can be read. That reading does not exclude other, more literal ones. It is a level of meaning that acquires a special sense in a

refers to the bottom of a cup. The performance context of the poem is given a precise reference in the imagery and used as a marker of added significance. The offensive violence of the next line, *hybris*, can in turn be read as a technical term for lack of distinction and unruly behaviour at the banquet in sympotic literature.¹¹⁶ Over-drinking and general shameful behaviour, breaking the rules of the banquet, is conventionally referred to as a lack of κόσμος, a phrase that we find in the same line.¹¹⁷ The transgressor of the following verse is punished by an unhealthy *mixing* of *atē* (13), an image that can recall the various ways of mixing wine at the symposium.¹¹⁸ The astounding simile of punishment that comes after this, finally, shows Zeus shaking the πυθμήν of the sea (v. 20). The πυθμήν of the image, mentioned here for the second time in the passage, refers not only to the bottom of the sea, as commentators have struggled to explain, but also, again, to the bottom of a cup, its primary, unmarked meaning in archaic diction.¹¹⁹ When Zeus ‘shakes the bottom of the unruly, infertile sea’, he is shaking the cup of sympotic wealth: he is spilling the sea out of its cup. Through this metalepsis, the rich play of allusion to the sympotic environment of the poem generates a complementary frame of meaning. The Muses of the invocation preside not only over the acquisition and the loss of wealth in the poem, but over the proceedings of a banquet. The poet portrays himself and his intended audience as the members of a group at the symposium.

The *persona* of Solon speaks as the voice of the civic ‘common ground’ between *kakoi* and *agathoi*, of the legislator who dictates the ‘middling’ values of the city, the ethics of modesty, tolerance, and cooperation, to the

sympotic setting. The metaphorical usage of κορυφή has a very broad semantic range, obviously, as the limited selection of LSJ shows, and the noun is indeed found in descriptions of sympotic vessels (e.g. Critias 7 B4). I fail to understand how that sense would ‘remain hidden’ when, for instance, a performer could refer to a πυθμήν while holding a πυθμήν in hand; cf. pp. 233–4. For a discussion of the many self-referential allusions to cups in sympotic literature, see Gagné (forthcoming c).

¹¹⁶ 13.11–13 W: ὃν δ’ ἄνδρες τιμῶσιν ὑφ’ ὕβριος, οὐ κατὰ κόσμον | ἔρχεται, ἀλλ’ ἀδίκους ἐργασίαι πειθόμενος οὐκ ἐθέλων ἔπεται, ταχέως δ’ ἀναμίσγεται ἄτη; see Seng 1988; cf. O. Murray 1990c; Fisher 2000.

¹¹⁷ 13.11 W; see Casevitz 1989; Bron 2002.

¹¹⁸ I agree that West’s dative ἄτη, by placing more emphasis on the dangers of wealth, is preferable to the nominative adopted by Gentili and Prato; see Noussia-Fantuzzi 2010: 153–4. On *atē* in Solon, see Roisman 1984. Cf. Säid 1978: 75–96.

¹¹⁹ 13.16–22 W: οὐ γὰρ δὴ <ν> θνητοῖς ὕβριος ἔργα πέλει, | ἀλλὰ Ζεὺς πάντων ἐφορᾷ τέλος, ἐξαπίνης δὲ | ὥστ’ ἀνεμος νεφέλας αἶψα διεσκέδασεν | ἥρινός, ὃς πόντου πολυκύμονος ἀτρογέτοιο | **πυθμένα κινήσας**, γῆν κάτω πυροφόρον | δηώσας καλὰ ἔργα θεῶν ἔδος αἰπὺν ἰκάνει | οὐρανόν, αἰθήρην δ’ αὖτις ἔθηκεν ἰδεῖν, | λάμπει δ’ ἡελίοιο μένος κατὰ πῖονα γαῖαν | καλὸν, ἀτὰρ νεφέων οὐδ’ ἐν ἔτ’ ἐστὶν ἰδεῖν; cf. M. L. West 1974: 77; Mülke 2002: 258–9; Noussia-Fantuzzi 2010: 159–60.

aristocratic symposium.¹²⁰ The poem frames itself as the song of the lawgiver addressing his peers from within their most privileged space, the banquet. In the process, it redefines the nature of that group as one element integrated into the shared values of the larger city.¹²¹ The symposium, in fact, becomes a space for the deployment of a cosmic imagery of justice for all. Grounded in the civic ideology of social cohesion between noble and commoner, Solon's poetry became the expression of an ideal common ground.¹²² As a dialogue with elite privilege from the new civic order, it has to bring truth ἐς μέσον, 'to the middle'.¹²³ To do so, the poetry of Solon portrays the aristocratic symposium as a setting for the expression of a conflict of values, an opposition of perspectives. The voice of Solon, contrary to the conventions of elegy, often dramatises its relationship with the voice of the group as one of conflict and opposition.¹²⁴ As a Pittakos answering Alcaeus, Solon can speak the words of a powerful aristocrat addressing his peers from above at the banquet of privilege.¹²⁵ He does so by subverting the traditional language of aristocratic friendship poetry to serve his portrayal of common justice in the city. An example of this tension can be seen in the deployment of the theme of memory in the poem.¹²⁶

In the ideology of φιλότης normally found in the aristocratic symposium, the theme of shared memory is of marked importance in defining the nature of the group.¹²⁷ The memory through which the elegiac poet binds the group is the mark of his authority. This authority to hold and to transmit the memory of the collective aristocratic 'We' is conventionally built in elegy through emphatic self-referential statements, where the poetic 'I' dramatises his acquisition of knowledge.¹²⁸ The personal memory of old age can be invoked, for instance, or wide travels through land and sea.¹²⁹ But the main source of the poet's knowledge remains the Muse. The Muse of elegy, however, contrary to the Muse of epic, does not speak through the poet; the singer is not a channel of direct divine vision.¹³⁰

¹²⁰ 13.33 W: θνητοὶ δ' ὥδε νο<έο>μεν ὁμῶς ἀγαθὸς τε κακὸς τε; see Noussia-Fantuzzi 2010: 189–90.

¹²¹ For the ideological stance of Solonic poetry, and the interaction of the Solonic voice with aristocratic values, see Irwin 2006 and Stehle 2006, with bibliography. For the interaction between the voice of Solon the poet and his biographical tradition as a statesman, see Lardinois 2006. For later engagements with the ethics of his poetry, see Soni 2011.

¹²² See Almeida 2003.

¹²³ e.g. Solon 10 W: δειξεῖ δὴ μανίην μὲν ἐμὴν βαιὸς χρόνος ἀστοῖς, | δειξεῖ ἀληθείης ἐς μέσον ἐρχομένης. See Loraux 1984.

¹²⁴ See Stehle 2006; Blaise 2006; Irwin 2006. ¹²⁵ Melissano 1994. ¹²⁶ See Anhalt 1993.

¹²⁷ Bielohlawek 1940; Muñoz Valle 1975; 1977; Donlan 1985; Levine 1985; Rösler 1990; Melissano 1994; Fitzgerald 1997; cf. Gagné 2009: 27–31.

¹²⁸ See Jarcho 1990; Slings 2000. ¹²⁹ See e.g. Xenophanes 8 DK. ¹³⁰ See Ford 1985.

In the words of one scholar, ‘the memory of elegy has been desacralized’.¹³¹ In elegy, the poet is a skilled craftsman who has reached the ‘measure of wisdom’, the μέτρον σοφίης.¹³² The elegiac poet is a sage. But he is not a poet to advise at the king’s court, he is a comrade at the banquet and his memory is useful to the group. The truth of his verses, its *alētheia*, is essentially a function of the contract between poet and audience.¹³³ Instead of recreating events from far away before the audience in full epic vividness, he evokes the past in terms of its immediate social relevance.¹³⁴ He places the group in dialogue with its past through exhortation and direct address. That poet does not know the language of the gods as Homer or Hesiod did. Rather, through his memory, he brings back echoes of divine knowledge to the world of men in order to make them remember the right path, the deeds of their ancestors, and to inspire their virtue, their ἀρετή.¹³⁵

It is no coincidence that the first word of the *Elegy to the Muses* is Μνημοσύνης, ‘Memory’.¹³⁶ The word is programmatic. Mnemosyne, the mother of the Muses, plays a role in the text comparable to that of her consort Zeus, the overseer of justice. The invocation to the Muses shows us the *persona* of the locutor-poet defining his character and his authority.¹³⁷ The poem is placed at once in the realm of elegiac memory, and the first-person voice of the poet is characterised as the privileged receptacle of this memory through his prayer. The opening voice of the text brings attention to itself with two emphatic personal pronouns in lines 2 and 3, and two finite verbs in lines 7 and 8.¹³⁸ Furthermore, this first voice is initially framed as a conventional sympotic call for exclusive, aristocratic group cohesion: at lines 5–6 it expresses the conventional desire to be sweet to friends and respected by them, and bitter and dreadful to enemies. This is a typical expression of aristocratic reciprocity between poet and audience in sympotic

¹³¹ Edmunds 1985; cf. Garzya 1988.

¹³² Pigres 1 W; Theognis 873–6; 769–72; 13.51–2 W; see Nagy 1985; Noussia-Fantuzzi 2010: 184–5.

¹³³ Minnertus of Colophon 8 W: ἀληθείη δὲ παρέστω | σοὶ καὶ ἔμοι, πάντων χρῆμα δικαιοτάτων; Solon 10 W. See Rösler 1990.

¹³⁴ Bielohlawek 1940; Donlan 1985; Bowie 1986.

¹³⁵ Muñoz Valle 1977; Karageorgos 1979; Nagy 1982.

¹³⁶ See Mülke 2002: 244; cf. Notopoulos 1938; Snell 1964; Rösler 1990.

¹³⁷ See Noussia-Fantuzzi 2010: 142, with references.

¹³⁸ 13.1–8 W: Μνημοσύνης καὶ Ζηνὸς Ὀλυμπίου ἀγλαὰ τέκνα, | Μοῦσαι Πιερίδες, κλυτὲ μοι εὐχομένω | ἄλβον μοι πρὸς θεῶν μακάρων δότε, καὶ πρὸς ἀπάντων | ἀνθρώπων αἰεὶ δόξαν ἔχειν ἀγαθὴν· | εἶναι δὲ γλυκύν ὥδε φίλοις, ἐχθροῖσι δὲ πικρὸν, | τοῖσι μὲν αἰδοῖον, τοῖσι δὲ δεινὸν ἰδεῖν. | χρήματα δ’ ἱμείρω μὲν ἔχειν, ἀδίκως δὲ πεπᾶσθαι | οὐκ ἐθέλω· πάντως ὕστερον ἦλθε δίκη.

literature.¹³⁹ The poet is defining his voice and his authority in the expected terms of symptotic convention.¹⁴⁰ But the text does not follow with the expected morals of elegy on greed, the deeds of the ancestors, or the group's shared memory. Solon has a different memory in mind. Instead, the poem launches into an extended 'objective' third-person description of the universal principles of justice that govern time. Time is retribution. The cycles of divine justice move beyond the scope of individual human life, but the poet's memory can perceive their shape. It lays the principles of divine time before our eyes, the slow wheels of a universal ordered law of divine retribution that move beyond our grasp. Through the eyes of the poet we glimpse the rules of the world. But Zeus is the only one to 'see the end of all things'. Or rather, he 'oversees' them.¹⁴¹ Only Zeus, the consort of Memory, does not forget.¹⁴²

At line 33 the privileged voice of the poet gives way to the voice of the group: *we* think, *we* rejoice, and so forth.¹⁴³ This narrative shift follows a straightforward pattern of ABABA ring composition. In the *Elegy to the Muses*, the second half of the text covers the same ground and reflects the same object as the first half, but through a different voice, and a different lens. With the narrative shift of line 33, a first-person plural voice directly addresses us. Instead of the *mnēmosynē* of the poet, the knowledge of the collective 'We' is defined by the verb *noeomen*, 'we think'. In addition to the opposition between individual and group voice, the poem contrasts *mnēmosynē* with *noos*. This emphatic tension between the two terms in the poem is significant. When they are used together, the semantic range of the words formed on the lexical roots *men-*, like *mnēmosynē*, and *no-*, like *noeomen*, or *noos*, can function as two elements of a complementary relationship. Egbert Bakker, for instance, argues that the *men-* words in the diction of Greek epic, when they refer to the memory of the poet and the performer, are used to summon the mythical past into existence and give it immediate presence; in opposition, the *no-* words, when they point

¹³⁹ See M. L. West 1974: 14; Spira 1981: 187; Loeffler 1993: 33; Fitzgerald 1997; Stehle 2006; Noussia-Fantuzzi 2010: 147.

¹⁴⁰ See Stehle 2006; Blaise 2006; Irwin 2006. ¹⁴¹ 13.17 W: ἀλλὰ Ζεὺς πάντων ἐφορᾷ τέλος.

¹⁴² Cf. 13.27 W: αἰεὶ δ' οὐ ἐλέηθη διαμπερές.

¹⁴³ 13.33–6 W: θνητοὶ δ' ὥδε νοέομεν ὁμῶς ἀγαθὸς τε κακὸς τε, | εὐ ρεῖν ἦν αὐτὸς δόξαν ἕκαστος ἔχει, | πρίν τι παθεῖν· τότε δ' αὖτις ὀδύρεται· ἄχρι δὲ τούτου | χάσκοντες κούφαις ἐλπίσι τερπόμεθα. See Nesselrath 1992: 98; Loeffler 1993: 26–7. This is hard to reconcile with Lewis' otherwise fascinating reading of the poem (2006: 96–107), with its emphasis on the second part of the elegy as a translation of the pessimism of the individual, which he sees opposed to the measured order of the *polis* as a community expressed in the first half of the poem. This is just not what we have in the text. That being said, I fully agree with his assessment that the poem 'shows us a more reflective and philosophical Solon than we find in most of his other verses'.

to the thought of audience and characters, refer to the perception and understanding of this otherworldly reality. He describes them as ‘the two sides of one and the same coin’ (2005b: 150). *Mnēmosynē*, in this model, summons this invisible world from beyond and enacts it here and now, while *noos* receives and perceives it.¹⁴⁴ Both are opposed to forgetfulness, *lēthē*, and can open paths to *alētheia*. In the poetic ideology of early Greek verse, in the words of Vernant, the person who has *noos* knows how to ‘decipher the invisible’.¹⁴⁵ There is a conventional contract of memory and vision between poet and audience. Solon writes over and against it.

In the *Elegy to the Muses* the ‘I’ voice of the poet in line 1 possesses *mnēmosynē*, and his thought reaches all the way to the divine principle of justice. But the *noos* of men at line 33, the group’s perception of the world, is unable to grasp anything beyond mere appearances, beyond *doxa*.¹⁴⁶ It is not able to reach the absence of forgetfulness (*lēthē*) presented in the first half of the poem. The *noos* of the group is unable to decipher the invisible, a conventional problem in the Solonic tradition which we find elsewhere in the poetry of the legislator.¹⁴⁷ In the second part of the *Elegy to the Muses*, we rejoice in false hopes until we suffer, and then we weep. Everyone imagines, *δοκεῖ*, that he can change his condition by acquiring something better.¹⁴⁸ But the truth is more brutal. The vengeance of Zeus falls unexpected on base and noble alike. The *noos* of the group in the *Elegy to the Muses* is cut off from the realm of memory. Like Achilles in the *Iliad*, who mentions the goods and evils distributed to men by gods as indistinguishable and contingent, a tradition alluded to in our text, and like the petty humans mentioned by Zeus at the beginning of the *Odyssey*, whose short-sightedness blinds them to the consequences of their actions and the larger patterns of justice, the ‘We’ group of the poem’s second part is unable to see the laws of divine retribution which the ‘I’ of the poet had set

¹⁴⁴ Bakker 2005b: 136–53. Cf. von Fritz 1943 and 1945.

¹⁴⁵ Vernant 1965b [1959]: 115; cf. Nagy 1982.

¹⁴⁶ 13.33–42 W: θνητοὶ δ’ ὧδε νοούμεν ὁμῶς ἀγαθὸς τε κακὸς τε, | εὖ ρεῖν ἦν αὐτὸς δόξαν ἕκαστος ἔχει, | πρὶν τι παθεῖν· τότε δ’ αὖτις ὀδύρεται· ἄχρι δὲ τούτου | χάσκοντες κούφαις ἐλπίσι τερπόμεθα. | χῶστις μὲν νοούσι· ὑπ’ ἀργαλέῃσι πιεσθῇ | ὥς ὕγιής ἐσται, τοῦτο κατεφράσατο· | ἄλλος δειλὸς ἑὼν ἀγαθὸς δοκεῖ ἔμμεναι ἀνὴρ, | καὶ καλὸς μορφὴν οὐ χαρίεσσαν ἔχων· | εἰ δέ τις ἀχρήμων, πενήτης δὲ μιν ἔργα βιάται, | κτήσασθαι πάντως χρήματα πολλὰ δοκεῖ. This emphasis is certainly part of the reason why the poem was called ὑποθήκη εἰς ἑαυτὸν in antiquity (see Diog. Laert. 1.61). Massa Positano 1947: 19–24 and Lewis 2006: 78–82 offer readings of the poem strongly focused on the individual, something that explains their difficulty with the second half of the elegy. Cf. Semonides 1 W and its emphasis on the blind hopes of νοῦς.

¹⁴⁷ 16 W: γνωμοσύνης δ’ ἀφανὲς χαλεπώτατόν ἐστι νοῆσαι | μέτρον, ὃ δὴ πάντων πείρατα μῶνον ἔχει.

¹⁴⁸ 13.39; 42 W.

down before them in the first.¹⁴⁹ There is no dialogue between the *noos* of the group and the *mnēmosynē* of the poet in this elegy.

The apparent discrepancy between the two halves of the poem is a question of narrative perspective.¹⁵⁰ The *Elegy to the Muses* does not depict a world of arbitrary chance and contingency, as some have said. It is only in its second half that the poem stages the sole perspective of contingency, the perspective of men described by Zeus in *Odyssey* 1. The group of the second half of the poem does not possess the memory to see the causes behind the actions of the gods. The first half of the poem, on the other hand, portrays a just, but harsh and immutable order. Through a narrative shift of ring composition, verse 33 goes back to the beginning of the poem and covers roughly the same ground as the initial half, but from a different standpoint. Cognition is thematised by the opposition between the poet's *mnēmosynē* and the group's *noos*. Instead of the divine memory of the poet, we see the world's failed justice through the eyes of the group's failed *noos*. The second part of the poem portrays a predicament of the human condition, the incapacity of mortal perception to locate its actions in time, to place the present in relation to past and future – a traditional concern of archaic Greek poetry of justice. At the very end of the poem, ruin, *atē*, is said to be revealed when Zeus wishes to extract his vengeance.¹⁵¹ This ruin brings us back to the beginning of the poem, and is, from a different perspective, the direct equivalent of the ancestral fault at the end of the poem's first half.¹⁵²

The verb usually translated as 'revealed', ἀναφαίνεται, means more precisely 'reappear', and this verb can be used to describe rivers and streams that flow underground and spring back up.¹⁵³ This *atē* of line 74 is far from arbitrary, it has a spring and an underground course in time – a course that remains invisible to the limited *noos* of men until it reappears to sight. However, *we* have now been shown, through the *mnēmosynē* and the knowledge of the poet, the law that governs this continuity in time. This is a law that the short-sighted *noos* of men, in direct contrast to the unforgetting mind of Zeus, is unable to understand, but the poet gives

¹⁴⁹ *Il.* 24.527–33; *Od.* 1.32–4. See further Anhalt 1993: 37–40; 56.

¹⁵⁰ See the positions of Manuwald 1989, Loeffler 1993, and especially Nesselrath 1992 on this question; cf. n. 143.

¹⁵¹ 13.75–6 W: κέρδεά τοι θνητοῖς ὥπασαν ἀθάνατοι, | ἅτη δ' ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀναφαίνεται, ἦν ὁπότε Ζεὺς | πέμψη τεισομένην, ἄλλοτε ἄλλος ἔχει. See Römisch 1933; Maurach 1983; Roisman 1984; Mülke 2002: 320–9; Noussia-Fantuzzi 2010: 196–202.

¹⁵² Cf. Stoddard's 2002 'ironic' reading of the poem's first half, especially her statement at p. 159 that the mention of ancestral fault as a mechanism of justice in the first half of the poem is actually meant to represent a voice contradicted by 'Solon'.

¹⁵³ e.g. *Hdt.* 4.195; 6.76; 7.30; 7.198; see Adrados 1965.

us the key to unlock its meaning in the first half of the poem – and emphatically so at the centre of the text, in lines 25–32.

At the end of the elegy the poet aggressively turns himself to the audience with three direct forms of address to engage the attention of the group and convey his wisdom to us with an emphatic repetition of the particle of address *τοί*.¹⁵⁴ The audience, addressed for the first time in the ‘latch’ at the end of the poem, is the nominal sympotic group.¹⁵⁵ The three *τοί* at the close of the text bring attention to the theme of *moira*, the extension of the poem’s principle to all things, and the notion of gain (*κέρδεα*), the theme of wealth acquisition, which brings us back to the beginning of the text.¹⁵⁶ These addresses put special emphasis on the dangers of ambition and boasting. They engage us to be more directly involved with this part of the text. The *atē* that reappears out of nowhere at the end of the poem, with so much emphasis placed on the cognition of the audience, is a reactivation of the principle of ancestral fault. It is an echo of the wrath of Zeus gathering the clouds out of a clear blue sky. The *ἀναφαίνεται* of line 75 creates a link with the *ἐξεφάνη* of line 28, where we are told that the culpable heart of the culprit is always revealed in the end, even in his children. The *atē* of line 76 is the same *atē* as the one of line 13, the *atē* of vengeance for the crimes of ancestors.¹⁵⁷ It is only presented from a different point of focalisation: the memory of the poet in the first case, the *noos* of the group in the other. The difference between the two is the expression of a change in the narrative perspective of the poem.¹⁵⁸ It should also be observed that, whereas the *atē* of line 13 is shown as the unavoidable consequence of the crime itself, that of line 75 appears as the eventual effect of its punishment, which can occur long after its initial cause.¹⁵⁹ The ‘desacralised memory’ of the elegiac poet has brought back echoes of divine knowledge to the world of men: it is by reading the second half of the poem through the first half that one can make sense of the text. With lines 75–6, the end of the poem’s second half meets the end of the beginning of the first and closes the loop. The problematisation of

¹⁵⁴ 13.63–6 W: Μοῖρα δέ *τοί* θνητοῖσι κακὸν φέρει ἡδὲ καὶ ἐσθλόν, | δῶρα δ’ ἄφυκτα θεῶν γίγνεται ἀθανάτων. | πᾶσι δέ *τοί* κίνδυνος ἐπ’ ἔργμασιν, οὐδέ τις οἶδεν | πῇ μέλλει σχήσειν χρήματος ἀρχομένου; 13.74–6 W: κέρδεά *τοί* θνητοῖς ὥπασαν ἀθάνατοι, | ἀτὴ δ’ ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀναφαίνεται, ἣν ὁπότε Ζεὺς | πέμψῃ τεισομένην, ἄλλοτε ἄλλος ἔχει.

¹⁵⁵ For a definition of latch in ring compositions, see Douglas 2007: 43

¹⁵⁶ See e.g. A. W. Allen 1949: 61–5; Loeffler 1993; Mülke 2002: 312; Stoddard 2002: 158–9.

¹⁵⁷ A point clearly made in Dalfen 1974; cf. Masaracchia 1958; Eisenberger 1984; Christes 1986; Poetscher 1987.

¹⁵⁸ See already Wilamowitz-Möllendorff 1913: 265; Römisch 1933: 10–13.

¹⁵⁹ Cf. A. W. Allen 1949: 60.

perspective in representing ancestral fault as an efficient pattern of divine action in human affairs is one of the most striking characteristics of Solon's poem. It draws on the traditional focalisation of justice found throughout early Greek poetry but makes creative and formal thematic use of it in its presentation of the patterns of justice in the poem. This was to remain a major concern for all later representations of ancestral fault in Greek literature, especially tragedy; as the text of Herodotus shows us, it was a concern that remained attached in the fifth century to the name of Solon.¹⁶⁰

The theme of ancestral fault is the fundamental element which holds the two halves of the poetic ring composition of the elegy together.¹⁶¹ Lines 25–32 are at the very centre of the poem. In the overarching architecture of the text, the principle of ancestral fault is what unites the two halves of the *Elegy to the Muses*. In the words of Mary Douglas, 'the centre of a polished ring integrates the whole'.¹⁶² The elegy is in many ways a message on human perspective before change and disaster. The emphatic placement of the idea of ancestral fault at the core of the ring was designed to provoke its audience as much as it still disturbs us. This passage is what allows us to

¹⁶⁰ See pp. 325–38. I disagree with Versnel's assessment (2011: 201–12) that there are no 'corroborative hints' in the poem pointing to the separation between the two parts of the elegy, or that it is 'entirely devoid of formal conjunctive or disjunctive signals or allusions'. The transition from the singular to the plural is a clear enough signpost of change inscribed in the text, something that could be made to stand out particularly well in performance, and there is nothing progressive about the change of meaning between the first and the second part of the poem; the separation between 1–32 and 33–76 is not a 'gradual shift in the train of thought' of the author during the process of creation. It is abrupt, and it contrasts one view of divine action with another, fundamentally divergent one. The syntactical juxtaposition of one after the other points to the obvious contradiction between the two. The differences are marked at the beginning of the second section and reaffirmed at the end of the poem, the closing of the ring, which is defined by evident similarities with the beginning of the text, and a complete, antithetical opposition to it. It restates the same problem and offers an entirely different solution. The structure of the elegy is simple, clear, and elegant. In a poem largely centred on the nature and the limits of human perspective, it stages a clash of difference, pitting one perspective against another; a kind of double construction parallel with what we see in Theognis 731–52, for instance (see pp. 267–73) and so much of Greek literature in general. It offers a variation on the theme of perspective divergences so common in Greek poetry from the *Odyssey* (1.32–4) onwards. The two views of divine justice do not peacefully coexist, they collide with each other. The opposition between perspectives is inscribed in the structure of the text, a part of the core meaning of the elegy. The *Elegy to the Muses* is not, I believe, the equivalent of a statement made *sur le vif* (after a tragic accident, for instance), or a document that translates the (very real) ability of one individual or society to hold multiple, conflicting beliefs at different moments or even at the same time. It is a polished, highly wrought piece of high poetry, a very deliberately crafted product of poetic meditation.

¹⁶¹ Cf. Versnel 2011: 205: 'The penalty executed on an innocent posterity as mentioned in line 31f. self-evidently evokes the inference that nobody, neither the guilty nor the innocent, can be sure about his own future. As such these lines may be regarded as both the poem's pivoting point and the lifebuoy of its coherence.'

¹⁶² Douglas 2007: 32.

make sense of the poem as a whole, together with its abrupt shift in perspective. It is also what makes the poem such a distinctive conceptualisation of justice. Werner Jaeger was right when he described Solon's justice poetry as 'a completely new structure of man's relationship to reality'.¹⁶³ But this distinctive conceptual innovation can no longer be seen as the product of one heroic mind. More can be gained by reading it as an expression of the new thought frontiers of the triumphant *polis*, whose language Solon so clearly speaks in his laws and his poems. The *Elegy to the Muses* proposes nothing less than a redefinition of wealth transmission for the *polis*, one of the central concerns of archaic wisdom literature, such as Hesiod's *Works and Days*. From a conceptual perspective, the principle of ancestral fault distinguishes the poem's portrayal of justice as a radical innovation. It organises the distribution of justice in time as a regular pattern of symmetry. Justice is modelled on the seasons and the seasons are modelled on vengeance. In lines 17–24 the water of winter that escapes from the sea and crosses the barriers of elements to become a cloud in the sky is punished by the vengeance of Zeus, who sends the wind of spring to the bottom of the sea in order to bring back the water below, to where it belongs, and thus clear the sky.¹⁶⁴ The wind ravages the rich fields in the process, but it allows the sun to shine again, αὖτις, on the fertile land (v. 31). The wheat destroyed by the winds in the simile *is* in some way the offspring of the clouds, but Zeus destroys it altogether in his punishment of the elements. It is no more responsible than the children of the wicked for the transgression: both are perfectly innocent, ἀνείτιοι. And that is precisely the point – the cycle of the seasons follows regular patterns of cause and effect with a time of their own, every event being conditioned by earlier action. Man is submitted to the inhuman rules of a divinely ordered cosmos. Justice is not a question of intent; it is a matter of order and perspective. Punishment does not involve will or conscience in any way.

The elegy of Solon is thoroughly grounded in the work of Hesiod. Note for instance the echoes of *Works and Days* 320–5 in the first half of the poem, or compare *Works and Days* 217–18 to line 28. Contrary to what we see in *Works and Days* 280–5, however, where intent is the fundamental consideration, the theme of divine wrath is entirely depersonalised in Solon's mechanism of retribution in time.¹⁶⁵ It no longer corresponds to

¹⁶³ Jaeger 1966 [1926]. ¹⁶⁴ 13.17–24 W. See Mülke 2002: 267–78; Noussia-Fantuzzi 2010: 156–62.

¹⁶⁵ The tendency of scholars to minimise the differences between Solon and Hesiod, which largely followed on the work of Lloyd-Jones 1983 and Havelock 1978, has now given way to a new appreciation of Solonic specificities; cf. Almeida 2003; Irwin 2005; 2006; Stehle 2006; Blaise 2006.

the personal wrath of a broken reciprocity, the anger of an individual slighted by another. It rather functions as a symbol of the divine protection of symmetry and order in the regular rhythms of the cosmos. This is a radical break with what we can observe in the earlier record. Unlike the reflection of the Homeric oath formula in *Iliad* 4, which emphasised the synchronic, horizontal totality of punishment $\sigma\upsilon\nu$ $\sigma\phi\eta\sigma\iota\nu$ $\kappa\epsilon\phi\alpha\lambda\eta\sigma\iota$ $\gamma\upsilon\nu\alpha\iota\zeta\iota$ $\tau\epsilon$ $\kappa\alpha\iota$ $\tau\epsilon\kappa\acute{\epsilon}\epsilon\sigma\sigma\iota\nu$ ('with their own heads and their wives and their children') at some inevitable moment, or the concentration of perjury's effect on the *geneē* in the *Works and Days*, which strictly emphasises the extension of punishment to descent in the future, Solon's point is built on the idea that one punishment has the same value as the other, whether it takes place now or later, even across generations. In Solon, children receive the weight of divine vengeance in time *in the place* of their parents, not in extension to it. This vicarious punishment is conceived of as being of equal value to the punishment which would have been meted out on the actual transgressor – it functions as a token of equivalence. It is explicitly framed as an expression of the inevitability of divine sanction in time, not of the overwhelming force of its blow when it falls. The important element of distinction here is the figure of time. In Solon, the wrath of Zeus is defined by its different temporality from that of men, and its equation with the regular rhythms of nature. From our perspective, it can appear to be slow, but it always reaches its end, and it functions precisely as a *tisis* against the breach of symmetry.¹⁶⁶ When something crosses a boundary it triggers a counter-movement that will come back in time. In the *Elegy to the Muses* everything that moves is either a transgression or a punishment; only the gifts of the gods and their high seat in heaven stay put.¹⁶⁷ To this flow in space corresponds the flow of time that ultimately puts everything back in its place at some point. When the wind of Zeus has done its work, there is not a cloud to be seen in the sky and the sea is calm again. This regular movement of time as the enactment of balance and justice, as natural law, is an idea that we can observe simultaneously take shape in Asia Minor during the same period; notably and most famously in Anaximander, of course.¹⁶⁸ Both can be seen, in part, as an imposition on the world of the spirit of the written law codes that were, at this time, first being set in wood and stone throughout the

¹⁶⁶ For the referent of $\acute{\epsilon}\phi'$ $\acute{\epsilon}\kappa\acute{\alpha}\sigma\tau\omega\iota$ in line 25, see Mülke 2002: 278 and Noussia-Fantuzzi 2010: 162–3.

¹⁶⁷ See Mülke 2002: 239, comparing the system of retribution in the *Elegy to the Muses* to the rest of Solon's poetry.

¹⁶⁸ Anaximander 1 DK (Simp. *In Phys.* 24, 17); see Masaracchia 1958: 218–20.

cities of the Greek world.¹⁶⁹ Principles of regular cause and effect now regulated the cosmos.

This understanding of cosmic justice can also be seen to reflect the reconfigurations of reciprocity opened by the emergence of the monetised economy at the time of our poem.¹⁷⁰ The first reflections of money in Greek literature can be discerned in the early sixth century. The legislation attributed to Solon, in fact, is the earliest known attestation of something that can be described as money in the literary record.¹⁷¹ The redefinition of reciprocity expressed by Solon in his poem is, at least in part, a direct reflection of the powerful social currents which were reshaping the city at the time of the legislators and tyrants, and imposing the *polis* as the unquestioned, standard referent of all social, cultural, and religious life. The gradual superimposition of conventional currency over the economy of gift-exchange and barter, in particular, led to the opening of vast new expanses of thought, and new, more abstract ways of conceptualising exchange and relations between human groups and with the gods, as Sitta von Reden, Leslie Kurke, and Richard Seaford have argued in recent years.¹⁷² The former zero-sum equation of symmetry between the groups of the household united in exchange of oaths, goods, and women gave way to a nominal form of abstract *equivalence* within the *polis* and between *poleis*. The value of one thing could stand for that of another with the guarantee of the *nomos* of the cities, a point which Aristotle expressed with characteristic clarity in that famous passage (*EN* 1133b.16–22):

τὸ δὲ νόμισμα ὥσπερ μέτρον σύμμετρα ποιῆσαν ἰσάζει· οὔτε γὰρ ἂν μὴ οὔσης ἀλλαγῆς κοινωνία ἦν, οὔτ' ἀλλαγὴ ἰσότητος μὴ οὔσης, οὔτ' ἰσότης μὴ οὔσης συμμετρίας. τῇ μὲν οὖν ἀληθείαι ἀδύνατον τὰ τοσοῦτον διαφέροντα σύμμετρα γενέσθαι, πρὸς δὲ τὴν χρεῖαν ἐνδέχεται ἰκανῶς. ἐν δὲ τι δεῖ εἶναι, τοῦτο δ' ἐξ ὑποθέσεως· διὸ νόμισμα καλεῖται· τοῦτο γὰρ πάντα ποιεῖ σύμμετρα· μετρεῖται γὰρ πάντα νομίσματι.

¹⁶⁹ See e.g. R. Osborne 1997; cf. Hölkeskamp 1992; 1999.

¹⁷⁰ The *Elegy to the Muses* cannot be precisely dated. We can say little more than that it probably belongs to the first half of the sixth century. That is enough to see it as slightly later than or contemporary with the very first physically attested Greek coinage, whether the Artemision hoard has a *terminus post quem* of 590, as Le Rider believes, or whether it belongs to the late seventh century, as the enduring *communis opinio* stated by Robinson more than fifty years ago still holds. It is, at any rate, contemporary with the development of Greek coinage as a radically new (and limited) mode of exchange in Asia Minor and on the mainland. The full bibliography is massive and beyond the scope of this chapter. On the controversial archaeological record of early Greek coinage, see e.g. Kraay 1976: 20–30; Wallace 1987; Le Rider 2001: 41–100; Schaps 2004: 93–110.

¹⁷¹ F 26; 30; 32; 33; 65 Ruschenbuch. See Miller 1971; Chambers 1973; Rhodes 1975. Cf. Seaford 2004: 81–2; 90–4.

¹⁷² Von Reden 1995; Kurke 1999; Seaford 2004; Schaps 2004: 108; 114–20.

'Money, then, acting as a measure, makes goods commensurate and equates them; for neither would there have been association if there were not exchange, nor exchange if there were not equality, nor equality if there were not commensurability. Now in truth it is impossible that things differing so much should become commensurate, but with reference to demand they may become so sufficiently. There must, then, be a unit, and that fixed by agreement (for which reason it is called money); for it is this that makes all things commensurate, since all things are measured by money' (trans. Rackham).

With the first stirrings of the monetised economy, symbolic value could more easily be rethought in terms of abstract equivalence.¹⁷³ In the system of conventional exchange that characterises the Solonian city, the notion of punishment itself becomes a value, and it can be filled by any equivalent value in time. The important thing to note is that, whether this crime is paid for by the culprit himself or by those who inherit the debts of his crime, the result is absolutely equivalent in value. The personal obligation of the oath from household to household, and its accompanying *ara*, is no longer the sole idea behind the punishment of a son for the crimes of his father. The son can now be punished vicariously. He can be punished instead of the father, rather than as an extension of the father's punishment in time. Generational punishment no longer means the destruction of kin wealth in time, as in *Works and Days*. Wealth itself is now the source of danger.¹⁷⁴ In the system of conventional exchange dramatised by the poem, crime can be punished vicariously through generations with exactly the same value as if the punishment was paid by the culprit himself. Punishment circulates in time as an exchange, an inheritance of commensurate value. The principle of ancestral fault that we see defined in the poetry of Solon is the reflection of the powerful social processes at work at the time and in the context where it was produced.¹⁷⁵ It is not a 'primitive' survival: it could not exist before in this explicit and systematic shape.

In the text of Solon the sanction of divine justice is not activated automatically by an offence against the sacred boundaries of an oath, nor by a breach of the conventions of the symptotic group, but by the desire of acquisition, the quest for gain (κέρδεα). It is the search for change of status through wealth, the attempt to possess more riches than one already has or

¹⁷³ See von Reden 1995: 67–74; Shipton 2001.

¹⁷⁴ Cf. Wilamowitz-Möllendorff 1913: 257–68; A. W. Allen 1949: 60; Büchner 1959; Alt 1979: 400–2; Spira 1981; Manuwald 1989.

¹⁷⁵ See Matthiessen 1994. Cf. Noussia-Fantuzzi 2010: 164, who describes the delay of divine punishment as 'a concept typical of ancient thought in general'.

has been given by the gods, that triggers the inescapable punishment of Zeus. The poet, like all men, 'longs to have wealth' (χρήματα δ' ἱμείρω), but he knows that the active search for its acquisition will lead to a breach of *dikē*.¹⁷⁶ Only by remaining in place, by keeping the position that each man has been given, will one not trample justice any further. Those who are rich only seek to get richer, and those who are poor want to change their situation. It is the role of the legislator, and of the social order which he is protecting, to keep them in place and impose a limit to the *movement* of wealth and its transmission. The faster movement of wealth generated by the possibilities of the new monetised economy is a grave danger to the order of the city, and the statesman must see to its balance.¹⁷⁷ In the system of Solon any attempt to change the distribution of wealth, or to change one's situation, will eventually be corrected by the action of the gods. The new form of exchange that is made possible by the new medium of currency is a threat. Its rapid changes and seemingly arbitrary patterns, Solon assures us, are all expressions of an overarching principle of justice. The formulation of justice in the poem is, of course, not a defence of privilege and aristocratic pedigree. But it is not a call for radical redistribution either. It is an argument against ambition, a powerful case for stability and social order in the midst of a rapidly changing city. Men should not seek a change from their station, but their station itself can be overturned at any time by the gods.

It can be interesting to return, in this light, to the meaning of *πυθμήν* in the poem. The word is found twice in the first part of the elegy, at lines 10 and 20, and used to combine the immediate image of the text with the performance context of the lines, as we have seen. In line 10 god-given wealth is said to attend a man both 'from the lowest foundation to the top' and 'from the bottom of the cup to its lip'. In line 20 the spring wind both 'shakes the foundation of the sea' and 'spills the sea out of its cup'.¹⁷⁸ This conflation of meanings, embedding the literal imagery of the word in the immediate semantic register of the sympotic audience, is a testimony to the allusive power of the rich elegy. The play of reference goes further. The thematic unity of the poem allows us to read a third layer of reference in the repeated use of this polysemic word. Another prominent meaning of the word *πυθμήν*, from Homer onwards, is 'stem, root, stock of a family'. Motivated by the centrality of kinship in the economy of the text, reading *πυθμήν* in that sense would be hard to miss. In line 10, then, we can see

¹⁷⁶ 13.7 W; see Masarrachia 1958: 204–7; A. W. Allen 1949: 51–3; Anhalt 1993: 25–8.

¹⁷⁷ Shipton 2001; Duploux 2002; Seaford 2004: 175–89. ¹⁷⁸ See p. 231.

god-given wealth attending man 'from the root of the family to its shoot': the puzzling image acquires another meaning, a reference to lasting wealth transmitted through generations. In line 20 the force which shakes the bottom of the sea and the cup of the banquet is the same force that shakes the stem of the family, now holding an 'infertile' (ἀτρυγέτοιο) sea.¹⁷⁹ The wrath of Zeus is at once a threat to nature and the aristocratic banquet, as well as to the root of the family. Three interlocked levels of reference, the literal image of the foundation, the contextual allusion to the symposium cup, and the theme of kinship stock, all find themselves activated by the same word. In all three the central idea is that of the solidarity uniting root and branch.

The notion of ancestral fault expressed by Hesiod in the *Works and Days* portrayed the transgression of the oath as the cause for the 'lessening' of *olbos* through generation, defined there as the riches of a household.¹⁸⁰ The wrong of one man against another man through perjury led to the eventual loss of property. The principle of ancestral fault conceptualised by Solon is in clear dialogue with this tradition. The *Elegy to the Muses*, in fact, redefines the very notion of *olbos* in the opening of the poem. The objective notion of *olbos* as the possession of the group gives way in the text to a subjective figure of *olbos* as a state, a condition of felicity defined by an acceptance of the individual lot chosen for each human being by the gods.¹⁸¹ Any desire to change this lot is itself a loss of *olbos* and will trigger the necessary punishment on generation in time. In opposition to the state of *olbos* is the state of the man who has a 'tainted heart' (ἄλιτρος θυμός), and who transmits punishment to his descendants as an inheritance, rather than lasting wealth.¹⁸² The Alcmaeonids are systematically referred to as ἄλιτῆριοι in our sources.¹⁸³ Maybe the choice of the formulation ἄλιτρος θυμός, in a poem literally centred on the notion of punishment through generations, produced at the time when the *agos* of the Alcmaeonids clearly played a central role in the affairs of the city, refers to that one incident. Maybe it does not. What is certain is that it resonates with red-hot political issues of the day and that it gives a precise shape to a contested concept. Whereas in Alcaeus 68 V Pittakos can be described as a μ[ι]σος ἄλιτρον because of the crimes of his ancestors, as a condition of wickedness related to the actions of his father and grandfather, in Solon the ἄλιτρος θυμός of

¹⁷⁹ See Noussia-Fantuzzi 2010: 159–60. ¹⁸⁰ See pp. 167–8.

¹⁸¹ See De Heer 1969: 32–8; 51–5; Lénègue 1982; Loeffler 1993; Mülke 2002: 246–7; see pp. 335–6.

¹⁸² 13.27–8 W: αἰεὶ δ' οὐ ἐλέγηθε διαμπερές, ὅστις ἄλιτρον | θυμὸν ἔχει, πάντως δ' ἐς τέλος ἐξεφάνη; see pp. 270–1.

¹⁸³ See pp. 207–8.

the transgressor is explicitly contrasted with the fact that his descendants might very well be entirely innocent themselves, that they share no responsibility in the crime. This statement of ancestral fault as a principle of divine punishment is brutal and blunt. Children or later descendants can pay for the faults of their forebears, even though they are innocent. There is absolutely no hint that they participate in the crime in any way. Quite the contrary, the fact that they do not is what the text emphasises with ἀνοίτιοι (31). The force of ἀνοίτιοι ('innocents') stands out in the text as a powerfully counterintuitive statement. It underlines the fact that the mechanisms of divine vengeance defy mortal ἐλπίς (hope).¹⁸⁴ Divine justice is implacable, absolute, and inhuman. It is no coincidence that the rest of the poem proceeds to describe the inability of mortals to understand it.¹⁸⁵

What distinguishes the *tisis* of Zeus in the *Elegy to the Muses* from the avenging time of Anaximander is the precise identification of the punishment principle: ancestral fault, delayed generational punishment. The principle that organises the action of divinity in time in the *Elegy to the Muses* not only seeks to achieve perfect symmetry through retribution in time but does this on the basis of descent. It is particularly important to consider the theme of ancestral fault in the poem from the perspective of heredity at work in the text. The first part of the elegy establishes the privileged authority of the poet and his memory. But instead of celebrating ancestors and pedigree, the memory of the poet enunciates the principle of ancestral fault. The idea that governs the first half of the poem is not the glorious common past of sympotic memory, but delayed punishment of kin by an unforgetful Zeus. Whoever acquires unjust wealth acquires a moral debt and places his descendants in mortgage to the gods as further payment. The punishment *value* is the same. As we learn later, nobody is more insatiable than the rich.¹⁸⁶ The memory of the poet contests the ideology of the aristocratic group's inherited virtue through the principle of ancestral fault. In this system, heredity becomes a constant source of anxiety and danger, not a justification of privilege. The cup of the aristocratic banquet can be broken as easily as Zeus shakes the foundation of the sea. All a man can do is not cross the boundaries of his state, but no one knows if this state has been rightfully acquired or not, if the foundation will hold. This social state is not justified by the memory of the poet

¹⁸⁴ Anhalt 1993: 32; cf. Blaise 2005: 24.

¹⁸⁵ On the link between the θνητός of line 26 and the θνητοί of line 33, see Noussia-Fantuzzi 2010: 167. 13.71–3 W: πλούτου δ' οὐδὲν τέρμα πεφασμένον ἀνδράσι κέϊται· | οἱ γὰρ νῦν ἡμέων πλεῖστον

¹⁸⁶ ἔχουσι βίον, | διπλάσιον σπεύδουσι· τίς ἂν κορέσειεν ἅπαντας; a thought with particularly strong resonances today, one might add.

but rather shown as a source of anxiety. Retribution can strike at any moment, and the *noos* of the group will not see from where it comes when it does, even if the legislator poet understands the laws of the gods. Only Zeus does not forget. There is no secure foundation to the possession of wealth. The memory of the poet in this text, by enunciating the principle of ancestral fault as the core object of its reach, works in direct opposition to the traditional role of the aristocratic singer at the elite banquet. The voice of Solon at the banquet does not define the group by a narrative focus on the common exploits of ancestors and the exclusion of enemies, by songs of praise and blame. It does not justify inherited privilege. Rather, it shows how the symptotic society is submitted to the same rules of the universe as all other men. The memory of the legislator is a threat to the symposium. It imposes common law and submission on all. The hegemonic *polis* has conquered the banquet. This triumph brings in a new form of wisdom.

The second part of the poem defines the group of the nominal audience.¹⁸⁷ Instead of the expected aristocratic group of elegiac symptotic convention, the inclusive 'We' of line 33 includes, with a highly emphatic diction (ὁμῶς . . . τε . . . τε), both the noble, the *agathos*, and the base, the *kakos*, in the collective voice of the elegy. The failed *noos* of mortals framed by the text involves all men at this nominal common banquet. The *symposium* of the elegy becomes a microcosm of the entire city.¹⁸⁸ Great wealth is not securely anchored in the narrative of the past. The memory of the poet does not justify the possession and enjoyment of privilege, but it activates the anxiety of past transgressions. Possibly acquired by crime in the past, wealth can now disappear at any moment as punishment, and the noble should check his greed in order not to provoke the gods further and endanger his own children. The voice of the poet tells the *agathoi* to live in moderation and keep to the middle road. Solon brings noble and base together on the same level of human frailty and false hopes. His common ethics of the middle unites aristocrat and commoner in a single human fellowship, living together under the harsh rules of the gods and the city.

In this poetics of inheritance, the stance of Solon the singer is in more ways than one an expression of the measures ascribed to Solon the legislator concerning kinship in the city: the Solonic family laws curtailing the power of the aristocratic elite, which came to define the individual as a citizen first rather than a kinsman. The redefinition of the *oikos* bonds

¹⁸⁷ 13.33 W: θνητοὶ δ' ὥδε νοέομεν ὁμῶς ἀγαθὸς τε κακὸς τε. See Loeffler 1993.

¹⁸⁸ See Levine 1985; Melissano 1994; for the symposium as microcosm, see also Gagné (forthcoming c).

which the Solonic laws established strictly redefined the nature of legitimacy in terms of lawfully recognised marriage, punished bastardy, and, more importantly, drastically regulated the transmission of inheritance within the group and placed it under the care of the city.¹⁸⁹ It cut down the ideological and the material justification of independent inherited privilege and squarely submitted this privilege to the rule of the city. The birth privileges of nobility are similarly revisited in our elegy text. It is the principle of ancestral fault that the memory of the poet reaches and sings in the elegy, rather than the ancestral noble exploits and the god-given sceptre of traditional aristocratic sympotic memory. At line 32, the principle of ancestral fault is expressed with a traditional formula of aristocratic praise, the line 'his children's children and his line after them'.¹⁹⁰ This is a traditional formula of inherited virtue, which we can see for instance in a fragment of Tyrtaeus describing the noble warrior's tomb in the aristocratic ideology of the Spartiate ὁμοῖος, or in *Iliad* 20.308, exactly the same verse as quoted by Celsus to illustrate Greek ancestral fault in his attack on Christianity.¹⁹¹ In the *Elegy to the Muses* this formulaic expression of inherited virtue is appropriated by the poet to portray the transmission of punishment through generations. It is a redefinition of heredity grounded on the dangers it carries, rather than the privileges it gives. In this redefinition, the memory of the poet is the only human mind capable of reaching the significance of this danger for the community, and it tells us to stay in our place. It tells us to seek no more, and accept the higher order of city and cosmos. The principle of ancestral fault in this poem is ultimately an expression of civic rule over the bonds of kinship.

In the verses of the Solonic tradition, the memory of the poet functions as the guarantor of social justice. It sings the harmony which must exist through generations for the city to exist beyond the sum of its individual groups – and impose itself on the elite circles of the banquet. A pendant to the regularised synchronic justice and the ideal social harmony of the city expressed in the *Eunomia*, the temporal dimension of justice explored in the *Elegy to the Muses* portrays the consequences of this new overarching civic justice for the time of the *polis*. The new social order of the *polis* is deployed on the territory of the symposium in the poetry of Solon. It imposes its own conception of time on the justice of the group, and its

¹⁸⁹ See p. 226. ¹⁹⁰ 13.32 W: ἡ παῖδες τούτων ἢ γένος ἐξοπίσω; see Mülke 2002: 283.

¹⁹¹ Tyr. 12.30 W: καὶ παῖδων παῖδες καὶ γένος ἐξοπίσω; *Il.* 20.308: καὶ παῖδων παῖδες, τοὶ κεν μετόπισθε γένωνται. See Loraux 1977; Duplouy 2006: 45–46; cf. pp. 60–1 and 452.

own logic of reciprocity in the conceptualisation of *dikē*. The legal symmetry and the social harmony that constitute the central concerns of the *persona* of Solon as the wise legislator of Athens find their way into the poetic expression of justice at the symposium. It draws on the elite symptotic conventions of aristocratic justice to contest the privilege of the few and impose the moderate symmetry of the middle as the new measure of justice. And it does that through the systematic formulation of a radically novel understanding of justice in time: the principle of ancestral fault.

In the *Elegy to the Muses* the notion of ancestral fault, which was formerly essentially confined to the semantic sphere of one institution, the generational oath, and used there to define the composition of the group in time, its obligations and duties, and its fortune, is now extended to the entire collectivity of the *polis*, and even to the natural cycles of the world as a coherent and regular retributive system. It becomes a regular pattern of the cosmos, like the days and the seasons.¹⁹² In the principle defined by Solon, the reciprocity of justice to action is not represented in terms of two human parties bound by a precise ritual and its defined sanction, but rather in terms of a transgression against universal, and often imperceptible, divine order. Whereas Archilochus could extend the justice of Hesiod to include the animal realm in his *ainos* of the eagle and the fox, and thus essentialise his depiction of symptotic justice beyond the social hierarchies of the audience, Solon projects his vision of divine *dikē* in time on the universe itself.¹⁹³ This extension of the concept reflects the new conceptual frontiers of the triumphant *polis* in the late seventh to early sixth centuries. It is the vision of the *polis* imposed on the group, the perspective of the legislator as the new determinant force marking the boundaries of the group and the world. While in Homer, Hesiod, and Archilochus the children of perjurers are punished through imprecation as an extension of their father's punishment, in the *Elegy to the Muses* generational punishment functions entirely as a vicarious meting out of sanctions. Ancestral fault, in this view, is no longer limited to the effects of the *horkos* imprecation but is observed as a regular pattern of cause and effect in the world.¹⁹⁴ It is recognised in the equivalent agencies of divine wrath, pollution, and heredity as the governing principle of divine action in its enactment of justice: the divine reflection in time of the human

¹⁹² Cf. H. Fraenkel 1975 [1951]: 228 and Noussia 2006: 140–1.

¹⁹³ Gagarin 1974b. For Archilochus, see Gagné 2009a.

¹⁹⁴ In contrast to the Theognidean corpus, where it is a recurrent and fundamental motif of aristocratic friendship and duty (200; 399; 745; 824; 1139; 1195), there is not a single mention of an oath in the extant verses of Solon; see pp. 263–4 and 270.

justice realised by Solon within the city. It is an expression of the new order of civic reciprocity in time, and the new patterns of monetised exchange which were emerging during this period. The principle of ancestral fault is the overarching framework through which the legislator poet at the symposium chose to express and illustrate his understanding of group identity and divine justice in time for the *polis*. Far from being the prehistoric vestige of some ancient and primitive family solidarity, the principle of ancestral fault in the poem is the witness to a radical transformation of thought. We can discern other aspects of the same process in the contemporary poetry of Theognis.

Theognidea

Theognis is the name of a poet attached to a corpus of roughly 1,400 elegiac lines that has come down to us through medieval manuscript transmission.¹⁹⁵ Papyrological finds indicate that at least part of the collection was already circulating in the Roman period in something close to its present form.¹⁹⁶ Although the genesis of the corpus is disputed, most scholars have long agreed that the poems of the collection cannot all be from the same hand.¹⁹⁷ Parts of the *sylloge* could date from the seventh century, while other parts are as recent as the middle of the fifth century.¹⁹⁸ A group of poems addressed to a certain Kynos, the young aristocrat who is advised about life in the world and the city by the voice of the mature poet, might form the kernel around which the *Corpus Theognideum* was organised.¹⁹⁹ The collection is possibly an accretion of texts progressively added to this 'original' layer of verse, the *florilegium purum*, which many scholars have tried to identify.²⁰⁰ They see this original layer as the only 'authentic' poems of the corpus, the production of a historical author called Theognis.²⁰¹ The collection might, alternatively, be an assemblage of various compilations of elegiac verse from different places and different periods brought together in the Hellenistic period.²⁰² The poems

¹⁹⁵ For the transmission of the text, see Selle 2008: 103–20; 389–91.

¹⁹⁶ Selle 2008: 103–11, with bibliography.

¹⁹⁷ See e.g. Welcker 1826; Nietzsche 1867; Fritzsche 1870; H. Schneidewin 1878; F. Dornseiff 1939; Carrière 1954; Selle 2008: 372–93, with bibliography. Highbarger (1927; 1929; 1931; 1937) was one of the last to defend a broad view of authenticity.

¹⁹⁸ Lines 603–4, 757–64, and 773–88 are the most important passages in this regard; see still Jacoby 1931; Selle 2008: 21.

¹⁹⁹ See M. L. West 1974: 40; Bowie 1997: 62; Fain 2006; Selle 2008: 36–7.

²⁰⁰ M. L. West 1974: 57; Bowie 1997.

²⁰¹ Hudson-Williams 1910; Vetta 2000; Selle 2008: 381–9.

²⁰² Peretti 1956; M. L. West 1974.

addressed to Simonides, for instance, would thus be part of another corpus joined to the Kyrnos poems at some point.²⁰³ Others argue that it is an evolving, living poetic tradition centred on the *persona* of an old disgruntled aristocrat reacting to change and instructing the young on the wisdom of their elders.²⁰⁴ In that view, Kyrnos would be the nominal addressee of an open-ended corpus shaped by generations of song. Whatever the case, all these poems share roughly the same language and metrical forms, and a limited constellation of themes and images centred around complaints against the *kakoi* and prescriptions for the life of the *agathoi*.²⁰⁵ They insist on the inalienable value of noble birth, εὐγένεια – something that lies beyond the fluctuations of acquisition.²⁰⁶ More importantly, they belong to the performance context of the archaic aristocratic symposium and the wisdom literature shared by its peers.²⁰⁷ Although they can often be seen to share themes, occasion, and ideological outlook, the verses of the *Theognidea* in no way constitute a coherent unity. The poems of Theognis are as varied as they are numerous and they sometimes contradict each other; even the many ‘doublets’ and repetitions can convey radically different messages.²⁰⁸ There is little that ties them to any specific historical situation, and they are almost all highly repeatable. These poems are designed for reperformance at the symposium through time and space.²⁰⁹ The fact that, for Plato already, the Megara of Theognis might be either the mainland or the Sicilian Megara (Pl. *Leg.* 630a) is a good illustration of the collection’s lack of grounding in the intricacies of any one context.²¹⁰ The poems form a varied repertoire of reactionary, nostalgic admonitions. They are intended for the well-born elite’s resistance to the loss of privilege that accompanied the triumph of the mature *polis* model throughout the Greek world in the later archaic period.²¹¹ This repertoire is another facet of the conflict exemplified by the poetry of Alcaeus. Also written in elegiac metre, it presents a perspective diametrically opposed to that of Solon.

As the central milieu of the dynamic song culture of the age, the late archaic symposium functioned as a space of contact and exchange between

²⁰³ Bowra 1934; cf. Selle 2008: 224–5. ²⁰⁴ Nagy 1985; Edmunds 1985; Lear 2008.

²⁰⁵ Cerri 1968; Dovatur 1972; Nagy 1983; Edmunds 1985; Donlan 1985; Greenberg 1985; Seng 1988; Garzya 1988; Barkhuizen 1989; Stein-Hölkeskamp 1989: 134–8; Lane Fox 2000; Selle 2008: 38–63.

²⁰⁶ See Duploux 2006: 43–8; Condello 2007.

²⁰⁷ Bielowlawek 1940; Melissano 1994; Selle 2008: 45–55; 352–7, with bibliography.

²⁰⁸ See for instance Nagy 1983 and 1985; Lardinois 2006: 29–31; cf. M. L. West 1974: 45–55; Selle 2008: 196–206.

²⁰⁹ Levine 1985.

²¹⁰ See Lavagnini 1932; Langwitz 1974; Figueira 1985b; Nagy 1985; Gavrillov 2000; Selle 2008: 27–36.

²¹¹ See e.g. Melissano 1994; Papakonstantinou 2004.

rival poetic voices and the worlds they projected to their audiences.²¹² Elegiac poems, in particular, were engaged in constant dialogue with each other, adapting, contesting, and appropriating the verses and ideas, the themes and images of other poems and the *gnōmai* of the wisdom traditions. Projecting different values to the same public, using the same communicative strategies, uniting all symposia in one republic of song, these conversations could stretch over cities and generations. In this environment of predominantly oral performance and transmission, individual songs easily escaped their original form and attribution, the function they first played, and their initial constellation of meaning. Lines attributed to an author in one source are found in another author in other sources, often with slight, significant variations. The same lines are also found repeated in different poems of the same corpus. The *Theognidea* abound in such floating verses, especially lines that are also found in Solon.²¹³ In many of these cases, the verses of Solon and Theognis are more than 'slightly different versions' of each other.²¹⁴ They are the entrenched positions of rival, irreconcilable perspectives of wisdom at the symposium. The usual scholarship looking for source and influence is mostly asking the wrong questions. By seeing one text as a copy of the other, we miss the point of the literary dynamic at work in the poetic rivalries of the symposium. It is often impossible to say which one of these contemporary texts came first. In a context of fluid oral transmissions and re-performance, the question is superfluous. Whoever really was the author of either text, the important point is that they both perfectly embodied the ideological stance of the poetic *persona* they channelled.²¹⁵ The same words could convey radically opposite messages. In the flexible and changing environment of capping and creative conflict that shaped the songs of the archaic symposium, they could be put to endless new uses as the poetic conversations evolved over time.²¹⁶ Here and elsewhere, the floating lines of archaic elegy are more than repetitions or traces of borrowing, they are the very matter of poetic rivalry in movement, and the clash of ideological worlds they represent.

²¹² Nagy 1985; Lear 2008.

²¹³ The contributions of Calame 2004 and Irwin 2006 stand out on this question. Among earlier scholarship, Young 1964 remains essential. Important studies include Küllenberg 1877; H. Schneidewin 1878; Crüger 1882; E. Harrison 1902: 100–210; Hudson-Williams 1910; Hasler 1959; Ferrari 1987; Colesanti 2001; Selle 2008: 212–26; Noussia-Fantuzzi 2010: 45–65. Cf. the various formulations of this issue from the point of view of oral composition, especially Nagy 1983 and 1985; Vetta 2000; Ferrari 1987; Colesanti 2001.

²¹⁴ Famous examples include Solon 6.3–4 and Theognis 153–4, or Solon 24 and Theognis 718–28.

²¹⁵ See e.g. Irwin 2006; Lear 2008. ²¹⁶ See Collins 2004.

Ten lines from Solon's *Elegy to the Muses* are also found in the *Theognidea*.²¹⁷ They are divided between two poems: 227–32 and 585–90. Verses 585–90 of Theognis correspond to Solon 13.65–70:

Theognis:

παῖσιν τοι κίνδυνος ἐπ' ἔργμασιν, οὐδέ τις οἶδεν
 πῇ σχήσειν μέλλει πρήγματος ἀρχομένου.
 ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν εὐδοκιμεῖν πειρώμενος οὐ προνοήσας
 εἰς μεγάλην ἄτην καὶ χαλεπὴν ἔπεσεν·
 τῷ δὲ καλῶς ποιεῦντι θεὸς περὶ πάντα τίθησιν
 συντυχίην ἀγαθὴν, ἔκλυσιν ἀφροσύνης.

In truth, there is risk in every action and no one knows, when something starts, how it is going to turn out. The man who tries for a good reputation falls unawares into great and harsh calamity, while to the one who acts well the god gives success in all things, an escape from his folly (modified trans. Gerber).

Solon:

πασι δέ τοι κίνδυνος ἐπ' ἔργμασιν, οὐδέ τις οἶδεν
 πῇ μέλλει σχήσειν χρήματος ἀρχομένου·
 ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν εὖ ἔρδεν πειρώμενος οὐ προνοήσας
 εἰς μεγάλην ἄτην καὶ χαλεπὴν ἔπεσεν,
 τῷ δὲ κακῶς ἔρδοντι θεὸς περὶ πάντα δίδωσιν
 συντυχίην ἀγαθὴν, ἔκλυσιν ἀφροσύνης.

In all actions there is risk and no one knows, when something starts, how it is going to turn out. The man who tries to act rightly falls unawares into great and harsh calamity, while to the one who acts badly the god gives success in all things, an escape from his folly (trans. Gerber).

Again, the differences between the two almost identical passages are worth noticing.²¹⁸ The δέ of Solon, not found in Theognis, reminds us that the passage is part of a longer poem, whereas the Theognidean lines are self-contained.²¹⁹ Lines 71–2 of the *Elegy to the Muses* colour the entire passage as a reflection on the acquisition of wealth.²²⁰ We are told that the limit of wealth is not revealed to men, and no one knows where the beginning of wealth leads.²²¹ The word χρήματος, in the context of this poem of

²¹⁷ See Lardinois 2006: 18–20.

²¹⁸ E. Harrison 1902: 105–6; Highbarger 1929: 347–8; van Groningen 1966: 233–5; Ferrari 1989: 25–8; Noussia 2001a: 216–17; Irwin 2006: 52–3; Noussia-Fantuzzi 2010: 60–1; cf. also Stob. 4.47.16, with the table in Van Groningen 1966: 234.

²¹⁹ Van Groningen 1966: 233. ²²⁰ See pp. 245–6.

²²¹ On πῇ and ποῖ in the manuscripts, see Van Groningen 1966: 232 and 234.

χρήματα (vv. 7; 42), refers very specifically to wealth, a sense it can have in the singular as well as the plural.²²² The plural χρημάτων would not fit the metre, and the singular χρήματος corresponds to the singular πλούτου, as well as emphasising the outcome of every single act of acquisition. A contrast between the lot of the man of good intention who falls unawares into a harsh, disastrous madness and the transgressor to whom the god gives a prosperous outcome in all things, a release from folly, conveys a vivid picture of cosmic injustice. In contrast to Hesiod's picture of perjury in *Works and Days* 284, intention is of no consequence here. Loss of mind, *atē* and *aphrosunē*, is tied to lack of wealth in this passage. The following lines go on to say that the rich always seek more and that the wealth that the gods give ultimately reveals itself as a disastrous madness when it is sent as punishment. Nothing ever remains in its place in that world of blind strikes from above. This well illustrates the opacity of the perspective of contingency expressed in the second half of the poem. In the first half of the poem, certain punishment follows the unjust man, and the poetic *persona* asks for just acquisition at the beginning of the elegy, prosperity from the gods, asserting that the wealth given by the gods is secure from beginning to end, that it has precise, definite boundaries, in opposition to the uncertain limits of the unjust wealth that is 'mixed with *atē*'.²²³ That picture is turned upside down at the end of the poem, as the exact opposite is expressed by the unknowing voice of the collective 'we'. Lines 65–70 of Solon 13 belong to that very precise outlook in the second half of the poem.

The verses of Theognis express something quite different. Lines 71–2 of the *Elegy to the Muses* are not part of the Theognidean elegy, and there is no mention of wealth in the text. What appears as χρήματος in Solon is found as πρήγματος in Theognis – the poem is about the outcome of any indeterminate action, not the beginning of wealth. The opposition between the harsh, calamitous *atē* of one man and the ἔκλυσις ἀφροσύνης, the liberation from madness, of the other also takes another turn in that text. The man who falls unawares in disaster in Theognis is not the person who attempts to act well in his acquisition of wealth, but 'the man who tries for a good reputation'. There is no opposition between good and bad in the poem of Theognis. What is ἔρδοντι in Solon is ποιεῦντι in Theognis. What is εὖ ἔρδειν in Solon is εὐδοκιμεῖν in Theognis.

²²² See Van Groningen 1966, with reference to Poll. 9.87, Hdt. 3.38 and Hesychius, s.v. χρήμα. Cf. Wilamowitz-Möllendorff 1913: 269–70.

²²³ See p. 228.

The contrast between a negative and a positive ἔρδειν, and their dissimilar outcomes, is not found in Theognis. The κακῶς of Solon, more importantly, is καλῶς in Theognis. Although many editors print κακῶς in their texts of Theognis, all manuscripts have καλῶς.²²⁴ A citation of the poem in Stobaeus, moreover, has καλόν instead of καλῶς, indicating that the καλῶς reading is not only the unanimous lesson of manuscripts, but the corroborating lesson of our only other independent witness. The sole authority for emending the text to κακῶς is the poem of Solon. As most editors of Theognis have seen lines 585–90 as a copy of Solon 13.65–70, they thought it justified to use the model in order to correct its reflection.²²⁵ If, however, we look at the two texts as part of a more complex dialogue of rival poetic voices in performance, as I believe we should, then it becomes more difficult to justify the removal of variants between the poems as so much corruption. The only real ground for changing the received καλῶς into κακῶς would be meaning. Meaning, however, does not demand κακῶς instead of καλῶς. Theognis is saying that it is impossible to know where an action leads once it has started. Mortal perception cannot distinguish between the appearance of intention and the reality of success. One man attempts to gain a good reputation, but does not see what lies ahead and falls into *atē*. The other one acts in the right manner, and to that man the god always gives felicitous prosperity, a release from folly. A contrast is made between the mere intention of the one and the correct action of the other, on the one hand. A complementary contrast, that between the unknowing intention of the first and the divine favour of the second, places the opposition on a theological level. The man who acts nobly is favoured by the gods, given success and delivered from thoughtlessness. Those who follow the right path are ultimately protected by the gods. What is a dark condemnation of divine injustice in the second part of Solon's poem is a pious vindication of cosmic order in Theognis.²²⁶

Verses 227–32 of Theognis, similarly, reproduce lines 71–6 of the *Elegy to the Muses* almost word for word:

Theognis:

πλούτου δ' οὐδὲν τέρμα πεφασμένον ἀνθρώποισιν·
οἱ γὰρ νῦν ἡμῶν πλεῖστον ἔχουσι βίον,

²²⁴ See Hudson-Williams 1910: 214–15; Ferrari 1989: 26.

²²⁵ See Lardinois 2006: 24.

²²⁶ Cf. Van Groningen 1966: 235, who sees the Theognidean text as 'l'oeuvre d'un petit moraliste qui a abusé de quelques vers de Solon qui lui allaient à coeur: les dangers d'une ambition imprudente et les conséquences agréables de la vertu. Le résultat de ses efforts est un sixain sans suite d'idées solides.'

διπλάσιον σπεύδουσι. τίς ἂν κορέσειεν ἅπαντας;
 χρήματά τοι θνητοῖς γίνεται ἄφροσύνη,
 ἅτη δ' ἐξ αὐτῆς ἀναφαίνεται, ἦν ὁπότε Ζεὺς
 πέμψη τειρομένοισ', ἄλλοτε ἄλλος ἔχει.

Of wealth no limit is revealed to men, since those of us who now have the greatest livelihood are eager to double it. What could satisfy everyone? In truth possessions result in folly for mortals, and from folly there is revealed ruin, which now one, now another has, whenever Zeus sends it to wretched men (trans. Gerber).

Solon:

πλούτου δ' οὐδὲν τέρμα πεφασμένον ἀνδράσι κεῖται·
 οἱ γὰρ νῦν ἡμέων πλεῖστον ἔχουσι βίον,
 διπλασίως σπεύδουσι· τίς ἂν κορέσειεν ἅπαντας;
 κέρδεά τοι θνητοῖς ὥπασαν ἀθάνατοι,
 ἅτη δ' ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀναφαίνεται, ἦν ὁπότε Ζεὺς
 πέμψη τεισομένην, ἄλλοτε ἄλλος ἔχει.

But of wealth no limit lies revealed to men, since those of us who now have the greatest livelihood show twice as much zeal. What could satisfy every one? In truth, the immortals give men profit, but from it (them?) there is revealed ruin, which now one, now another has, whenever Zeus sends it to punish them (trans. Gerber).

There are quite a few differences between the two texts.²²⁷ Line 230 of Theognis does not appear in the poem of Solon. In that passage of the *Elegy to the Muses*, the very end of the poem, the emphasis is specifically placed on the agency of the gods. The limits of wealth are not 'revealed' (πεφασμένον) to men.²²⁸ On the contrary, what is revealed, ἀναφαίνεται, is the *atē* that comes from it. I read the αὐτῶν as referring to κέρδεα, but it could as well refer to the gods.²²⁹ Maybe the ambiguity is intentional. In either case, the δ' of line 75 grounds the cause of the disaster in the preceding line. In direct opposition to what the first half of the poem says, the acquisition provided by divinity is presented as an instrument of ruin in these lines. Continuing the echo of the poem's first section, the future participle τεισομένην of line 76 specifies that this ruin is the punishment of a transgression. The wealth that the gods now give to this man, now to

²²⁷ See the table in Van Groningen 1966: 90; Van Groningen 1966: 91 insists that we are not comparing Solon and Theognis here, but traditions of Stobaeus and Theognis (the superior witness in this case, he believes), each one the indirect reflection of a lost original; he adds the witness of Plut. *De cupiditate divitiarum* 524e. Cf. Irwin 2006: 59–60 on ἀνθρώποισιν vs ἀνδράσι κεῖται.

²²⁸ Van Groningen 1966: 89, with parallels.

²²⁹ See pp. 229–30.

that, is a form of divine retribution opaque to the sight of men. Acquisition is provided by the gods as a form of punishment. The richer one is, the more one wants, and the harder the punishment that will come. Verses 71–6 of the *Elegy to the Muses* perfectly embody the cosmic contingency of the text's second half and close the ring of the poem.²³⁰

Lines 227–32 of Theognis say something else entirely.²³¹ The inclusion of line 230 in the passage places the emphasis squarely on the effect of wealth. The agency of gods in punishing men is barely mentioned in that text. The immortals do not provide men with the acquisition that ultimately causes their downfall in Theognis. Wealth itself is singled out as the threat. It is not the eagerness of their striving that is underlined in Theognis, διπλάσιως, contrary to Solon, but the objective growth of wealth, διπλάσιον.²³² Again, there is no reason here to correct the unanimous texts of the manuscripts. The differences between the lines of Solon and Theognis are not necessarily due to the corruption of the text in that case either. The rich want to double their βίος. No one is satisfied with what he has. Yet what people strive for is the ultimate source of danger. Out of χρήματα comes loss of judgment, *aphrosunē*, and out of this loss of judgment the mad calamity that falls on men, *atē*. The αὐτῶν of Solon is αὐτῆς in Theognis. The source of *atē* is *aphrosunē*, and *aphrosunē* is the product of wealth.²³³ When Zeus sends *atē*, it is a direct result of the possessions held by men. This acquisition is not offered by the gods as retribution; it is strictly motivated by mortal desire for gain. The *atē* sent by Zeus, moreover, is not singled out as punishment, τεισομένην, but defined by the weakness of the people whose fortune has fallen, the τειρόμενοι. He who was rich is now one of the 'wretched'.²³⁴ That reversal of fortune affects 'now one, now another'.²³⁵ True valour does not lie in wealth. The poem of Theognis teaches that those who are *now* acquiring wealth will soon fall; the force of νῦν at 228 probably has a stronger emphasis in the Theognidean poem than in the Solonic passage.²³⁶ In this

²³⁰ See p. 230.

²³¹ See Van Groningen 1966: 90–3; Ferrari 1989: 27–30; Irwin 2006: 58–63; Noussia-Fantuzzi 2010: 61–5.

²³² Van Groningen 1966: 91.

²³³ Van Groningen 1966: 90; Irwin 2006: 60–1. I see no good reason for seeing the Theognidean lines as an 'attempt to rescue wealth from being the direct source of ἄτη', and for the consequent need to emphasise the 'limited moral responsibility' of ἀφροσύνη. The reactionary defence of privilege of Theognis' *persona* is often antithetical to the defence of wealth, of course, and, more importantly, of acquisition; cf. Figueira 1985b: 153; Donlan 1985: 239.

²³⁴ See Highbarger 1929, who insists on the social connotations of τειρόμενοι; cf. Irwin 2006: 61, n. 78.

²³⁵ Van Groningen 1966: 90. ²³⁶ Cf. Van Groningen 1966: 89.

case of poetic dialogue with Solon, again, we have an example of the versatility of the elegiac poets in adapting the verses of their rivals to new contexts in the late archaic symposium.²³⁷ Had we preserved more of Solon's poetry, our picture of this agonistic interaction of texts and verses between the two poetic figures, what Elizabeth Irwin has called 'elegiac boundary disputes', would undoubtedly be enriched.²³⁸

Another kind of dialogue is taking place between ideas in these texts. The close contact of the poems of Theognis with the *Elegy to the Muses* is hardly limited to the sharing of verses. The ancestral fault of the *Theognidea* (197–208 and 731–52) is not a simple imitation or echo of the ancestral fault of Solon. The themes, images, thoughts and diction of the archaic elegiac symposium recur across poems and authors. To call these building blocks of sympotic song 'generic' or 'traditional' is to risk losing sight of their nuance and variety, the precise tone of their shade, and the great diversity of a tradition locked in conflict and division. The language of the elegiac symposium draws from the same stock, but what it does with it opens a wide range of variation.²³⁹ The same lines, the same words express different things in different contexts. Even the same poem can be made to present opposite messages when it is sung by another voice. Wrapped around the poem long after its composition, the *persona* of the poet, the colour of his ideological stance and the connotations of the literary and biographical tradition that accompany his name profoundly affect the meaning of the text ascribed to him at the symposium. Sympotic elegy, so singularly attached to the first-person singular, the 'I' and the name of the poet, opens a powerful tension between the words themselves and the broader baggage of the speaking *persona*.²⁴⁰ Most of the voices of sympotic poetry are very distinctive, and no voice is more distinctive than that of Theognis.²⁴¹ Perhaps the famous 'seal' of Theognis, commonly derided by generations of scholars as the powerless effort of an author trying to defend his original, authentic composition from change and interpolation, is in fact a badge of authority, the claim of a particular stance and a distinctive knowledge in the ideological landscape of the banquet.²⁴² 'Now read the same words through the *persona* of Theognis!' Borges' *Pierre Ménard, autor del Quijote* has some striking predecessors. In this context, the shared ideas deployed in elegiac verse are defined as much

²³⁷ See Blok and Lardinois 2006: 3. ²³⁸ Irwin 2006: 51–72. ²³⁹ See Giannini 1973.

²⁴⁰ See Slings 2000. ²⁴¹ A good example of this is Pl. *Leg.* 630a–c.

²⁴² See the various models proposed by Perotti 1985; Ford 1985; Cerri 1991; Pratt 1995; Edmunds 1997, among others.

by their poem as by the voice that carries them. The stock themes and imagery of elegy participate in the same process of opposition through appropriation that we have seen at work in the reduplication of lines and formulae.

This does not mean that we have evidence for poetic rewriting in the two poems discussed below.²⁴³ Rather, we have two contemporary inscriptions of a parallel thought on opposite sides of the ideological pole. The family resemblance between these texts is overwhelming. That apparent similarity makes them particularly exciting. The dozens of minor, profoundly significant differences between the expressions of ancestral fault in these poems are not evidence for a direct literary engagement between model and copies, but the result of different perspectives drawing from the same stock as they look into the same object of common concern. A close attention to detail and the difference that hides behind apparent similarity is necessary to unpack the logic of the individual elegy. Such comparison does not seek to uncover some kind of refined, sophisticated intertextuality of the Alexandrian kind. It aims for a better understanding of the distinctive logic at work in these texts behind what can appear as the repetition of a mere traditional commonplace at first glance. The notion of ancestral fault that we find in the Theognidean corpus is not a simple reproduction of the Solonian idea, or another facet of a contemporary 'tradition'. For the specificity of its meanings to emerge, the ancestral fault of Theognis must be assessed on its own terms – not as a mere variant. Theognis presents us with distinctive perspectives on delay and generational punishment contemporary with the poems of Alcaeus and Solon.²⁴⁴ Like the poems of Alcaeus and Solon, these perspectives are grounded in the voice of the poetic tradition that produced them. Like so many double lines of the elegiac corpora, they reflect a powerful process of difference in similarity.²⁴⁵

Two poems stage ancestral fault in the *Theognidea*: lines 197–208 and 731–52. The first poem comes from the corpus's primary section, the initial block of so-called 'Kyrnos-poetry' (19–254).²⁴⁶ That section is seen by most as a kernel of the oldest collection, fragments of the first Theognis songs.²⁴⁷ The poem is possibly fragmentary, as the δ' of line 197 might indicate, or designed to attach itself to some earlier thought.²⁴⁸ It has no apparent link to the preceding or the following lines of our collection.²⁴⁹

²⁴³ Van Groningen 1966: 80–1.

²⁴⁴ See Dovatur 1977.

²⁴⁵ See pp. ***–***.

²⁴⁶ See M. L. West 1974: 40; Selle 2008: 122–31; 137–47.

²⁴⁷ Bowie 1997: 62.

²⁴⁸ E. Harrison 1902: 216; Van Groningen 1966: 80.

²⁴⁹ For symptotic chains in Theognis, see e.g. Vetta 1984; Colesanti 2001; Selle 2008: 170–3.

χρῆμα δ' ὃ μὲν Διόθεν καὶ σὺν δίκη ἀνδρὶ γένηται
 καὶ καθαρῶς, αἰεὶ παρμόνιμον τελέθει.
 εἰ δ' ἀδίκως παρὰ καιρὸν ἀνὴρ φιλοκερδέϊ θυμῷ
 κτήσεται, εἴθ' ὄρκῳ πὰρ τὸ δίκαιον ἐλών,
 αὐτίκα μὲν τι φέρειν κέρδος δοκεῖ, ἐς δὲ τελευτὴν
 αὐτῆς ἔγεντο κακόν, θεῶν δ' ὑπερέσχε νόος.
 ἀλλὰ τὰδ' ἀνθρώπων ἀπατᾷ νόον· οὐ γὰρ ἔτ' αὐτως
 τίνονται μάκαρες πρήγματος ἀμπλακίας·
 ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν αὐτὸς ἔτισσε κακὸν χρέος οὐδὲ φίλοισιν
 ἄτην ἐξοπίσω παισὶν ἐπεκρέμασεν·
 ἄλλον δ' οὐ κατέμαρψε δίκη· θάνατος γὰρ ἀναιδὴς
 πρόσθεν ἐπὶ βλεφάροισ' ἔζετο κῆρα φέρων.

Whatever possession comes to a man from Zeus and is obtained with justice and without stain, is forever lasting. But if a man acquires it unjustly, inopportunistically, and with a greedy heart or seizes it wrongly by a false oath, for the moment he thinks he's winning profit, but in the end it turns out badly and the will of the gods prevails. The minds of men, however, are misled, since the blessed gods do not punish sin at the time of the very act, but one man pays his evil debt himself and doesn't cause doom to hang over his dear progeny later, while another is not overtaken by justice; before that ruthless death settles on his eyelids, bringing doom (trans. Gerber).

Scholarship on this poem has, predictably enough, focused on its relation to the work of Solon. Bergk (1845) believed that the elegy was composed of citations from Solon. For Wilamowitz, it was a pale, artless imitation of the thoughts found in the *Elegy to the Muses*.²⁵⁰ Nothing, however, allows us to see one poem as a mere copy of the other. Although contact between them is a given, the close dialogue that linked the voices of Solon and Theognis at the archaic symposium was not a matter of simple imitation. The deep rivalry between the two poetic perspectives created a logic of echoes in opposition. The ancestral fault of Theognis belongs to that clash of wisdom in verse.

The poem's perspective is directly opposite to the stance defended in the second half of the *Elegy to the Muses*. The perspective of the text is focused on the certitude of future punishment, not the opaque causes of the past that now come back to collect their due. In Theognis 197–208, the exercise of justice is accurate and inescapable – it reaches over generations. Beyond the appearance of gain lies the reality of *dikē*. Although the cosmic order operates beyond our sight, the balance of the gods is infallible. The *noos* of men cannot understand the *noos* of the gods (202 and 203). The immediate

²⁵⁰ 1913: 268–71; cf. Perrotta 1924; Van Groningen 1966: 80. See more recently Versnel 2011: 211.

event leads to an illusion of knowledge. That knowledge of appearances, the fleeting object of δοκεῖν, is bound to be reversed. The word κέρδος becomes κακόν; αὐτίκα becomes αὔθις.²⁵¹ The *noos* of the gods ‘overtakes’ the *doxa* of the temporarily successful transgressor. The verb ὑπερέσχε indicates a victory, a success over the apparent gain of the unjust man. The will/mind/vision of the gods triumphs over the failed understanding of the mortal. The verb also conveys a spatial imagery of superiority. The perception of divinity stands above that of man; its elevation allows it to see beyond the limits of appearance. That condition – τᾶδε – ‘deceives’ the *noos* of men. The verb ἀπατᾷ connotes an active agency. The gods trick through gain, κέρδος. Contrary to the κέρδεα that the gods provide to trap men in Solon, however, the gods of the Theognidean elegy only deceive the guilty. The secure wealth of the just comes from Zeus. It is the illusory acquisition of the transgressor that is punished by this asymmetry of divine and mortal will. The gods only punish the *noos* of unjust men in the poem of Theognis.

Wealth is the first word of the poem. Gain and acquisition are the actions singled out by the elegy to reflect on the nature of divine order in time. Transgressors have seized (ἐλῶν) the goods they own, and that disruption will be corrected, Theognis tells us. The boundaries of wealth are very emphatically left open in the poem. The possession of the just man is not only secure, ἔμπεδος as in Solon, it is αἰεὶ παρμόνιμον – permanent for all times.²⁵² This persistence in continuity defines it to the exclusion of all other characteristics. The possession of the unjust, on the other hand, leads to certain punishment. Echoing the τελέθει of line 198, the τελευτήν of line 201 emphasises the contrast between the present moment and the ultimate outcome. The τελευτή is the endpoint towards which the mind of the gods is turned, in opposition to the ephemeral illusion of men. For these mortals, the end of wealth lies unseen. As in the first half of Solon’s *Elegy to the Muses*, the contrast between the true and the false stability of wealth in time is a matter of justice in Theognis 197–208. If Theognis’ poem stages a view directly opposite to that of the second half of the *Elegy to the Muses*, however, its stance does not simply follow the first half of Solon’s masterpiece.

Intention is the root of transgression in this poem. It is not only the unjust act that ultimately unleashes punishment, but the motivation that lies behind it. The φιλοκερδέι θυμῷ of the man who unduly accumulates wealth is singled out in line 199 as the third element of a rising threefold.

²⁵¹ Van Groningen 1966: 78.

²⁵² See Van Groningen 1966: 77.

The greed of his heart governs the blindness of his *noos*. The κέρδος he craves is an illusion. His love for gain leads to the harm of his loved ones (φίλοισιν). In opposition to the ‘pure’ action of the just man, the act that takes place καθαρῶς, the desire of the transgressor is characterised by a negative emotion.²⁵³ In continuity with old evolutionist paradigms, scholars of the ‘inner self’ still tend to dismiss the complexity of the ethics of emotions represented in the archaic period as primitive beginnings and examples of a simple early stage of culture in the discovery of the mind.²⁵⁴ ‘Archaic wisdom’ mostly concerns ethics. The complex ethical stances of the poems, even if they are harder to recover, deserve the same attention as the intricacies of style and metre.²⁵⁵ By looking ever harder for the differences of nuance and contrast between contemporary texts, we can gain a better understanding of the precise stance taken by a poem. The *intention* of greed is underlined as a cause of divine punishment in Theognis 197–208. The gods punish and reward acts based on their underlying motivations. The third element of the list of positive conditions for gain presented in lines 197–8, the purity of the acquisition, is placed in parallel with the greed of intention, the third element of the list of negative characteristics of line 199. There can be no doubt that καθαρῶς here has some kind of ethical value. The ‘purity’ mentioned in the text is neither completely objective nor ritual – it involves intention. As such, it is a direct parallel to the ἀλιτρός θυμός of Solon 13.27–8, the ‘wicked heart’ of the transgressor whose crime will eventually be revealed. The ἀδίκως of Theognis is the opposite of pure.

A strong link is expressed between the interior state of a man and the nature of the possession he holds. The rotten greed of the transgressor is echoed in the impurity of his acquisition. The immediate appearance of gain ultimately gives way to the reality of consequence. As in Solon, αὐτίκα is confronted with αὔθις.²⁵⁶ The same usage of the aorist to indicate the timeless certitude of punishment is found in both poems. But the emphasis on intention is different. In Theognis the *noos* of the unjust man cannot discern the true nature of the κέρδος craved for by his heart and the κέρδος he has acquired through that greed. The interior and the exterior hide a similar deception. Such false wealth embodies the illusion of the *thymos*. That deception tricks the minds of men and the *noos* of the

²⁵³ See Van Groningen 1966: 77.

²⁵⁴ Ideas such as those of J. Böhme 1929 and Snell 1953 [1946] still loom large; contrast e.g. with Clarke 1999.

²⁵⁵ Cf. the wide-ranging study of Soni 2011 on the interactions of ethics and narrative.

²⁵⁶ 13.29 and 31 W; see p. 245.

gods comes triumphant in the end, ἐς δὲ τελευτήν. In Solon the hidden *thymos* of the transgressor is also revealed in the end, ἐς τέλος, as it never escapes the memory of Zeus in the great expanse of eternal time (αἰεὶ . . . διαμπερές) – for the god *oversees* the end of all things.²⁵⁷ Whereas the perception of the gods in Solon's poem is a matter of agency, in Theognis it is a question of difference in perspective. In Theognis the gods do not 'oversee' the punishment, as in Solon, but the emphasis is placed on the act itself, and the responsibility of the transgressor in his own downfall.

In Solon the 'wicked *thymos*' that does not escape the attention of Zeus is the heart of the transgressor, the interior state of the man who has committed the crime. It is 'revealed' when the punishment is made to answer the crime. The poem focuses on the effect of crime after the deed, and the tension between the possibility of delayed sanction and the lack of responsibility of the innocent children and descendants punished for the action of their forebears, the ἀναίτιοι. What matters in that text is cosmic symmetry and the re-establishment of balance in due time. The circulation of equivalence is the operating principle. The 'wicked *thymos*' of the transgressor does not stay hidden within the individual, it becomes an objective value, a debt that cannot be forgotten or remain concealed and must ultimately be paid. The desire (ἡμείρω) of the first-person voice at the beginning of the poem is not ethically charged, and neither is its echo, the κορέσειεν of line 73 at the end. It is the act that is underlined, the objective *hybris* of the deed; the *hybris* of the poem is an act, not a mental state.²⁵⁸ The *Elegy to the Muses* is one long disquisition about the dangers of ill-acquired wealth. It relates the trajectory of that transgressive πλοῦτος which advances (in time) οὐ κατὰ κόσμον. As it 'attends' injustice, the wealth itself appears as an agent in the poem.²⁵⁹ Obeying unjust deeds, it is quickly corrupted, it becomes 'mixed' with *atē*, an appropriately symptotic image of perverted association. In the *Elegy to the Muses* the presence of *atē* is an outcome of the injustice set in motion by *hybris*. *Atē* is the looming disaster that quickly becomes part of the deed, hiding until it becomes manifest in god's good time. Like the 'wicked heart' of the transgressor, it will ultimately be 'revealed' through punishment. It is the unseemly progression of wealth on the road to punishment whose agency the poem emphasises. The wealth advances 'unwillingly' (οὐκ ἐθέλων ἔπεται) – a striking image of the elegy (13).²⁶⁰ This ἐθέλων answers the ἐθέλω of line 8. The will of the mortal voice, like the will of wealth, is an outcome, not a

²⁵⁷ See p. 234.²⁵⁸ See Fisher 2000.²⁵⁹ See p. 230.²⁶⁰ See p. 231.

factor of morality. The gods are the ones who determine the true justice of an act in the end. The *noos* of mortal blindness fails to understand the effects of its acts.

In Solon the wicked *thymos* is revealed at the moment of punishment. The contrast is clear between the hidden, interior nature of *thymos* and the open, visible event of the eventual sanction. Punishment is a demonstration of divine power. It joins act to consequence for all to see. The wicked heart of the person who receives divine vengeance belongs to the object of Zeus's memory. The point is that this time operates beyond human time. It has nothing to do with intention, emotion, will. The *thymos* of the man who is revealed as the god's rightful victim can belong to someone far removed from the crime, children or descendants who have no responsibility in it: ἀνάτιοι.²⁶¹ The poem's emphasis on the punishment of the ἀνάτιοι leads to no moral outrage. It is the debt that must be uncovered, the price that must be paid back. This characterisation is far removed from any hint of an ethical choice. The power of *atē*, like the germ of the fire that slowly grows to its full force, comes back to take its due.

The relation between *noos* and *thymos* in Theognis' poem follows a different logic. Whereas in Solon the *thymos* of the transgressor is revealed as wicked at the moment of the punishment of the innocent, the poem of Theognis emphasises its agency at the moment of the crime. In the *Elegy to the Muses* injustice is caused by an act, a transgression that breaks objective barriers of order. In Theognis 197–208, injustice is measured by the motivation of the act. The affection for gain that defines the *thymos* of the Theognidean criminal is what points to injustice. Ἀδίκως, in that view, is presented as the combination of two elements: the instrumental desire of the individual, and the lack of opportunity (καῖρός) that marks the act.²⁶² The characterisation of the faulty acquisition as one that is done παρὰ καῖρόν is as important as the emphasis on the ἀδίκως of the same line. Missing the adequate occasions, the right moment of the καῖρός, is the crime. Doing it with a φιλοκερδέι θυμῷ is what makes it an injustice.

This type of acquisition is placed on a parallel footing with another crime: seizing something unjustly through an oath. The second element of the pair of actions framed by εἰ . . . εἴθ' . . . is a mirror of the first. The ἐλῶν echoes the κτήσεται, the πᾶρ τὸ δίκαιον answers the ἀδίκως παρὰ καῖρόν, and the dative ὄρκῳ follows the dative φιλοκερδέι θυμῷ. These two models of unjust acquisition are presented as negative opposites of the

²⁶¹ See p. 239.

²⁶² See Van Groningen 1966: 78.

just, pure acquisition which comes from Zeus and remains for all time. The words ὄρκῳ . . . ἐλῶν clearly refer to perjury.²⁶³ Breaking an oath and untimely seizing riches with a heart of greed are the crimes that are singled out as provoking certain punishment in due time. They have in common the fact that they create a tension between the apparent, outward gain and the hidden ethical duplicity that lies behind it. Opposition of perceptions ultimately traps the culprit. While he believes (δοκεῖ) that he has acquired a κέρδος, he fails to see that it is in fact a κακόν. His *noos* is tricked by the illusion. The τῶδε of line 203 can be read as either anaphoric or proleptic.²⁶⁴ In both cases it refers to the deception of time. In opposition to the enduring, stable possession of the just man, the goods of the unjust are marked for eventual punishment. The disruption of time provoked by the crime παρὰ καιρόν results in a disruption of time separating the event and its consequence. Punishment for transgressions, ἀμπλακίας, does not fall at the time of the act.²⁶⁵ Delay is the filter that separates the perception of men and gods, the present of human action in line 201 and the different temporality of divine action in the aorist of line 202. The man who intends to acquire goods unjustly, to 'seize' them, will become the object of his own greed. *Dikē* will one day seize him or his children. For the person who does not pay the penalty himself is leaving the debt to his descendants. Instead of him carrying (φέρειν) the κέρδος that his heart craves, it will be death that carries destruction (κῆρα φέρων) as it sits on his eyes.²⁶⁶ Mortal perception cannot see beyond the limits of death. The *atē* that lies suspended over the heads of the children of those transgressors who have not paid their debts themselves escapes their short sight. Like the *atē* that looms above the heads of a criminal's progeny, the superior *noos* of the gods stands above that of men. Affection for greed (φιλοκερδέει) becomes doom for one's dear (φιλοισιν) progeny. The poem ends with an open-ended threat.

The continuity of wealth lies at the heart of the text. Instead of transmitting goods to his descendants, the unjust man leaves them punishment as a heritage. As in Hesiod, the false wealth of perjury brings destruction to an entire line of descent. The presence of the oath and the ethical quality of inheritance as themes in this text stands out from a contrast with Solon. These elements of heredity are not found as explicitly articulated in the *Elegy to the Muses*. Neither are they simply traditional

²⁶³ So Van Groningen 1966: 78.

²⁶⁴ Cf. Van Groningen 1966: 79.

²⁶⁵ Van Groningen 1966: 79 refers to Empedocles 115.3 DK as a parallel.

²⁶⁶ See Van Groningen 1966: 80.

elements of poetic wisdom inherited from the baggage of earlier texts.²⁶⁷ The theme of illusory wealth, which plays a distinctive role in the Theognidean corpus, is clearly activated by this poem.

The idea that what seems to be gold or silver might actually be worthless lead under the surface is a staple of Theognidean poetry.²⁶⁸ Applied to the aristocratic ethical discourse of the archaic symposium, it provides the cornerstone to what Leslie Kurke has called the 'language of metals'. A man's true character lies behind the glimmer of outside appearance; what shines is regularly revealed as worthless metal by the testing stone. Appearance and reality are often at odds in the determination of worth. The notion of conventional value brought forward by the advent of coinage provoked massive changes in many aspects of the Greek cultural landscape, especially all those facets of thought that dealt with issues of wealth and the circulation of value. This upheaval in the measure of worth and the transmission of wealth was a threat to the established order of aristocratic landowners, and it generated hostile representation in the literature of the elite symposium.²⁶⁹ In Theognis the false value of metals functions as a symbol for the false value of persons. True worth is not a question of appearance. The rapid transaction can trick faulty perception and only the right trial can uncover the kernel behind the gleam. The circulation of wealth is a mirror for the evaluation of character. The real worth of a man, like the value of gold, resists the transactions of time. The tyrant and the *kakos* can glitter for a few brief moments of illusion. The *agathoi* will retain their just, god-given inheritance throughout these upheavals.

That Theognidean web of themes informs the whole poem. The wicked *thymos* of the unjust fools his *noos* into believing that he has acquired something of value. The wealth he holds, however, is no more than failed perception. The object of the transgressor's wicked intention, the desire of greed, is just a deception. Its momentary illusion is eventually revealed for what it truly is. What the gods refuse to give they take away in the end. Stability, permanence, transmission are denied the perjurer. He leaves punishment rather than goods as an inheritance to his descendants. The ephemeral acquisition is a net loss in the course of time. The poem of Theognis, in other words, projects the core idea of delayed justice in its most simple form. Transgression is always punished in due time. No one

²⁶⁷ See the rich pages of Versnel 2011: 218–31 on the circulation of gnomic wisdom in the archaic period, with bibliography.

²⁶⁸ Kurke 1989; 1999: 42–3; 50–5.

²⁶⁹ Kurke 1999: 17–18.

escapes, even those who die without having paid their due. Vengeance will fall on their children and the balance be redressed. This end lies beyond the limits of death. The short *noos* of mortal men is incapable of understanding the superior *noos* of the gods and its superior designs.

The elegy thus covers the same ground as the first half of the *Elegy to the Muses*. It uses the same vocabulary, the same images, the same ideas. It follows the same generic conventions and belongs to the same performance context. Yet, despite the clear dialogue that links the poetry of Solon and Theognis in so many places, there is no reason to believe that the Theognidean elegy somehow reflects the Solonic masterpiece in this case. Despite the thematic similarities, there is no shared formula in the two poems, no direct verbal echo. Neither poem is a copy of the other. Rather, they both look at a similar object with the shared diction of contemporary symptotic elegy. Both focus on the transmission and acquisition of wealth. Both insist on the asymmetry of perception. Profound differences, however, can be discerned between the two poems behind the apparent identity of thought. The poem of Theognis has little of the high abstraction found in Solon's text. Justice is defined in greater relief and in more personal terms. It involves intention and the face-to-face trust of the oath exchange. The ethical choice of the individual is at the heart of the poem's message. The presence of *horkos* and intention indicates a certain continuity with the earlier representations of ancestral fault. The line between the breaking of an oath and the punishment of children, the insistence on the will of the perjurer as a cause of the crime, place the text on a direct line of continuity with Hesiod, one that Solon does not share to the same extent.²⁷⁰ Yet, as much as the poem owes to the traditional cluster of associations linked to ancestral fault in earlier literature, it fully integrates the idea to the specific circumstances of its own perspective and the logic of its voice. Intention, for example, is given a much more prominent role than anything we find in Hesiod.

The ideas of justice and acquisition, the meaning of *καίρως*, the circulation of goods represented in this poem of the aristocratic symposium point in a different direction from the civic manifesto of Solon for the triumph *ἐς μέσον*. The role of inheritance and transmission strike opposite chords in the two poems. Ancestral fault, cast in the same diction and shape of contemporary symptotic elegy, can be made to project the radically different values of rival poetic traditions. The poem of Theognis, at once closer to Hesiod's antecedent than Solon's text, and thoroughly anchored

²⁷⁰ See Zalewska 1986.

in another ideological frame, offers a fascinating glimpse into the dynamics of culture and the range of meaning that can be expressed through ancestral fault in the fragmented world of archaic elegy.

While Theognis 197–208 deals with the principle of delayed justice, poem 731–52 is concerned with the idea of the innocent's legacy.

Ζεῦ πάτερ, εἴθε γένοιτο θεοῖς φίλα τοῖς μὲν ἀλιτροῖς
 ὕβριν ἀδεῖν, καὶ σφιν τοῦτο γένοιτο φίλον
 θυμῷ, σχέτλια ἔργα † διατὰ φρεσὶ δ' ὅστις † ἀθήνησ
 ἐργάζοιτο θεῶν μηδὲν ὀπιζόμενος,
 αὐτὸν ἔπειτα πάλιν τεῖσαι κακά, μηδ' ἔτ' ὀπίσσω 735
 πατρὸς ἀτασθαλῖαι παισὶ γένοιτο κακόν·
 παῖδες δ' οἵτ' ἀδίκου πατρὸς τὰ δίκαια νοεῦντες
 ποιῶσιν, Κρονίδη, σὸν χόλον ἀζόμενοι,
 ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὰ δίκαια μετ' ἀστοῖσιν φιλέοντες,
 μή τιν' ὑπερβασίην ἀντιτίней πατέρων. 740
 ταῦτ' εἴη μακάρεσσι θεοῖς φίλα· νῦν δ' ὁ μὲν ἔρδων
 ἐκφεύγει, τὸ κακόν δ' ἄλλος ἔπειτα φέρει.
 καὶ τοῦτ', ἀθανάτων βασιλεῦ, πῶς ἔστι δίκαιον,
 ἔργων ὅστις ἀνὴρ ἐκτὸς ἐὼν ἀδίκων,
 μή τιν' ὑπερβασίην κατέχων μῆθ' ὄρκον ἀλιτρόν, 745
 ἀλλὰ δίκαιος ἐὼν, μὴ τὰ δίκαια πάθη;
 τίς δὴ κεν βροτὸς ἄλλος ὁρῶν πρὸς τοῦτον ἔπειτα
 ἄζοιτ' ἀθανάτους, καὶ τίνα θυμὸν ἔχων,
 ὀπιπτότ' ἀνὴρ ἄδικος καὶ ἀτάσθαλος, οὔτε τευ ἀνδρὸς
 οὔτε τευ ἀθανάτων μῆνιν ἀλευόμενος, 750
 ὕβριζι πλούτῳ κεκορημένος, οἱ δὲ δίκαιοι
 τρύχονται χαλεπῇ τειρόμενοι πενίῃ;

Father Zeus, would that it pleased the gods that wanton outrage delighted sinners and that wicked deeds pleased the hearts of the gods. But that whoever acted . . ., without regard for the gods, should then pay woeful requital in person, and the father's sins should no longer be a bane for his sons afterwards; and would that sons of an unjust father who act with just intent, dreading your anger, son of Cronus, and loving justice from the start in their dealings with fellow townsmen, should not pay for the transgressions of their fathers. May this be pleasing to the blessed gods. But now the perpetrator escapes and another then suffers misery. Also, king of the immortals, how is it right that a man who keeps from unjust deeds and does not commit transgressions and perjury, but is just, suffers unjustly? What other mortal, looking upon him, would then be in awe of the immortals? What frame of mind would he have whenever an unjust and wicked man who does not avoid the wrath of any man or god commits wanton outrage and rolls in wealth, while the just are worn out and consumed by harsh poverty? (trans. Gerber)

The text, which does not appear to be incomplete, is composed of two parts.²⁷¹ The first consists in a counterfactual wish describing an ideal system of justice where the unjust are punished for their own crimes and the children do not pay for the transgressions of their fathers. The second part confronts this with the reality of unjust suffering. The elegy is designed as a complaint to Zeus. Direct addresses to the god are placed at the beginning of each section and in the middle of the poem. The tone of despair at the obvious injustice of divine action taps into the long tradition of eastern Mediterranean lamentation that the Greeks adapted to their own verse in the archaic period.²⁷² Theognis 373–400 is the closest parallel to 731–52.²⁷³ Like that text, it directly reproaches Zeus for his inability to discriminate between right and wrong action. The inadequation of crime and punishment is a permanent accusation against the idea of divine justice. The poet's angry monologue to the supreme god is an expression of hopelessness at the ethical compass of the universe addressed to Zeus.²⁷⁴ The lack of any first-person characterisation in this poem does not point towards an ironic stance. The θαυμάζω σε of line 373 is hardly an indication of impolite arrogance.²⁷⁵ What we have in this text is a distinctive category of elegiac complaint poetry about failed cosmic justice. Theognis 731–52 belongs to a different type of literature from 197–208.

The idea of ancestral fault found in that poem is not another facet of a coherent Theognidean theology on the notion of delayed generational punishment, but another example of the thematic adaptation of the idea to the stance of the Theognidean voice. The idea of ancestral fault is not defined for itself or questioned in the poem. Neither its nature nor meaning is the object of the poem. Taken for granted as an accepted fact, it is used in the text to further the force of the complaint thrown at the world by the song. Poem 731–52 covers almost exactly the same ground as 373–400. The main difference between the two is the presence of ancestral fault in the former. There it expands the temporal span of the elegy's generic lamentation. The idea of ancestral fault is activated to play a part in a larger argument.

The aim of 731–52 is diametrically opposed to that of 197–208. While the first is designed as a vindication of divine justice, the other is a shout of

²⁷¹ Many have argued that these two parts are in fact two poems; see for instance Van Groningen 1966: 290–1. I agree with E. Harrison 1902: 165 that 'the division at 742 is between two periods, not two poems'; cf. p. 201. For the abruptness of the transition, cf. Verdenius 1960; Cobb-Stevens 1985.

²⁷² Labarbe 1980; M. L. West 1997: 512–24.

²⁷³ See Van Groningen 1966: 290.

²⁷⁴ See Labarbe 1980; Garzya 1988. Could an ironic tinge be read in the Κροῖδῃ of 738?

²⁷⁵ Van Groningen 1966: 148–9.

outrage at its lack of humanity. The first correspondingly refers to one aspect of ancestral fault: the idea of delayed justice. The second draws on the other aspect of ancestral fault, the paradox of the innocent's legacy. Like Theognis 197–208, poem 731–52 has been compared to Solon's text. Some have even argued that it is dependent on the *Elegy to the Muses* or influenced by it.²⁷⁶ As in the case of 197–208, I see no reason to accept this. Theognis 731–52 illustrates its complaint to Zeus through the paradox of the innocent's legacy. As such, it contains many similarities with the second half of the *Elegy to the Muses*, and oppositions to the ideas of the first half. Such thematic parallels are certainly no indication of direct intertextual links. Similarly, the presence of the same imagery and vocabulary to treat the same theme in these contemporary elegiac poems of the symposium cannot be understood to establish direct contact between the two poems. No direct echo links these texts and neither poem derives from the other. Rather, they both react, in their own way, to the same idea. Observing the differences that distinguish the two repays the effort.

In 731–52, the unfulfilled wish of the poem's first part is answered by the reality of the second. The *ἔργων* of line 744 echoes the *ἔργα* of 733 and the *ἐργάζοιτο* of 734; the *ὑπερβασίην* of 745, the *ὑπερβασίην* of 740; the *ἀλιτρόν* of 745, the *ἀλιτροῖς* of 731; the *μή τὰ δίκαια* of 746, the *τὰ δίκαια* of 737 and 739; the *ἄζοιτ'* of 748, the *ἄζόμενοι* of 738; the *θυμὸν* of 748, the *θυμῷ* of 733; the *ἀτάσθαλος* of 749, the *ἀτασθαλίαι* of 736; the *ὑβρίζη* of 751, the *ὑβριν* of 732.²⁷⁷ The two sections establish a similar link between will, action, perception, punishment, and time. The first section is built as a ring (*φίλα . . . φίλα*) within the wider ring of the poem (*ὑβριν . . . ὑβρίζη*). In the first section, the impunity of the transgressor's actions contrasts with their consequences on the innocent descendants who have to pay for them. This is answered in the second section by the contrast between those who commit a crime and the other people who have to pay for it. The elegy is a finally crafted piece.

A striking feature of this poem is its emphasis on will and perception. While the second half of line 733 is hopelessly corrupt, and I do not wish to add another conjecture to the long list of proposed reconstructions, it almost certainly contained the word *φρεσί*, and that refers to the *ὅστις* of the same line, the person who does not avoid injustice.²⁷⁸ The gods of the first line are sarcastically mentioned with respect to their pleasure at the

²⁷⁶ Van Groningen 1966: 290; see Versnel 2011: 211, n. 138.

²⁷⁷ E. Harrison 1902: 201; Van Groningen 1966: 290–291.

²⁷⁸ E. Harrison 1902: 328; Van Groningen 1966: 285–7.

delight of the ἄλιτροί in *hybris*.²⁷⁹ The gods, the transgressors, and the just man are all characterised by their cognition in this poem. Their mental and 'emotional' link to a deed, rather than the act itself, is the focus of the elegy. The children of the transgressor, similarly, are defined by their intentions, the understanding of justice that lies behind what they do (737). The verb νοεῦντες in this line is key to the meaning of the text. Internal motivation and the just *noos* of innocent descendants are at the heart of the picture of justice painted by this elegy. This is what we saw in the second section of the poem as well. It ends with a statement about the effect of impunity on the perception of men: what they see (ὁρῶν) and what effect this has on their *thymos*. Contrary to the unfulfilled wish of the first section, then, the gods of the second are shown to foster *hybris* and shameful acts in the *thymos* of the innocents.

Intention is marked as the essence of responsibility in the two texts. Its transmission in time is denied and the principle of delayed generational punishment singled out as an embodiment of injustice. Just like the descendants of the transgressor in the *Elegy to the Muses*, the son of the unjust father can be innocent. The ἄλιτροί are defined by their pleasure in *hybris*, the desire they have for shameful deeds in their *thymos*. But whereas the ἄλιτρος θυμός of the transgressor can be revealed through the just punishment of his innocent descendants in the poem of Solon, the just man of the Theognidean elegy can have no part in the ἄλιτρος ὄρκος of someone else. What is a statement in Solon is a problem in Theognis. An oath is someone else's word. The perjurer 'possesses' (κατέχων) the tainted oath – the punishment of another person for it is cast as a paradigm of divine injustice.²⁸⁰ The mention of perjury in this regard is far from being a coincidence. This is not a random crime chosen from other potentially equivalent transgressions. The only specific action of a text that deals mostly with abstract ideas is exactly the one we would expect to find in an archaic poem that is centred around ancestral fault. It reproduces the common pattern of association between oath and delayed generational punishment exemplified by *Iliad* 4, *Works and Days* 280–5, or Theognis 197–208. Only, contrary to these passages, and the undoubtedly countless number of such texts that have not come down to us, this poem singles out the oath as the crime that should *not* be punished upon someone else.

²⁷⁹ Contrary to Van Groningen 1966: 285, I do not believe that the σφιν of the second line necessarily refers to the gods. Whoever the referent, the important thing to note is the emphasis on ἀδεῖν, which should indeed not be emended away.

²⁸⁰ See Van Groningen 1966: 289.

It turns the traditional wisdom of justice poetry on its head and denies the value of perjury's sanction over generations. Punishing one who stays away from unjust acts, who does not 'possess' the ἀλιτρός ὄρκος himself, is a spectacle of ethical failure. What is supposed to serve as an example of justice and a demonstration of divine order is in fact an attack on the very principle of justice and an incitation to crime. Uncannily similar to the exactly contemporary condemnations of Ezekiel 18 against the Hebrew idea of corporate responsibility, as Melanchthon observed, 'the children's teeth set on edge' and the crimes of the fathers punished unto the third and the fourth generation, the Theognidean poet sets himself against a long baggage of texts and voices and proclaims the principle of sole personal responsibility.²⁸¹

Like Ezekiel, elegy 731–52 attacks an established tenet of cosmic justice in time. It contests the idea of generational responsibility and presents the individual agent, αὐτός, as the only guarantor of his own act. This is how we can make best sense of the words ἐξ ἀρχῆς in line 739. They do not simply mean 'from the start' but redefine the start of one's own life as the only legitimate beginning.²⁸² When the text characterises an individual as having practised justice ἐξ ἀρχῆς it separates his action from any other point of origin. He is not liable for any actions that took place before that. Not having committed a transgression himself, not 'possessing' any ὑπερβασίη, he should not be punished for the ὑπερβασίη of his parents. The poet sees it as an outrage that the ἀτάσθαλος commits his crime without consequence while others suffer for the ἀτασθαλίαι of their fathers.²⁸³ Contrary to the received wisdom of delayed punishment found in earlier and contemporary literature, he makes a clear separation between the ἔπειτα of later life and the ὀπίσσω of another generation. That distinction transforms the κακά of the criminal into a scandalously unjust κακόν for his children.

Contrary to the Book of Ezekiel, however, Theognis 731–52 is not bringing forth a new prophecy to announce a change in the cosmic order. It does not declare the abolition of a previous paradigm of justice but offers a condemnation of the order presently in place. The contrafactual wish of the first section and the accusations of the second are directed at a principle whose reality is not questioned. The idea that children can be punished for

²⁸¹ On Ezekiel 18, see e.g. Krašovec 1999: 474–80; Wong 2001; Joyce 2007; de Jonge and Tromp 2007; Jenson 2009; cf. Selle 2008: 331–7. On Melanchthon's reading of Theognis 731–52, see pp. 91–2.

²⁸² Pace Van Groningen 1966: 287–8, I see no merit in reading ἀρχή as *principium* in this line.

²⁸³ Van Groningen 1966: 287.

the crimes of their fathers, even those who stayed away from all wrong themselves, is presented as a commonly accepted fact. The poem attacks a general and recognised conception of justice, the type of idea defined and celebrated by Theognis 197–208. It shows how widespread ancestral fault was in the cultural background of the archaic elegy. It also indicates how disagreements over its significance could be laid out.

While Theognis 197–208 is centred on the principle of delayed punishment, poem 731–52 revolves around the paradox of the innocent's legacy. If Solon's poem manages to combine both aspects of ancestral fault in one complex imbrication of perspectives, in Theognis each perspective stands alone. What the first text defends the second text attacks. There is no theological coherence in the Theognidean usage of ancestral fault. The corpus can accommodate two directly opposite views of the same idea. Yet, contrary to Solon, it does not do this by contrasting perspectives, but by adapting each aspect of the idea to a different message. Although the messages of 197–208 and 731–52 are fundamentally opposed to each other, they can be read as channelling similar stances in their representation of social order. For 731–52, like 197–208, the scandal is the inadequation of justice and wealth. Perjurers and criminals prosper. The man of *hybris* is wrapped in riches and the just man is 'worn out and consumed by harsh poverty'. Those who understand τὰ δίκαια and foster it in the city are punished by the gods.²⁸⁴ The state of the *polis* is an embodiment of disharmony. The cultivation of justice within the group of *astoi* is rewarded with ruin. Attacks against the social fabric lead to prosperity.

It is in the meaning ascribed to this bleak social picture that the two poems differ. Both are concerned with the perception of justice and its enactment in time. The direction of their statements, however, is radically opposite. For 197–208, the appearance of injustice is an illusion. Stability is the true measure of order and the ultimate reparation of transgression over generations is the absolute guarantee of *dikē*. The temporary wealth of the criminal disappears before the vision of the gods. The limited *noos* of men, unable to see beyond death, is subjugated by a justice that escapes its understanding. Ancestral fault is used to vindicate the world beyond all appearances of cosmic disorder. The crisis of social upheaval that lies at the heart of Theognidean poetry is given an acceptable meaning. For 731–52, it is a source of lamentation. The fact that the just are not rewarded and that the criminal go unpunished is not the foil of a future resolution. That state of dystopian disorder is the endpoint of the cosmic injustice that forms the

²⁸⁴ See Seng 1988.

kernel of divine action. By punishing transgression on others, the gods actually encourage crime. Worse than the world of contingency described by the Homeric heroes or the capricious destruction of divine power that sweeps through the mere mortals of contemporary poetry, the picture of the Theognidean elegy is one of systematic injustice. Delayed generational punishment imposes a structure of entropy on the world. The expanded time of divinity transforms every action into its opposite. Crime is punished on the pious. The moral basis of divine sanction is a contradiction of the very basis of just retribution. The social upheaval of the Theognidean city is a reflection of the cosmic imbalance that separates divine and human time. While in 197–208 that distinction between gods and mortals is the key of the inevitable justice at work behind apparent disorder, in 731–52 it is the foundation of the perpetual disorder transmitted from father to son. While the victory of the divine *noos* over limited human understanding points to the ultimate triumph of justice and moral intelligibility in 197–208, elegy 731–52 emphasises its effect on the perception of men. Through the effect of delayed generational punishment, men can see and understand in their *noos* that transgression is rewarded and piety punished. The pillar of the broken social order teaches men to commit crimes. The poet can wish for an end to this situation, an abolition of that transmission through time so that it no longer (μηδ' ἔτ') governs the exercise of justice (735). The optative picture of his counterfactual is contrasted (νῦν δ') to the indicative reality of the present (741).²⁸⁵ The elegiac poet laments the world. Contrary to the prophet Ezekiel, he does not have the power to proclaim its transformation. The idea of ancestral fault belongs to the way things are. It cannot be wished away.

The ancestral fault poems of Theognis offer a glimpse into the adaptability of the idea. Two elegies of the same tradition present diametrically opposed views of its meaning, each one based on a different facet of the idea. Ancestral fault is used to further a standard, generic point in both poems: inevitable justice in the first, cosmic disorder in the second. It plays the role of a readily recognisable element of the cultural background shared by the audience. Its activation allows each text to broaden the thematic resonance of time, kinship, the transmission of inheritance, and justice pursued in its verse. Inevitable justice is transformed into a reflection on the place of time in punishment. The time of cosmic disorder becomes a specific accusation against divine action through heredity. The idea of delayed generational punishment anchors the meaning of the text in a

²⁸⁵ Van Groningen 1966: 287.

shared, striking concept of the contemporary audience and reinterprets its contested meaning in the process.

Ancestral fault appears to have been charged with ever-broader functions in the poetry of this period. No longer limited to the ritual institution of the oath, it is found in a wide variety of texts as a pivotal idea through which a vision of justice in time can be expressed. As the face-to-face social economy of the oath and the hereditary wealth of land and livestock progressively gave way to the conventional economy of monetary exchange and the rapid shift of fortune in the rapidly expanding *poleis* of the period, the idea of transmission was thoroughly transformed and opened to radically new possibilities of meaning. The urgency of placing the perpetual crisis of the present in the long course of time certainly contributed to bringing new attention to the old idea expressed already long ago in the poems of Homer and Hesiod.

Whether it be in the aristocratic animosity of Alcaeus against Pittakos or in the grandiose Solonic portrait of triumphant justice, in the Theognidean song of hope or the complaint of its matching song of lament, the idea of ancestral fault recurs in sixth-century symptotic poetry as a major concern of poet and audience. The same constellation of themes and vocabulary reappears in all these texts. It is consistently used to trace the position of a group in the city. A group's power and wealth can be contested by redefining the legacy of the past and the promises of the future. The justification of privilege can be undermined through attacks on continuity and negations of heredity. The idea of ancestral fault became a battleground of competing voices using it to represent their adversaries in contrast to their own claims. What is at stake is no less than the role of time in justice and the place of heredity as an agent of privilege. Our more than fragmentary record presents us with myriad facets of the idea. Each text adapts it to its own purposes. A recognisable concept of contested value in the symposium of the sixth century, ancestral fault was constantly being reshaped and redefined by the rival poetic *personae* fighting to assert their vision of the city. It lies at the heart of a struggle of perceptions and knowledge, the *noos* of different groups of men and the memory of their poets. It affects the place of the present in time, the meaning of the past and the shape of the future. As poetic authority evolved into the classical period, so too did the theological functions and the cultural significance of that perpetually contested idea.

Tracking divine punishment in Herodotus

If the poetic expression of ancestral fault was mostly based on the ritual logic of the great oath of extermination in the early archaic period, or the agonistic performance of wisdom at the aristocratic symposium in the time of Solon and Theognis, it became an idea of much broader currency in the fifth century. We now find it in ritual texts, in medical literature, in wisdom poetry and lyric verse, in historiographical investigation and forensic oratory, in philosophy, and especially in tragedy, as the next chapter will show in some detail. The variety of relevant texts is matched by the variety of functions given to the idea. No longer bounded by one dominant context, it became instrumental for an unprecedentedly wide array of situations and messages at this time. The poetics of ancestral fault, in the classical period, no longer had a fixed location. Unmoored from any limited ritual or performative environment, now explicitly conceptualised in the widely disseminated literature of earlier generations, brimming with a huge potential of cultural significance, malleable and available for adaptation and reinterpretation, it readily found a meaning and a place in a large number of unrelated areas of Greek culture. It is striking, in that context, to note that the great extension of its reach was not accompanied by a greater fragmentation of its expressions. There is a clear logic and a certain consistency to the range of its representations that crosses over the diversity of genre and message in which it is found in the period. One major factor for the consistency of this implicit theology is the persistent presence of the literary antecedents of earlier times. Once part of the canon, the written landmarks that had inscribed the idea of ancestral fault in the poetry of archaic Greece never left its cultural memory.

As the expanding literacy of the Greek cities continued to accumulate and interpret the texts of earlier generations in the classical period, to build an archive of reference and authority over which new texts could be composed, and as these layers of meaning accumulated ever further in the written records of authors and audiences, the reiteration of a distinctive

idea like ancestral fault was ever more tightly linked to precedents. Part of the transmission and diffusion of these precedents remained 'oral', of course, but what matters here is that their fixed written forms stayed in the cultural landscape (mostly) unchanged long after any performance imperative had disappeared.¹ A dialogue of texts that was not strictly determined by the immediate cultural environment was becoming more and more common. The deeper diachrony opened by this confrontation laid the ground for a greater range of experimentation with the meanings of ancestral fault. The written archive had become the necessary background against which new formulations of the idea were positioned. What essentially functioned as a rivalry of living poetic voices for Alcaeus, Solon, or Theognis had become a stance in the increasingly crowded field of fixed tradition for the author of the classical Greek city. Giving shape to ancestral fault, from then onwards, necessarily involved marking a position in relation to the landmarks of the past. Antecedents could be activated and continuities underlined, echoes struck, old thoughts given new life. With the constitution of a written memory of traditional wisdom now providing a massive channel of communication over space and time for the circulation of authoritative culture, repetition and adaptation, sometimes over long distances, allowed for the constitution of a distinctive, recognisable shape for the notion of ancestral fault that transcended any one context. While the exchanges of Solon and Theognis were shaped by a tense interaction within the contemporary context of the elite symposium, a mostly synchronic chain of reference, the fifth-century record presents us with a different kind of dialogue. Representations of ancestral fault can be seen to develop a certain level of resemblance as deeper diachronic chains of reference were formed, as new texts continued to return to the same models and to reference each other ever more tightly in their formulations. A limited semantic field of vocabulary, images, and associations thus coalesced around the central intersections of these recurrent references. The literary landmarks of the past functioned as networks of associations linking together disparate strands of thought through direct activation, circumscribed bodies of related texts, or more diffuse channels of dialogue: restricted, median, and open intertextuality.² It is not always possible to distinguish the three. Whatever the case, a more distinctive idea progressively emerged out of this process.

¹ Cf. the important terminological clarifications of 'oral' and 'written' for early Greek poetry in Bakker 2005a.

² See p. 10.

This is not to say that ancestral fault should be seen as a precisely defined cultural category in the fifth century. It had not yet been crystallised as an object of explicit theology. It had no solid boundaries. The fluid, ever-changing semantic field of ancestral fault, in that period, is better understood as a series of parallel, related trajectories. These loosely intertwined strands of implicit theology can be seen to interact with each other, but their different trajectories never reached any strict form of coherence. Time and time again, as the idea of generational punishment was revisited, the same antecedents were activated and used to ground very different messages and texts in a dialogue with the authority of the past. One major problem for us, of course, is that most of the relevant texts are lost. Moreover, the range of variables involved in motivating these trajectories is immense, and understanding its complexity lies beyond the scope of any long-range historical study of literature. It goes without saying that the type of research open to the anthropologist working with living population groups is a fundamentally different affair. We will have to limit ourselves, more humbly, to discerning references and patterns in the recurrence of words, images, and ideas of those relevant texts that have survived. Individual texts can be used as microcosms, small windows into the trajectories of overwriting that are contained within each expression of ancestral fault in this period. The results of such an atomistic investigation can only be fragmentary at best, but the detailed points of observation thus opened can be connected to trace the outlines of a larger picture. The combination of near and far perspectives can allow us to see something of the dynamics at work in the constitution of ancestral fault as a shared cultural idea in the classical period.

Herodotus is a rich witness for apprehending the varieties of ancestral fault in the period. As a particularly adequate tool for making connections between distant moments in time, finding patterns in the deep past, discerning causality and deciphering meaning in events, ancestral fault was an idea that was good to think with for the radically new experimentations of *historia*. It offered useful ways into the knowledge of the past and the narrative organisation of its expressions, and it comes as no surprise to find it play such an important role in the work of Herodotus.³ The idea appears in the *Histories* both as a trace of what other people said and as a

³ See the stimulating discussion of T. Harrison 2000: 110–13, who presents ‘inherited guilt’ as one of the ‘let-out clauses’ that allow the ‘complete moral system’ of Herodotus and his belief in just divine retribution to resist the criticism of empirical refutation; cf. Lachenaud 1976: 49–61; Darbo-Peschanski 1987: 56; Sewell-Rutter 2007: 1–14.

pivotal instrument of the text. The sheer variety of forms it takes in the work is striking, and its expressions can be embedded in fairly complex settings; we find it present at all levels of narrative focalisation. An exhaustive study of the question could easily fill an entire monograph. The present chapter will limit itself to reviewing some of the main expressions of ancestral fault in Herodotus.

The oath of Glaukos

For Pausanias in 2.18.2, the idea of ancestral fault associated in tradition with the disasters that struck the descendants of Pelops through the generations is best illustrated by a Herodotean passage: the story of Glaukos.⁴ Reference to the same passage is found in Plutarch's *De sera numinis vindicta* (556d). That Herodotean passage, interestingly enough, cites one of the oldest records of Greek ancestral fault. It reproduces verse 285 of Hesiod's *Works and Days*: ἀνδρὸς δ' εὐόρκου γενεὴ μετόπισθεν ἀμείνων.⁵ The line no longer belongs to the poet's address to his brother Perses, however, but to an oracle pronounced by the Pythia to the Spartan Glaukos (6.86γ):

Γλαῦκ' Ἐπικυδεΐδη, τὸ μὲν αὐτίκα κέρδιον οὕτω
 ὄρκῳ νικῆσαι καὶ χρήματα ληίσσασθαι·
 ὅμνυ, ἐπεὶ θάνατός γε καὶ εὐόρκον μένει ἄνδρα.
 ἀλλ' Ὅρκου πάϊς ἔστιν, ἀνώνυμος οὐδ' ἔπι χεῖρες
 οὐδὲ πόδες· κραιπνὸς δὲ μετέρχεται, εἰς ὃ κε πᾶσαν
 συμμάρψας ὀλέσῃ γενεὴν καὶ οἶκον ἅπαντα·
 ἀνδρὸς δ' εὐόρκου γενεὴ μετόπισθεν ἀμείνων.

Hear, Epicycles' son: 'twere much to thy present advantage
 Couldst thou prevail by an oath and ravish the stranger's possessions:
 Swear an thou wilt: death waits for the just no less than the unjust.
 Ay but an oath hath a son, a nameless avenger of evil:
 Hands hath he none, nor feet; yet swiftly he runneth pursuing,
 Grippeth his man at the last and maketh an end of his offspring.
 Better endureth the line of the man that sweareth not falsely (trans. Godley).

The tale is told to the Athenians by the Spartan king Leutychides when he tries to convince them that they should agree to release the Aeginetan hostages that have been entrusted to them.⁶ Glaukos, a Spartan, had been entrusted with a large sum of silver coins by a man from Miletus who had heard of his great reputation for justice throughout the Greek lands

⁴ See pp. 56–8.

⁵ See pp. 159–77.

⁶ 6.85. For the Aeginetan hostages, see below.

(6.86α-β). This man wanted to ensure that his wealth would be protected from the risks that made Ionia such an insecure place; the event is set during the time of the Lydian conquests.⁷ Contrary to the Peloponnese, which is 'securely established', there was no possible continuity in the possession of wealth (χρήματα) for the inhabitants of Ionia. The rich Milesian decided to change one half of his belongings into silver coinage in order to send it to the Peloponnese for safekeeping.⁸ The transformation of the Milesian's wealth into money made possible its circulation in space and continuity in time. Tokens of recognition – *symbola* – were established between Glaukos and the man from Miletus so that the rightful owners of the silver could recover their due at the proper moment.⁹ When the sons of that man came to Sparta with their *symbola*, Glaukos pretended he had no memory of the event and needed to enquire further. He promptly went to Delphi to consult with the Pythia and ask the oracle 'whether he should swear and so ravish the money'.¹⁰ Although he was moved by the Pythia's threatening verse oracle to return the silver to the Milesian's sons, he did not avoid punishment in the end. There is no difference between 'tempting the gods' and doing the deed, as the Pythia answered him when he demanded pardon for his words. The story goes on to say that his line and household have now completely vanished from Sparta.¹¹

There is no more reason to believe that Herodotus composed these hexameter verses himself than to believe he composed the verses of Simonides or Pindar that he quotes. The vast corpus of metrical oracles contained in the *Histories* is made of fragments from an apocryphal popular genre of poetry circulating at the time.¹² There is no good reason to locate its composition in Delphi, let alone see it as the result of an 'authentic' consultation.¹³ What matters is that the episode from Book 6, in one form or another, is clearly earlier than the work of Herodotus. The self-contained tale centred on the lines of the oracle forms a narrative unit

⁷ 6.86α: ὥς γὰρ δὴ ἀνὰ πᾶσαν μὲν τὴν ἄλλην Ἑλλάδα, ἐν δὲ καὶ περὶ Ἰωνίην τῆς σῆς δικαιοσύνης ἦν λόγος πολλός, ἔμεωυτῷ λόγους ἐδίδουν καὶ ὅτι ἐπικίνδυνός ἐστι αἰεὶ κοτε ἢ Ἰωνίη, ἢ δὲ Πελοπόννησος ἀσφαλῶς ἰδρυμένη, καὶ διότι χρήματα οὐδαμὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἐστι ὄραν ἔχοντας; for the dramatic date of the event, see Nenci 1998: 248–49.

⁸ 6.86α; see Nenci 1998: 249–50. ⁹ Cf. Thomas 2000: 224. ¹⁰ 6.86β–γ. ¹¹ 6.86γ–δ.

¹² For oracles in Herodotus, see Benedict 1871; Panitz 1935; Crahay 1956; Kirchberg 1965; Lachenaud 1976: 244–305; Giuliani 2000; Harrison T. 2000: 122–57; Bowden 2003; Miletta 2004; E. Barker 2006.

¹³ Hendess 1877 starts his discussion of authentic χρησμοί with the Glaukos oracle. Parke and Wormell 1956 thought (vol. I: 380–2; vol. II: 16–17) that it was a historical oracle (no. 35), while Fontenrose (1978: 118–19; 299) argued that it was a folkloric fable (Q92); see also Dempsey 1918: 137–8; Klinger 1930; Panitz 1935: 71. For criticism of the focus of earlier scholarship on identifying the 'authenticity' of oracles, see Maurizio 1997 and Kindt 2006.

that must have circulated for some time before it was integrated by Herodotus into his work. It is pointless to speculate further about the precise origin or trajectory of this tale, but the echoes of the verses found in the prose text of the episode do suggest that the story we have was formed, to a certain extent, as a commentary on the poem.¹⁴ While the verses themselves probably retained their form throughout the process of transmission, it is hard to imagine that the tale that accompanied them did – one is more easily changed than the other.¹⁵ Whatever the actual context of composition of the oracle, the οὐτω at the end of the first line indicates that the verses themselves invited a renewed interpretation of their meaning by pointing to something beyond them. The prose text and the oracle are two distinct parts of what was transmitted to Herodotus as a narrative unit in some lost form. The story's main concern with the acquisition of wealth is not directly relevant to the political narrative of the episode. Herodotus incorporated this narrative unit with its own complex history into his own project in this passage. There is no way to tell how much he rewrote into the story, of course, but the presence of the poem at the centre of the episode ensures that we have at least the kernel of the tale. If the prose story was obviously changed to a certain extent for the purposes of the Herodotean work, the poem itself was probably not altered substantially.¹⁶ Let us start by taking a brief look at the theme of the oath in the poem of Glaukos, independently of what Herodotus does with it in the larger architecture of his work – just as a fragment of Archilochus or Alcaeus can be analysed on its own.

The oracular text is an intricate composition thoroughly grounded in traditional wisdom literature.¹⁷ In addition to the reproduction of *Works and Days* 285 at the end of the poem, the oracle can also be seen to echo

¹⁴ See for instance the γενεήν of 6.86α and the ὄρκω τὰ χρήματα λήσῃται of 6.86γ.

¹⁵ Note that the κραιπνός of line 5 appears as κραιπνῶς in some manuscripts and Stobaeus, and μετόπισθεν as κατόπισθεν. The last word of the poem, ἀμείνων, is found as ἀρείων in the version of Pausanias. Versions of the anecdote found in Herodotus appear in a variety of later texts, including Paus. 2.18.2 and 8.7.8 and Plutarch's *De sera numinis vindicta* (556d): *Anth. Pal.* 14.91; Juv. 13.199; Clem. Al. *Strom.* 6.2.23; schol. Pl. *Resp.* 363d; Stob. 27.14; Eust. *Il.* 3.278 (p. 414.44); Apostolius 2.84d; see Aly 1921: 155–6; 239; 252; Klinger 1930; Parke and Wormell 1956, vol. II: xvii–xix; Fontenrose 1978: 299; Nenci 1998: 248–9.

¹⁶ Cf. Parke 1946; S. West 2004.

¹⁷ For recent research on oracles as literature, see e.g. Rossi 1981; Manetti 1987; Andersen 1987; Fernández Delgado 1986; 1991; Suárez de la Torre 1990; 1992; 1994; Nagy 1990: 159–74; Maurizio 1993; 1997; 2001; Kindt 2003; 2006; important older works include Hendess 1877; Pomtow 1881; Ohlert 1912; Amandry 1950; Crahay 1956; Parke and Wormell 1956; Parke 1945 and 1981; Defradas 1958; Fontenrose 1978. For the suggestion that the Glaukos of the poem can be read to refer to the Glaukos of *Iliad* 6, see Gagné (forthcoming b).

lines 219 and 322 of the great Hesiodic poem: the image of the oath immediately running (τρέχει) after crooked judgments and the pillaging of wealth (ἀπὸ γλώσσης λήσσεται) through perjury find direct parallels in the words of the Pythia.¹⁸ The appropriation of the Hesiodic line by the oracular text is the result of an intricate process of poetic dialogue with the theme of the oath in the work of Hesiod.¹⁹ By giving him such an emphatic place, the text appropriates the authority of Hesiod to crown its own message. The integration of the Hesiodic poem in the oracle allows it to present itself in direct continuity with the master text of Panhellenic wisdom. It can thus be seen as an invitation to revisit the famous Hesiodic passage concerning the place of the kinship group in time, the last element in the progression from *genos* to *polis* to *geneē* that stands at the heart of the first third of the *Works and Days*.²⁰ It is possible to understand the oracle as an expansion of the Hesiodic teaching, a clarification of its image of generational punishment. The verse of Hesiod, in turn, can be read as a confirmation of the text that it closes. By inscribing the words of the old poetic authority as a seal on its own text, the oracular poem (*chrēsmos*) builds an exceptional capital of truth for itself. The vision of the *chrēsmos* merges with the teaching of Hesiod to his brother, both of them in perfect agreement with their broader portrait of the oath. The optimistic note on which the Hesiodic passage ends is renewed by the *chrēsmos*, the alternative of a choice opposed to crime, and a reaffirmation of the beneficial consequences of that choice. But if the ἀμείνων of the *Works and Days* continues the logic of the two ways traced throughout the poem, the ἀμείνων of the *chrēsmos* is a clear echo of the λῶρον καὶ ἀμείνων formula of the oracular response, the choice of action at the heart of the oracular consultation.²¹ The mantic poem fully integrates the Hesiodic verse to its world of meaning. This is not a simple pastiche, a reminiscence, or the formulaic material of composition-in-performance, but a process of reference. The short hexameter poem is built on a dialogue with the *Works and Days*.

A well-crafted piece of poetry, the oracle is divided into two parts, each one a play on the conventions of the *chrēsmos*. The first identifies the object of the question and the occasion of the consultation.²² The second, coordinated with the first with the characteristic ἀλλά of the oracular

¹⁸ See p. 168.

¹⁹ For the sustained dialogue between oracular poetry and the work of Hesiod, see Parke and Wormell 1956, vol. II: xxii–xxiii; Fernández Delgado 1986.

²⁰ See pp. 168–9. ²¹ See for instance Amandry 1950: 164.

²² See Parke and Wormell 1956, vol. II: xxv; Fontenrose 1978: 177–8.

response, indicates the course of the future.²³ But rather than limiting itself to describing the circumstances of the consultation, the first part of the oracular poem redefines it by giving a strong focus to the perspective of the question. 'Yes, swear, since that is the way to the greatest gain (κέρδος), and death awaits us all, even the man who keeps his oath' (v. 3). The irony of this assertion locates it at a different level of signification from the rest of the poem. The voice of the oracle, following the identification of the consultant, reveals its motivations, its reasoning, the vision behind its demand. It exposes the objective of the crime with a fascinating exercise of focalisation. This emphasis on the perspective of the consultant allows the poem to create a powerful contrast between the error of the demand and the superior vision of divinity.

The two parts of the seven-line poem answer each other in perfect symmetry. At the middle of the text is the pivot of the transition, the statement that there is another reality than the one just stated, that the crime will have very specific consequences. A verse of the second part of the poem answers each verse of the first part, following an ABCDABC schema. The first and the fifth line have the same rhythm: dactyl-spondee-dactyl-dactyl-spondee.²⁴ Through the ἄλλ' of the fourth line, the δέ of the fifth line answers the μέν of the first, and the κραιπνός the αὐτίκα. The συμμάρψας of the sixth verse answers the λήισσασθαι of the second, and the οἶκον ἅπαντα the χρήματα. The ἄνδρὸς . . . εὐόρκου of the last verse, finally, echoes the εὐόρκον . . . ἄνδρα of the third verse, and the μετόπισθεν answers the μένει. Parallel to this web of correspondences, the text provokes a clear opposition between the μετόπισθεν ἀμείνων of the last verse and the αὐτίκα κέρδιον of the first in order to fully close the circle. This entanglement of verses is worthy of the most intricate epigrams.

One element that stands out of the Glaukos poem is its insistence on the union of descent and household in defining the moral of the tale. In the *Works and Days* the punishment of the *geneē* (284–5) and the *oikos* (325) for perjury are placed at different moments of the poem in order to make different points. The oracle, on the other hand, links both *geneē* and *oikos* in the same movement, a combination strengthened by the force of the preposition σύν from the verb συμμάρψας. The poem shapes a distinctive temporality for its message. It opposes the certitude of death to the varying lots that await the families of the perjurer and the pious man

²³ Parke and Wormell 1956, vol. II: xxii and xxix; Fontenrose 1978: 179.

²⁴ The most common rhythm in oracular literature, according to Parke and Wormell 1956, vol. II: xxix.

after they have passed away. No man escapes mortality and death remains (μένει) in wait for us all. What *moves* is the effect of the oath long after its actual performance. Parallel to this contrast between movement and immobility is the opposition of the present moment to the future outcome of the event. Death is a common, static endpoint. The punishment of perjury, on the other hand, is fast (κραιπνός) and it always reaches its proper prey. While the perjurer may find gain (κέρδιον) in the present through his act, its consequences after death are devastating. The poem stages an opposition between the αὐτίκα of the first line and the μετόπισθεν of the last verse.

What does it mean, then, to say that the agent of punishment for perjury is κραιπνός? The vengeance of the oath, after all, strikes only after death. It is marked by delay, opposed to the immediate, apparent gain of the transgressor. This oracular paradox finds a correlate in the puzzling image of the child that stands at the centre of the poem. The son of Horkos has neither hands nor feet. It is without feet that it pursues (μετέρχεται) the perjurer. It is without hands that it seizes his family (συμμάρψας), a verb regularly used with the instrumental χερσίν.²⁵ His two fields of action are defined by two absences that separate him from all human comprehension, an image underlined by the chiasmus hands–feet–running–seizing placed at the centre of the poem.²⁶ The swiftness of the divine punishment serves as a direct pendant to the immediate profit of the crime. To the death that awaits each man in the end, the poem opposes the lot that awaits the *geneē* after death. There is the appearance of κέρδος on the one side, in the short time of men, a semblance of enrichment through crime. On the other side is the total eradication of the family and of its possessions in the long time of divine action. The κραιπνός of line 5 is surprising at first, since the manifestation of divine punishment is clearly not a matter of rapidity. The text offers another, counterintuitive vision of pace, based on the progressive force of the present μετέρχεται, which begins as soon as the crime has been committed, to find its way to eventual fulfilment in the end, εἰς ὃ κε, beyond death. The enlarged immediacy of the punishment completely surrounds the immediacy of the crime, a speed that remains invisible to mortal understanding. The true swiftness of the vengeance can only be conveyed to the reader by the privileged temporal perspective of oracular discourse.²⁷

²⁵ See e.g. 'Hesiod' F 343.7 MW; cf. the emphasis on the hands and feet of the Erinyes in Soph. *El.* 489; see Finglass 2007: 243–4.

²⁶ χεῖρες–πόδες–μετέρχεται–συμμάρψας. ²⁷ Cf. pp. 364–5.

The other characteristic of the “Ὀρκου πᾶσις is another absence, the fact that it has no name. This contrasts with the emphatic identification of the addressee at the beginning of the poem: Γλαῦκ’ Ἐπικυδείδῃ. Although Glaukos is defined by his name and the name of his father, however, his dominant trait is that his own children will be nameless, as his entire line of descent is set for extermination. No hearth is said to be ‘of Glaukos’ any longer. The oracular poem completes the Hesiodic genealogy of Horkos, who is presented as the last son of Eris in the *Theogony* (231), and thus identified as the very last descendant of Night in the great poem. The son of Horkos embodies the punishment of perjury. The nature of this anonymous monster reflects the force that is set in motion by the broken oath. Its movement and its action are emphatically marked as inhuman and vast in power. The speed of its progress operates beyond human time. What seems to be an immediate victory (νικῆσαι) for the perjurer is in fact an immediate defeat. The reversal is completed when the family of the man who has pillaged somebody else’s goods will be seized by the “Ὀρκου πᾶσις. The image of filiation used to define this agent of punishment is particularly appropriate for a tale that revolves around the idea of generational eradication. The son of Horkos destroys both *geneē* and *oikos* as it combines the vertical depth of descent with the horizontal inclusion of the household. One points to diachronic transmission through generations, the other to the synchronic presence of the kinship unit as a recognisable entity in the community: the *oikos* as a shared identity of physical spaces, cult, and group. The text underlines the totality of the extermination with the adjectives πᾶσαν and ἅπαντα placed at the end of lines 5 and 6 respectively. The prose narrative of the episode adds that the oracular threat has been confirmed and that not only are there no ἀπόγονοι of the perjurer left in Sparta, but the extended household (ἰστίη) of Glaukos has been extirpated root and branch (ἐκτέτριπται . . . πρόρριζος) from the city, a marked echo of the ritual oath formula.²⁸ The ἀπόγονον answers the γενεή of the poem, and the ἰστίη the οἶκον of line 6. There is no longer any continuity of descent for the recipient of the oracle, or an established household in the city. Prominently displayed at the beginning of the poem, his name becomes the icon of the house with no name at the end. The verb of ἐκτέτριπται τε πρόρριζος ἐκ Σπάρτης agrees with the single Glaukos, not ἀπόγονον or ἰστίη – descent and household are presented as extensions of the transgressor. Glaukos, the son of Epikydes, that is, ‘The Illustrious’, will become *anonymous* (ἄνώνυμος), like the son of Horkos.

²⁸ See p. 174. For that usage of the verb, see W. S. Barrett 1992: 291; add F 81 Snell (*TrGF* 2).

While death awaits the honest man and the perjurer alike, the continuity through generations that allows human existence to escape complete oblivion is closed to the latter. What is a better lot in Hesiod becomes an absolute difference between continuity and extinction in the oracle. Its rapid flash of ominous wisdom paints a fundamental challenge of the human condition.

Another element that stands out in the Glaukos story is the theme of the circulation of riches. The oracle is built on the unjust acquisition of wealth through perjury. As in Hesiod, it is concerned with the act of 'plundering' (ληϊσσοῦσθαι) with a false oath. The idea that the temporary enrichment provided by the broken oath leads directly to ruin is the foundation of the message of justice in time delivered by the oracle. It encodes the warning of traditional poetic wisdom into a different textual register. The short oracular tale presents itself as the memory of an event, an act that can be shown as an exemplary moment of normative wisdom. The poem hardly makes sufficient sense by itself: it demands a narrative context. As most other records of the Pythia's verses in circulation at the time, it invites a telling both of the circumstance that motivated the oracular answer and of the outcome of the story. Before it was crystallised in its Herodotean version, the easily detachable tale could have been adapted to time and place from one performance to the next and serve to illustrate a suitably relevant past. While it is presented as a local Spartan tale in the work of Herodotus, it could as well be located in Athens, in Crete, or in Thessaly in another context. It belongs to no fixed occasion.²⁹ Unlike most other verse 'answers' ascribed to the Pythia, the oracle of Glaukos reveals a general truth applicable to all who hear it – the stark message is a lesson for all publics. The striking image of the Son of Horkos (Ὁρκου παῖς) and the uncharacteristically clear warning of the Pythia in the poem could thus be used to imprint a standard of morality on whatever audience it was delivered to.

The idea of delayed justice presented in the poem draws from the most prominent antecedent of the written record and deploys it in the simple form of a popular moral admonition. The oracle reproduces a familiar pattern of high poetry in the form of a memorable, straightforward tale of edification through the fear of punishment. The grounding of the colourful poem in the hallowed, Panhellenic authority of Hesiod gave it a stamp of recognised wisdom. The echo of text into text strengthens the resonance

²⁹ Cf. Parke and Wormell 1956, vol. II: xxiv–xxx; Fontenrose 1978: 119; 180; on the many links between oracles, *gnōmai* and proverbs, see Fernández Delgado 1986: 89–98; Nagy 1990: 334.

of the poem. The old extermination formula of the great oath becomes the pillar of a simple, clear idea of justice in this process of adaptation. The very specific power of the *exōleia* imprecation is here generalised and applied to all oaths. In a line of direct continuity with the poetic model on which it is based, the acquisition of wealth serves as a framework for the expression of normative social life.

The possession of wealth in time is what matters for the message of the oracle. The perjurer might get his hands on some quick gain, but he must forfeit the possibility of transmission through his *oikos* in return. His crime transforms his entire household into disposable debt. If the oracle paints a strongly Hesiodic image of wealth, the prose tale, on the other hand, presents a rather different picture; the theme of acquisition is greatly expanded and refined in that narrative. Instead of the undefined wealth (χρήματα) of the oracle, the prose story is set up around the silver coins of a precise transaction.³⁰ The actions of the Milesian man are motivated by the problem of continuous possession (6.86α). As no man is able to hold on to wealth in Ionia, he has resolved to place half of his in the safety of the Peloponnese. More precisely, as the story progresses, we see that the continuity he is hoping to establish is a transmission through the generations. The tokens he has given to Glaukos for the retrieval of the silver will be claimed by his children only after a great amount of time has passed (χρόνου δὲ πολλοῦ διελθόντος). The property (οὐσίη) he has sent away from Ionia is literally transformed into deposits (κείμενα) for safekeeping. The equivalence between what is sent and what is retrieved is guaranteed by the equivalence between the *symbola* of the sender and the keeper. The ability of money to preserve the value of wealth over time and space, to make the deposit and the retrieval σύμμετρα, to use Aristotle's terminology, is an essential part of the episode's narrative.³¹ The pivot of the tale, in fact, is that the punishment is σύμμετρον to the crime. While the Milesian man will be able to transmit his wealth to his children, the house of Glaukos is eradicated. The tale is set three generations back before the time of the narrator (6.86α), the point being that the disappearance of Glaukos' line has been thorough and fast (6.86δ). The equivalence between the transmission of the money and the transmission of punishment through generations is striking. The text is concerned with something other than the thriving/declining *olbos* of the Hesiodic tradition. What is a wealth of property and fields in Hesiod is a wealth of coins in the story of Glaukos. The word χρήματα points to different realities.

³⁰ See n. 8. ³¹ EN 1133b; see pp. 241–2.

The narrative emphasises the safeguard of value through circulation, and the ability of wealth to endure through the protection of justice. The presence of coinage in this context is no casual detail, but a clear indication that the old Hesiodic theme reflects a different modality of exchange. The wealth staged in the tale echoes the same concerns as the poems of Solon and Theognis on the dangers of unjust acquisition discussed in the previous chapter. If the oracle is thoroughly grounded in the Hesiodic antecedent of punished perjury, the prose narrative reflects ideas closer to the elegiac tradition on delayed punishment. The two parts of the episode draw from different sets of references. Each points to a distinct moment in the trajectory of ancestral fault.

We find the same pattern repeated with the poem's representation of responsibility. The notion of intent is another prominent element of the Glaukos episode.³² A clear difference is once more perceptible between the oracle and the prose narrative. The oracle consists of a warning against perjury. If an act is committed, this will be the consequence. The terrible menace of the son of Horkos is clearly dependent on the imperative ὄμνυ. The oracle stages the threat of extermination that looms over the man who commits perjury. The prose tale, however, is concerned with the consequences of *intention*. The point of the story is that Glaukos has enquired about the possibility of perjury. He will eventually return the coins and he has in the end not actually broken his oath, but punishment comes all the same and it will extirpate his house from Sparta. Glaukos has 'tempted' the god (πειρηθῆναι).³³ He has, in other words, tried to see how far he could go. This, says the Pythia, is no different from doing the deed. Leutykhides reframes the moral of the tale at the end of the episode: 'So good a thing it is not even to design aught concerning a trust, save the restoring of it on demand.'³⁴ The episode emphatically locates the nature of crime in intention, even if it is not consummated in act. This has little in common with the representations of punishment for perjury in Homer, Hesiod, or Archilochus, for instance, or indeed in the oracle itself, where the terrible sanction of *exōleia* is reserved for those who have broken the great oath. Hesiod's mention of will in *Works and Days* 284 is designed to limit the punishment to those who break their oath deceptively, as opposed, probably, to those who might break it accidentally, but what matters in the end

³² See T. Harrison 2000: 117–20; Baragwanath 2008 does not discuss 6.86.

³³ See Crahay 1956: 97–9; Fontenrose 1978: 113; cf. S. West 2003.

³⁴ 6.868: οὕτω ἀγαθὸν μηδὲ διανοέσθαι περὶ παρακαταθήκης ἄλλο γε ἢ ἀπαιτούντων ἀποδιδόναι; see Lateiner 1989: 144.

is whether the crime has been committed or not, not whether one intends to commit it in the future.³⁵ The cunning flirting with false oaths of Odysseus in Homer and Hermes in the *Homeric Hymn to Hermes* are obviously deceptive in intent, but never technically perjury – the poems titillate the audience with a dangerous possibility.³⁶ That distinction between deed and intention has no place in the Glaukos episode. The closest contemporary parallel to this insistence on motivation in earlier literature is to be found in the Theognidean corpus.

Theognis 197–208, like the Glaukos story, is based on the opposition between appearance and intention, the semblance of the justice and the motivation that lies behind it, immediate acquisition of wealth and later transmission of punishment, plunder through perjury, and the clash of human and divine perspectives.³⁷ While the Theognis elegy is concerned with the articulation of *thymos* and *noos* in relation to justice, the Glaukos story focuses on the dangers of *διανοέεσθαι* under false pretence. The whole episode can be seen as a reflection on the illusions of human justice. Glaukos is chosen by the Milesian man because of his reputation for *dikē*. He stands out from all Spartans of his time through his virtue, and word of his *δικαιοσύνη* has reached all of Greece. He is careful to maintain appearances when the descendants of the Milesian man come to claim their due. As he feigns a lack of memory of the deposits, he insists that his actions are based on his respect for *dikē*. His attempt to seek authorisation from the god through the oracle backfires as it exposes the discrepancy between his acts and thoughts. The story's striking contrast between the hidden intention of crime through immediate gain and the open proclamation of divine justice in time also illustrates the same point as Theognis 731–52.³⁸ While there is no reason to believe that one is dependent on the other or that there has somehow been any direct contact between the two texts, the parallels indicate the common grounding of a shared outlook. The two pictures of divine justice stem from a related conception of wisdom. From this point of view, again, if the oracle is built on a direct dialogue with the Hesiodic tradition, the prose narrative seems closer to the perspective of late archaic elegy.

The Glaukos episode of Herodotus 6.86, a self-contained narrative adapted from a previous source, reproduces a moralising story designed to illustrate divine justice and teach respect for fundamental social cohesion to its audience. The anecdote of 6.86 gives a precise time and place to

³⁵ See p. 160. ³⁶ Cf. Callaway 1993; 1998; cf. Mikalson 1991: 130.

³⁷ See pp. 258–67. ³⁸ See pp. 267–73.

the general teaching of the poem. The triangle that unites Sparta, Delphi, and Miletus defines an extended Panhellenic area of meaning, and the dramatic time of the Lydian conquests in Ionia offers a perfect setting for reflection on the ties that bind the Greeks together and separate them from others. The anecdote puts emphasis on distance: that between the time of the crime and the moment of its narration within the text of Herodotus – three generations – and that which separates the Peloponnese from Asia Minor, the vast area through which the renown of Glaukos circulated in one direction, and then back. Glaukos, the man known throughout the world for his δικαιοσύνη, will be forever remembered for his impiety, and he is the one who will lose his ἀπόγονοι and ἰστίη, when the Milesian man sought only to transmit his wealth through generations. Three themes are developed in the anecdote. (1) The χρήματα become silver coinage, and the transmission of wealth a question of circulation through vast distances. (2) The trust betrayed by Glaukos is a form of *xenia* sealed by *symbola* and transmitted through the generations. (3) The moral of the story is a question of will. It is the intention of the crime that matters, the attempt to test the god, rather than the act in itself. None of these themes is present in the text of the poem itself, but together they give it an entirely different signification.

The framing of the tale by Herodotus suggests that it had a certain currency by the time it was written down in the *Histories*. It is probably safe to say that it was composed and circulated sometime between 550 and 450.³⁹ Whatever the precise dates, it constitutes a precious document illustrating a trajectory of ancestral fault at the end of the archaic period. The fact that it is in direct dialogue with the *Works and Days* and that it reproduces the same combination of associations, words, and images found in elegy, the two most prominent expressions of the idea found in earlier literature, is a witness to the early constitution of a written web of references around the notion of delayed generational punishment. The narrative of exemplary wisdom of the episode is built to produce normative fear. Its appropriation of older wisdom literature strengthens its claim to represent accepted tradition. The oath of the Pythia's poem is at least as much a product of dialogue with earlier literature as it is an activation of the contemporary ritual practice of *horkos*. The specific idea of punishment through generations it encodes is a distinctive written value now able to float from text to text through reference and adaptation, independently of any other social or cultural background resonance.

³⁹ See Fontenrose 1978: 299.

The written antecedent now functions as an underlying reality of its meaning for the audience.

That is true for the integration of the tale itself in the work of Herodotus. If it can be read and understood on its own as an autonomous story, the version we have belongs to the precise context of a moment in Herodotus' *Histories*. Woven by Herodotus into his own massive narrative, the episode of Glaukos functions as the part of a much larger whole. Its meaning and its function are fully incorporated into the architecture of the great historical work. An *exemplum* put into the mouth of the Spartan Leutychides as he tries to convince the Athenians to release the Aeginetan hostages that Sparta had entrusted to them earlier, it serves as a reflection of key themes in this section of the work, and a development of king Leutychides' perspective as a character.⁴⁰

The Aeginetan hostages held by Athens are the subject of a long development in the narrative, part of the pattern of revenge that pits *polis* against *polis* and sets in motion the never-ending cycles of divisions and retributions that continuously tear Greece apart in the work.⁴¹ The historical feud between Athens and Aegina is presented as the continuation of an ancient hatred (ἐχθρη παλαιή) between the two cities.⁴² It first appears in Book 5, at that point in the narrative when Athens has successfully overthrown the Peisistratid tyranny and defended its sovereignty against its neighbours, notably Thebes (5.81). Herodotus defines this moment as the beginning of the growth of Athens, the fundamental turning point that will pave the way to Athenian might and its ability to resist the Persian onslaught.⁴³ The newfound equality (ἰσηγορίη) of the city is identified as the cause that allowed the Athenians to become 'the first of all by far' and it is presented as an objective good.⁴⁴ The freedom of the citizens is marked as the new source of Athenian strength, a contrast to their past and their enemies. After its defeat, Thebes, following the interpretation of an oracle from Delphi, decides to seek the help of Aegina against Athens to continue its retaliation, and Herodotus proceeds to describe the reason why Aegina accepted to ally itself with the Boeotian city.

The episode of 5.81–9 is framed as a tale of impiety. Following the invitation of the Thebans, the Aeginetans are shown attacking Athens without sending a herald (ἀκήρυκτον) in 5.81, and an oracle from Delphi

⁴⁰ See Johnson 2001–2; for the logic of divine retribution in Herodotus, see T. Harrison 2000: 102–21.

⁴¹ Figueira 1985a. ⁴² 5.81; see Dunbabin 1936–7.

⁴³ Waters 1971; R. L. Fowler 2003; T. Harrison 2008–9.

⁴⁴ See Momigliano 1971.

presents the attack as an injustice in 5.89.⁴⁵ The Aeginetans are then at the height of their power (εὐδαιμονίη τε μεγάλη ἐπαρθέντες), and they manage to inflict significant damage on Attica with this raid. The assault continues the enmity of an ancient hatred, which Herodotus relates in detail. He is able to identify its precise origin (ἐξ ἀρχῆς τοιγῆσδε) in a story of vendetta and ritual transgression.⁴⁶ The event took place long ago, at a time when only Athens was familiar with the cultivation of the olive tree. Herodotus knows of no chronological landmark that would allow him even to date it approximately, but the reference to a time before the spread of the olive tree indicates remote antiquity.⁴⁷ This is a moment of important aetiologies, when the cult of Damia and Auxesia, with its choruses of mocking women, was instituted in Epidaurus and Aegina, the clothing of Athenian women was changed from the Dorian dress to the broochless linen chiton, the women of Argos and Aegina started using much longer brooches, ‘even to my time’ (ἔτι καὶ ἐς ἐμὲ), and all products from Attica (‘even ceramic’) were barred from the temple.⁴⁸ Just as the historian is able to demonstrate his knowledge in regard to the origin of these rituals and customs – the choruses of women mock other women, not men; the Epidaurians have the same rites, as well as certain secret ceremonies (ἄρρητοι ἱουργίαι 5.83); the linen chiton is Carian, not Ionian – he has the ability to identify the precise event that set the cycle of vengeance between the two cities in motion.

The hatred of the Aeginetans is based on their own crime. The oracle at Delphi had advised the Epidaurians to make the ἀγάλματα of Damia and Auxesia in olive wood in order to heal the infertility of their soil, and the Athenians agreed to provide the trees in exchange for the payment of sacred dues (ἱρά) every year to Athena and Erechtheus (5.82).⁴⁹ The Epidaurians paid their dues until Aegina stole the ἀγάλματα, at which point they told the Athenians that they were no longer responsible for the former agreements.⁵⁰ Aegina refused to comply with Athenian demands

⁴⁵ 5.89: Αἰγινήται τε δὴ ἐδηλοῦν τῆς Ἀττικῆς τὰ παραθαλάσσια, καὶ Ἀθηναίοισι ὀρμημένοισι ἐπ’ Αἰγινήτας στρατεύεσθαι ἤλθε μαντήιον ἐκ Δελφῶν ἐπισχόντας ἀπὸ τοῦ Αἰγινήτεων ἀδικίου τριήκοντα ἔτεα τῷ ἐνὶ καὶ τριηκοστῷ Αἰακῷ τέμενος ἀποδέξαντας ἀρχεσθαι τοῦ πρὸς Αἰγινήτας πολέμου, καὶ σφι χωρήσειν τὰ βούλονται. For the expression ἀκήρυκτος πόλεμος (5.81), see Law 1935 and Myres 1943; cf. Nenci 1994: 276–7.

⁴⁶ Ciccio 1983; Figueira 1981: 211–72; cf. Weil 1985.

⁴⁷ Cf. Isoc. 12.28; Cic. *Rep.* 3.9.15 with Detienne 1970; see Figueira 1985a; Nenci 1994: 278.

⁴⁸ 5.89. See Dunbabin 1936–7 and Martini 2009; on Damia and Auxesia, see Paus. 2.30.4; 2.32.2; Hesychius s.v. Δάμεια; *IG* iv 1588; Nilsson 1906: 413–16; Lambrinudakis 1986.

⁴⁹ Nenci 1994: 278.

⁵⁰ Note 5.84: ὅσον μὲν γὰρ χρόνον εἶχον τὰ ἀγάλματα ἐν τῇ χώρῃ, ἐπιτελέειν τὰ συνέθεντο, ἐπεὶ δὲ ἔστερησθαι αὐτῶν, οὐ δίκαιοι εἶναι ἀποφέρειν ἔτι, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἔχοντας αὐτὰ Αἰγινήτας πρῆσσεσθαι ἐκέλευον.

for the ἰρά, and as a consequence of this Athens attacked. The nature of the Athenian raid is disputed, with Athenian, Aeginetan, and Argive versions given in full, but in all it is clear that the outcome was a negative one; Athens did not get its dues, and the hatred never abated since.⁵¹

That affair is an important part of the background for the episode of Glaukos in 6.86. It is because of the ancient, long-standing feud between Athens and Aegina that Athens complained to Sparta about the Aeginetan decision to give 'earth and water' to the Persian king (6.49), provoking the Spartan king Cleomenes to invade the island, and the Spartans to subsequently entrust the Aeginetan hostages to the Athenians (6.73).⁵² In 6.87, immediately after the Glaukos episode, Herodotus writes that the Aeginetans plotted against the Athenians when they refused to hand the hostages back, 'before paying the penalty for the high-handed wrong they had done the Athenians to please the Thebans' (πρὶν τῶν προτέρων ἀδικημάτων δοῦναι δίκας τῶν ἐς Ἀθηναίους ὕβρισαν Θηβαίοισι χαριζόμενοι).⁵³ Then, following on the narration of the Glaukos episode, Herodotus recalls the earlier crimes told in Book 5 and announces the future punishment for it. Not long after, in 6.91, he describes a sacrilege committed by the Aeginetans during their struggle with Athens. As the 'fat' (οἱ παχέες), the rich men of the island, proceeded to slaughter several hundred captives when they had the upper hand over the Aeginetan rebels who had allied themselves with Athens, one prisoner managed to escape to the temple of Demeter Thesmophoros, and when they could not pry away his hands from the door-handles they cut them off. The rich, at the height of their power, killed a suppliant and broke the laws of *asylia*, just like the men who massacred the Cylonians, and as a consequence an *agos* fell on the *polis*.⁵⁴ The Aeginetans were incapable of 'sacrificing away' (ἐκθύσασθαι) the *agos*, and Demeter was not appeased before they were punished. Herodotus points specifically to the expulsion of the Aeginetans from the island by the Athenians in 431, something that took place two generations after the events narrated in Book 6.⁵⁵ The complete extirpation of all inhabitants from the island by the Athenians is emphatically presented as a

⁵¹ 5.84–8.

⁵² See Leahy 1954; Figueira 1988. For Herodotus' ability to make long-distance connections of this kind over chapters and books, see de Jong 1999; 2001.

⁵³ See Andrewes 1936–7; Jeffery 1962. Hude and Rosén prefer προτέρων το προτέρων.

⁵⁴ 6.91: ἀπὸ τούτου δὲ καὶ ἄγος σφι ἐγένετο, τὸ ἐκθύσασθαι οὐκ οἱοί τε ἐγένοντο ἐπιμηχανώμενοι, ἀλλ' ἔφθησαν ἐκτεπρόντες πρότερον ἐκ τῆς νήσου ἢ σφι ἴλεον γενέσθαι τὴν θεόν; see Nenci 1998: 252; cf. pp. 206–9.

⁵⁵ See Figueira 1991.

punishment for the *agos*. It is also the τῶν προτέρων ἀδικημάτων . . . δίκας of 6.87, and thus, ultimately, the consequence of the Aeginetan crimes narrated by Herodotus in 5.79–89. The *agos* is one link in a much longer chain of causes, which the historian can follow up to its very beginning (ἐξ ἀρχῆς τοιῆσδε), and follow down all the way to its end. It provides that part of the work with one of its narrative threads, a recurring plot that can tie different moments together in one causal sequence and demonstrate the power of the author's *historiē* in making sense of the past. The episode of Glaukos is placed squarely in the context of that cycle of generational punishment.

A similar pattern of crime and retribution is found in the related tale of king Cleomenes.⁵⁶ As the driving force of Spartan power in the time of Athens' ascent and the events leading to the battle of Marathon, he is one of the principal figures of Books 5 and 6, and we find him playing a major role in the conflict of Athens and Aegina related in those books.⁵⁷ His tale is intrinsically linked to the narrative context in which the episode of Glaukos appears. His feud with Aegina leads to his conflict with Demaratus and the accession of Leutychides to the Eurypontid throne.⁵⁸ It is Cleomenes who demanded hostages from the Aeginetans in his second expedition against them, the same hostages he then proceeded to place in the custody of their bitterest foes, the Athenians (6.73). Chapter 6.73, in fact, stands out as a return to the main course of the narrative. On one side, Cleomenes' conflict with Demaratus occupies centre stage in 6.52–72, and the king's demise is the focus of 6.74–84 on the other, the passage that immediately precedes the Glaukos episode. In both 6.52–72 and 6.74–84 Cleomenes is presented as a tragic figure of excess and transgression, and the whole passage is framed as an investigation of crime and punishment.⁵⁹

Leaving the city when his treacherous actions against Demaratus became known, Cleomenes tried to assemble the Arcadians in a coalition against Sparta by having their chief men swear an oath to him on the water of the Styx itself.⁶⁰ The Spartans eventually recalled him, and he was locked up because of his obvious insanity. Raving mad, he killed himself in

⁵⁶ On Cleomenes in Herodotus, see e.g. Zographou 2007.

⁵⁷ Cf. Klein 1973; Carlier 1977; Cawkwell 1993.

⁵⁸ 6.65–71. For the conflict between Cleomenes and Demaratus, see Meier 1999.

⁵⁹ The tale has been read as a reflection of clinical pathology (Giusti 1929), the ritual suicide of the sacred king (Luria 1928), Near Eastern influence (Pizzagalli 1937; Burkert 1965; cf. Schmitz 2004), or political machinations (Hereward 1958). Narrative considerations have become the central elements of more recent readings.

⁶⁰ 6.74; see Nenci 1998: 239–40.

custody, after having lost all power, by horribly mutilating his body with a dagger (6.75). The medical condition of the king is a question of *historiē*. Herodotus explores different possible explanations for this madness (6.75–84). The version of the majority of the Greeks, as he says in 6.75, is that Cleomenes was punished because of the bribes he gave the Pythia to lie about Demaratus. The Athenians are alone in believing that he was punished because of his sacrilegious destruction of the *temenos* at Eleusis, and the Argives say that he was punished because he burnt down the sacred grove of Argus and unlawfully sacrificed at the temple of Hera. Apollo, Demeter and Persephone, or Argus and Hera: in all three versions, the madness of Cleomenes is seen as a punishment for a great sacrilege. Only the Spartans say that no *daimonion* was involved in provoking the madness of the Agiad, and that it was caused instead by Cleomenes' habit of drinking unmixed wine (6.84). But Herodotus disagrees, and he explicitly asserts that he believes Cleomenes was punished for what he did to Demaratus.⁶¹ That is, he agrees with 'the majority of the Greeks', and the notion that Cleomenes was struck with madness by divine retribution for having subverted the Pythia.⁶²

Leutychides, the other Spartan king, is also portrayed as a punished transgressor. After having helped Cleomenes depose Demaratus and having himself taken his place in 6.71, Leutychides is immediately shown to have paid for his deeds by Herodotus in 6.72: *τίσιν τοιήνδε τινὰ Δημαρήτῳ ἐξέτεισε*. It is certainly no coincidence that the phrase *τίσιν τοιήνδε τινὰ Δημαρήτῳ ἐξέτεισε* is reflected by the *τίσιν ταύτην* ... *Δημαρήτῳ ἐκτεῖσαι* of 6.84, Herodotus' statement about the real cause of Cleomenes' madness, almost word for word. The delayed punishment of Leutychides is framed as a parallel to the punishment of Cleomenes for the same crime. The *tisis* of the Eurypontid king took place many years after the deed (*ταῦτα μὲν δὴ ἐγένετο χρόνῳ ὕστερον*), when he was caught taking a bribe during an expedition in Thessaly (6.73). He was exiled from Sparta and his house was destroyed (*τὰ οἰκία οἱ κατεσκάφη*).⁶³ The later crime is a consequence of the earlier crime, and divine agency is involved. Herodotus breaks the sequence of his story to establish that link over the decades, before returning to the Spartan conflict with Aegina in 6.73, and the taking of the hostages from the island. In other words, the story of

⁶¹ 6.84: οὕτω δὴ Σπαρτιῆται τὰ περὶ Κλεομένεα λέγουσι· ἐμοὶ δὲ δοκεῖ τίσιν ταύτην ὁ Κλεομένης Δημαρήτῳ ἐκτεῖσαι; see Nenci 1998: 247.

⁶² 6.75: ὥς μὲν οἱ πολλοὶ λέγουσι Ἑλλήνων, ὅτι τὴν Πυθίην ἀνέγνωσε τὰ περὶ Δημαρήτου [γενόμενα] λέγειν.

⁶³ See Nenci 1998: 237–8.

Leutychides, like that of Cleomenes, is a determinant factor of the narrative context in which the episode of Glaukos is set. If the message encoded in the moral of the episode can be interpreted as the independent tale of an older tradition, as it usually is, it should also be read within its environment.⁶⁴ The *chrēsmos* of 6.86 is embedded in the anecdote of Leutychides, itself imbricated in the immense narrative web of the *Histories*. Each level reflects on the other without fully subsuming it.

It is a man who has accepted to lie about the birth of Demaratus who tells the tale of Glaukos (6.65). More specifically, he has sworn (κατόμνυται) what is a false oath for his accusation against Demaratus in court. Herodotus could have used a number of other verbs to describe the accusation, but he chose to bring attention to the presence of the oath in the crime of Leutychides against his predecessor by using the marked verb κατόμνυμι. Leutychides, thus, is emphatically presented as a perjurer who will be expelled from his country in time and whose house will be destroyed a generation later for his crime a few chapters before he tells the tale of Glaukos. Moreover, he is guilty of having sold Spartan military victory for a bribe (6.72). Cleomenes, the senior king of Sparta who initiated the whole feud and is responsible for taking the hostages, is himself guilty of having suborned the Pythia with a bribe (6.65–7) – the cause of his horrible death. The Aeginetans, finally, are locked in a chain of sacrilegious crimes for which their descendants, two generations from the events at hand, will be expelled from the island.⁶⁵ That entire section of Book 6 revolves around a certain pattern of crime and delayed punishment.

The section just before the tale of Glaukos relates the punishment of Cleomenes and Leutychides, and the section immediately after that completes the long story of Athens' feud with Aegina. It ends with an *agos* and the announcement of the city's complete destruction (6.91). This is a significant moment in the progression of the *Histories*, the last development before the work turns definitively to the Persian expedition proper at 6.94 and Athens' triumph at Marathon.⁶⁶ The irony of having Leutychides, following the demise of Cleomenes, make a case for the Aeginetans with the story of Glaukos, is rather hard to miss for anyone who is paying attention.⁶⁷ The king who will be exiled and whose house will be destroyed for taking a bribe is shown giving advice to Athens about not taking what is not yours. A perjurer who will be punished by divinity in due time, he tells a tale of traditional morality centred on perjury. The Delphic crime

⁶⁴ See Johnson 2001: 2. ⁶⁵ See p. 290.

⁶⁶ Nenci 1998: 253. ⁶⁷ See T. Harrison 2000: 118.

of Cleomenes is parallel to that of Glaukos himself. And the complete uprooting of the Aeginetans in later generations for sacrilegiously keeping what is not theirs directly echoes the main theme of the story. Placed at the heart of a part of the work interested in the disunity of the Greeks at the start of the Persian onslaught, it illustrates the logic of crime and punishment that pits city against city and locks each *polis* in long cycles of enmity and vengeance. The story of Glaukos, the tale of a man and his house, is told to the Athenians by Leutychides as a moral for the whole city.⁶⁸ It perfectly illustrates the rhetorical point the Spartan king wants to make for the Athenians at that moment. Yet at the same time it makes a direct comment on him, as well as on the Aeginetans, by contrast. The lesson of transgression and consequence encoded in the story functions as a comment on the whole passage. Set in Ionia some three generations ago, at the time of Croesus, when the Ionian cities were being subdued by the Lydians, and Greek cities first relied on each other and on the reputations of justice of their prominent citizens to survive conquest from the east, it says something about the time when Greeks first prepared to resist the Persian attack on the mainland, and it speaks directly to the time of the audience itself, some three generations later, when a divided Greece is destroying itself in the Peloponnesian War.⁶⁹ The morality tale, placed at the crossroads between the time of Croesus, the Persian Wars, and the Peloponnesian War, resonates with an armature of the *Histories*. The destruction of the house, the extermination of the city, the delay through generations, indirect divine agency, the madness of the king, perjury, the *hybris* of greed, the danger of wealth, the *agos* of the Aeginetans are all brought together side by side in this great staging of punishment in time. Ancestral fault serves as a link in bringing the various events together in a coherent sequence, part of a much larger pattern in the work of Herodotus, as we will see below.

The wrath of Talthybios

Another episode in the second half of the *Histories* where ancestral fault plays a prominent role is found at 7.133, where Herodotus explains why Xerxes did not send any messengers to Athens or Sparta to ask for earth

⁶⁸ See Johnson 2001–2.

⁶⁹ For the presence of the Athenian Empire and the time of the Peloponnesian War in the *Histories*, see e.g. 5.90; 92; 6.98; 7.138; 235; 9.73; cf. Jacoby 1913: 233; Strasburger 1955; Fornara 1971a: 90–1; 1971b; 1981; Cobet 1977; Evans 1979; Sansone 1985; Prandi 1991; T. Harrison 2008–9; Irwin 2008–9; Strong 2009–10; Raaflaub 2010.

and water.⁷⁰ The reason is that when Darius had summoned the two cities to surrender themselves to him earlier, both of them had the heralds executed, thus breaking a most sacred convention of war.⁷¹ The text goes on (δὲ ὧν) to relate how this sacrilege provoked the anger of Talthybios in Sparta, the mythical herald of Agamemnon who had a sanctuary in the city, and a *genos* claiming descent from him.⁷² The narrative of the next few chapters describes how Sparta sent two ambassadors to Xerxes in order to be executed and thus pay the penalty for the sake of the city. Xerxes craftily refused to accept their sacrifice and thus release the city from its debt, but punishment came a generation later when the sons of the two ambassadors that Sparta had sent to Xerxes were executed by the Athenians, something that Herodotus sees as a clear sign of divine intervention.

The death of these two men, Nicolas son of Bulis and Aneristus son of Sperthias, happened at the very beginning of the Peloponnesian War, and it was obviously an event of great prominence, as the description of the same events in Thucydides 2.67 attests.⁷³ Dated by that passage to the summer of 430, the execution of the two Spartan messengers is one of the most recent events mentioned in the *Histories*, and thus often thought to be contemporary with the last stages in the composition of the work and its probable performance readings in Athens and elsewhere.⁷⁴ These events were fresh, and Herodotus is bringing the course of his narrative into direct contact with current affairs, something that was of particularly great concern to people in Athens.⁷⁵ It is interesting to note that, in Thucydides' account, the two Spartan messengers were caught on their way to negotiate an arrangement with the Persian king, as their fathers had before them in the account of Herodotus, and that they were killed by being thrown into a pit, exactly as the Persian heralds had been killed two

⁷⁰ Wéry 1966; Sealey 1976; Mariggió 2007; cf. 6.48 and 7.32, with Macan 1908: 174. I am grateful to Professor Vannicelli for having sent me the rich discussion of his forthcoming commentary on this passage.

⁷¹ See R. D. Griffith 2008.

⁷² 7.134: ἐν γὰρ Σπάρτῃ ἐστὶ Τάλθυβίου ἱρόν, εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἀπόγονοι [Τάλθυβίου] Τάλθυβιάδαι καλεόμενοι, τοῖσι αἱ κηρυκῆαι αἱ ἐκ Σπάρτης πᾶσαι γέρας δέδονται; see also Pausanias 3.12.7 (with Musti and Torelli 1991: 201–2); 7.24.1 (with Moggi and Osanna 2000: 321 and Casevitz 2000: 211). Cf. 6.60: συμφέρονται δὲ καὶ τάδε Αἰγυπτίοισι Λακεδαιμόνιοι· οἱ κήρυκες αὐτῶν καὶ αὐληταὶ καὶ μάγειροι ἐκδέκονται τὰς πατρῴας τέχνας, καὶ αὐλητῆς τε αὐλητέω γίνεται καὶ μάγειρος μαγείρου καὶ κήρυξ κήρυκος· οὐ κατὰ λαμπροφωνίην ἐπιτιθέμενοι ἄλλοι σφέας παρακληίουςι, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὰ πάτρια ἐπιτελέουσι. ταῦτα μὲν δὴ οὕτω γίνεται. Cf. 7.24.2 (see p. 300).

⁷³ See Hornblower 1991: 150–1. Thucydides, of course, has nothing to say about divine intervention in his relation of the events of 430.

⁷⁴ See Raaflaub 2010: 200–3. ⁷⁵ See Vannicelli (forthcoming).

generations back. It is not that evident, as some believe, that the Thucydidean passage is engaged in a direct dialogue with Herodotus here. It is just as possible that this was an event that was so well known at the time of Herodotus, when it was still so recent, that it did not need to be described in detail. If the text of Herodotus presupposes knowledge of the event from the audience, then the coincidence between the different stages of the story becomes all the more striking, and it is easier to understand Herodotus' marked enthusiasm for it. This was a *cause célèbre* of the time.⁷⁶

Whatever the case, Herodotus presents it as a congruence of great significance. The execution of the two Spartans is, he says, something that appears to be most divine, *θειότατον*.⁷⁷ This is the only place in the *Histories* where the superlative of *θεῖος* is used. The voice of the narrator intervenes directly to confirm the fact that this is the result of a divine intervention. It is the Lacedemonians themselves (ὡς λέγουσι Λακεδαιμόνιοι) who say that the anger of Talthybios was responsible for the killing of the messengers, and that interpretation is supported by the rare unqualified declaration *μοι . . . φαίνεται* of the next sentence, a statement that is then expanded to describe what it is that makes those deaths particularly clear signs of divine action. One element of the explanation, introduced by *μὲν γάρ*, is that the *μῆνις* (wrath) is just, *δίκαιον*.⁷⁸ It is, according to the narrator, just that the anger of Talthybios has fallen on messengers, and that it reappeared after having abated for some time. That is, Herodotus sees the presence of justice in the execution of the Spartan messengers because they were a particularly adequate target for the wrath of the ancient Iliadic herald, and because it shows that delay is not contingency, but that punishment will not cease until it is accomplished. Another, complementary element that makes the event *θειότατον*, introduced by *δέ*, is that the punishment fell on the sons of the men who had originally been sent to the king to pay for the fault of the city.⁷⁹ Their fathers had been chosen to appease the anger of the herald, and the anger

⁷⁶ For the posterity of the story in later historiography, see Corcella 1996.

⁷⁷ See still the discussion of Stein 1874: 132–3.

⁷⁸ See T. Harrison 2000: 110: 'There seems to be a sliding scale in operation here: the more coincidental the retribution, the more just; justice as miraculously appropriate as this must be divine. Clearly the element of delay makes the eventual fulfilment of Talthybios' wrath more miraculous.' Cf. How and Wells 1912: 179–80, who see this as an example of 'the doctrine of Nemesis'. They refer to Ezekiel 18 and John 9:2.

⁷⁹ 7.137: ὅτι μὲν γὰρ κατέσκηψε ἐς ἀγγέλους ἡ Ταλθυβίου μῆνις οὐδὲ ἐπαύσατο πρὶν ἢ ἐξηλθε, τὸ δίκαιον οὕτω ἔφερε· τὸ δὲ συμπεσεῖν ἐς τοὺς παῖδας τῶν ἀνδρῶν τούτων τῶν ἀναβάντων πρὸς βασιλέα διὰ τὴν μῆνιν.

of the herald fell on their sons. This is emphatically labelled as a θεῖον πρῆγμα. It is a visible sign of divine justice, something that is δῆλον.⁸⁰ The fact that the sons died as an equivalence for the deaths of their fathers, a statement introduced by the last γάρ of the passage, is presented as the ultimate proof of the correlation between events that Herodotus paints in the passage. The fact that the fathers of the heralds very emphatically made a choice that their sons did not is not presented as a problem, something that commentators have repeatedly condemned.⁸¹

The theological mechanism at work is clearly laid out. A crime of the utmost gravity has been committed by the city as a whole, as a collective, and this shared fault has provoked the anger of Talthybios.⁸² Just as in the episode of Zeus Laphystios in 7.197, the transgression provokes the μῆνις of a local divine power.⁸³ In a passage from Book 3 of the *Periegesis* which constitutes a commentary of sorts to the Herodotean text, Pausanias refers to this μῆνις as a μῆνιμα (3.12.7).⁸⁴ That Talthybios is the power involved in the event is explained (γάρ) in the text by the fact that he has a sanctuary in the city, a ἱερόν, and descendants forming a recognisable kin group, the Talthybiadaí.⁸⁵ That sanctuary is almost certainly the grave of the herald mentioned by Pausanias. His local presence in cult, and his function as the mythical herald of Agamemnon and the ancestor of all the heralds of the city, points to him as the deity responsible for protecting the offence.⁸⁶ As the crime falls in his sphere of influence, he becomes the agency of its punishment.

This sanction takes the form of a breakdown between human and divine communication. Following on the murder of the Persian heralds (μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα), the Spartans are no longer able to receive favourable omens in their sacrifices.⁸⁷ The role of heralds in the conduct of sacrifice is one of their important functions in the *Iliad*, where Talthybios himself cuts the sacrifice of the great oath-ritual in Book 3.⁸⁸ It is interesting to note that Pausanias still knew of ‘heroic sacrifices’ (ἐναγίζουσιν) being offered on the

⁸⁰ See Thomas 2000: 200–12.

⁸¹ See e.g. Macan 1908: 180–1; cf. T. Harrison 2000: 110.

⁸² For the inviolability of heralds, see Palli Bonet 1956; Wéry 1966; Adcock and Mosley 1975: 152–3; Goblou-Cahen 1999.

⁸³ For Hdt. 7.197, see Gagné 2013.

⁸⁴ See Musti and Torelli 1991: 201–2.

⁸⁵ 7.134: ἐν γάρ Σπάρτῃ ἐστὶ Τάλθυβίου ἱερόν, εἰσι δὲ καὶ ἀπόγονοι [Τάλθυβίου] Τάλθυβιάδαι καλεόμενοι, τοῖσι αἱ κηρυκταὶ αἱ ἐκ Σπάρτης πᾶσαι γέρας δέδονται.

⁸⁶ See Touchefeu-Meynier 1994.

⁸⁷ 7.134: μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τοῖσι Σπαρτιήτησι καλλιερῆσαι θυομένοισι οὐκ ἐδύνατο; for καλλιερῆσαι, cf. 6.82; 7.113; 7.167.

⁸⁸ *Il.* 3.118–20; 245; 268–74; 19.250–1; 267–8; *Od.* 20.276–7; cf. Wéry 1967.

grave of Talthybios.⁸⁹ That the punishment of Talthybios on Sparta took that form and not another is probably not a coincidence. Just as Zeus the Devourer punishes through human sacrifice in 7.197, the herald of Agamemnon strikes the city with a collapse of the most fundamental channel of exchange between gods and men. Without the ability to obtain favourable omens through sacrifice, the city is thoroughly paralysed, deprived of any hope of success in its endeavours, notably in warfare. The loss of effective sacrifice basically makes the city powerless. What falls on Sparta in this episode is akin in some ways to the terrible effect of the annulment of sacrificial communication imagined by Aristophanes in the *Birds*.⁹⁰ There is hardly a more dangerous situation for a state like Sparta, something clearly shown by the fear of the Lacedemonians and their helplessness in the face of this disaster. The prevention of sacrifice is a common consequence of pollution (e.g. Antiphon 5.82), but pollution is mentioned nowhere in the passage, and there is no reason to bring it in the equation.

As the calamity remains on the city for a prolonged period of time, assemblies are convened and citizens are asked to offer their lives in payment for the crime. It is interesting to note that a solution is sought through the communal space of the assembly, but that it is not imposed on anyone by the city. The emphasis of the decision process presented in the text is on the will of individuals, not the will of the people.⁹¹ The proclamations of the assemblies asked if someone would be willing to give his life (εἴ τις βούλοιτο), and the sacrifice of the two volunteers is underlined as something that is done of their own free will (ἐθελονταί).⁹² That foregrounding of will is particularly remarkable in the light of the punishment that ultimately will fall on their sons, who did not explicitly set out to die for the city, contrary to their fathers. That emphasis on individual choice in the passage shows the logic of the expiation that the Spartans are trying to achieve.

The city could not liberate itself from the crime it has committed simply by sending people to their deaths. Its fault was the execution of inviolable

⁸⁹ 7.24.1–2: Αἰγίεῦσι δὲ ἔστι μὲν πρὸς τῇ ἀγορᾷ ναὸς Ἀπόλλωνι καὶ Ἀρτέμιδι ἐν κοινῷ, ἔστι δὲ ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ ἱερὸν Ἀρτέμιδος, τοξευούσῃ δὲ εἴκασται, καὶ Ταλθυβίου τοῦ κήρυκος τάφος· κέχωσται δὲ τῷ Ταλθυβίῳ καὶ ἄλλο μνημεῖον ἐν Σπάρτῃ, καὶ αὐτῷ αἱ πόλεις ἐναγίζουσιν ἀμφοτέραι. Cf. Ekroth 2002: 97 (who puzzlingly refers to a tomb of Talthybios in Athens).

⁹⁰ See A. M. Bowie 1993a: 160–1.

⁹¹ Cf. R. C. T. Parker 1983: 264–5: 'If the story were true, it would provide the most spectacular evidence in all of Greek history for self-punishment as a form of religious expiation, since the affliction was merely the inability to sacrifice successfully, while the cure was the loss of two Spartiate lives'; cf. J. Stern 1991, who reads the episode as a reflection of scapegoat rituals.

⁹² For the idea that this prefigures the sacrifice of the Thermopylae, see Vannicelli (forthcoming).

individuals, something that would not be washed away by the execution of more individuals. The entire passage is based on the language of exchange, debt and dues, and the idea of ποινὴν τεῖσιν, the price of the penalty that must be paid (7.134). Everything rests on equivalence, and the lives that were lost must be paid for with lives of similar worth. The city cannot right its wrong with another wrong, but it must devise a way to *offer* lives to the wronged party. The collective fate of the city thus finds itself in the hands of individual wills.

Only volunteers can save the *polis* from this mortal danger. After many assemblies, the two that finally presented themselves were perfect for the role. Rich and of the best lineage, they were citizens who could equal the worth of the heralds, and embody particularly well the responsibility of the city and the *poinë* it must pay. But it is the strength of their choice that the passage places in the foreground, and the significance of their resolve. Their admirable decision is brought into much sharper focus by the challenge of the Persian general who first welcomes them to Asia, as he offers them the commands and treasures of the king's friendship, which they promptly decline (7.135–6). Their individual will is still responsible for the fate of the city even then, and their courageous resolve to refuse the gifts of the Persians allows them to carry their mission to the end and embody the city in its attempt to seek release from its debt.

The characters of the two messengers are fleshed out by the passage as embodiments of admirable Spartan virtue in both deeds and words. They present their choice to the general as an expression of Greek freedom, ἔλευθερίῃ, their most prized possession, one worth fighting for to the death in close combat – yet another continuation of Demaratus' speech to Xerxes and foreshadowing of the Thermopylae in 7.102.⁹³ The mention of the sweetness of freedom, the emphasis on the verb πειράω, to try, to taste, open a reference to the symposium in their speech. Fêted by the Persian general most lavishly, showered with all the luxurious gifts of imperial *xenia*, they oppose the taste of freedom to the feast of abundant slavery.⁹⁴ When they reach the king in Susa, they still refuse to submit and bow down, saying that it is not in their custom (ἐν νόμῳ) to fall down and worship (προσκυνέειν) before a man.⁹⁵ Their acts are indeed 'worthy of amazement' (θῶματος ἄξιῃ), and this powerful scene of confrontation between Greeks and Persians functions as a condensed tableau of the entire *Histories*.

⁹³ See Lachenaud 1976: 514–53; Forsdyke 2001.

⁹⁴ Cf. Thomas 2000: 107. ⁹⁵ See Macan 1908: 178–9.

To the defiance of the Spartans Xerxes responds with an equally impressive statement. What Sparta has done is break the laws *of all men*: τὰ πάντων ἀνθρώπων νόμιμα.⁹⁶ Literally, it poured them all together, obliterated them.⁹⁷ Confusion and destruction, the abolition of the σπονδαί that make the backbone of relations between men, are the direct consequence of the heralds' execution. To the law of one *polis* Xerxes opposes the laws that have no frontiers and govern all men. The empire champions a universal legislation against the custom of one city, a claim as frighteningly effective then as it is now in the hands of the powerful. Xerxes goes further, with a bid to use these cosmic νόμιμα to his own advantage. The force of ὑπὸ μεγαλοφροσύνης cannot be translated simply as 'magnanimity' or 'grandeur d'âme' but is better rendered by Immerwahr's 'pride in his magnificence'.⁹⁸ It is, as Baragwanath notes, a term reserved for Xerxes in the *Histories*, and the Persian exercise of imperial power. By refusing to accept the reparations of the Spartans, Xerxes makes the νόμιμα of all men a tool of the empire, and of his designs on Greece. As in the case of Zeus Laphystios and so many episodes, his understanding is atrociously wrong.⁹⁹

The strength of Herodotus' insistence on divine action in this passage has to do with the fact that the course of events follows neither Spartan nor Persian intention but still finds its way to a just conclusion. Even though Xerxes refused to accept the lives of the two Spartan messengers in exchange for the dead heralds, their mission was successful, and the anger of Talthybios ceased for some time (ἐπαύσατο τὸ παραυτίκα).¹⁰⁰ Without this, Sparta would not have been able to fight, and all of Hellas would have fallen before Xerxes. The breathless scene of the battle sacrifices performed by the Spartans before Plataea, to take one example, is only possible because the Spartans were able to appease the anger of Talthybios.¹⁰¹ The episode of 7.133–7 describes one of the conditions for the victory of the Greeks. The heroic resolve of the two messengers in their defence of freedom is one of the pivotal moments of the war. As such, it functions as an exact parallel to the immediately following discussion of Athens' choice in 7.139.

⁹⁶ 7.136: λέγουσι δὴ αὐτοῖσι ταῦτα Ζέρξης ὑπὸ μεγαλοφροσύνης οὐκ ἔφη ὁμοίος ἔσεσθαι Λακεδαιμονίοισι· κείνους μὲν γὰρ συγχέαι τὰ πάντων ἀνθρώπων νόμιμα ἀποκτείναντας κήρυκας, αὐτὸς δὲ τὰ ἐκείνοισι ἐπιπλήσσει ταῦτα οὐ ποιήσσειν, οὐδὲ ἀνταποκτείνας ἐκείνους ἀπολύσειν Λακεδαιμονίους τῆς αἰτίας.

⁹⁷ See Macan 1908: 179 on συγχέαι, who refers to Euripides, *Supp.* 311 and Thuc. 5.39.3.

⁹⁸ Immerwahr 1966: 177; Baragwanath 2008: 264–5.

⁹⁹ See Pippidi 1960; Lachenaud 1976: 608–22.

¹⁰⁰ See Macan 1908: 180. ¹⁰¹ 9.61; see Asheri 2006 ad loc.; cf. Jameson 1991.

Sperthias and Bulis, the two emissaries, were able to return to Sparta, but their sons were later executed in their stead. The anger of Talthybios, says Herodotus, 'woke up' (ἐπηγέρθη) much later.¹⁰² The delay is marked by its great extent, in this case a period of some fifty years, during which the wrath of the ancient herald is conceived of as sleeping. Although inactive, it is still there, a presence in the community. When it wakes up, it 'strikes down', from above (137: κατέσκηψε), the Spartan ambassadors, just as it had 'struck down' (134: κατέσκηψε) the city in the time of Xerxes, and it pursues its target until the end. Its accomplishment is also its departure – once the heralds are killed, the debt is paid and the wrath is gone.¹⁰³ The spatial imagery shows a conception of the wrath (μῆνις) as something that is clearly localised yet can move at will when it strikes. Limited to the crime committed in the territory of the ἱόν, it is able to reach its targets all the way into Asia and Athens.

The temporal imagery is more elaborate. Its main characteristic is that the μῆνις has a beginning and an end. There is a clear αἰτία to it, a cause that is intrinsically linked to its effect, and no question about the identification of that cause. The Spartans know what it is and which divinity is responsible for its sanction, but nothing in the text hints at how they reach this knowledge.¹⁰⁴ Xerxes, interestingly enough, shares it, and one of the reasons why he refuses to take the life of the two messengers is that he does not want to liberate the Spartans from their αἰτία, a particularly interesting statement. The use of the legal phrase ἀπολύσειν τῆς αἰτίας here implies that the Lacedemonians are bound to the debt of their crime. The αἰτία is both cause and responsibility. It stays with the city until it can be released, 'loosened away'.¹⁰⁵ Duration is inconsequential. It matters that the debt meet its appropriate price. When the αἰτία is answered by an equivalent penalty, the crime is acquitted. The resolution annuls the cause and the punishment disappears. Until that happens, the μῆνις is there. It can have a temporary ending, in that its effect is no longer felt for some time, but once the penalty is paid it leaves for good. The μῆνις of Talthybios, contrary to the μῆνις of Zeus Laphystios, is a finite line in the time of history, not a cyclical recurrence of ritual time. What they have in common is that their impressive duration extends over the life of any one individual, a clear expression of the power of divinity over mere

¹⁰² 7.137: χρόνῳ δὲ μετέπειτα πολλῶ ἐπηγέρθη κατὰ τὸν Πελοποννησίῳ καὶ Ἀθηναίων πόλεμον; cf. Aesch. *Eum.* 280.

¹⁰³ 7.137: οὐδὲ ἐπαύσατο πρὶν ἢ ἐξῆλθε, τὸ δίκαιον οὕτω ἔφερε.

¹⁰⁴ Stein 1874: 130 suggests an oracle; cf. Macan 1908: 175; How and Wells 1912: 179.

¹⁰⁵ Cf. 2.74; 4.68; 9.88.

mortals. In both cases the anger of the divine power is grounded in a sanctuary with special links to a *genos*, and its continuity is built on filiation. While the rite of Zeus Laphystios described in 7.197 periodically re-enacts the original crime and stages the responsibility of the victims anew on each occasion, however, the two Spartan heralds are killed as a result of no act on their part. The issue of individual will, so important in the personal choices of their fathers to pay the debt of Sparta with their lives, has no part to play in the punishment of their sons. The choice of the fathers directly involves the death of the sons fifty years later. This is not only a clear sign of divine action, but an expression of divine justice. We are far from the lamentations of a Theognis. All debts *must* be paid.

That brings us back to the case of Athens. If Herodotus goes on at length about the punishment of the Spartans, and the successful acquittal of their crime, he has nothing to say about the punishment of Athens.¹⁰⁶ Or rather, he says a lot about it by not being able to identify what it is. Sparta and Athens have committed exactly the same crime. The more Herodotus describes the punishment of Sparta for its fault, the more he strengthens the expectation of an equivalence for Athens. The point is that none will come, as he writes at the beginning of the passage. Herodotus explicitly says that he is unable to tell what punishment fell on the Athenians as a result of their crime. More, he identifies a catastrophe that did not strike them as a result of this crime. The complete destruction of Athens at the hands of the Persians, he writes, is the only suitable ἀνεθέλητον he can think of, but he believes that ‘there was another reason for this, and not the aforesaid’.¹⁰⁷ Few sentences can be more pregnant.

One fact that stands out is that nowhere does Herodotus say what that cause is. Maybe that sentence is meant to point in the direction of Athens’ destruction of Sardis’s temples (5.102), as some commentators believe. Maybe it is not. What matters is that Herodotus claims some knowledge about the causality of that event: δοκέω.¹⁰⁸ His opinion about it is different from his lack of information (οὐκ ἔχω εἶπαι) concerning the punishment of Athens. He believes that there is another cause to that catastrophe. Which is doubly interesting, in that the implication is that an event such as the destruction of Athens has an αἰτία, and that that cause is identifiable; it is not ‘that cause’ (οὐ διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίην), it is another. The knowledge

¹⁰⁶ 7.133: ὃ τι δὲ τοῖσι Ἀθηναίοισι ταῦτα ποιήσασι τοὺς κήρυκας συνήνεικε ἀνεθέλητον γενέσθαι, οὐκ ἔχω εἶπαι, πλὴν ὅτι σφέων ἡ χώρα καὶ ἡ πόλις ἐδωρώθη, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο οὐ διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίην δοκέω γενέσθαι.

¹⁰⁷ For ἀνεθέλητον, see Macan 1908: III, who reads it as a euphemism.

¹⁰⁸ See Thomas 2000: 235–48.

deployed by the historian in his narrative is able to discard a possible solution. That reminder of Herodotus' careful talents of observation and deduction, if one is needed, emphasises even more the striking fact of his inability to identify the Athenian punishment.¹⁰⁹

That loose end was intolerable to ancient readers of Herodotus. Pausanias bears witness to the need to complete it, and he presents the story of Talthybios' wrath as one that strikes both Athens and Sparta equally (3.12.7). For him, it is an issue of contrast (μὲν . . . δέ) between the collective punishment of Sparta, where the μήνιμα 'appeared as a symptom' (ἐπεσήμαινεν) to the whole state (ἐς τὸ δημόσιον), and the lot of Athens, where it affected individuals (ἰδία) and fell down on the house of one man, Miltiades (ἐς ἑνὸς οἶκον ἀνδρὸς κατέσκηψε). It would be interesting to know if Pausanias reproduces an earlier source there, and how the ancient reception of the Herodotean passage evolved in time, or if he is simply upstaging his predecessor. Whatever the case, the very different perspective on the events deployed in this passage makes the contours of the Herodotean text much sharper by contrast.

In Herodotus, nothing points to an opposition between the δημόσιον and ἴδιον in the lot reserved to Athens and Sparta. Quite the contrary, the mention of Athens' destruction as a possible candidate for the punishment of the crime points to a sanction of great collective significance. And far from hinting at the identification of the punishment in some way, as he does with his refusals to speak elsewhere, Herodotus foregrounds his incapacity to find out what it must have been. Which is another way to say that it has not happened yet.

This entire section of the *Histories* is concerned with Athens and Sparta and the decisions that allow them to unite in opposition to the Persians. Written in the early years of the great struggle that pitted the two cities against each other in total war, a conflict that constitutes a powerful subtext to the whole of the *Histories*, as many have argued, it would have resonated very forcefully with audiences of the day.¹¹⁰ This is the only place in the *Histories* where the Peloponnesian War is explicitly

¹⁰⁹ Cf. Vannicelli (forthcoming): 'οὐ διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίην: tema centrale in Erodoto, a partire dalla dichiarazione proemiale, di voler indagare la responsabilità, la colpa dell'inizio del conflitto tra Greci e Barbari. Per Erodoto la devastazione di Atene è verosimilmente da ricondursi alla partecipazione ateniese alla fase iniziale della rivolta ionica (cfr. V 97, 3; 102, 1). E' però degno di nota che, in linea di principio, egli la consideri una possibile punizione per l'atto sacrilego (forse in polemica contro una tradizione in questo senso? gli Ateniesi non sembrano essere stati in grado di mostrare di aver espiato quella colpa: cfr. n. a 137, 1).'

¹¹⁰ See p. 296; as Vannicelli writes, part of the effect of the passage is also to say that '*quod non fecerunt Barbari fecerunt Athenienses*.'

mentioned. The punishment of the Spartans fell down on the descendants of the messengers in the early years of that conflict. If Herodotus is leading the audience in any direction here, as indeed he often does, it is that Athens' punishment is yet to come. The historian's enquiry consistently demonstrates its ability to establish patterns of causality and correspondence over vast distances in time. It is a knowledge that, in this case, brings the ominous presence of the past into future time. The passage begins with the statement that Athens' punishment for its crime against the Persians has not yet taken place and ends with the image of Athens repeating that crime against the Spartans many years later. It begins with events at the beginning of the Persian Wars and their consequences at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War. Transmission through generations becomes a powerful tool of meaning and continuity in the hands of the historian.

The Enagees

Another interesting case of using ancestral fault to create an association between the past of the narrative and the present of the audience is found in 5.70–3, the passage concerned with the expulsion of the Alcmaeonids from Athens.¹¹¹ The story is well known, placed at a key moment in the narrative of Athens' development as a democratic *polis*. The Spartan king Cleomenes, after having helped the Athenians drive out the Peisistratids from the city, decides to intervene in the resulting power struggle, and to take the side of Isagoras against Cleisthenes and the Alcmaeonids (5.70). The stated reason for this is the old bond of guest-friendship uniting the Spartan king and the Athenian leader, one that goes so far as to include 'visits' of Cleomenes to the wife of Isagoras, something that is presented as an αἰτία for his action.¹¹² In order to break the hold of Cleisthenes on Athens, Cleomenes seeks to have him expelled from the city, and he sends a herald to Athens demanding that all the Alcmaeonids and their accomplices be cast out from Attica, presenting them (ἐπιλέγων) on the instructions of Isagoras as the Impure, *Enagees*.

Herodotus then goes on to describe the nature of that pollution ascribed to the Alcmaeonids (5.71). Generations earlier (πρὸ τῆς Πεισιστράτου ἡλικίης ἐγένετο), the Olympic victor Cylon had attempted to seize power

¹¹¹ For the events themselves, see pp. 206–9. The following pages are concerned with their representation.

¹¹² 5.70.4–5: τὸν δὲ Κλεομένηα εἶχε αἰτία φοιτᾶν παρὰ τοῦ Ἰσαγόρεω τὴν γυναῖκα. On the meaning of αἰτία in the passage, see Nenci 1994: 261–2.

in the city, and his coup failed. Having sought refuge in the temple of Athena on the Acropolis, he and his men were forcibly removed from the sanctuary by the 'presidents of the naval boards' (οἱ πρυτάνεις τῶν ναυκράρων) and put to death.¹¹³ That murder of suppliants was a sacrilege of utmost gravity and its responsibility lay with the Alcmaeonids. In 5.70 Herodotus writes that the Alcmaeonids and their συστασιῶται, a word that implies taking a stand in a conflict and can be translated as 'partisans', 'had' the αἰτίη of that murder.¹¹⁴ The imperfect of εἶχον here implies a process of continuous perception ('they were held to be guilty') from the perspective of that moment in time. In 5.71, after the description of the Cylonian conspiracy and its outcome, the claim of perceived responsibility is repeated: the αἰτίη of the murder 'has' the Alcmaeonids. The use of the present tense in this sentence has the interesting effect of keeping its force both in the time of the narrative and in the time of the audience.¹¹⁵ Just as the Alcmaeonids were accused then, so they are now. Following this formal declaration from the Spartan herald, Cleisthenes discreetly left the city, which Cleomenes then occupied with a small force (5.72). Seven hundred households (ἐπίστια) were expelled, by any account a massive number of citizens.¹¹⁶ Having tried to dissolve the *boulē* and establish Isagoras' faction in power, the Spartans were resisted by the Athenians and they had to seek refuge on the Acropolis, where they were besieged for two days.¹¹⁷ When they surrendered, the Spartans were allowed to leave, but the other members of their faction were taken prisoner and put to death. The seven hundred households of the Impure were recalled together with Cleisthenes (5.73).

Herodotus' text is the earliest extant narrative of those events, but by no means the only one. The Cylonian *agos* was one of the defining moments of Athenian cultural memory. Mentioned in a number of later authors, it is related in greater detail by four other writers: Thucydides (1.126), Aristotle (*Ath. Pol.* 1 and 20), Plutarch (*Solon* 12), and Diogenes Laertius (1.109–15).¹¹⁸ All of them present rather different stories, even if they are all

¹¹³ See Lang 1967; Billigmeier and Dusing 1981; Lambert 1986; Jordan 1992; Nenci 1994: 265–6; Valdés Guía 2002a; C. Schubert 2008.

¹¹⁴ 5.70.8–10: οἱ μὲν γὰρ Ἀλκμεωνίδαι καὶ οἱ συστασιῶται αὐτῶν εἶχον αἰτίην τοῦ φόνου τούτου, αὐτὸς δὲ οὐ μετείχε οὐδ' οἱ φίλοι αὐτοῦ

¹¹⁵ 5.71.7–8: φονεῦσαι δὲ αὐτοὺς αἰτίη ἔχει Ἀλκμεωνίδας.

¹¹⁶ The numbers are disputed; see e.g. Nenci 1994: 266–7. What matters here is that, within the text of Herodotus, the expulsion is presented as a considerable population movement of the past. On the meaning of ἐπίστια, see Cromei 2000; cf. Andrewes 1961.

¹¹⁷ See R. C. T. Parker 1998; Rosivach 2008. ¹¹⁸ See Giuliani 1999.

dependent on Herodotus to some extent. What can they tell us about the evolution of the traditions concerning this ancient pollution?

Thucydides retells the story of the Cylonian massacre at 1.126.¹¹⁹ The main difference from Herodotus is that the archons are the main actors of the murders, not the presidents of the naval boards, and the various stages of the narrative are described at greater length.¹²⁰ There is no mention of the Alcmaeonids in the text, just the nine archons and their descendants.¹²¹ The passage insists on the motivations of Cylon in staging his coup. A victor in the Olympic games, he was the son-in-law of the tyrant Theagenes of Megara, whose help he obtained in his attempt to seize the Acropolis. An oracle from Delphi had advised him to do this 'at the greatest festival of Zeus' (ἐν τοῦ Διὸς τῇ μεγίστῃ ἑορτῇ), which he took to be the Olympic festival in the Peloponnese, rather than the Diasia at Athens. The Athenians rose against the failed conspirators, who were besieged on the Acropolis. As the siege dragged on, the city left its conduct to the nine archons, who successfully reduced the plotters to famine. Cylon and his brother managed to escape, but those who remained either died of hunger as suppliants in the sanctuary or were butchered after they agreed to leave on the promise of safe conduct, some being killed on the altars of the *Semnai Theai* themselves.¹²² The archons and their descendants were, as a result, called impure and offenders against the goddess (ἐναγεῖς καὶ ἀλιτῆριοι τῆς θεοῦ).

The pollution, which Thucydides describes as 'the *agos* of the goddess', was tied to the *genos* of the archons (ἐκεῖνοί τε . . . καὶ τὸ γένος τὸ ἀπ' ἐκείνων). What is meant by *genos* here is not necessarily pointing to the Alcmaeonids, and the fact is that all nine archons were very probably not from the same kinship group.¹²³ The word *genos* in this case could as well refer to the extended descendance of the implicated magistrates rather than one precise clan. That can very well be the referent implied in the statement that 'their *genos* is still in the city'.¹²⁴ Whatever the case, the fact is that the Alcmaeonids are nowhere mentioned in the passage.

¹¹⁹ See Hornblower 1991: 202–3; Ellis 1994.

¹²⁰ J. W. Williams 1951; Lang 1967; Figueira 1986; Thomas 1989: 144–54; 261–81; Parker 2004.

¹²¹ An important concern of the scholarship has consisted in trying to assess which source is pro-Alcmaeonid and which one reflects more critical accounts. I agree with Rhodes (1981: 82) that 'it is too simplistic to claim that Herodotus' account is a defence of the Alcmaeonids and Thucydides' is a rebuttal of that defence'.

¹²² 1.126.11: καθεζομένους δέ τινας καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν σεμνῶν θεῶν τοῖς βωμοῖς ἐν τῇ παρόδῳ ἀπεχρήσαντο; see Valdés Guía 2002b; cf. Harris-Cline 1999.

¹²³ See Thomas 1989: 276–7.

¹²⁴ 1.127.1: κατῆλθον μέντοι ὕστερον καὶ τὸ γένος αὐτῶν ἔστιν ἔτι ἐν τῇ πόλει.

Thucydides, contrary to Herodotus, mentions three attempts to drive the Impure out of the land. One took place just after the event, and the second is the one described by Herodotus, the intervention of Cleomenes at the time of the civil strife. Another difference with the Herodotean account is that not only were the living cast out of the land, but the bones of the dead were disinterred and removed from the territory.¹²⁵ It is the third expulsion, however, not mentioned by Herodotus, that makes the Thucydidean account so distinct (1.127). It is written there that the Spartans demanded the expulsion of the Impure at the very beginning of the Peloponnesian War, at the time when they were seeking a pretext for the commencement of hostilities. Pretending to defend the honour of the gods (τοῖς θεοῖς . . . τιμωροῦντες), they were in fact seeking to have Pericles banished, or weakened in the eyes of the city, as he was 'implicated' (προσεχόμενον) in the *agos* through the side of his mother.¹²⁶ There is no reason to doubt the historicity of this demand, which plays such an important role in the Thucydidean account of the war's origins.¹²⁷ Lines 445–6 from Aristophanes' *Knights*, if confirmation is needed, show how burning and actual the accusation of being one of the ἀλιτῆριοι τῆς θεοῦ was in 424, a charge made doubly funny by being put in the mouth of Pericles' former enemy.¹²⁸ The congruence of this phrase with the ἀλιτῆριοι τῆς θεοῦ of Thucydides is not a coincidence.

The adjective ἀλιτήριος is used together with the verb γεγόνει in the Aristophanic passage.¹²⁹ Kleon is obviously saying something about the birth of the Sausage-Seller in this sentence, as the reply of the Sausage-Seller makes clear. Being an offender against the goddess is a state that one inherits. Just as the man who has an ἀλιτρός θυμός in Solon's *Elegy to the Muses* might be innocent (ἀναίτιος) and still be subject to the anger of Zeus because of the deeds of an ancestor, so can a man be born ἀλιτήριος without having committed any fault of his own but still be held by the αἰτίη of a previous generation.¹³⁰ It is a condition that one is born with, similar to the *agos* which, in a passage like Herodotus 1.61, is shown to be

¹²⁵ 1.126.12: ἤλασαν μὲν οὖν καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τοὺς ἐναγεῖς τούτους, ἤλασε δὲ καὶ Κλεομένης ὁ Λακεδαιμόνιος ὕστερον μετὰ Ἀθηναίων στασιαζόντων, τοὺς τε ζῶντας ἐλαύνοντες καὶ τῶν τεθνεώτων τὰ ὀστὰ ἀνελόντες ἐξέβαλον; see Hornblower 1991: 210 for possible archaeological evidence relating to the event; cf. Isoc. 16.26.

¹²⁶ 1.127.1: εἰδότες δὲ Περικλέα τὸν Ζανθίππου προσεχόμενον αὐτῷ κατὰ τὴν μητέρα.

¹²⁷ See Hornblower 1991: 203. ¹²⁸ See Rogers 1910: 65; cf. Sommerstein 1981: 167.

¹²⁹ See p. 208. ¹³⁰ See pp. 244–5.

transmissible only through generation, not through contact.¹³¹ Contrary to the adjective ἐναγής, however, which denotes an objective pollution, ἀλιτήριος is subjective, and it is defined by the genitive τῆς θεοῦ.¹³² One is ἀλιτήριος in relation to the goddess. Her enduring offence at the act determines the condition. It is here, in other words, a state that expresses the ‘anger’ of the divinity following a transgression, and its continuity over the generations. Far from being a simple synonym of ἐναγής, it refers to a complementary facet of the ancestral fault transmitted through generations in the story, a witness to the nuance of perspectives and intertwined ideas associated in the concept. There can be no doubt that Aristophanes and Thucydides both refer to a related formulation, whether that was the actual terminology of the accusation or not. They are witnesses to the same tales circulating in the city about the event.

For Aristophanes, the term ἀλιτήριος is sufficient to evoke the whole story. For Thucydides, it is the *agos* that has pride of place, and the various attempts to expel it from the territory of Athens. The verb that recurs over and over again in the text is ἐλαύνειν, with its clear reference to the physical expulsion of pollution, its driving out from the land.¹³³ As a technical term of ritual purification, it involves the physical removal of a stain such as a *musos*, a *miasma* or an *agos* from a territory. It corresponds exactly to the rare verb ἀγηλατέω (ἄγος + ἐλαύνειν) found in Herodotus 5.72, used to describe Cleomenes’ expulsion of the seven hundred families.¹³⁴ While the operative term is ἐλαύνειν in Thucydides’ passage, it is ἐκβάλλω in Herodotus, a verb that is more specifically used in reference to the expulsion of individuals rather than pollution *per se*. Both ἀγηλατέω and ἐκβάλλω, interestingly enough, are associated in Sophocles, *Oedipus Tyrannus* 400–2.¹³⁵ Whatever the case, the emphasis of the Thucydidean passage is on the recurrent physical expulsion of the stained groups, and their periodical return. That is a problem that is addressed differently in the Aristotelian *Athēnaiōn politeia*.

In both Herodotus and Thucydides the pollution is presented as a matter of perception. It is Cleomenes who designates (ἐπιλέγων) his opponents as *enagees* in Herodotus, and in the text they were and are ‘held to be guilty’ of the deed by the Athenians (εἶχον αἰτίην/αἰτίη ἔχει),

¹³¹ Whatever distant historical reality it actually reflects, the logic of the text in Herodotus 1.61 is that the fear of Peisistratus is clearly not marriage itself or physical contact with his wife, but the production of children.

¹³² See Hatch 1908: 161. ¹³³ See Burkert 1985a [1977]: 270. ¹³⁴ Cf. Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 20.3.

¹³⁵ Soph. *OT* 399–402: ὃν δὴ σὺ πειρήεις ἐκβαλεῖν, δοκῶν θρόνοισι | παρὰστατήσῃ τοῖς Κρεοντείοις πέλας. | κλαίων δοκεῖς μοι καὶ σὺ χῶ συνθεῖς τάδε | ἀγηλατῆσῃν; see Jebb 1893: 64.

nothing more. In 1.61, already, the Alcmaeonids are ‘said to be impure’ (λεγομένων ἐναγέων εἶναι τῶν Ἀλκμεωνιδέων). Nowhere does the narrator present the pollution as an objective fact. No oracle is invoked to sanction its purification. The contrast is clear with Herodotus’ very emphatic recognition of divine action in the case of the heralds’ murder in 7.133–7, or the oracular establishment of cult in 7.197. Herodotus is not saying that an *agos* fell on Athens, as he can say that the wrath of Talthybios fell on Sparta, but that certain individuals *were said* to be impure as a result of the acts committed at the time of Cylon. The distinction is significant. The Cylonian pollution is framed as a political tool in the hands of a faction, and that is exactly what we see in Thucydides 1.126 as well. There, the entire tale serves to illustrate Sparta’s desire to open the hostilities against Athens, and the accusation of impurity is a πρόφασις, a pretext.¹³⁶ The Spartans demand the expulsion of the *enagees* in order to create a wedge between Pericles and the Athenian population, as the onset of war would thus be seen as, in part, the result of his misfortune (ξυμφορά) – common punishment for his ancestral fault.¹³⁷ Thucydides paints the picture of the Spartans cynically manipulating the story of the Impure to their own end. They, in turn, are never presented objectively as ἐναγείς καὶ ἀλιτῆριοι τῆς θεοῦ, but the story of Cylon is told to explain why they and their descendants *were called* (καὶ ἀπὸ τούτου . . . ἐκαλοῦντο) thus. The *agos* is an open value in that text.

The Aristotelian *Athēnaion politeia*, on the other hand, emphasises the care of the city in recognising its presence.¹³⁸ The *agos* is identified and condemned in court, and the people responsible for it (editors are too quick to replace the lacuna in the text by Alcmaeonids here) are formally convicted for the crime.¹³⁹ A prosecutor is named and members of the jury, chosen among those of noble birth, properly sworn in through an oath taken over sacrificial victims.¹⁴⁰ This is a completely different situation from the one we see in Herodotus, where the *enagees* are ‘held to be guilty’ by some, rather than actually sentenced by the city. In the Aristotelian text, they are expelled from the land for all time, and the bones of their

¹³⁶ See García González and Campos Daroca 1988.

¹³⁷ 1.127.2–3: οὐ μέντοι τοσοῦτον ἡλιπίζον παθεῖν ἂν αὐτὸν τοῦτο ὅσον διαβολὴν οἴσειν αὐτῷ πρὸς τὴν πόλιν ὥς καὶ διὰ τὴν ἐκείνου ξυμφορὰν τὸ μέρος ἔσται ὁ πόλεμος.

¹³⁸ 1: . . . Μύρωνος καθ’ ἱερῶν ὁμόσαντες ἀριστίνδην. καταγνωσθέντος δὲ τοῦ ἄγους, α[ὐ]τοὶ μὲν ἐκ τῶν τάφων ἐξεβλήθησαν, τὸ δὲ γένος αὐτῶν ἔφυγεν ἀειφυγίαν. Ἐ[πι]μενίδης δ’ ὁ Κρήης ἐπὶ τούτοις ἐκάθηρε τὴν πόλιν; see Rhodes 1981: 81–4.

¹³⁹ Rhodes 1981: 84. ¹⁴⁰ See p. 220.

ancestors dug out from their graves.¹⁴¹ This act, as in Thucydides, serves as a striking illustration of the complete removal of the *genos* from the territory. Is the pollution imagined as contaminating ancestors as well as descendants? What is certain is that the entire kin group is conceived of as one solidary unit in this act, where the fault of one member implicates the entire line, both those who came before and those who will follow. The idea is that the extirpation of the *genos* must be total, so that it might disappear entirely, root and branch, *πρόρριζος*, as in the old formula of imprecation *κατ' ἐξωλείας*.¹⁴² Contrary to the text of Thucydides, this grave expulsion is placed immediately after the crime in the *Athēnaion politeia*, rather than at the time of the expulsion demanded by Cleomenes.¹⁴³

A more significant difference between the Aristotelian text and the Thucydidean, however, is the mention of Epimenides in the former.¹⁴⁴ In that version of events, the great Cretan holy man is brought in to perform a purification over the city. Just as in the case of Herodotus 7.197, where a *katharmos* is involved in washing away the stain of the crime for the sake of the entire *polis*, the ritual intervention of a hallowed religious authority is called in in order to remove the pollution once and for all. Contrary to the narrative of Herodotus 7.197, however, where the *katharmos* is interrupted, and a cult of perpetual expiation established to atone for the failed purification, Epimenides actually purifies the city in the *Athēnaion politeia*. Athens is the direct object of the verb *ἐκάθηρε*, and the action of the holy man concerns the territory of the whole *polis*. As Rhodes writes, the use of *ἐπὶ τούτοις* indicates that 'Epimenides' purification is not merely subsequent to the expulsion of the Alcmaeonids but (as in Plut. *Sol.* 13.1) is associated with it.¹⁴⁵ In contrast to the versions of Herodotus and Thucydides, the cleansing of the city offers a closural event, a distinction between the state of pollution of one moment and the purity of the other. When the *enageis* are mentioned again in chapter 20, it is in reference to the perception of their pollution and its instrumentalisation, the fact that the Alcmaeonids 'were believed to be among the Impure'.¹⁴⁶ The references in that passage to Isagoras demanding the help of Cleomenes in expelling the pollution (*ἄγος ἐλαύνειν*) from the city and

¹⁴¹ Thucydides 1.126: τῶν τεθνεώτων τὰ ὅσα ἀνελόντες; Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 1: α[ὐ]τοὶ μὲν ἐκ τῶν τάφων ἐξεβλήθησαν; cf. Plut. *Solon* 12; Diog. Laert. 1.110.

¹⁴² See p. 174. ¹⁴³ See Rhodes 1981: 88.

¹⁴⁴ Federico 2001; Pòrtulas 2002; Valdés Guía 2002b; see p. 208. ¹⁴⁵ Rhodes 1981: 83–84.

¹⁴⁶ 20.2: ὁ δὲ Ἰσαγόρας ἐπιλειπόμενος τῇ δυνάμει, πάλιν ἐπικαλεσάμενος τὸν Κλεομένην ὄντα ἑαυτῷ ξένον, συνέπεισεν ἐλαύνειν τὸ ἄγος, διὰ τὸ τοὺς Ἀλκμεωνίδας δοκεῖν εἶναι τῶν ἐναγῶν.

driving out (ήγηλάτει) the seven hundred families (οἰκίαι in this case) from its territory closely follow Herodotus.¹⁴⁷

Epimenides plays a much larger role in the most extensive version of the events, that of Plutarch in chapter 12 of the *Life of Solon*.¹⁴⁸ In that passage, which draws directly from Herodotus, Thucydides, and the *Athēnaiōn politeia*, the Cyloneian *agos* is presented as an objective force that ‘agitated’ the city at a certain moment.¹⁴⁹ It is ‘at the time of the disturbances’ (ταύταις ταῖς ταραχαῖς) that the divine portents visit the city (12.3). The passage begins with the statement that the *agos* long ‘threw the city into confusion’ (διετάραττε), from the moment when the conspirators were murdered onwards, and it ends with a reference to the termination of the Cylonian disturbance (ταραχή), when the *enageis* were exiled.¹⁵⁰ As in the Aristotelian text, it postulates a clear closure and an end to the pollution. The Alcmaeonids are not named in the passage. It is the archons who ‘were called polluted men and were held in execration’ (ἐκ τούτου δὲ κληθέντες ἐναγεῖς ἐμισοῦντο), and their faction is presented as ‘the men who were held to be polluted’ (τοὺς ἐναγεῖς λεγομένους).¹⁵¹ The crime is described in dramatic detail, with the noteworthy addition of a reference to the thread that the Cylonians attached to the statue of the goddess on their way down from the Acropolis when they accepted to leave its safety and stand trial below (12.1.1).¹⁵² The thread broke when they reached the sanctuary of the Erinyes, and they were either stoned to death outside the sanctuary or butchered on its altars.

With this emphasis on ταραχή, the passage foregrounds the issue of political strife that resulted from the event. The kin groups that are linked to Alcmaeon and the archons are from then onwards opposed to the kin groups that are linked to the descendants of the Cyloneians, and the city is divided into two factions, a state that increases in severity over time. It takes the intervention of Solon the mediator, repeating a role he is recurrently ascribed in the Plutarchean text, to convince the accused to stand trial and submit to the judgment of the jury.¹⁵³ The trial that had been promised to the Cyloneians elegantly finds its way to their murderers (12.2–3). That is the same trial mentioned by the Aristotelian text, with the same details as in the *Athēnaiōn politeia* (Myron as prosecutor, the removal of bodies), and the expulsion (μετέστησαν, ἐξέριψαν) of the dead

¹⁴⁷ See Rhodes 1981: 243–6. ¹⁴⁸ See Piccirilli 1977: 148–62.

¹⁴⁹ 12.1: τὸ δὲ Κυλώνειον ἄγος ἥδη μὲν ἐκ πολλοῦ διετάραττε τὴν πόλιν.

¹⁵⁰ 13.1: αἱ δ’ Ἀθηναῖοι τῆς Κυλωνείου διαπεπαισμένης ταραχῆς.

¹⁵¹ 12.2–3. ¹⁵² See Bremmer 1980. ¹⁵³ See de Blois 2006.

and the living is also presented there as a verdict of the human tribunal.¹⁵⁴ One difference is that it is here located in a precise time some years after the massacre.

As in the Aristotelian text, the purification of Epimenides follows on the trial, but it is explained and justified there by a clear set of divine communications. Plutarch writes that ‘superstitious fears and strange apparitions’ possessed the city at this time, and that the seers proclaimed that their sacrifices identified pollutions and defilements (ἄγη καὶ μiasμούς) which demanded purifications (12.3). The verb προφαίνεσθαι clearly points to some kind of divinatory procedure, and sacrifice (διὰ τῶν ἱερῶν) is specified as the technique used by the diviners (μάντις). The plural of ἄγη and μiasμούς points to the fact that the pollution is not limited to the kin groups that have been expelled from the territory together with the bones of their ancestors. It is a stain that concerns the entire city.

Epimenides is called in because of his hallowed reputation.¹⁵⁵ The text of Plutarch, it should be noted, has nothing to say about the Cylonian crime in this section, but it details the close cooperation of Epimenides and Solon. We read that ‘on coming to Athens he made Solon his friend, assisted him in many ways, and paved the way for his legislation’, and his various contributions to the religious foundations of the city are listed, notably his giving order to the cult practices (ἱερουργίαι) of the *polis*, and his civilising reform of the funeral ceremonies (τὰ πένθη), an innovation towards milder, less ostentatious rites that curtailed the role of women – a development usually ascribed to Solon in other sources.¹⁵⁶ The *katharsis* of Athens, presented as his greatest deed, takes the form of a refoundation of the city. Through it ‘he brought it to be observant of justice and more easily inclined to unanimity’. The action of Epimenides is described as a form of initiation (κατοργιάσας) – we cannot forget at this point that the Cretan holy man ‘was reputed to be beloved of the gods, and wise concerning the religious matters that dealt with inspired and telestic knowledge’ – and a consecration (καθοσιώσας). The verb καθοσιώω is not a simple synonym of purification here, as we read in the Liddell–Scott

¹⁵⁴ See Piccirilli 1977: 153–5; Rhodes 1981: 83.

¹⁵⁵ 12.7: ἔδoκει δὲ τις εἶναι θεοφιλὴς καὶ σοφὸς περὶ τὰ θεῖα τὴν ἐνθουσιαστικὴν καὶ τελεστικὴν σοφίαν· διὸ καὶ παῖδα νύμφης ὄνομα Βλάστης καὶ Κούρητα νέον αὐτὸν οἱ τότε ἄνθρωποι προσηγόρευον.

¹⁵⁶ 12.8–10: καὶ γὰρ εὐσταλεῖς ἐποίησε ταῖς ἱερουργίαις καὶ περὶ τὰ πένθη πρατότερος, θυσίας τινὰς εὐθὺς ἀναμείξας πρὸς τὰ κήδη, καὶ τὸ σκληρὸν ἀφελὼν καὶ τὸ βαρβαρικόν, ὥς συνείχοντο πρότερον αἱ πλεῖστα γυναῖκες. τὸ δὲ μέγιστον· ἱλασμοῖς τισι καὶ καθαρμοῖς καὶ ἰδρύσεισι κατοργιάσας καὶ καθοσιώσας τὴν πόλιν, ὑπήκουον τοῦ δικαίου καὶ μᾶλλον εὐπειθεῖ πρὸς ὁμόνοιαν κατέστησε; see Piccirilli 1977; H. A. Shapiro 1996; Federico 2001; Pòrtulas 2002; Valdés Guía 2002b.

lexicon, but a clear usage of the special meaning of *hosios* as correct religious and political behaviour.¹⁵⁷ These profound religious transformations of the city are enacted by three means: *katharmoi* proper, *hilasmoi* ('appeasements'), and *hidruseis*, a word that conveys a physical reorganisation of the sacred space, whether the foundation of sanctuaries, altars, or the setting up of statues.¹⁵⁸ To the ritual purification of the stain, in other words, Epimenides adds the placation of the divine wrath that accompanies it, and the perpetual commemoration of the atonement through the erection of monuments and cults. The religious reform simultaneously looks back to the deed, now into the clear and present anger of the divinity, and forward to its permanent propitiation.

The reform of Epimenides, however, is not presented as a mere reaction to the *agos*, but nothing less than a step in the creation of Athens. It functions in the text as a foundational moment of religious transformation. While Solon takes care of the necessary social trust, the persuasion and conciliation necessary for the avoidance of civil war and the correct function of the tribunal as an accepted instrument of mediation, Epimenides lays the ground for the religious life that will allow the Athenians to listen to justice and follow concord (ὁμόνοια). His reorganisation of cult becomes an element of the Solonian ideal and its significance as a prefiguration of what Athens was to become in this narrative.

The text of Plutarch and the passage of Diogenes Laertius have much in common. While it is clear that Diogenes derives some of his material from Plutarch, they obviously have another common source apart from Herodotus, Thucydides, and Aristotle, and that source is probably Theopompus, the contemporary of Plato, whom Diogenes cites, and Plutarch knew well.¹⁵⁹ In chapters 109–15 of his *Lives*, the portrait of Epimenides, who is presented as a quasi-legendary wisdom figure from the world of the Seven Sages, Diogenes returns to the story of the purification of Athens. The arrival of the holy man is precisely dated to the 46th Olympiad, which places us exactly at the time of Solon, but Solon is not named anywhere in the passage that deals with the purification. Rather than the superstitious fears and the strange apparitions of the Plutarchean text, it is a plague (λοιμός) that sets the event in motion, and the Delphic oracle that tells Athens to call the Cretan religious specialist to purify the city. The ritual procedure of Epimenides is described in detail (1.110):

¹⁵⁷ See Peels (forthcoming).

¹⁵⁸ See H. A. Shapiro 1996.

¹⁵⁹ Gigante 2001.

λαβὼν πρόβατα μελανὰ τε καὶ λευκὰ ἤγαγε πρὸς τὸν Ἄρειον πάγον. κάκειθεν εἶασεν ἵεναι οἱ βούλοιντο, προστάξας τοῖς ἀκολούθοις ἔνθα ἂν κατακλίνοι αὐτῶν ἕκαστον, θύειν τῷ προσήκοντι θεῷ· καὶ οὕτω λῆξαι τὸ κακόν. ὅθεν ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἔστιν εὐρεῖν κατὰ τοὺς δῆμους τῶν Ἀθηναίων βωμοὺς ἀνωνύμους, ὑπόμνημα τῆς τότε γενομένης ἐξιλάσεως.

He took sheep, some black and others white, and brought them to the Areopagus; and there he let them go whither they pleased, instructing those who followed them to mark the spot where each sheep lay down and offer a sacrifice to the local divinity. And thus, it is said, the plague was stayed. Hence even to this day altars may be found in different parts of Attica with no name inscribed upon them, which are memorials of this atonement (trans. Hicks).

The ritual method of Epimenides is presented much more extensively than anywhere else, but the fact that it also consists of *katharmoi*, an *exilasis*, and the foundation of altars is probably not a coincidence. One major difference with Plutarch is the emphasis of the passage on sacrifice, which is nowhere as pronounced as in the section that mentions an alternative version of the purification, one that involved the sacrifice of two young men, Kratinos and Ktesibios.¹⁶⁰ That tale of human sacrifice, in fact, appears in the passage as the only ritual act that is explicitly linked with the purification of the Cylonian *agos*.¹⁶¹ ‘There are some who say’, writes Diogenes, that Epimenides identified the *agos* as the αἴτια of the plague, and that he indicated what its atonement should be. One would like to know what the exact meaning of σημαίνειν is in this passage. Epimenides was a famous singer of oracles, after all, and he was particularly known for his ability to divine about the past.¹⁶² Whatever the case, the death of the two young men was a direct result of that revelation in those versions, and the scourge (συμφορὰ) was thus dissolved (λυθῆναι). Following the same logic as the one found in Herodotus 7.133–7 or 7.197, the killing of men serves to purify the killing of other men and put an end to the enduring consequences of an ancient crime. The latest extended version of them all, Diogenes’ passage is the only one that tells of the Cylonian *agos* and its purification by Epimenides without mentioning the expulsion of the *enageis*. From Herodotus to Diogenes, in other words, there is a clear movement away from the idea that the punishment for the crime was

¹⁶⁰ 1.110–11: οἱ δὲ τὴν αἰτίαν εἰπεῖν τοῦ λοιμοῦ τὸ Κυλῶνειον ἄγος σημαίνειν τε τὴν ἀπαλλαγὴν· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀποθανεῖν δύο νεανίας, Κρατῖνον καὶ Κτησιβίον, καὶ λυθῆναι τὴν συμφορὰν.

¹⁶¹ The sacrifice was also found in Neanthes of Cyzicus (84 F 16 *FGrH*) and Polemon of Ilium, as we know from Athenaeus (602c–f); see Bonnechere 1994: 249, n. 77.

¹⁶² Arist. *Rhet.* 1418a.

limited to its perpetrators and their descendants, the *agos* as the presence of some polluted individuals, and a progressive foregrounding of a more collective conception of the stain, with the expulsion of the bones of the ancestors of the group taking centre stage and, later, the reforms of Epimenides: the *agos* as a contagious pollution of the land.

If Diogenes' version draws from Theopompus, it also has some characteristics in common with that of Plato. It is through *manteia*, interestingly enough, that Epimenides is called to Athens in the *Laws* already (642d), and his visit in that passage is defined by the sacrifices that he performs, under instruction from the god, but purification is not explicitly mentioned there.¹⁶³ The date of the event, more importantly, is placed around 500 BC in that work, something that makes it completely at odds with all other chronologies about it, notably those of Herodotus and Thucydides, whose works Plato knew well.¹⁶⁴ There was obviously never any agreement about the nature and significance of the Cylonian *agos* in the historical consciousness of classical and later Greek literature. The processes of lumping and splitting at work in the organisation of collective memory identified by Eviatar Zerubavel, whereby events and figures of the past are shaped by association or dissociation and made to answer the narrative imperatives of certain messages as they are redefined through time and occasion, are clearly operative in this case.¹⁶⁵ In Herodotus and Thucydides the massacre is presented in terms of its significance for later events, respectively the second invasion of Attica by Cleomenes and the beginning of the Peloponnesian War. In Aristotle, Plutarch, and Diogenes, it is the association with Epimenides that defines the massacre, and the role it played in the definition of Athens. The differences between the versions are striking and the emphasis that is found in each version is an expression of its own internal logic, whether it be the evolutionary constitutional teleology of Aristotle, the foundational resolution of conflict of Plutarch, or the ritual *mirabilia* of Diogenes.

The text of Plutarch, in particular, develops its own logic of the event in some detail, and its version functions as an exploration of the religious side of Solon's transformation of Athens. The duration and gravity of the ancient crime becomes the occasion for drawing the picture of a crisis out of which the citizens of Athens learnt their rites and the ability to live together. The purification of the city functions as half of a larger whole in the tale. Solon, on the one hand, figures as a mediator between factions, taking his usual place ἐς μέσον between the divided sides of a civic strife,

¹⁶³ Cf. 677d.

¹⁶⁴ See M. L. West 1983: 45–6.

¹⁶⁵ Zerubavel 2003.

and he manages to convince the enemies to submit to his arbitration and accept the authority of a tribunal. Epimenides, on the other hand, initiates the entire city in mystery rites, teaches it the cults and the ritual locations that will allow it to be *hosios* and find the *homonoia* necessary for the life of a community. By looking back at the crime and its consequences, the purification constitutes an endpoint, the final moment of the *agos*, a termination to the transmission of the pollution different in kind from the mere expulsion of the responsible families. By looking forward to the continuing social life of the *polis*, it lays the ground for the survival of the city and its future development. It is through his exchanges with Epimenides that Solon gives shape to the principle of his laws. The vision that made Athens derives directly from the consequences of the *agos* in that text.

The old crime, its enduring stain on the city, and the violent rift that it causes between the families all serve to portray the time of endless conflict that characterised the city before the time of Solon. There is no mention of Spartan or other foreign claims on Athens in this version of the events; the whole focus is turned on the internal division of the city, its pre-Solonian stasis. The duration of the pollution, the continuous presence of the ancestral fault, and its effect as a perpetually renewed cause of civic strife perfectly embody the state of disorder, the *ταραχή*, so thoroughly challenged by Solon in the narrative of the *Life*. Perhaps it is not a coincidence that Plutarch, who knew the traditions of ancestral fault better than anyone, so thoroughly associates the author of the *Elegy to the Muses* with the purification of the Alcmaeonid *agos*. Whatever historians say about the reconstruction of the older sources that he may have used, the fact remains that the *Life of Solon* is the earliest extant text that brings Solon and Epimenides together in the purification of the ancient crime. There is here a clear adaptation of the old Alcmaeonid story to the very specific narrative demands of the text in the *Life of Solon*, and the work develops its own complex idea of ancestral fault in the process.

The text of Plutarch, then, like the other versions of the tale, transforms the material of the ancient story of pollution to suit its own needs. But it also, like all other versions of the tale, reflects the deeper articulations of cultural memory that shape the transmission of tradition. It is clear that by the time of Plutarch the Alcmaeonid *agos* had long become an important reference in the imagination of the Athenian past. The crime of Cylon and its aftermath came to function as a paradigmatic moment of the deep past in the written tradition, and as such it acquired

many of the characteristics usually ascribed to what scholars, for the sake of convenience, continue to call myth.¹⁶⁶

All post-fifth-century versions share a number of common points. One is the objective presentation of the *agos*, which is less portrayed as the instrumental perception of foreigners or enemies than as a fact with a tangible presence, a state of the city. Another is less emphasis on the *enageis*, and the clearer focus placed on the city as a whole. A third is the central role given to Epimenides, who, from the *Athēnaïōn politeia* onwards, appears as the main protagonist in the atonement for the crime; his purification is portrayed as a watershed separating then and now, and thus a direct contrast to the recurrent returns of the *enageis* in Herodotus and Thucydides. Another common point of later sources, from Aristotle onwards, is the importance of the trial in the recognition of the fault and the culpability of the involved families, and the emphasis of the texts on the fact that the proper procedure has been followed in the judgment. A related point is the role of the Erinyes in the punishment of the crime. The altar of the *Semnai Theai* is mentioned in Thucydides already.¹⁶⁷ The slaughter of the suppliants on the altar of the Erinyes creates a powerful link between crime and punishment, sacrilege and divine sanction, and the sacrificial imagery of human blood on the altar of the divinities of vengeance offers a direct parallel to the animal sacrifices of Epimenides and the human sacrifices mentioned by some sources of Diogenes (Theopompus?); yet another example of the use of human sacrifice as an atonement for a murder committed by ancestors. The proximity of the sanctuary of the *Semnai Theai* to the Areopagus, where the murder trial will take place, is made clear in Plutarch's version.¹⁶⁸

A common pattern is evident in these later versions of the tale. An ancient crime has set in motion a long cycle of punishment. Pollution has taken a durable hold on kin and city and the group is locked in interminable repetitions of internecine strife. The ritual stain of sacrilege and the endless violence of family vengeance threaten the survival of the community. In addition to the divine wrath of violated suppliants, the Erinyes have been awakened by murder. The absence of a proper trial at the Areopagus is answered by the necessity of a new trial to recognise the crime and punish all the generations involved in it, and the atonement will involve the integration of new cults into the religious landscape of the city. With the combination of trial and cult foundation, the crime is truly

¹⁶⁶ On the ancient and modern debates about the definition of this term, see now R. L. Fowler 2011.

¹⁶⁷ See Harris-Cline 1999. ¹⁶⁸ See Piccirilli 1977: 151.

purified and the city can live in *homonoia*. This primordial resolution of conflict creates a dividing line between an earlier period of polluted vendetta and the lasting foundation of an order of civic and religiously hallowed institutions. The resemblance of this story to the *Eumenides* of Aeschylus is not fortuitous.

It is often said that the *Eumenides* somehow reflects the events of the Alcmaeonid *agos* to a certain extent.¹⁶⁹ Whether that is true or not, I would like to put it the other way and suggest that the tales of the Alcmaeonid *agos* reflect the *Eumenides*. The cultural memory of the Cylonian *agos* modelled itself on the most famous and influential template of Athenian narrative about the establishment of civic justice in the city. While the conflict is internal to the *oikos* in the tragedy, and it takes the form of a civil strife in the Alcmaeonid stories, the pattern is the same. An ancient blood crime generates pollution and further conflict that tears apart the group through the generations. A resolution is found that brings together the special jury of the authoritative tribunal and the reorganisation of the city's religious system around new cult. The Areopagus and the Erinyes are interlocked in the protection of justice, and a new era of communal life, free of the stains of the past, is made possible by the wisdom of persuasion. One story reads directly into the other.

This is a pattern that is not found in the texts of Herodotus and Thucydides. Among the many differences that separate these two early versions from all the later ones is the dominant presence of Epimenides from Aristotle onwards. The crime becomes an index pointing to its resolution, and this confrontation of an ancient conflict the ground for a profound transformation of the city. Placed squarely at the time of Solon in all these later versions, the purification of the *agos* becomes a commentary on the significance of the great legislator's reforms in contrast to what went on before and as a prefiguration of what was to come. The religious dimension of the reforms is what comes to the fore in these tales of refoundation through purification. The meeting of Solon and Epimenides thus becomes the perfect embodiment of that transition that liberated Athens from the past, and it comes to define the essence of each character from the fourth century onwards.¹⁷⁰ Not yet a necessary part of the story in Plato's *Laws* still, it can be alluded to and referenced as something that is widely known in the *Athēnaion politeia* already. A great transformation in

¹⁶⁹ Cf. Mazzarino 1960; Samons 1998–9; Federico 2001.

¹⁷⁰ On the place of Solon in the cultural memory of the fourth century, see M. H. Hansen 1989; Mossé 2008.

the memory of this event clearly took place in the fourth century, as Athens intensely renegotiated its past after the defeats of the Peloponnesian War and the Macedonian conquest, taking particular care in understanding the formative resolutions of conflict of earlier times, the refoundations of the city and the transformations of cult that defined the *polis*.¹⁷¹ Whether it was inscribed in Theopompus or an author of Atthis, or derived in a much more diffuse manner out of the discourses of the time, that reconfiguration of the narrative of the Cylonian purification and of its place in the collective imagination of the city's past took a durable hold on the cultural memory of the event and profoundly altered its shape. Beyond the numerous rewritings of the individual authors who adapted their version of the *agos* to the projects of their own messages, a common basic structure remains in place from Aristotle to Diogenes.

The foundational purification becomes a myth of Athenian identity in the post-imperial period. The Aeschylean masterpiece, so familiar to audiences and writers of the time through reperformance and reading, was the obvious parallel in place for reflection on the institutions that control blood pollution and vendetta. The dominant version of the traditional myth circulating in the tragedy thus provided a significant shape for rethinking the place and the meaning of the historical event. This adaptation of history to the meaningful scheme of myth created a deep structure of resonance between the parallel pasts of Athens and their importance for the day. Following the familiar process described by Aleida Assmann, the cultural memory of the event was formed by the patterns of literature.¹⁷² The profound authority of tragedy imprinted itself on the memory of a conflict and transformed it to serve as an aetiological blueprint of society. The ancestral fault of one tradition, in the process, is made to conform to that of another.

Herodotus presents a different picture. Rather than internal strife, he focuses on its instrumentalisation by a foreign power, and rather than a definitive purification of the city, his tale puts forward the exile and expulsion of allegedly polluted kin groups, and their continued presence in the *polis*. As in the *Athēnaiōn politeia* or in Plutarch, the crime of Cylon appears only as an index to its consequences, but unlike later versions of the story, there is no effective atonement.

The Spartan demands for the expulsion of the Alcmaeonids are shown as the cynical strategy of an unjust policy (5.70). Attacking another state is hardly a neutral action in Herodotus. Cleomenes' motivation to intervene

¹⁷¹ See e.g. T. Hölscher 2010.

¹⁷² A. Assmann 2012 [1999].

in the affairs of the city are different from the time when he chased the Peisistratids away, thinking that he was following the voice of the Pythia (5.63).¹⁷³ His friendship with Isagoras, the enemy of the Peisistratids, with whose wife he may have had an affair, we are told, and the desire to limit the power of the people through a small group of oligarchs that could better be controlled, are the forces at play in the text on that occasion. The repelling of the Spartans from Athens is even presented as something that accomplished a prophecy (ἐπετελέετο δὲ τῷ Κλεομένει ἡ φήμη), namely the words of the priestess of Athena when the king tried to enter the sanctuary of the Acropolis to consult the goddess (5.72): ὦ ξεῖνε Λακεδαιμόνιε, πάλιν χώρεε μηδὲ ἔσιθι ἐς τὸ ἱερόν· οὐ γὰρ θεμιτὸν Δωριεῦσι παριέναι ἐνθαῦτα ('Go back, Lacedaemonian stranger, and enter not into the holy place; for it is not lawful that Dorians should pass in here').¹⁷⁴

The king will be expelled after having demanded the expulsion of his enemies. He pretends to defend the city against the pollution of sacrifice by committing a sacrilege himself. He champions the wrath of the goddess, and it is the goddess herself who orders him to go. Cleomenes' real motivation for intervening in Athens will ultimately be the weakening of the city and the imposition of tyranny, an unjust endeavour that the long disquisition of the Corinthian Socles will condemn in clear terms, followed in his disgust by the other allies of Sparta (5.92–3). Cleomenes, attempting a coup on the city to impose the power of the few on the many, finds himself besieged on the Acropolis with his small group of friends and co-conspirators, exactly like Cylon many generations earlier.¹⁷⁵ The many connections between this portrait of the failed Spartan intervention and the ancient event that motivated the *agos* in the first place is probably not fortuitous. Contrary to Cylon and his friends, however, Cleomenes is spared and allowed to escape unharmed.

The ancient pollution is never described as something that exists objectively by the voice of the narrator, as mentioned earlier. Always shown through the eyes of characters in the tale, it is a matter of perception and focalisation. The pollution is an instrument of interstate relations in the text. The *agos* plays the role of a propaganda stratagem, a πρόφασις, a word used for it in Thucydides, and as such it serves to highlight the impiety and injustice of Cleomenes in his intervention against Cleisthenes. The manipulation of religious forms is a prominent theme in the *Histories*, one used in this case as a direct answer to the corruption of the Pythia by the Alcmaeonids to motivate the first invasion of Attica by the Spartans.

¹⁷³ Cf. p. 294.

¹⁷⁴ Parker 1998.

¹⁷⁵ See Rausch 1998; Rosivach 2008.

The instrumentalisation of religion is an element in the characterisation of Cleomenes at this moment in the narrative, a fact that is made even more effective by the reference to the great age of the ancestral fault that the Alcmaeonids are accused of bearing. By pointing to the fact that the crime is so ancient, that it dates to 'before the time of the Peisistratids' (5.71), as Herodotus specifies, the passage emphasises the opportunism of the Spartan in invoking it at that precise moment, so long after the fact. There is no oracle from Delphi demanding an intervention in the version of Herodotus, no plague, no civil war in need of an urgent settlement through trial, just the very convenient appropriation of religion by the impious king.

This, however, is far from meaning that the Athenians are presented as being free from the *agos* in the tale. The crime, after all, is presented as something that did happen, and the slaying of suppliants is unquestionably one of the greatest imaginable sacrileges. Part of the effect of the episode is that Cleomenes' request is indeed plausible and understandable. The passage in which the *agos* is mentioned, further, is devoted to the significance of Cleisthenes and his reforms, and it is important to remember that it paints a rather dark image of this foundational moment of Athenian democracy, something that is probably not emphasised as much as it should be in the literature.¹⁷⁶ The reform of the Athenian tribes is portrayed as an imitation of the tribal reforms of Cleisthenes of Sicyon, the man who mocked his own people by renaming them 'Swinites', 'Assites', and 'Porkites'.¹⁷⁷ Cleisthenes of Athens, Herodotus tells us, 'was imitating his own mother's father, Cleisthenes the despot of Sicyon', in his reorganisation of the Athenian tribes (5.67).¹⁷⁸ Even more significantly, the bribing of the Pythia by the Alcmaeonids, the event that most directly led to the overthrow of the Peisistratids, is in itself a crime of the very gravest kind, as the episode of Demaratus in Book 6 will show, and Cleisthenes of Athens is 'he who was reputed to have bribed the Pythia' (5.66). Although he never explicitly recognises the reality of the *agos*, Herodotus never denies it either, and he presents it in a passage where the actions of Cleisthenes and the Alcmaeonids are tainted by dark implications.

The indirect framing of the Alcmaeonid *agos* through the eyes of others deploys a – typically Herodotean – tool of pattern shaping that makes full use of the polyphony of the text. The narrator never asserts the reality of

¹⁷⁶ For the traditional portrayal of Cleisthenes as a step in the progression to democracy, see e.g. Ostwald 2000; cf. C. D. Hamilton 1993; McInerney 1994; Payen 2001; Anderson 2003.

¹⁷⁷ 5.68; see Bicknell 1982; Vilatte 1990; V. Parker 1994.

¹⁷⁸ 5.67: ταῦτα δὲ, δοκέειν ἔμοι, ἐμιμέετο ὁ Κλεισθένης οὗτος τὸν ἑωυτοῦ μητροπάτορα Κλεισθένα τὸν Σικυῶνος τύραννον; see Nenci 1994: 256–7.

the *agos* directly but places it in the context of an environment that points in a certain direction. The great age of the ancient crime, in that light, is an indication of its depth and danger for the city. By being so closely tied to the radical transformation of the city by Cleisthenes, the story of the *agos* and of its transmission in time opens some difficult questions about the birth of democracy in Athens for an audience of the imperial period. The ancestral fault of the pollution is thus used in this passage to undermine the narrative of foundation that must undoubtedly have surrounded the figure of Cleisthenes in the time of Herodotus, and thus the memory of triumph and victory that shaped the dominant narrative of the Athenian revolution.

Further, one of the initial events of the Peloponnesian War, as we have seen earlier, is the request from the Spartan king Archidamos for Athens to expel the *enageis* from the city, an event first mentioned by Thucydides (1.127).¹⁷⁹ The measure targeted Pericles. It happened in 431, before the final redaction of the *Histories*, and it was thus part of the common baggage of Herodotus' audience. If we can believe Thucydides, it was a prominent event, one that profoundly marked the beginning of the hostilities, and lines 445–6 of Aristophanes' *Knights* shows that it could be referenced with a single word in 424 to elicit immediate reactions from the crowd in the theatre.¹⁸⁰ This was a burning issue of the day. The text of Herodotus does not mention it, but the *Histories*' description of the demands of Cleomenes some two generations earlier is an almost exact replica. Without committing ourselves to the reconstruction of what really happened in 506, something that ultimately cannot be answered properly in my view, we must recognise – as has often been remarked – that the description of these events in the text of Herodotus creates a powerful effect of correspondence to the events of 431. By not mentioning the latter, the text leads the reader to make his own connections, involving him further in the significance of the text. This is one particularly brilliant example of the orientation of interpretation, the organisation of choice, that makes the Herodotean narrative, a 'readerly' text if there ever was one, such a powerful experience of inferences.

The oracles that Cleomenes captured on the Acropolis tell the Spartans of a time when 'many deeds of enmity would be done against them by the Athenians' (5.90). After Socles manages to convince the Corinthians not to assist the Spartans in attacking Athens, Hippias solemnly observes that one day the Corinthians will come to regret the house of Peisistratus in their

¹⁷⁹ See p. 309.

¹⁸⁰ See p. 218.

conflict with Athens (5.93). The hostilities that were to culminate in the Peloponnesian War are inscribed in the text's portrait of the events of 506. In direct line with this, the Spartan demands for the expulsion of the Impure implicates the present of the audience and the harsh reality of the war being fought here and now in the present. The present talks directly to the question of Spartan scheming against the growth of Athenian power, and the continued, dangerous presence at the head of the state of a family that never paid its dues for an ancient crime, a *genos* bound by the debt of a transgression that (according to some ...) still demands retribution. The αἵτις of a massacre committed more than two hundred years ago holds (ἔχει) the Alcmaeonids in the presence of the audience. The doubts about its dangers for the city remain a matter of debate and concern. The long continuity of the pollution through the generations and the uncertainty about its meaning allow for the weaving of proleptic links and references over long periods of time, a narrative tool similar to that of the oracles. The failed purification of the *agos* provides an open-ended path in time connecting different moments of the story with the moment of its enunciation. It says something about Spartan ambition, Athenian dissensions, and the ominous power of the Alcmaeonids. Herodotus, in this passage again, can be seen to exploit the full potential of ancestral fault as an instrument of storytelling.

Croesus and Solon

That is a pattern that begins early in the *Histories*, with a dominant, programmatic episode of Book 1. Croesus is the character around whose actions much of Book 1 is organised. Identified as 'the first of those we know' (1.5) to have submitted Greeks to Eastern rule, his story constitutes the earliest field of knowledge claimed by the new ἱστορίη at the beginning of the work.¹⁸¹ It is with this that the fresh project of historical enquiry is defined against the remote past of Greek poetry and myth and the hearsay of barbarians. As the first extended narrative of the *Histories*, it lays the ground for everything that is to follow. Its detailed exploration of power and change, cultural differences, piety and divine action, wealth, wisdom, and the art of reading the world, essentially traces the boundaries that the

¹⁸¹ The bibliography on the episode is of course immense; note Regenbogen 1930; M. Miller 1963; Krischer 1964; von Fritz 1967; Stahl 1975; Burkert 1985b; Chiasson 1986; Shapiro 1996; T. Harrison 2000: 31–63; E. Visser 2000; Schwabl 2004; Pelling 2006; Kindt 2006; Versnel 2011: 179–201; 527–37; Grethlein 2010: 197–203; Hollmann 2011.

rest of the text will unfold. The *Histories* are based on repetitions, parallels, and recurrences, and the exceptions that eventually stand out from these repeated appearances; the map of these themes and figures that will compose the bulk of the work is all but laid out in that lengthy first episode. Croesus is named in chapter 6 already, the direct object of the performative speech-act οἶδα, and he remains at the fore of the action into chapter 92, as well as an important character of Cyrus' narrative into chapter 208. The story of the Lydian monarch serves as a prefiguration of all later events in the vast fresco painted by Herodotus. That being said, there is no hard system in the *Histories*, no systematic rule of history, and the *logos* of Croesus is not the key to some general analytical coherence. It is simply the first, particularly significant act of a long story. That is what it means to say it is programmatic.¹⁸²

If there is one place in the *Histories* where ancestral fault plays a prominent role, this is it. Delayed punishment through generations is explicitly mentioned twice, in passages that frame the episode and answer each other. The first, chapter 13, shows the narrator commenting directly on the transgression of Gyges, Croesus' ancestor and the founder of the dynasty of the Mermnads. Following the forced spectacle of the queen's disrobing in the royal bedchamber and the violation of her *aidōs*, Gyges, the former bodyguard of king Candaules, has killed his master and taken his place (1.8–12).¹⁸³ Seizing the wife and the kingship (βασιληίην) of the Heraclid monarch, he plunged the realm into a state of internal conflict between his partisans and those who remained loyal to Candaules. Only the arbitration of the oracle of Delphi, accepted by both sides, allowed Lydia to avoid the outbreak of civil war. Gyges was 'confirmed' (ἐκρᾶτύνθη) by the oracle, which 'chose' (ἀνείλε) him, but the Pythia also revealed what the consequences would be.¹⁸⁴ A *tisis*, a vengeance for the crimes committed against the Heraclidae, will come (ῥξει) against a descendant of Gyges in the fourth generation. The Lydians and their kings, we are told, paid no attention to this verse oracle (ἔπος) of the Pythia before it was accomplished (πρὶν δὴ ἐπετελέσθη).

This identification of a fault and of its direct consequences many generations later appears at the beginning of Book 1. It is referenced and

¹⁸² Cf. Shapiro 1996: 348–9; T. Harrison 2000: 31–63.

¹⁸³ For *aidōs* and disrobing, see G. Ferrari 1990.

¹⁸⁴ 1.13: ἀνείλε τε δὴ τὸ χρηστήριον καὶ ἐβασίλευσε οὕτω Γύγης. τοσόνδε μέντοι εἶπε ἡ Πυθίη, ὡς Ἡρακλείδῃσι τίσις ῥξει ἐς τὸν πέμπτον ἀπόγονον Γύγεω. τούτου τοῦ ἔπεος Λυδοὶ τε καὶ οἱ βασιλεῖς αὐτῶν λόγον οὐδένα ἐποιεῦντο, πρὶν δὴ ἐπετελέσθη; cf. Nicolaus of Damascus *FGrH* 90 F 47. See Arieti 1995: 24–30.

reactivated many chapters later at the end of the Croesus section, after the downfall of the fourth descendant of Gyges and his narrow escape from death. At chapter 90, saved from the pyre on which he was to be burned by the Persian Cyrus, Croesus requests from his victorious opponent the right to send a delegation to Delphi to demand explanations from Apollo.¹⁸⁵ He wants to show the god the fetters of his captivity and ask this question: why did Apollo persuade him to attack Cyrus, and why does he repay his benefactors in this manner?

The answer of the Pythia points straight to Gyges (1.91). Croesus has fulfilled (ἐξέπλησε) the fault of his ancestor (γονέος ἀμαρτάδα) of the fourth generation.¹⁸⁶ The consequence of this ancestral crime had been preordained and his lot was sealed. It is impossible, even for a god, to change the course of fate, or lead the Moirai in a different direction. Apollo had wanted to help Croesus and wanted to delay the suffering of Sardis further to the next generation, the children of Croesus, but that proved impossible. He was, literally, not able to (οὐκ οἶός τε ἐγένετο), a powerful statement on the limits of divine action. The god could only accomplish and grant what the Moirai gave him.¹⁸⁷ That is, he was able to delay the fall of Sardis by three years, and it is he who saved Croesus from the pyre. As to the accusation of having led him to war, the god demonstrates how wrong it is to lay the blame of Croesus' false interpretations of oracles on him. All three *chrēsmoi* given by Apollo to the king are reviewed, and the error of Croesus made plain in each case. Following this answer, the Lydian recognises that the fault (ἀμαρτάς) is his (ἑωυτοῦ), and not the god's.

These words come at the end of the Croesus section in Book 1 (the next sentence effects a transition to another section of the narrative).¹⁸⁸ The speech of the Pythia, let us call it the Justification of Apollo, is a condensed retelling of the previous chapters from the perspective of divinity. With a direct reference to the crime of Gyges and its consequences, and the different acts of generosity and interpretation that punctuate the story of Croesus over the years, it essentially brings the various stages of the tale into one coherent understanding of causality. It is a retrospective account, where the god retells the story from above. The Justification of Apollo unveils a vision of the principles that govern the paradigmatic fate of the man placed at the very beginning of the long narrative of Herodotus. A veritable theological exposition, it uses the privileged perspective of the

¹⁸⁵ Contrast with 1.38. ¹⁸⁶ For ἀμαρτάς in Herodotus, see also 1.119; 167; 3.25; 6.29; 7.194; 8.140.

¹⁸⁷ See Asheri in Asheri *et al.* 2007: 143.

¹⁸⁸ 1.92: κατὰ μὲν δὴ τὴν Κροίσου τε ἀρχὴν καὶ Ἰωνίης τὴν πρώτην καταστροφὴν ἔσχε οὕτω.

oracle to reframe the significance of the events just described and extract a clear teaching from it.¹⁸⁹ Through his enlightenment of Croesus, the god also instructs the audience, and lays down in broad terms a general articulation of cause and agency at work in the text and in the world. It temporarily shatters the obscurity of divine will.

The theological structure it presents is composed of three levels: Moirai, gods, and men. All have a limited range of choices. A μοῖρα can be πεπρωμένη, that is, set, determined; an old figure with a long poetic pedigree.¹⁹⁰ In this passage its passive form is marked by the fact that it is entirely conditioned by the ancient crime. The μοῖρα is set in motion directly by the action of the crime. The consequence of the transgression was announced at the time when the crime was committed, and what was decreed then will be accomplished exactly as proclaimed. Punishment will fall very precisely on the fourth generation. That is an inexorable, almost mechanistic outcome of the fault. What the Moirai can give will not contradict what has been set in motion by the crime.

Apollo's desire to send the punishment to another generation is not granted. He is only able to gain an allowance of three years. His will to save the life of Croesus, however, is not refused, as that is not opposed to the decree of the fates. Contrary to the famous scene of *Iliad* 16, where Zeus is similarly confronted with the problem of changing the lot of his son Sarpedon, a man who is πάλαι πεπρωμένον ἄσση (16.441), a passage that generated much theological reflection throughout the centuries and which forms part of the conceptual background of Apollo's Justification, the life of a single individual is of little consequence in itself in the Herodotean passage, even that of a king; what does matter is the fall of empires, and the precise moment when they take place.¹⁹¹ Compared with the focus on battlefield time of the epic poet, the extended temporal vision of the historian locates the event in a vast framework of generations, states, and causes.

If the agency of the god is limited by the boundaries of the Moirai, it is still able to exercise its will within this framework of allotments. Apollo can accomplish (ἥνυσε) what the Moirai give him, and he is able to benefit (ἐχαρίσατο) Croesus with it. The verb ἐχαρίσατο is particularly interesting here, as it characterises the relation that binds the god and the king. The benefactions of Croesus to Delphi occupy an important place in Herodotus' portrait of the Lydian monarch, mentioned repeatedly over the course of the narrative, and described at length in the final chapter of

¹⁸⁹ Cf. Kindt 2006. ¹⁹⁰ See Lachenaud 1976: 93–6; Marinatos 1982.

¹⁹¹ See Lateiner 2002; Delattre 2006.

the section, a form of epilogue to the tale. For Apollo, delaying the demise of Sardis by three years and saving the life of Croesus from the pyre are a form of *charis*, a gift that reflects a certain kind of reciprocity.¹⁹² The verb ἐχαρίσατο indicates that a link exists between giver and receiver, where the act of offering implies the promise of something in return. Apollo, in the speech of the Pythia, is grateful for the gifts he has received from Croesus, and his action bears witness both to the extent of his *charis* and to the limits of his power.

This is a direct rebuttal of Croesus' accusation that the Greek gods are 'ungrateful', that they are ἀχάριστοι, lacking in *charis* (1.90). One of the great faults of the king was to believe that the reciprocity which bound him to Apollo was a reciprocity of peers. Croesus misunderstood the fundamental difference between gods and mortals at the heart of this system of exchange. The gifts of the king, cast in metal and stone, are timeless, witnesses of his generosity even now, in the time of the audience, and promise to remain so long thereafter. The perennality of the monuments is matched by the immortal life of the god who will receive and keep them. The short existence of the mortal, on the other hand, can hold on to the gifts of the gods only for a limited duration, and as long as the divinity wills it. A man's fate can be delayed, but its endpoint will remain the same. Some years can be added to the dynasty, Croesus can be saved from the pyre today, but death will come tomorrow. There is nothing stable in human life, especially not wealth, and the gifts that are exchanged between gods and men are the tangible illustrations of that chasm separating the two levels of existence, where gift and counter-gift operate on a fundamentally different plane. The *charis* of the god and the *charis* of the king have essentially distinctive natures. An important part of the meaning of the tale in Herodotus is the definition of that exchange that binds men and gods. To understand the specificities of the portrait he presents to his audience, it can be useful to contrast it with parallel accounts.

Croesus, a man legendary for his wealth, had showered the gods with gifts and offerings more lavishly than anyone, yet his kingdom was utterly destroyed through spectacular defeat at the hands of the Persians. His downfall questioned the entire system of exchange between gods and men that lay at the heart of Greek religion, and it generated a commensurate number of responses.¹⁹³ A famous image from the beginning of the fifth

¹⁹² See e.g. M. Scott 1984; Chirassi Colombo 1994; Mignini 1994; Scheid-Tissinier 2000; Neri 2009.

¹⁹³ See Segal 1971; Oliva 1975; Peron 1978; Burkert 1985b; Lamedica 1987; Tarditi 1989; Crane 1996; Frings 1996; Kurke 1999: 130–74; Belloni 1999; Duploux 2000; Neri 2009; Cairns 2010: 65–6.

century on a vase painted by Myson (Louvre G197) shows Croesus sitting on a throne placed over a pyre.¹⁹⁴ Although found in Etruria, the vase was produced in Athens. Gazing straight ahead with almost hieratic poise, Croesus is presented with a long beard and dressed in full kingly attire. Identified by an inscription on the vase, he holds a sceptre in his left hand and his head is covered by a crown of laurel leaves. With his right hand, he is shown performing a libation with a *phiale* over the pyre that is about to burn him. The wood is being lit by a servant with two torches in his hands. The man, identified as Euthydemos by an inscription, wears only a loincloth and a band over his head, in clear contrast to the exuberantly luxurious attire of the king. The other face of the *hydria* is painted with a scene of Antiope's capture by Theseus and Peirithoos, who are also all identified by inscriptions.

Like these most Athenian figures of myth, whose precise act can be activated through a combination of text and image, an index to a well-known episode of traditional narrative brought to life on the object, the end of Croesus is evoked by the moment that immediately precedes it.¹⁹⁵ The combination of text and image is sufficient to point to that particular tale; the name Croesus, by itself, opens a link to a narrative shared by painter and audience. It is famous enough to be activated with very precise indexical elements, as in the parallel scene from the Theseus cycle. The story of Croesus, in other words, is presented as a 'traditional tale with secondary, partial reference to something of collective importance'.

A variant of the tale told in Herodotus, it portrays the death of the king as a voluntary act. There is no constraint in the image, no fetter or threatening individual to suggest compulsion. The king, wearing a *στέφανος* of laurel that points to Apollo, is crowned as a celebrant at a sacrifice. His libation, and embodiment of the man's piety, serves as a preliminary to the kill. Rather than an animal led to the *θυσία*, however, the king himself is to be the victim, a holocaust sacrifice. There is something noble and defiant in the king's offering of his life in the image. It expresses an understanding of Croesus' end that is both poignant and admirable. What that version was, how it was represented, what were the details of its action – who, for instance, was Euthydemos – are all questions that have no answer at present. Perhaps that image from the Louvre *hydria* is related to another, later image of a man on a pyre, which some believe also shows Croesus.¹⁹⁶ Whatever the case, it demonstrates that a narrative tradition relating Croesus' downfall was in place by the later sixth century.

¹⁹⁴ ARV 2 238, I.

¹⁹⁵ Cf. Squire 2009: 300–I.

¹⁹⁶ ARV 2 571, 74.

It is on this basis that some have argued that a tragic trilogy portrayed the ‘myth’ of Croesus in the first half of the fifth century, in which Croesus was shown paying for the faults of his ancestor Gyges.¹⁹⁷ The evidence for that is tenuous at best.

At the end of the first *Pythian* ode, in any case, written in 470, not long after the Louvre *hydria* was painted, Pindar describes the power of song to immortalise fame.¹⁹⁸ The commemorative words of the *logioi* and the *aoidoi* guarantee that nothing escapes the future, neither crimes nor virtuous deeds.¹⁹⁹ The atrocities of Phalaris, on the one hand, are shown as the model of evil actions and of the dark reputation that accompanies them (95–7). The ἀρετά (virtue) of Croesus, on the other, is their opposite, the paradigmatic embodiment of the noble accomplishment whose memory will endure. Described as φιλόφρων, an ἀρετά of cooperation and friendliness, rather than warlike valour, it evokes the Croesus of gifts, largesse and benevolent rule, the generosity of the good king. That is the memory of his character that endures, the one that will not die (οὐ φθίνει). Far from the image of the Lydian monarch given by Herodotus in his work, Croesus is here the model of kingship, the personification of the ruler’s virtue transmitted in speech and song. A good example of what that could look like at the time is the third *Epinician* of Bacchylides, written in 468, two years later than the Pindaric poem, for the same Hieron.²⁰⁰

That ode, which celebrates the victory of the Sicilian tyrant in the chariot race at Olympia, the most prestigious prize of all, the crowning achievement of a long career of athletic competitions, is built around one central idea: the pious usage of wealth.²⁰¹ Croesus, whose story, the main mythical exemplum of the text (24–62), dominates the poem, is explicitly set up as an object of comparison for Hieron. He is, of all mortals, the one who has sent the greatest gifts to Delphi, whereas Hieron has sent more gold to Apollo than all men who inhabit Greece (63–6). The significance of Hieron’s superlative fortune is staged as a reflection of the superlative fortune of Croesus. What Hieron does with his wealth, with his power, his victory, is measured against the mythical paradigm of the old Lydian king.

¹⁹⁷ Page 1962; Snell 1973; Riecks 1975; cf. Chiasson 2003; Griffin 2006.

¹⁹⁸ *Pyth.* 1.92–4: ἐπιθόμβροτον αὐχμημα δόξας | οἷον ἀπιοχομένων ἀνδρῶν δίαίταν μανύει | καὶ λογιόις καὶ αἰοιδόις. οὐ φθίνει Κροῖ- | σου φιλόφρων ἀρετά.

¹⁹⁹ See Luraghi 2008–9.

²⁰⁰ Cf. also Ctesias *FGrH* 688 F 9; Xen. *Cyr.* 7.2.9; Castor *FGrH* 250 F II; Nicolaus of Damascus *FGrH* 90 F 68; Philostr. *Imag.* 2.9.

²⁰¹ Cf. Cairns 2010: 70–1.

The crowds rejoice in Hieron's victory, the man who 'knows how not to hide a wealth girded by a black-veiled darkness'.²⁰² The participle πυργωθέντα suggests an image of wealth protected by a rampart, a barrier against sight, something hidden. The verb πυργόω also means to boast, to exaggerate, to lift oneself up in overconfidence.²⁰³ By knowing how not to hide the πυργωθέντα πλοῦτον, Hieron opens the way for the rich, exuberant festivities of his triumph. The sanctuaries abound (βρύει), the streets abound (βρύουσι) with the celebrations.²⁰⁴ The wealth of the tyrant, gleaming in the open, is not locked in a tower of arrogance. Shared with the population, it is not a hoarded treasure. It is, says Bacchylides later in the poem, possible for one who does not grow fat with envy to speak well of such men (67–8).²⁰⁵ The distribution of many gifts, the unveiling of the tyrant's gold, is the true rampart, and the fount of a reputation lifted out of obscurity. Hieron holds his inheritance from the Muses and his sceptre from Zeus.²⁰⁶ A legitimate king, he honours the god with his wealth above all. 'It is the god, the god, that the ἄριστος [ᾧ] λβων must glorify'.²⁰⁷ The ἄριστος of wealth, and this is the meaning of ὄλβος in this sentence, must elevate the dignity of divinity, not man.²⁰⁸

That is the lesson of Croesus' story. When Zeus accomplished the fated judgment (πεπρωμέναν . . . κρίσιν) and Sardis fell, Croesus resolved to escape the day of slavery and destroy his house by his own hand (25–6). A pyre was set up in the court of the palace and the monarch ascended it with his wife and two daughters. The scene is described in full detail and the cries of the daughters clinging to their mother made to stage a powerful pathos. As the king raises his hands to the sky, he calls on heaven (37–47):

Ὑπέρ[βι]ε δαῖ
 μον, [πο]ῦ θεῶν ἐστι[ν] χάρις;
 [πο]ῦ δὲ Λατοῖδ[ας] ἄναξ; [ἔρ]
 [ρουσ]ιν Ἀλυά[τ]τα δόμοι
 [.] μυρίων
 [.]ν.
 [.]ν ἄστυ,
 [ἐρεύ]θεται αἶματι χρυσο]δίνας

²⁰² 10–14: ἄ τρισευδαίμ[ων] ἀνὴρ | ὅς παρὰ Ζηνὸς λαχὼν πλείστ- | ἀρχον Ἑλλάνων γέρας | οἶδε πυργωθέντα πλοῦτον μὴ μελαμ- | φαρεῖ κρύπτειν σκότῳ.

²⁰³ Cf. e.g. Aesch. *Pers.* 192; Eur. *Med.* 526; *Or.* 1568; *HF* 238; 475.

²⁰⁴ Maehler 1982–97, vol. 1: 45; Cairns 2010: 201. ²⁰⁵ See Cairns 2010: 208–9.

²⁰⁶ 11–12; 70; see Cairns 2010: 200–1. ²⁰⁷ 22; cf. Cairns 2010: 202.

²⁰⁸ Cf. Nagy 1990: 276; Crane 1996: 67–8.

Πακτωλός, ἀ[ε]ικελίως γυναι[ῖ]κες
 ἐξ εὐκτίτων μεγάρων ἄγονται·
 τὰ πρόσθεν [ἐχ]θρὰ φίλα· θανεῖν γλύκιστον.

Overmighty *daimōn*, where is the gratitude of the gods? Where is the lord born of Leto? The halls of Alyattes [are falling] [...] of countless [...] [...] the city, [gold] eddying Pactolus [reddens with blood]. And shamefully the women are being dragged from the well built palace. What was hateful before is dear. To die is the sweetest thing (trans. Cairns).

Faced with the day he never expected (ἄελπτον ἄμαρ), the destruction of the house of his father and his own imminent death, Croesus thus questions the gratitude of the gods, and he orders his slave to light the fire (48–9). As the flames begin to rise and the cries of the king's daughters fill the air, Zeus intervenes by sending a cloud to quench the fire, and Apollo carries the old man and his daughters to the land of the Hyperboreans, where he 'settles' (κατ[έν]ασσε) them (60).

Apollo 'protected' (φύλαξ) Croesus, we are told at the beginning of the tale (29), as an explanation (ἐπεὶ) for the fact that 'the ἄριστος [δ]λβων must glorify the god', and the passage ends with the statement that the god saved the king because of his piety (δι' εὐσέβειαν), that is, because of the generosity he showed in his gifts to Delphi.²⁰⁹ The levels of divine causality are shared by Zeus and Apollo. Zeus is the one who accomplishes a judgment that is set, the capture of Sardis by the Persians, and the same who puts down the fire on the pyre, thus indicating that the downfall of the kingdom and the rescue of the king are in no way incompatible.²¹⁰ Apollo is responsible neither for the disaster of Sardis nor for the rescue of the pious king. The god's further action, however, the settling of Croesus' house in the land of the Hyperboreans, solves the situation once and for all. It confirms the stability of the system, where the action of the son complements that of the father, and piety is rewarded by divinity as a whole. A precise constellation of deities answers the indeterminate 'ὑπέρ[βι]ε δαῖμον' of the king on the pyre, and the cosmic tension of the pious man's downfall is fully resolved.²¹¹ The central question of Croesus is: 'where is the *charis* of the gods?'²¹² Where is the reciprocity of Apollo? Have all the offerings been in vain? The poem has a precise answer. The land of the Hyperboreans is the closest thing there is to immortality. Described by Pindar in the tenth *Pythian* ode (30–50), it is a place where no one ages and all live in harmony, a close equivalent to Elysium or the

²⁰⁹ 61–2: δι' εὐσέβειαν, ὅτι μέ[γιστα] θνατῶν | ἐς ἀγαθέαν <ἄν> ἐπέμψε Π[υθ]ῶ.

²¹⁰ 26; 55. ²¹¹ Cairns 2010: 204–7. ²¹² 38; see Maehler 1982–97, vol. 1: 48.

Blessed Isles.²¹³ Croesus and his daughters are given an afterlife of bliss and the great generosity of the king is repaid in full by the god. As the Lydian monarch becomes the incarnation of vindicated piety, the central place of *charis* at the heart of the system is reaffirmed.

Death is the central theme of the poem's last section. Life is short and man must die, the poet says to the king at the end of his life (he had one more year to live). The last day must be present at all times in the minds of men. The ether remains pure and the water of the sea does not rot. Gold remains a joy, but no one can reclaim his youth. If the body will waste away, fame is eternal; its gleam will not disappear, for it is the Muse that nourishes it. The great virtue of Hieron, in other words, will live through the honeyed tongue of the poet. There is a *charis* that unites the noble deed and the song of the poet, a relation of reciprocity between the action and its celebration, and whoever hymns this *charis* will be σὺν ἀλαθείαι.²¹⁴ Hieron will have to die today or tomorrow, just as Croesus' kingdom had to fall at a set time. But the fame of his deeds will forever endure through the *charis* of the poet, just as the house of Croesus was given a blissful afterlife through the *charis* of the god.

The virtue of pious wealth described in that poem of Bacchylides could hardly be further removed from what we see in Herodotus. The episode of Croesus in the *Histories* is not just a reproduction of earlier sources, and it does not simply reflect the hard-set ideologies of Delphic priests or aristocratic discourses channelled by the historian. That radical experiment in configuring the past is no passive receptacle of other people's discourses. Herodotus is a master of nuance and implications and he writes his own vision of the material he reshaped for his work. That is particularly true in the case of an episode that is given pride of place in the *Histories*. Herodotus traces a thoroughly distinctive portrait of the Lydian king's demise and the significance of his fall. Just like the Croesus of Bacchylides, the Croesus of chapter 91 demands an explanation from the gods, and he expresses bitter surprise at their lack of *charis*. Contrary to the king of the epinician, however, the Croesus of Herodotus is given a lesson in theology, and he is made to recognise his error in accusing the god. Far from receiving the gift of a blessed afterlife, he is saved from the pyre to serve another king as a slave. His line is cut, he will no longer have anything to transmit to his children. Apollo is the one who rescues him from the pyre, not Zeus, and his repayment ends there. The absence of Zeus in the story highlights the overbearing force of fate over the actions of the gods. It is

²¹³ See Bridgman 2005: 15–19; 36–44.

²¹⁴ Cairns 2010: 214–15.

Cyrus who had the pyre set up, not Croesus, and the agency of self-death so nobly represented in the Louvre *hydria* and the Bacchylides poem is denied the hapless Croesus of Herodotus.²¹⁵ His failed understanding of *charis*, even after his rescue from the pyre, is incapable of grasping the chasm that separates the gifts of men from the gifts of the gods, and he arrogantly complains about having lost something he cannot have.²¹⁶ His wealth, his lavish donations, the monuments he has bestowed on the sanctuaries, amount to very little in the end, as they cannot alter the cycle of events in motion. Croesus is shown the real meaning of *charis*. A traditional figure of moral instruction is thoroughly deconstructed in the process.

One of the distinctive features of Herodotus' Croesus is the long time of generations in which his story is set. The wealth of Croesus was in fact never his own. In taking over the βασιληίη of Candaules, Gyges appropriated a τιμή that did not belong to him, and its transmission over generations never altered that fact. What is an obscure judgment of fate in Bacchylides is the consequence of a very precise event in Herodotus. The downfall of Croesus is the endpoint of a long line of causality centred on the meaning of wealth. The great riches of the king, his proverbial gold, the massive treasures buried in his vaults, his benefactions, his *olbos*, are the fruits of unjust wealth. Croesus never rightfully owned what he had, as the foundations of his inheritance were based on a crime. There is, indeed, no injustice in the collapse of his power, as it rested on the fruits of usurpation. All his generosity consisted in handing out the wealth of others. By losing everything he inherited from his father and becoming the servant of a king, he simply finds himself back in the state of his ancestor Gyges. The fall of Croesus is, in fact, a perfect illustration of cosmic justice.

By introducing the idea of ancestral fault at the heart of the traditional old story of Croesus, Herodotus thus profoundly changed its significance, and resolved the cosmic challenge of the pious man's downfall in a different way. Far from the celebration of *charis*, the elevation of lavish benefactions and the great wealth of power that is not hidden from view, far from the celebration of the tyrant and the exaltation of princely fame of the epinicians, the text of the historian offers another pattern of narrative to his audience. A wealth that is not secure in its foundations will not remain stable to the top. A fortune that is unjustly acquired will lead to certain punishment. Justice always comes in the end, *tisis* will strike. If not

²¹⁵ See Carson 1984: 112.

²¹⁶ Cf. Kurke 1999: 130–74.

now, then on the children of those who have committed the crime, or their *genos* thereafter. The *atē* of punishment, starting from a mere spark, will grow into a raging fire. There is little doubt, in other words, that the first half of the *Elegy to the Muses* is a direct intertextual presence in Herodotus' rewriting of the Croesus story.²¹⁷ One tradition is read through the other.

The staging of Croesus' meeting with Solon is the pivotal moment of the entire episode, and it revolves around Croesus' boastful exposition of his treasures (1.29–33).²¹⁸ Solon famously rejects the claims of this massive wealth to constitute the true *olbos*. To the arrogant luxury of the tyrant, the Athenian sage opposes the humble virtue of the pious *idiotēs*. *Olbos* is redefined as something less tangible, a state of bliss, a sort of moral justification before the gods.²¹⁹ The *olbiōtatos* is not the richest man. The *olbos* of the stories that Solon tells Croesus reproduces the same pattern: a simple man dies in a state of justice. Having reached the end with that prize in hand, he will forever hold that greatest of fortunes, free from the troubles of mortal existence. Wealth, on the other hand, generates ever-deeper cravings for more wealth and the disasters that accompany that endless pursuit. Whatever is acquired can be taken away and the gods are jealous and unpredictable (1.32).²²⁰ The life of man is an endless series of inscrutable misfortunes, which is why one must always look to the end before making a judgment about something. True *olbos* is not of this world. That teaching of Solon, in other words, reproduces exactly the same message as the second half of the *Elegy to the Muses*, almost literally at times.

Two general perspectives, then, are deployed in the narrative of Croesus' downfall.²²¹ One, the divine perspective offered by the course of the tale and expounded at length by Apollo, is made of precise relations of causality between crime and punishment over generations, the long cycles of divine retribution, and the perfect harmony of the paid debt. The other, the human perspective of apparent contingency taught by Solon to the king, the blindness of mortals before the movements of divinity, the miserable state of danger and perpetual change shared by mortals, presents the

²¹⁷ For Herodotus' familiarity with the verses and figure of Solon, see Chiasson 1986; T. Harrison 2000: 36–40; Versnel 2011: 186: 'There can hardly be any doubt about intertextuality here, nor about its recognition by readers, even if many of the themes were ubiquitous in a wide range of archaic poetry and Herodotus created his own variations and additions.'

²¹⁸ See Asheri in Asheri *et al.* 2007: 97–9.

²¹⁹ See De Heer 1969: 71–2; R. E. Doyle 1970.

²²⁰ Cf. 3.40–3, with T. Harrison 2000: 45–7 and Versnel 2011: 179–81.

²²¹ See Pelling 2006: 163; cf. 1.34, with de Jong 1995; T. Harrison 2000: 36; Versnel 2011: 183–4. It is important to note that the narrator's intervention in that passage concerns the death of Atys: one event in the larger story.

situation from below. Contrary to Versnel, I do not believe that the marked and clearly signposted difference between these two perspectives is simply a product of cognitive dissonance or the ability of a mind to entertain contradiction, but I see it as an active element in the architecture of the text.²²² Both perspectives are applied to the same events at different moments of the narrative. Far from being opposed or incompatible, they offer complementary angles on the episode. The fact that each embodies one half of Solon's great poem is surely no coincidence.

As Croesus is tied on the pyre and the fire begins to rise, he cries 'Solon, Solon', and suddenly understands something of what the Athenian had tried to tell him (1.86).²²³ He has clearly not fully grasped the meaning of Solon's idea, however, as one of his first acts after having been freed from the pyre will be to send emissaries to Delphi to accuse the god of ungratefulness and misleading (1.90). Similarly, even after the Justification of Apollo, he fails to grasp the meaning of the Pythia's long speech and ends up disastrously provoking another war of aggression. His pastiche of Solon's thought at 1.207 makes a mockery of everything he has been shown.²²⁴ Disaster has indeed been his teacher, and he never caught on to its lessons. Up to the very end, Croesus has understood very little of the instructions that he has been given.

Misinterpretation is the one constant feature of his character. His errors are embodied in his repeated failure to understand the oracles, as the Pythia shows at length in her speech, and the recurrence of these misreadings of the oracles emphatically brings attention to his own personal fault in his downfall. Croesus has 'filled the fault of his ancestor', the Pythia tells him, and the precise year of his fall was set long ago, and yet the events that directly lead to the disaster are provoked by his own personal action, and he recognises at the end of the speech that the fault (ἁμαρτία) is his. There is no contradiction in the identification of these two faults. Croesus' great, unjust wealth, built on the unjust foundations of a crime, was a source of *hybris* and *atē*. Once a spark, the disaster of transgression has grown to become a raging fire. Motivated by the arrogance of his usurped wealth, Croesus thought he could own the sanctuary of the god with his benefactions and he acquired the acquiescence of the oracle. His incapacity to read through the simple ambiguity of the oracular message perfectly captures his dangerous state of blindness. His error is a direct *extension* of the error of his ancestor. His crime completes the crime of Gyges, and his punishment meets the fault of his ancestor; one fault is a facet of the other.

²²² Cf. n. 230.

²²³ Cf. Dewald 2012: 83–4.

²²⁴ See Pelling 2006.

Not responsible for the transgression committed so many generations ago, he acts out its consequences of his own free will. He perfectly embodies the figure of the *Elegy to the Muses* who, although he is innocent (ἀναίτιος) of the crimes of his ancestors, participates in its outcome.

Herodotus' fundamental innovation in the rewriting of the Croesus story was to place it under the sign of Solon. This involved more than a clash of perspectives, a meeting of Greek and barbarian, or an opposition between ideologies, but it brought an entire theological programme to bear on the meaning of the traditional story. The tale was rethought in terms of the mastertext of Solonian wisdom, the *Elegy to the Muses*. The two levels of perspective articulated in that poem are developed at length in the prose text, and the special values and dangers of Croesus' wealth reinterpreted according to the categories of the elegy. The slow cycle of punishment through the generations, in particular, and the special status of the descendants' participation in the crime of his ancestor, are placed at the fore of the text. The poem of Solon serves as a conceptual building block for the construction of the Croesus narrative. Explicitly referenced over and over, foregrounded by the presence of Solon himself, it would have been clearly visible to the audience.

This is not to say that Herodotus blindly reproduced the logic of the elegy, of course, or that he passively channelled it. The poem provides a vision of justice in time that was perfectly appropriate for the function of the tale in the work. It allows the historian to completely undermine the prevailing aristocratic representation of Croesus and confront it with the voice of its most forceful opponent, Solon.²²⁵ By making the Athenian legislator a character of his tale and his ideas an armature of his narrative, Herodotus captured the authority of one of the most prestigious figures of contemporary wisdom, the prime inspiration of Athenian democratic imagination, and refashioned it as the gateway to his work. Adapted to the narrative of the text, the general, impersonal ideas of the poem are fleshed out with precise protagonists and events, with the privileged Herodotean voices of oracles and Apollo, and transformed into living and breathing figures of history in the process. The activation of the Solonian message in the deconstruction of the traditional image of Croesus allows Herodotus to trace a very distinctive position for the nature of the knowledge he presents in his first episode. By embodying the wisdom of the poem, it is the story that becomes a paradigm, and the tale of Croesus is reinvented as an illustration of the deep patterns that govern the history

²²⁵ Cf. Duplouy 2002.

of empires. It is in direct dialogue with the ideas of Solon that Herodotus developed the understanding of ancestral fault that underlies the episode of Croesus.

The idea that the transgressions of earlier generations had repercussions on their descendants offered the Greek culture of the fifth century a powerful tool for understanding suffering and finding causal links in time. It was certainly not a 'belief' shared by all, nor an eccentric theory relegated to the edges of social life or the fringes of *polis* religion, and even less a fossilised vestige of primitive archaic wisdom. A distinctive statement, a counterintuitive idea with prominent expressions in the cultural landscape of the time, it was one model among others available to the individual for concretely apprehending the work of divinity in the world. Contested in the sixth century already as a morally unjust paradox, we find it more directly attacked in the fifth century as an object of refutation. In the battles for knowledge of the revolutions of wisdom then in full course, it was an idea against which new forms of argumentation were bound to define themselves.

An interesting example of the debates where this could take place is the early Hippocratic treatise *De morbo sacro*, a text exactly contemporary with the work of Herodotus, which begins with a powerful rejection of magical healing and the logic of ritual purification, the conception of sickness as a punishment that can be atoned through gifts or threats. Within the complex layers of moral, analogical, religious, and empirical arguments that constitute this epoch-making text, what stands out for our purpose is the role it gives to heredity in its attack against ritual purification. Epilepsy, the sickness claimed by the magicians for their knowledge, is not a punishment from the gods in the text, but a 'natural' condition that has nothing whatsoever to do with transgression – the kind of fault, ancestral or otherwise, that the purifiers described by Plato in the *Republic* (364d) said they could heal.²²⁶ The Hippocratic treatise does not deny that epilepsy is hereditary (νουσήματα κατὰ γένος), on the contrary, but it proceeds to redefine heredity as a natural process that is independent of divine punishment.²²⁷ The hereditary transmission of sickness is an object

²²⁶ See pp. 451–5.

²²⁷ 2.1–2 Jouanna (ch. 5 Jones): τὸ δὲ νοσήμα τοῦτο οὐδὲν τί μοι δοκεῖ θεϊότερον εἶναι τῶν λοιπῶν, ἀλλὰ φύσιν μὲν ἔχει ἦν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα νοσήματα, καὶ πρόφασιν ὅθεν ἕκαστα γίνεται· φύσιν δὲ τοῦτο καὶ πρόφασιν ἀπὸ ταύτου τὸ θεῖον γίνεσθαι ἀφ' οὗ καὶ τὰλλα πάντα, καὶ ἡτὸν εἶναι, καὶ οὐδὲν ἥσσον ἐτέρων, ὅ τι ἂν μὴ ἦδη ὑπὸ χρόνου πολλοῦ καταβεβιασμένον ἔη, ὥστε ἦδη εἶναι ἰσχυρότερον τῶν φαρμάκων τῶν προσφερομένων. ἀρχεται δὲ ὥσπερ καὶ τὰλλα νοσήματα κατὰ γένος.

of knowledge that has demonstrable symptoms, causes, and treatments.²²⁸ It is a regular, natural phenomenon with fixed rules. Separated from the field of operation of the purificatory magician, it is made into a display for the demonstration of the new medical enquiry.

The text presents a strong position in a sustained polemic against other rival positions, and there can be no doubt that it was contested in turn – in practice and in discourse – and that the polemic continued to evolve far beyond the meagre traces preserved in our documents. The fundamental role given to the medical discourse of heredity in the texts of Plutarch, Proclus, and Hermias on ancestral fault, and to the example of epilepsy in particular, is the endpoint of that long, ongoing discussion.²²⁹ The point here is that the Hippocratic treatise's position on pollution and heredity is not a teleological stage of evolution away from religion and magic, but a marked, and admittedly radical, stance in the complex and constantly changing horizon of Greek culture at that particular moment. Thucydides' complete silence on ancestral fault, similarly (if we except his report of the Cylonian *agos* in 1.126–7), is not the product of evolution and enlightenment away from the Inherited Conglomerate, but a clear choice between the many alternatives of the day. The same is true of Herodotus' decision to give such a prominent role to ancestral fault in his work.

Contrary to the *ιστορίη* of the Hippocratic treatise, the enquiry of Herodotus does not contest the old idea but adapts it to its own project and transforms it into a tool of historical narrative and knowledge. Ancestral fault is rethought as a revolutionary instrument of investigation into the past. The narrator's very emphatic intervention at 7.137 expresses enthusiasm and wonder at the ability of the historian to perceive the hand of divinity at work in the course of events. Applying the same method of correspondences, parallels, and analogy it uses everywhere else in its ambitious decipherment of the world, the text puts forward a fundamental means of knowledge by reading ancestral fault into the long-term movement of history. The ability of the idea to situate transgression and suffering in the larger cycles of time is made into a model for linking the acts of one generation with the events of another, and creating meaningful links of causality over and above the contingencies of narrative and individual events. The glimpse offered by the historian with this evidence-based demonstration of just divine action in the affairs of men illuminates the entire work. A strategically placed witness to the divine forces at work in history, a direct link of cause and effect presented by the

²²⁸ See Pigeaud 1983.

²²⁹ See pp. 27 and 45.

careful narrator as a tangible, objective reality, a proof of the meaning that lies under the seemingly random correspondences, it is a passage that resonates far and wide in the work.

The same is true of the Croesus episode, of course, and of the narrative instrumentalisation of the oracles at 1.13 and 1.91 to articulate a straight link between events over five generations.²³⁰ The indirect statement of cause and effect presented in the two reported speeches that frame the Croesus section of Book 1, with its direct confirmation in the course of the events, emphasises the reality of divine punishment through the generations as a model for understanding the movement of history, an important tool of the investigation conducted by Herodotus, and its *mise en récit*. Found nowhere else in the contemporary relations of the Croesus story, it is placed at the very centre of this programmatic tale in the *Histories*. It shows, just like the example of 7.133, how much of a key role ancestral fault plays in the redefinition of time staged by Herodotus in his work. Far from a simple vestige of the 'archaic world-view', what we find in the *Histories* is a usage of the idea as a cutting-edge grid of meaning that allows the master of the new narrative *ἱστορίη* to display the fundamental causes and symptoms at work in historical change.

A grid of meaning; not the grid of meaning, of course. It goes without saying that ancestral fault is not the model of historical change in the *Histories*, just as the story of Croesus is not the key to the work. It is all too easy to overemphasise the paradigmatic force of that story placed at the beginning of the work and impose its logic on the rest of the text. The *Histories* are too vast, too varied, too rich and complex and full of contradictions to accommodate such a restrictive 'philosophy of history', and any consideration of the roles played by ancestral fault in the text has to refrain from reading the idea of these episodes as a rigid principle of the entire work or a structure of its narrative. It functions in the *Histories* as one pattern of causality and retribution among many others.

One consideration that stands out in this regard is the fact that the various attestations of ancestral fault in the text are not placed in dialogue with each other. The generational punishment of Croesus in 1.13 and 1.91 does not refer to the *μῆνις* of Talthybios in 7.137, and neither one directly

²³⁰ I disagree with Versnel (2011: 189) that the *Histories* 'fail to offer interpretative assistance in any textual form as a glue for sticking different utterances together' in this case. Discussing the fact that the two Delphic utterances of 1.13 and 1.91 emphatically refer to each other, are realised in the events and frame the whole episode in the clearest possible manner has *per se* nothing to do with 'saving the author' or finding what 'the author had in mind' (2011: 194). The expression of an idea in the text can be assessed without recourse to the belief of the author; cf. p. 238.

activates or is activated by the other passages where ancestral fault is mentioned or described by characters in the text (6.86; 7.197; 1.61 and 5.70–3). The idea plays clearly grounded roles of explication, it serves as a narrative link, and it is used to characterise individuals and situations and create thematic echoes across episodes and even books. Each and every one of its expressions is motivated by the flow of the text at that point in the narrative where it appears, and not by an overarching theology, a coherent (or incoherent) belief, or a general philosophy of history. There is nothing to suggest that the different expressions of what is here called ‘ancestral fault’ for hermeneutic reasons were seen as related or equivalent by the author or the audience.²³¹ The sheer variety of themes, functions, and connotations associated with the idea of divine generational punishment in the *Histories* reflects the great number of shapes taken by the idea in Greek culture at the time of Herodotus and the choices of the author at different moments of the narrative.

Considering the lack of interaction of the various relevant passages with each other in the work, it is all the more striking to observe how closely integrated they are to the intertextual web that had already given shape to the idea in earlier literature. The passage of 6.86 cites an oracular poem that is built on a dialogue with the *Works and Days* of Hesiod, and the anecdote it relates very distinctly echoes the images and themes of sixth-century elegy on wealth, acquisition, and divine punishment. The Croesus episode is entirely built on a dialogue with the figure of Solon, and the structure of the narrative perspective it presents reproduces the same logic as the one found in the *Elegy to the Muses*, the influential poetic charter of the Athenian lawgiver on wealth and the delays of divine retribution. The description of the cult of Zeus Laphystios in 7.197 obviously relies on the shared knowledge of the traditional tale for its effect, and it would be difficult to believe that its references to the gruesome stories of attempted sacrifice it mentions do not engage in one way or another with the many popular and widely known versions of the myth circulating in the literature of the time.²³² The description of the Alcmaeonid *agos* of Books 1 and 5, similarly, necessarily relies on earlier accounts, undoubtedly both written and oral, and part of that record of factional strife among aristocrats from the sixth century must have looked something like the fragments of Alcaeus reviewed in the previous chapter. The expressions of the idea we find in Herodotus, in other words, are all written upon earlier expressions of the idea, most of which we can demonstrably tie to texts that have

²³¹ There is, alternately, nothing to suggest they were not.

²³² See Gagné 2013.

survived, and all of which parallel similar, older texts. Almost every earlier manifestation of ancestral fault in Greek literature found its way, in one manner or another, into the *Histories*. The text of Herodotus gives us a live picture of the trajectories followed by the idea in the fifth century, and their progressive crystallisation in a written archive of authorities and references. It offers, as such, an indispensable background for making sense of the many roles played by ancestral fault in tragedy at the same time.

Tragic reconfigurations: Labdacids

Tragedy is filled with the idea that the crimes committed in the present are grounded in the crimes committed in the past. Notions of curses, pollution, the divine wrath of clearly identified gods or anonymous divinities of retribution, the heredity of character, the obscure designs of fate, the dangerous legacies of ill-acquired wealth, *atē* and the transmitted madness of crime are variously combined in different plays to describe ancestral fault, intertwined and equated, often opposed to each other in the same play by the fragmented perspectives of characters and chorus, but always grounded in the same basic premise: an ancient crime is linked to punishment taking place now within the kin group. To insist on a clear analytical division between these notions is to impose doctrinal clarity over the plays against the logic of the texts.

As an unknown character says in a fragment of Euripides prominently quoted by Plutarch in the *De sera numinis vindicta* (12: 556e and 21: 562e): τὰ τῶν τεκόντων σφάλματ' εἰς τοὺς ἐκγόνους οἱ θεοὶ τρέπουσιν.¹ Despite numerous guesses, the play from which the fragment comes and the context of the statement are unknown, but the sentence is remarkable nonetheless for expressing the principle of punishment through generations so clearly, framing it anew as a *gnōmē* on the same general, abstract lines as the ones found in Solon or Theognis.² The same thought is found in another fragment of Euripides, this one quoted by Stobaeus: τὰ τῶν τεκόντων ὥς μετέρχεται θεὸς | μιάσματ.³ Wrongly seen as a variant of the preceding fragment by some, that fragment is a distinctive affirmation of the idea in its own right, another example of its explicit formulation in the language of the maxim. Declarations of this type can serve as a warning.

¹ Eur. F 980 Kannicht. ² See pp. 226–74.

³ F 82 Kannicht. See pp. 12 and 97 for the old debate about the genitive of the sentence. As Kannicht notes, the *gnomologus* took it as an objective genitive ('pollution against the parents'), but most have read it as a subjective genitive ('pollution from the parents') since Valckenaer.

Aeschylus, for instance, has the chorus of the *Suppliants* end the first *stasimon* with this admonition to the king (434–7):⁴

ἴσθι γάρ, παισὶ τὰδε καὶ δόμοις,
ὁπότερ' ἄν κτίσης, μένει Ἄρει κτίνειν
ὁμοίαν θέμιν.
τὰδε φράσαι. δίκαια Διόθεν κράτη.

Know this: whichever decision you make
will hereafter affect your children and your house:
matching justice must be paid in full.
Ponder that. Justice prevails by the will of Zeus (trans. Sommerstein).

Such statements can also serve to buttress a preceding statement, as in Euripides' *Heracles*, where Heracles declares that 'when the foundation of a family is not laid straight, the descendants are fated to suffer ill-fortune', in order to make a point about the crime of his father Amphitryon (1261–2) – a point highly resonant with the all-important theme of heredity in the play.⁵ Most such expressions of the idea have broad thematic significance in the plays where they are found, as the various cases reviewed below will aim to show. The plot of Euripides' lost *Chrysippus*, to take an example, was probably centred on the rape of Pelops' son by Laius, who was consequently cursed by Pelops, thus tying the crimes of the Labdacids with the family of the Tantalids.⁶

Ancestral fault is particularly present in the work of Euripides, something that goes against the grain of most scholarship on 'inherited guilt', which has generally presented the idea as a primitive survival, as we have seen in Chapter 2, and insisted on its presence in Aeschylus as an example of the proximity of 'archaic thought', in contrast to the more enlightened classicism of Sophocles and his relative silence on ancestral fault.⁷ When Euripides is mentioned, it often is as an experimental archaiser, or a parodist.⁸ Part of the reason for this is the persistent force of the evolutionary paradigm. Ancestral fault, in that view, is the expression of

⁴ See Friis Johansen and Whittle 1980: 338–40.

⁵ Cf. Wilamowitz 1889: 268 for the architectural imagery of the sentence; cf. Saïd 1978: 230.

⁶ F 838–43 Kannicht. The precise details of the play are lost, and the actual cause of the curse is not entirely clear (see M.L. West 1999: 43–4). For Lloyd-Jones 2002, that story is at the heart of the archaic Theban epics (see n. 15). It is, however, not attested before Euripides. For the possibility that this was the second play of a trilogy that ended with the *Phoenissae*, see p. 377. In later sources the murder of Chrysippus is often associated with Hippodamia, and the estrangement of Atreus and Thyestes from their father; see Gantz 1993: 489.

⁷ Glotz 1904: 579; Dirksen 1965: 122–3; Vickers 1973: 126.

⁸ See e.g. Rohde 1925 [1890–4]: 425; Saïd 1978: 225; cf. Lloyd-Jones 1983: 151–2.

a kin-based social organisation that precedes the emancipation of the individual from the family in the *polis*.⁹ The presence of the idea in poetry of the classical period is either a fossil from tradition, or a commentary on the past. The *Oresteia*, for instance, has been seen as a celebration of the demise of family solidarity before the tribunals of the city, an end to the long cycles of punishment and renewed violence for ancestral fault, while the second stasimon of the *Antigone*, with its insistence on ancestral fault, tends to be portrayed as a swan song of archaic thought.¹⁰

The archaic nature of myth, more importantly, has been invoked to explain the prominence of ancestral fault in tragedies about the Atridae and the Labdacids.¹¹ The notion that myth is a traditional story with a set narrative core has had a tenacious life in scholarship. In that view, the mythical tale is fixed, and the individual mythical text explores one aspect of the well-known story. Central elements of the myth are always relevant to its meaning, even if they can be changed by an author's 'innovations' or they fail to appear in a particular version. The particular version always presupposes the traditional story with a set narrative core, in that view. The interpreter has to determine what that narrative core is, and how it affects the meaning of the mythical plot found in each individual tragedy.

Many scholars have seen ancestral fault as forming part of the narrative core of the Atrideid and Labdacid cycles.¹² The grounding of the sufferings of Oedipus and his children in the error of Laius can be pushed back all the way to the slaughter of the Dragon by Cadmus five generations earlier.¹³ The misfortunes of Agamemnon and his children can be linked to the horrible crimes of Atreus and Thyestes, and these crimes in turn tied to the crimes of Pelops and Tantalus four generations back.¹⁴ In that framework of interpretation, the presence of ancestral fault is a central element of the myth, and it must play a central role in the interpretation of the narrative of the tragedy that relates one of its mythical episodes, whether the idea of generational punishment is mentioned in the play or not.¹⁵ Ancestral fault

⁹ See pp. 134–48. ¹⁰ See Doods 1951: 49–50; cf. Moreau 1997; 2008; Morin 2005.

¹¹ See, for instance, Solmsen 1937; Adkins 1982; David-Guignard 2008.

¹² The most prominent advocate of this idea in recent scholarship is Lloyd-Jones. See pp. 151–3.

¹³ See pp. 377–81. ¹⁴ See p. 404.

¹⁵ Lloyd-Jones (2002: 14): 'The whole body of early Greek myth was like a vast spider's web, in which countless events and countless persons were linked together. The stories were not invented by the authors of the post-Homeric epics which we know about; most of them must go back a long way, to the time before the introduction of writing. Like the epic poets, the tragedians, and also many members of the original audiences, including, one would imagine, those whom the poet most wishes to please, must have possessed a considerable knowledge of the web, so that they knew what place the story told in a particular play occupied within it, and could use or allude to an episode in the past without telling the entire story of which it formed a part.'

is neither referred to in the *Oedipus Tyrannus* nor even hinted at in the play, for instance, but interpreters have seen it as an armature of the tragedy.¹⁶ Part of the narrative core of the Labdacid myth, it is portrayed as an essential cause behind the sufferings of Oedipus in the tragedy. In contrast to the limitations of perspective staged in the play and the dark misunderstandings of divine designs dramatised throughout the tragedy, according to that interpretation, the broader knowledge of the audience, its ability to place the episode in the longer sequence of the traditional myth known by all, allows it to see something of the hand of fate and derive a pattern of meaning behind the calamities that affect the house. Reading the *Oedipus Tyrannus* through the prism of ancestral fault, as scholars have done for centuries, drives a(nother) profound wedge of dramatic irony between characters and audience. Such a filter of analysis makes for a thoroughly distinctive reading of the play.

Criticisms of these readings are almost as old as the readings themselves; many people have refused to accept that the theme of ancestral curses or generational punishment can be imposed on plays where they are not found.¹⁷ The ideal target for this line of thought has been to argue that ancestral fault is not attested in the earliest versions of the myths concerning the two families. If it is not there in the earliest texts, it cannot possibly be a central, core element of the tradition, and the justification for reading it in later texts where it is not found all but disappears. The issue of origins has consistently played a major role in scholarship on the topic.

In Homer or Hesiod, indeed, there is no reference to ancestral fault or generational punishment concerning the families of Orestes and Oedipus, and no fragment of early lyric poetry clearly mentions it.¹⁸ There is no relevant text in Stesichorus.¹⁹ The same situation is found in the fragments of Cyclic epic, and in the meagre traces of texts such as the *Thebaid*, the *Oedipodia*, or the *Epigoni*. The fact that we have so little has led some to assert that the argument from silence has no weight, and that indirect evidence suggests that generational punishment did play a role in early

¹⁶ On the differences between the *OT* and the *OC*, see Giordano 2009: 235–9.

¹⁷ See Lurje 2004: 392; cf. Moreau 1990. The most influential proponents of the view that what is not in the play does not exist remain Dodds 1960 and Stinton 1986.

¹⁸ *Il.* 23.679–80 indicates that Oedipus is buried in Thebes; *Od.* 11.271–80 relates his misfortunes; cf. Hes. *Op.* 163; F 193 MW. The τῶ δ' ἄλγεα κάλλιπ' ὀπίσσω | πολλὰ μάλ', ὅσσα τε μητρὸς ἐρινύες ἐκτελέουσι of *Odyssey* 11.279–80 does not suggest that there will 'perhaps' be more trouble for Oedipus' descendants, as Lloyd-Jones (2002: 2) writes. See Valgiglio 1963; Cingano 2000; 2002; 2003; Berman 2001.

¹⁹ See Zancani Montuoro and Zanotti Bianco 1951; Meillier 1978; Thalmann 1982; Neschke 1986; Mueller-Goldingen 2000; Wick 2003.

epic. One important source for that view is the so-called 'Pisander scholion', which is found in a lengthy scholion to Euripides' *Phoenissae* 1760.²⁰ Here is the part that concerns the divine punishment of the Thebans:

ἰστορεῖ Πείσανδρος ὅτι κατὰ χόλον τῆς Ἥρας ἐπέμφθη ἡ Σφίγξ τοῖς Θηβαίοις ἀπὸ τῶν ἐσχάτων μερῶν τῆς Αἰθιοπίας, ὅτι τὸν Λάιον ἀσεβήσαντα εἰς τὸν παράνομον ἔρωτα τοῦ Χρυσίππου, ὃν ἥρπασεν ἀπὸ τῆς Πίσσης, οὐκ ἐτιμωρήσαντο . . . ταῦτά φησι Πείσανδρος.

Pisander relates that the Sphinx was sent against the Thebans from the furthest reaches of Ethiopia because of the wrath of Hera, because they had not taken vengeance on Laius, who had committed sacrilege through his lawless desire for Chrysippus, whom he had snatched from Pisa . . . That is what Pisander says.

That text has been seen as a reflection of the archaic *Oedipodea* or *Thebaid* and used to defend the view that an ancestral curse was present in the poem.²¹ The problem, as scholars have been quick to point out since the nineteenth century, and as they have periodically reasserted since, is that nothing in the scholion itself decisively points to the *Oedipodea* or the *Thebaid*.²² Its present form has suggested a work of prose mythography to most scholars who have looked at the question. Keydell, for instance, places it in the Hellenistic period.²³ Whether Hellenistic or later, the question is determining what 'sources' it reflects. The Pisander scholion can only be used as a document for the reconstruction of the archaic poem if one believes that there are enough external factors pointing in that direction. Lloyd-Jones offered the latest full defence of the archaic source material in 2002, but his case rests almost entirely on inferential guesses. The idea that there has to be an archaic antecedent for the abundance of references to the ancestral fault of the Labdacids in classical tragedy is ultimately circular. There is no necessity to postulate any such thing, and

²⁰ The text is found in Bernabé 1996 (n.7): 17–19.

²¹ See the exemplary presentation of the evidence in Garvie 1986: ix–xxv. Bethe 1891: *Oedipodea*. Wecklein 1901: *Thebaid* and *Oedipodea*. Bernabé 1996 still defends the view that the text ultimately derives from the *Oedipodea*. For Zielinski 1924, Wilamowitz-Möllendorf 1925, and others, the material goes back to the archaic poet Pisander of Camirus, while Schwartz 1940 thought that it was based on an archaising epic from the Hellenistic period. Many, including F. W. Schneidewin 1852, Deubner 1942, Jacoby 1957, de Kock 1962, and E. Fränkel 1963, among others, have argued that the text cited by the scholion is mostly composed of reflections from tragedy, in particular the *Phoenissae*, *Chrysippus*, and *Oedipus* of Euripides. C. Robert 1915 and Mastronarde 1994: 31–8 argue that the various sources of the prose text cannot be disentangled from each other. See M. L. West 1999: 42 and Lloyd-Jones 2002: 1–4.

²² It is worth noting that the scholion actually does quote from the *Oedipodea*, which it keeps separate from what 'Pisander says'.

²³ Keydell 1935; cf. already Welcker 1849.

no valid reason to see archaic epic material in the fragment of Pisander. Despite Lloyd-Jones' spirited defence, Martin West is surely right when he writes that it 'certainly cannot be used as evidence for the presence of the Chrysippus story in the *Oedipodea*'.²⁴

There is no direct evidence for ancestral fault in archaic tales of the Atridae and Labdacids, but it is wrong to say that there is no evidence for it. Notwithstanding the date of the Pisander scholion, the fact is that a number of sources do point, indirectly, to the generational misfortunes of the two families as a theme of archaic song. In the *Thebaid*, for instance, the plight of Oedipus is explicitly linked to the inheritance of Laius, and it is in connection with that legacy that he resolves to curse his children.²⁵ The misfortunes of three generations are related in the three Theban epics, and divine punishment probably played a role in the poems.²⁶ The inheritance of the Atridae, as we have seen in Chapter 4, can be seen as a theme of invective in Alcaeus, and Pindar comments on the heredity of misfortune in the Labdacid *genos* in *Olympian* 2, when he writes (35–7) that 'Thus it is that Fate, who controls the kindly destiny | that is the patrimony of this family, adds to their | heaven-sent happiness some misery as well | to be reversed at another time.' The legacy of the Theban hero is used as an effective figure for reflecting on the dangers of kinship and the uncertainties of inheritance in the ode, and setting up an appropriate background for the song's celebration of acquisition; in short, perfect material for warning and celebrating a tyrant in a victory ode.²⁷ The song, written in 476, before the Theban trilogy of Aeschylus, does portray the heredity of Oedipus as a factor of his fate and that of his descendants, but nowhere does it present it as the consequence of an ancestral fault or the origin of a punishment for later generations. On the contrary, it figures prominently in a song of praise for his descendant Theron. The absence of explicit, direct references to ancestral fault in archaic accounts of the Atridae and Labdacids is notable. The fact that, where sources do hint at the generational transmission of misfortune in these families, the subtle connotations remain in the background of the text, is even more significant. The idea of ancestral fault is not entirely absent from the pre-Aeschylean record of the two houses of myth, but it is clearly not a major issue for the texts that have come down to us, as well as for the lost texts they reflect.

²⁴ M. L. West 1999: 42. ²⁵ Fragments 2 and 3 Bernabé. See Garvie 1986: xxvii–xxviii.

²⁶ See Lloyd-Jones 2002: 11.

²⁷ See R. D. Griffith 1991; for the relation between this mythical exemplum and the poem's depiction of reincarnation and afterlife punishment, see Gernet 1983; Lloyd-Jones 1984; Bremmer 2002: 91; Graf and Johnston 2007: 100–2.

The lack of clear evidence for the prominence of ancestral fault in the cycles of the Labdacids and Atridae before Aeschylus severely undermines the idea that it is an essential, necessary element of the traditional tale. One particularly influential reaction to this problem, as we have seen in the introduction, has been to dismiss the idea as an epiphenomenon, or ignore it altogether.²⁸ I believe that this is an error. A presupposition of much work on the topic is that the importance of generational punishment in tragedy is tied to the age of the theme in earlier myth. But the privileging of origins and essence in the interpretation of myth in tragedy has long given way to a pragmatic focus on the individual version of the tale, the rewriting at work in each telling, and the question of what is central to the 'core' of the myth or not, what are its 'fixed, primary' elements, has consequently lost much of its importance.²⁹ The material that matters is what is actually said in each text, and the abundance of references to ancestral fault in tragedy cannot be reduced to any one pattern, or seen exclusively in terms of the archaic tradition. The fact that the various versions of the myth do not agree with each other and that they do not depend on archaic antecedents is neither here nor there when it comes to assessing their significance in the texts where they are found. The tragic expressions of ancestral fault are numerous, and they follow their own logic. The games of perspective in which they are set are different in every play, and so are the resonances and connotations of the idea. In order to make sense of the expressions of ancestral fault in tragedy, its passages must be read individually, in the distinctive contexts of the plays where they are found. Only then can the patterns of a big picture start to emerge.

The next two chapters will discuss the main expressions of ancestral fault in the plays of all three tragedians, including Euripides. The close readings of the following case studies seek to shed light on the roles played by ancestral fault in specific tragedies. They are, it goes without saying, not attempting exhaustive commentaries on the passages under discussion, and certainly not trying to push forward general interpretations of the plays. The aim is more modest: to record the precise expressions of the idea, and their position in the dramatic structure of each individual play. The much broader topics of curses, divine agency, and the processes of human choice will be addressed only when they touch directly on ancestral fault in the plays. The review of the evidence, analysed as so many distinctive,

²⁸ See pp. 10–18.

²⁹ Calame 2009 states the case for the pragmatic approach to the study of myth most clearly; cf. the excellent pages of M. Wright 2005: 80–133 for tragedy. See also Parker 2009.

individual vignettes, is a necessary step towards the consideration of the larger patterns at work in the tragic representations of ancestral fault.

Seven against Thebes

The story of our evidence for ancestral fault in Greek tragedy starts with the *Seven against Thebes*, produced in 467 as part of the Labdacid trilogy. The three plays of Aeschylus' Labdacid trilogy were called *Laius*, *Oedipus*, and the *Seven against Thebes*.³⁰ Not much survives from the first two, and attempts to reconstruct them, based almost entirely on the second *stasimon* of the *Seven*, are very speculative.³¹ It is clear from the names of the three plays that each one revolved around a different generation, and that the trilogy was organised on the basis of a succession of calamities transmitted from father to son to grandsons. Now more than an organisational pattern for coordinating texts with a tradition, generation appears there as a dominant factor in the vast temporal fresco painted by the trilogy, as the transmission of punishment through descent is singled out as a motivation for the pain and the suffering unfolding on stage.³² The idea of ancestral fault plays a more important role in this rendering of the ancient Theban tradition than in any older extant text. Contrary to what one still regularly reads on the topic, there is no reason to believe that the prominence of generational calamity in the *Seven against Thebes* is the remnant of some old strand of the tradition, and little doubt that the three texts of the trilogy subordinated tradition to the logic of their own spectacle. The *Seven* is the first clear attestation of this theme at the heart of the myth, and it could very well be its first expression, even if that remains far from certain. Whatever the case, it was the one single most influential expression of the idea for later fifth-century tragedy, as we will see – just as the ancestral fault of the Atridae in the *Oresteia* was the one most influential depiction of generational calamity in the house of Agamemnon for all subsequent tragedians.³³

The key passage in the play is the second *stasimon* (720–91), the ode that is sung by the chorus of Theban maidens immediately after Eteocles leaves the stage for battle with his brother at the seventh gate, and followed by the report of the fratricidal slaughter from the messenger. It is composed of five strophic pairs arranged in a complex temporal and thematic order.³⁴

³⁰ Radt 121–2 and 173. It was followed by the satyr-play *Sphinx*. ³¹ See n. 67.

³² See Schadewaldt 1974: 135. ³³ Cf. Sewall-Rutter 2007: 24–5.

³⁴ See Hutchinson 1985: 160–3.

The first movement, which consists of the first three stanzas, relates the misfortune of the two brothers and presages their mutual slaughter as the culmination of the curse cast by Oedipus against his sons, the work of the Erinyes invoked by the prayer of a father. The first antistrophe (727–33) recasts this collapse of the household as the division of a catastrophic inheritance, and the second strophe (734–41) presents this turning in of the house on itself (αὐτοκτόνως, αὐτοδάκτοι) as a point of no return.³⁵ No purification could ever wash away the stain of that blood once it has seeped in the earth of the land. The calamity at hand is revealed as the continuation of something that comes from much further back, and the last line of the second strophe links the new travails (πόννοι) of the house to its ancient evils (παλαιῶσι . . . κακοῖς). The second movement of the ode looks back into the deep past, before the time of Oedipus' curse. The first three lines of the second antistrophe present the paradox of the ancestral fault in the most explicit terms.

The first word of the stanza (742–9), παλαιγενῆ ('born long ago'), places us at once in the remote time of origins. The opposition of παλαιγενῆ to ὠκύποινον ('quickly avenged'), the last word of the second line, both of them attributive adjectives of the noun παρβασίαν ('transgression'), together with the following line, which states that it has stayed (μένειν) into the third αἰών ('lifetime'), generates the counterintuitive trigger of ancestral fault as a frame of reference.³⁶ Here, as elsewhere, the long hold of the punishment over generations is presented as a manifestation of the special temporality of the gods, the fact that their swiftness is perceived differently by mortals. The transgression is both ancient and productive of swift reprisal, depending on whether one considers the retribution from the divine or the mortal perspective.³⁷ The contrast between παλαιγενῆ and ὠκύποινον draws from a tradition of counterintuitive statements on generational punishment that goes back at least as far as the poetry of Solon.³⁸ There is no valid reason to add a negation before ὠκύποινον.

³⁵ For references to the application of 'compounds in αὐτο- to murder within the family', see Hutchinson 1985: 165.

³⁶ μένειν is an emendation of Wilamowitz. M. L. West (1999: 40) is right to insist that this does not point to a curse, but not right to reduce the insistence of the chorus on the ancient crime of Laius in this song to the trite statement that 'what is highlighted as the common factor in the whole story is ill-judged, deluded behaviour'. The song's rich portrayal of inheritance and the continuities of transgression and punishment through generations are fundamental to the architecture of the play, independently of the presence or absence of an ancestral curse.

³⁷ Compare with p. 364; cf. Torrance 2007: 63.

³⁸ Cf. for instance Hutchinson 1985: 166, who writes that 'one would strain it cruelly to call the punishment swift when set against the span of three generations; one would also spoil the point of the contrast'.

A distinctive aspect of the ancestral fault presented in the stanza is that it is not based on delay or substitution, but on duration. The fault 'remains' over three generations, both ancient and swift in punishment throughout that time. The choice of αἰών in line 744 is significant in that respect.³⁹ It emphasises the succession of lifespans through which the fault remains, its survival over individual existences, at the same time as the word suggests, used in the singular as it is here, one lifespan in three moments. In other words, the τρίτον of line 744 is both third and triple, a distinction that the Greek does not impose.

The precise nature of this transgression is identified in the rest of the stanza. The event that is singled out is the birth of Oedipus, the decision from Laius to have offspring against the thrice-repeated wishes of Apollo (745–52). Oedipus the father-slayer, the μόρον of Laius, the child who married his mother, is given centre stage in the third strophe (750–7) as the embodiment of the swift punishment of the ancient crime. Born from the madness of his father, it is madness that led to his union with his mother.⁴⁰ The two moments of procreation link the three generations in the same ancient transgression. Placed at the centre of the ode, this strophe emphasises the pivotal role of Oedipus as the son/father of a line that should never have existed.

The simile of the third antistrophe (758–65) then abruptly changes the perspective of the song. The image of the storm in that stanza condenses everything that has been said in the preceding strophes and brings it in another direction. The succession of waves is the real danger, as the one that falls is followed by the rise of another with triple crest. The emphasis on the triple crest of the wave is obviously no coincidence, and its embodiment of the evils that are now about to crash on stage points directly to the third/triple αἰών through which the ancestral fault of the swift punishment endures. The one massive wave that channels the force of the storm exemplifies the whole course of the generational transgression of Laius and his descendants, the size of its triple crest an expression of its length in time.

What is threatened is the ship of state, the traditional image of the vessel, tossed on the waves of a storm that represents the civic community at a time of great danger.⁴¹ The wave threatens the stern of the ship, which is explicitly identified with the city in lines 760–1. The stern of the ship, the seat of the pilot, is without any doubt a reference to the ruling house of the city, something that is confirmed at the end of the strophe with the

³⁹ See Degani 2001. ⁴⁰ 750: ἀβουλιᾶν. 756: παράνοια. Cf. n. 102.

⁴¹ Cuartero 1968; cf. pp. 213–14.

mention of the βασιλεῦσι in line 764. The articulation of the opposition between inside and outside that this image implies is a particularly apt rendering of the logic of the passage. The ruling family at the head of the ship of state is also the triple-crested wave that is about to engulf it. That problematic separation between inside and outside is made even clearer in the next line, which states that there is a narrow space keeping the threat of the storm away.⁴² Only a wall serves as a defence – an image that further emphasises the association between the threatened ship and the threatened city. The question is: on which side of the wall is the threat? Is the danger merely the wave, or the stern of the ship itself? It is the entire city that is at risk of being overthrown with its kings.

The first sentence of the next strophe (766–71) explains this by restating the power of the ancestral fault. The καταλλαγáι of ancient curses are heavy (βαρεῖαι), an image that is particularly loaded in the context of the ship of state metaphor. Indeed, the wealth that has grown too fat must be thrown overboard, says the chorus at the end of the strophe. The heavy curse of the ancestral fault is now placed squarely within the ship of state, a further play on the porosity of the opposition inside/outside of the earlier stanza, and confirmation that the danger lies on both sides of the wall. The fat *olbos* will be thrown ‘away from the stern’ (πρόπρυμνα), a statement that points back to the πρύμνα (‘stern’) of the preceding strophe. More interesting is the ἀνδρῶν ἀλφιστᾶν of line 770. Used only twice in all of tragedy, ἀλφιστής, a common epic term, is associated with the acquisition of merchants, more specifically naval merchants.⁴³ We find it in the description of the Phaeacians in *Odyssey* 6.8, for instance.⁴⁴ What we have in this strophe, in other words, is a fundamental transformation of the idea of the ship of state.

From the community at sea threatened by the great triple wave of the ancient transgression of the royal household, it is turned into a commercial vessel that has become burdened with the weight of the wealth of that family amassed in the hull. Only the expulsion of that wealth, that power, the desire for acquisition of this family can save the ship. The fat *olbos* of the Labdacids, the heavy weight of their inheritance, is swelling the state. It must be thrown overboard for the division between inside and outside to be re-established.

The next stanza (772–7) begins the third and final movement of the ode, the actions of Oedipus and their consequences on his children. After

⁴² Hutchinson 1985: 168–9. See B. H. Fowler 1970.

⁴³ See e.g. *Od.* 13.261. Other usage in tragedy: Soph. *Phil.* 709.

⁴⁴ Cf. Hes. *Op.* 82; *Hymn. Hom. Apoll.* 458.

starting from the end, as it were, with the last episode of the family calamity and the mutual destruction of the two cursed sons of Oedipus, the poem moves back to the very beginning, the ancient transgression of Laius and its consequences in Oedipus, only to close the circle with the last three stanzas, and their depiction of Oedipus' misfortune and their translation on his children. These three complementary movements are perfectly integrated into the larger picture of recurrent transgression projected by the ode. The figure of Oedipus, who stands at the centre of the generations, is emphasised by his position at the end of the song. Whereas the Oedipus of the third strophe is marked first and foremost by incest and the consequences of his father's crime in begetting him, the Oedipus of the ode's last movement is defined by parricide and the violence of his curse against his sons. The abrupt reversal of his fortune is singled out. There was a time (τότε) when he was greatly honoured by gods and men for his victory over the Sphinx. Then (ἐπει), following his marriage to his mother, and 'with a maddened heart', an image that recalls lines 750 and 756, he worked a double evil: he blinded himself, and cursed his sons.⁴⁵ He lost what he had won, and his wealth, his κτήματα, will be divided in fraternal slaughter. What we are seeing now (νῦν) is the accomplishment (τελέσθ) of the ancient transgression. Ἐρινύς is the last word of the song.⁴⁶ The divinity of vengeance is swift, like the παλαιγενῆ . . . παρβασίαν ὠκύποινον of 743–4, now running with 'hurrying pace' (καμψίπους). Its presence is terrifying (τρέω) to the chorus of old men.⁴⁷

The chorus has every reason to tremble at the presence of this Erinyes, as the calamity of the Labdacids is one that threatens the survival of the entire city. What Laius refused to do when he disobeyed Apollo and had a child was nothing less than save the city (749: σῶζειν πόλιν). The emphasis of the song is on the danger of the long transgression of the household for the whole of Thebes, the idea that the present calamity – the imminent assault on the city walls by a vast foreign army and the threat of total destruction – is the consequence of the ancestral fault of the Labdacids. Both identified as the great wave in the storm and the danger at the helm of the ship of state, the crime of the royal family is a formidable challenge to the survival of the *polis* itself. Only its expulsion, its complete removal from the city, can lead to a safe harbour. The wave is crashing down, the Labdacids will slaughter themselves. The curse, with all the might of its age, is coming to an end. The question is: will it bring down the entire city with it?

⁴⁵ See Winnington-Ingram 1966. ⁴⁶ Cf. p. 371.

⁴⁷ Cf. the πέφρικα of line 720. See Manton 1961: 77.

At the heart of the fears of the chorus is the notion of wealth and inheritance. The *olbos* of the acquisitive men who rule the city has grown too fat and must be discarded. The end of the curse, its final resolution, is framed as a bloody division of heritage by the two brothers, one that will see them rip it apart as they slaughter each other. Emphasised at the beginning of the ode, in the first antistrophe, and at the end, in the fifth antistrophe (785–91), the theme of the ancient inheritance focuses the resolution of the ancient transgression on the κτήματα (790) of the household. Laius' desire for succession leads to the denial of heritage of his final descendants. Just as Oedipus has risen to the greatest heights and fallen further than any man in the span of one lifetime, the household of Laius now embodies the fall from kingship to oblivion in the longer course of time. The wealth that defines the *oikos* will be divided by a stranger, a *xenos*, the steel of the northern Scythians. Reimagined as a carver of wealth, the steel sword will reapportion the riches that have been acquired (729: κτεάνων) into their exact opposite: lack and the absence of transmission. The Chalyb settler from the fringes of the world has become the channel of transmission of the household's fortune.⁴⁸ The foreigner has been made arbitrator of the family's claim to the territory. Forever deprived of the great plains of Thebes, the two brothers will retain only that portion of earth in which their bodies will be buried – eternal inhabitants of a land they no longer possess (734–7).

This inscription of wealth and inheritance at the heart of the ode's great depiction of the ancient transgression of the Labdacids illustrates a theme that is found elsewhere throughout the play. The recurrent mention of Oedipus' curse against his children is linked to the idea of transmission and inheritance, and the distinctive portrayal of the *oikos*' dissolution staged in the play insists on the failure of the reciprocal exchange of wealth and honour through generations that should define the proper *oikos*. Nowhere before the second stasimon, however, is there any reference to the temporal depth of that curse within three generations.⁴⁹ In lines 69–72, for instance, Eteocles prays to Zeus, Earth, the city-gods, and *ara*, identified as 'the powerful Erinyes of my father', not to utterly destroy the city and the household (note the usage of πρυμνόθεν).⁵⁰ In 653–5, Eteocles again, after he has been told by the messenger that he must know how to 'steer the

⁴⁸ For the relation between autochthony and identity in the play, see Rader 2009; cf. Cameron 1964.

⁴⁹ For the theme of the curse in the play, see e.g. O. L. Smith 1969; Hutchinson 1985: xxxix–xl; Roisman 1988; Ryzman 1989; M. L. West 1999: 39–40; Stehle 2005; Torrance 2007: 42–6.

⁵⁰ See Lenz 1981; Sewell-Rutter 2007: 26.

Ship of State' before the imminent attack of the Seven, begins his reply with a lamentation describing the woes of his *genos*, 'maddened by Heaven and by Heaven deeply loathed'.⁵¹ The *genos* is identified as that of Oedipus; and the nature of the present calamity, as the final conclusion of his curses.⁵² In 695–7 Eteocles once more refers to the curse of his 'dear father', which 'whispers first of gain and then of death'. Nowhere is there a mention of the continuing transgression of the house, its enduring calamity over the generations, in the first three-quarters of the play. The theme of the curse is entirely limited to the legacy of Oedipus for his sons. As Hutchinson writes, 'the connection of this play with its predecessors is at first suppressed'.⁵³ The one allusion to the divine disfavour of Laius' *genos* (691) that precedes the second *stasimon* rapidly refers to the hate of Apollo for the line.⁵⁴ After the second *stasimon*, on the other hand, the ancient transgression of Laius continues to be mentioned by the chorus in the last quarter of the play.⁵⁵

The messenger speech (792–802) that immediately follows the second *stasimon* builds on the image of the ship of state to present the deaths of Eteocles and Polyneices as the end of the storm. The great wave has left the civic vessel unharmed, he says, and the walls of the city still stand. Only in one of the seven gates has it suffered, with the killing of Eteocles. This is presented as the work of Apollo, the 'Commander of Sevens', who 'fulfilled upon the *genos* of Oedipus the ancient errors of Laius'.⁵⁶ The speech thus gives a completely new meaning to the images used to describe ancestral fault in the second *stasimon*. Whereas the storm of the ode is shown as an imminent threat to the city, a massive surge drawing its strength from the deep past, it has become a memory in the speech of the messenger, something that has been resolved and that now lies in the times of yore. In the course of a few lines, with no action on stage, the metaphorical storm has come and gone in the temporal interstices of the choral intervention. The city has been saved, and Apollo channels the danger of the

⁵¹ See Burnett 1973.

⁵² ὦ θεομανές τε καὶ θεῶν μέγα στύγος, | ὦ πανδάκρυτον ἄμὼν Οἰδῖπου γένος | ὥμοι πατρός δὴ νῦν ἄρα τελεσφόροι.

⁵³ Hutchinson 1985: xxi.

⁵⁴ 689–91: 'Since Heaven so urgently presses on the event, let all the race of Laius, hated by Phoebus, drift down the wind, apportioned to Cocytus' wave' (ἐπεὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα κάρτ' ἐπισπέρχει θεός, | ἴτω κατ' οὖρον, κύμα Κωκυτοῦ λαχὼν | Φοῖβωι στυγῆθ' ἅν τὸ Λαῖου γένος).

⁵⁵ Cf. Sewall-Rutter 2007: 26–7, who sees a watershed after line 653, where the kinship affiliation of Eteocles starts to be underlined more prominently in the text.

⁵⁶ 801–2: . . . Οἰδῖπου γένει | κραιῶν παλαιὰς Λαῖου δυσβουλίας; cf. Kyriakou 2009: 48–51. For the numerical plays on seven in the tragedy, see Allison 2009.

ancient transgression of Laius on his descendants. The danger to the ship of state bemoaned by the chorus has been averted. In a further echo of the second *stasimon*, the messenger (814–21) confirms that the wealth of the two brothers has been divided by the steel of Scythia and that, as a result of their father's curse, they will now possess only the land heaped on their bodies.⁵⁷

The rest of the play, variations on the lamentations that are to accompany the death of the brothers, constructs a powerful tension with the report of the messenger and the idea that the curse has been resolved and the city saved.⁵⁸ Much of course depends on where one thinks the play actually ends. The transmitted ending has long been suspected of massive interpolations, and a majority of scholars now believe that it was rewritten in the fifth or fourth century for later performances and audiences and to better accord with the now dominant versions of the tradition found in Sophocles' *Antigone* and Euripides' *Phoenissae*.⁵⁹ The presence of the two daughters on stage is seen as a dramatic incoherence that clashes with the whole rhythm of the tragedy and its insistence on the definitive extermination of the household. The intervention of the herald has been identified as even more problematic for its abrupt introduction of the voice of the city and cursory presentation of the decree banning Polyneices' burial, followed by no further consideration of consequence.

If, as many believe, everything that follows line 1004 is a late addition to the play, we have much more there than an adaptation destined to harmonise the Aeschylean version with later texts, but a thorough reinterpretation of the play's meaning in itself. Taking a resolute turn away from the idea that the calamity has come to an end and that the danger and division of the household no longer threatens the city with the death of the two brothers, the transmitted text of the *Seven against Thebes* stages a fundamentally open-ended closure and emphasises the continuity of the conflict into the city. The separation of the chorus into two half-choruses (1066–78) brilliantly embodies this at the heart of the stage directions. With each half of the group leaving the stage to honour one brother and not the other, each one defending a different idea of justice, the chorus answers its own question in lines 1059–71 of how one would suffer to let one of the brothers be left without honour by the city. The Erinys and the

⁵⁷ Hutchinson (1985: 177) on 816f.: 'This sentence renders 788–90 in a richer form.'

⁵⁸ See e.g. 819; 832; 840; 886; 894; 898; 946; 955; 977; 988; 1055–6.

⁵⁹ See Lloyd-Jones 1959; H. Fraenkel 1964; Dawe 1967; 1978; Petersmann 1972; Erbse 1974; A. L. Brown 1976; Flintoff 1980; Orwin 1980; Hutchinson 1985: 209–10.

Spirit of Death have thoroughly destroyed (note, again, the use of *πρυμνόθεν*) the *genos* of Oedipus, but it is the city that the chorus now fears, something it even expresses in terms of the terror inflicted by its citizens.⁶⁰ Antigone is not alone. A continuous conflict, in other words, opposes one group to another within the city, and the strife of the Labdacid inheritance has not entirely subsided. Eteocles has saved the *polis* 'from sinking, overturned, beneath an alien surge of men', but only 'for the most part', τὰ μάλιστα, the last words of the (transmitted) text, a qualification that brings some doubt to the extent of his action and its lasting strength.⁶¹ With this reactivation of the image of the great storm developed by the second *stasimon*, and the physical division of the chorus into two sides of a conflict opposing the city and what is left of the royal household, that ending strongly emphasises the absence of resolution and the dangerous continuity of strife within the city.

Few would now argue that lines 1005–78, as they are, are genuine, and constitute the legitimate ending of the play. Does that mean that they should be entirely rejected as a spurious interpolation? Do they reflect material that has been lost? Are they adaptations of an ending that was not as abrupt as ours would be if we accept that 1004 really is the last line? The peremptory condemnation of these lines as an alien presence by some scholars is probably too categorical a judgment, considering the state of the evidence. If there can be little doubt that something is amiss with the passage, and that the intervention of the two daughters would be very hard to defend in its present form, the wholesale rejection of all those lines from the body of the play is a radical act of interpretation, buttressed, as so often in classical scholarship, by the argument of authority, that can hardly be demonstrated to be necessary in the present state of the evidence. A more careful reserve of judgment seems preferable.

The *Seven against Thebes* stages a simple, powerful evolution in the temporal scope of its characters. A clear linear movement is at work. A restricted, immediate concern with the imminent threat of invasion defines the interaction between the characters of the first three-quarters of the play, especially the extended confrontation between Eteocles and the chorus, and the anxieties that shape the confrontation revolve around the nature of the two brothers' inheritance and the curse of Oedipus.⁶² The character of Eteocles is very much fleshed out by his reaction to that

⁶⁰ See Byrne 1997. ⁶¹ Cf. the negative comments of Hutchinson 1985: 221 on the sentence.

⁶² For the conflict of Eteocles with the chorus, see Bernadete 1967; A. L. Brown 1977; Lenz 1981; Zimmermann 2003b; Giordano-Zecharya 2006.

looming presence, the weight of his father's vengeful hostility on his fate. His madness, his blind resolve, his hope and refusal to heed the warnings of the chorus are only linked with the vision of the more ancient curse of Laius before he sets out to his death (691).⁶³ With the second *stasimon*, immediately after his departure, the perspective is fully opened to the new broader temporal frame that sees the events of the play as a continuation of an ancient transgression surging through the generations, and that connects in the same sweep the madness of father, son, and grandsons.⁶⁴ At the moment when the battle is taking place before the wall, and the brothers are killing each other on the battlefield, the chorus finally moves away from the restricted, immediate perspective of the first part of the play to bring back the events of the earlier generation to the fore of the drama.⁶⁵

These events are brought back, in that they activate references to the actions staged in the first two plays of the trilogy.⁶⁶ The little that we know of the *Laius* and the *Oedipus* is based in large part on interpretations of the second *stasimon* of the *Seven against Thebes*.⁶⁷ The reason is that only there does the play decide to return to the events of the two preceding generations in the same perspective and thread them together in the same portrait of temporal causality. At the close of the play, the end of the trilogy, the climax of the entire theatrical experience of the day, the moment when the ancient transgression becomes its punishment and swift justice is accomplished with the extinction of the Labdacid males, the

⁶³ For the many different views on Eteocles' character and the nature of his choice in the play, see for instance Golden 1964; Lesky 1966; Winnington-Ingram 1977; Hutchinson 1985: xxiv–xxvi; De Vito 1999; Sewell-Rutter 2007: 26–32; Kyriakou 2009: 56–8; cf. Vernant 1972: 'Présente en lui, la folie d'Étéocle ne laisse pas d'apparaître aussi une réalité étrangère et extérieure: elle s'identifie avec la puissance néfaste d'une souillure qui, née des fautes anciennes, se transmet de génération en génération, tout au long de la lignée des Labdacides.' As Sewell-Rutter (2007: 32) observes: 'No character in extant tragedy presents a more acute sense of the mortal agent standing at the interface between supernatural causation and human action, where causal determinants of various kinds and differently construed necessities combine to bring about a fateful act'; see also Saïd 1978: 116–18, as well as Zeitlin 1982: 28–49 and Stehle 2005 on the relation between his usage of language and the curse of Oedipus.

⁶⁴ 686–7 (θυμοπληθής δορίμαργος ἄτα); 750 (ἐκ φιλᾶν ἀβουλιᾶν); 756 (παράνοιοι); 781 (μαινομέναι κραδίαι); 802 (παλαιὰς Λαῖου δυσβουλίας); 842 (βουλαὶ δ' ἄπιστοι Λαῖου); 875 (δύσφρονες).

⁶⁵ Cf. Zimmermann 2005 on the choral shifts of perspective of the play.

⁶⁶ See Hutchinson 1985: xviii–xix. Cf. de Romilly 1968: 66; 71–3.

⁶⁷ While we do not know why Laius was told that he should not father a child in the first play, there is no evidence for the presence of the Chrysippus story in the *Laius*. The references to the rape of Chrysippus and the curse of Pelops in the *argumenta* to the *Seven against Thebes* and to the *Phoenissae* can derive from any number of mythographical sources. The rape itself is not explicitly attested before Euripides' *Chrysippus*. One thing we do know is that the verb χυτρίζειν (122 Radt), as Hutchinson argues (1985: xxiii), suggests that the exposure of Oedipus was mentioned in the tragedy; see Hutchinson 1985: xvii–xxx; Kyriakou 2009: 45–8. Cf. Podlecki 1975 on the dangers of reconstructing trilogies through the model of the *Oresteia*.

chorus ties the whole generational fresco into one integrated sequence and transforms the crime of the immediate moment into the expression of a much deeper pattern of actions in time.⁶⁸ The rich exploration of inheritance and agency staged by the *Seven against Thebes* is thoroughly transformed by the foregrounding of ancestral fault in the last third of the play. The ending of the trilogy is thus made into an instrument of extended narrative continuity in the re-orchestration of tradition that is at the core of the tragic project, and the succession of transgressions and punishment over three generations pushed forward as the scope of one long story.⁶⁹ The second *stasimon* serves as the armature that brings together all three moments in one vision. It is the significance of that vision, the contrast between the triumphal optimism of the messenger, who celebrates the end of the storm and the resolution of the curses, and the more sombre perspective of the chorus in its ominous lamentations, which questions the idea that the threat has gone. Laius has been told that he would only save the city if he had no child. Now that his last male descendants are dead, is the city saved? The complete absence of reference to the Epigoni in the play does not allow us to dismiss them entirely from the scope of this dark, open-ended closure.⁷⁰

Written in 476, just a few years before the *Seven against Thebes*, Pindar's *Olympian* 2 articulates a certain vision of the transgenerational rhythms of transgression, as mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, and, like the Labdacid trilogy of Aeschylus, it builds its portrait of the long rhythms of punishment flowing through the generations of the *genos* on the idea that the disasters that strike the various characters of the family in the tradition do form some kind of pattern. But the understanding of what that pattern is, and how it is reflected in later tradition, could not be more different. The long cycles of time defined in Pindar's text have little in common with the παλαιγενῆς παρβασία ὠκύποινος of *Seven against Thebes* 743, and the perspective of the ancient transgression as wrath, curse, and pollution through three generations. If Aeschylus' version will quickly come to illustrate what the received tradition actually is, the model against which all later versions are measured, Pindar's *Olympian* 2 stands alone in its portrayal of Labdacid fortune in time. It could, in fact, be argued that a text like that, with its exhortatory depiction of a direct filiation between Oedipus and a present-day ruler, would be unlikely after the production and circulation of Aeschylus' masterpiece made the ancestral fault of Laius

⁶⁸ See Manton 1961: 77. ⁶⁹ Cf. Gagarin 1976: 59.

⁷⁰ See Hutchinson 1985: 167 and 195–6 on the probably spurious line 903; cf. Cameron 1968.

a dominant characteristic of that kinship line. Whatever it owes to earlier literature, something we will never be able to ascertain properly, the Aeschylean trilogy stands out as a watershed in the portrayal of the ancient transgressions of the House of Labdacus. Its many successors built on it and echoed its depiction of ancestral fault, adapting it to their own ends. The three extant plays that most prominently revisit the ancestral fault of the Labdacids, the *Antigone*, the *Phoenissae*, and the *Oedipus at Colonus*, all show this process at work.

Antigone

In direct dialogue with the *Seven against Thebes*, Sophocle's *Antigone* also gives a relatively important place to the idea of punishment transmitted through generations.⁷¹ Already at the very beginning of the tragedy (2–3), Antigone herself presents her plight and that of her sister as a series of evils that both come from Oedipus and are accomplished by Zeus, a view echoed by Ismene at 49–60.⁷² Antigone expands on this theme later in the play, not long before her final exit from the stage, at 857–71, the second antistrophe of a *kommós* exchange with the chorus, where she laments the fate of her father and that of the 'famous' Labdacids as a whole.⁷³ Born from the *atai* of an incestuous marriage (863–5), she will now return to them in death accursed and without marriage. This understanding of her misfortune presented by Antigone at the moment when she makes her 'last journey' (807) is a direct answer to the words of the chorus, who had just said that she was stumbling 'against the lofty altars of justice' for having reached the edge of daring, and that she was now 'paying out some hereditary ordeal', πατρῶον δ' ἐκτίνεις τιν' ἄθλον (853–6).

The translation 'crimes of your fathers' adopted by Lloyd-Jones in his Loeb text for πατρῶον . . . ἄθλον presents the ἄθλος as the debt that Antigone is acquitting with the verb ἐκτίνεις, whereas the construction of the verb with the accusative and the meaning of the word ἄθλος itself more properly point to what it is that is being paid, something like the τίσιν, the ἄποινα, the ἀμοιβήν or the δίκην which are often found as its direct object. The phrase πατρῶος ἄθλος is not the equivalent of *progonikon hamartēma*, not a reference to the crime of her fathers, but a reference to

⁷¹ I unfortunately read Liapis 2013 too late to include in this discussion. For the dialogue with the *Seven against Thebes*, see below; cf. Avezzù 2006; Bruzzese 2010. See also the comparative study of Zimmermann 2003b.

⁷² See M. Griffith 1999: 131–3; cf. Else 1976: 27–35.

⁷³ See McDevitt 1982; Kitzinger 2008: 53–4.

the fact that the *suffering* of Antigone, her trial, is a punishment for something that comes from a previous generation. It is hard, similarly, to see how Griffith (1999: 272) can read the *τιν* in line 856 adverbially as 'somehow'. In agreement with the *πατρῷος ἄθλος*, it refers to the indeterminate quality of the ordeal that Antigone has inherited, the fact that its precise tenor is not identified. As such, it clearly does not point, specifically, to the very precisely identified suffering of her father Oedipus, but to a less definite object. Lloyd-Jones' Loeb translation 'of your fathers' for the adjective *πατρῷος* thus captures the sense of the wording better than one that would identify Oedipus as the express referent. The torment is hereditary.

In what Griffith (1999: 260) identifies as 'the emotional and musical climax of the play', the *kommos* sees the chorus and Antigone attempt to make sense of the young girl's fate and find the appropriate lamentation for her imminent death.⁷⁴ The abrupt transitions of the stanzas stage a quick succession of different views. As the metre of the *kommos* shifts to synco-pated iambics at line 853, the chorus enters a more agitated mode with this stanza and presents a framework for Antigone's suffering that combines the daring of her own actions with the inheritance of her family.⁷⁵ It is this latter element of the stanza that Antigone seizes on to present her plight as a cursed legacy from the Labdacids, an inherited *πότμος*, in 857–71, and the chorus then seeks to correct that one-sided perspective in the following stanza, 872–5, by reaffirming the voluntary nature of her act and its consequences, however pious it might have been, the fact that 'you were destroyed by your own self-willed (*αὐτόγυνωτος*) passion'. In the final words of her long speech (921–8), she apparently remains uncertain whether she has done wrong or not.

This usage of the idea of transmitted generational misfortune by the chorus echoes another part of the play, the second *stasimon* (582–625), where the ancient woes of the Labdacids occupy centre stage.⁷⁶ In that ode, sung immediately after Antigone's death sentence is pronounced, the individual troubles of the young girl are reinterpreted against the background of the generational miseries of the Theban royal household and the hard lot of humanity in general. The song is divided into four stanzas. The first strophe (582–92) conjures the image of the swelling sea to detail the *atē*

⁷⁴ Cf. Hawthorne 2009: 34–9 on the effective lack of communication between the chorus and Antigone.

⁷⁵ M. Griffith 1999: 272.

⁷⁶ See the exemplary presentation of the text in M. Griffith 1999: 218–23.

that falls on a family (*genea*). The first antistrophe (593–603) follows with the specific case of the Labdacid house (οἶκων) and the horrible fate transmitted through its generations. The second strophe (604–14) changes the scope of the ode and looks to the permanence of wealth in time, while the second antistrophe (615–25), finally, focuses on the dangers of hope and expectations.

The idea of ancestral fault found in the first two stanzas develops some powerful images. The first line of the first strophe begins with a *makarismos* formula – ‘blessed are they who . . .’ – that serves as a foil to the rest of the stanza.⁷⁷ Those whose lifespan (αἰών) is entirely free from evil (κακῶν ἄγευστος) are at once declared to be fortunate. As no mortal’s life is entirely free from evil, of course, the statement offers a rather bleak view of human fortune, which it proceeds to illustrate with the reverse of the blessed individual life, that of the unfortunate household. The γάρ of line 583, the second line of the stanza, presents the second statement as a confirmation of the first, a portrait of its opposite. The extended αἰών of the household that the ode turns to in its second line, the full lifespan of the family through its generations, further expands the scope of the first line’s statement to both ancestors and descendants.⁷⁸ Those whose *domos* is ‘shaken’ (σεισθῆ) by divine power see disaster strike without restraint.⁷⁹ No part of calamity (*atē*) is left out of the blow, which moves slowly, literally ‘creeps’, into the greater number of the family’s generations.⁸⁰ Liddell and Scott’s translation of this passage as ‘*come suddenly* on one (of calamities)’, with further reference to another line of the same ode, 618, and to *Ajax* 1087, is slightly misleading in that it suggests a rapidity of movement quite at odds with the other usages of the verb.⁸¹ If there is one thing that unites these three passages, it is the *unexpected* timing of the strike, one fully in line with the idea of the slow, imperceptible crawl on the ground central to the verb in general.⁸² It is a meaning that fits perfectly with the context of the passage. The speed of the *atē*’s movement emphasised by ἔρπον suggests that the *genea* that is mentioned there is

⁷⁷ See Easterling 1978: 143; M. Griffith 1999: 223–4. ⁷⁸ Cf. pp. 352–3.

⁷⁹ As Easterling (1978: 143) writes, referencing lines 597, 602, 607, and 624, ‘the agency of the gods is given the strongest possible emphasis’ with θεόθεν. She identifies a movement in the ode that goes from ‘house’ (585; 594; 596; 600) to ‘people in general’ (605; 614; 616; 617) to ‘the individual mortal’ (619; 623).

⁸⁰ M. Griffith (1999: 222) rightly presents *atē* as ‘the keynote of this song’.

⁸¹ The recurrent usage of ἔρπειν in the ode (585; 613; 618) brings attention to the specific type of movement of the verb. I see nothing wrong in Goheen’s (1951: 57) translation as ‘creeping on’.

⁸² Cf. *Ajax* 1087, with Finglass 2011: 445; cf. p. 283.

properly the generation, the continuity of the family in time.⁸³ The house that is shaken by the gods is never deserted by *atē*.⁸⁴

It is a vision of the raging sea that embodies this statement in the strophe. The movement of lines 586–92 conjures up the powerful image of giant waves crashing on the shore.⁸⁵ A dreadful wind from Thrace reaches down to the seabed and stirs up the depths, bringing the sand all the way up from the bottom to the surface and projecting its mass of brine on the coast. The running movement at the bottom of the sea is described as ‘darkness beneath the water’ (ἐρεβος ὑφαλον), and the sand that is rolled up βυσσόθεν is black. The use of the word ἐρεβος to describe that dark space deep under the waves is emphatically marked. Erebos, of course, when it is not simply an equivalent of Hades, is a location of the underworld, ‘a place of nether darkness, forming a passage from Earth to Hades’, in the words of Liddle and Scott, that space through which the shades of the dead depart for the afterlife – and from which they sometimes come back.⁸⁶ The word, rarely used figuratively, keeps all of its live connotative strength in the passage and a clear association with the realm of the dead. The dark sand that lies hidden from view at the bottom of the sea and is brought up to the surface by the force of the wind to be projected on the shore is a visible manifestation of that ἐρεβος ὑφαλον.⁸⁷

If the prime literal sense of the image is to show the power of the calamity that assaults the house, it also illustrates the statement of the preceding two lines much more closely than that. The massive wave of the storm is like the divine *atē* that besets the generations of the household in that it whirls up the foundations of the sea, just as the disaster of the gods shakes the *domos* of the family. When a wind from a distant land comes and stirs up the ground that lies deep down below, the black sand of the darkness beneath the water rushes to the fore of the wave that is sent crashing down on the shore. The wind from outside, the powerful element unleashed by the gods, releases the ominous matter of the ἐρεβος under the sea in its fury. The calamity brings back the hidden presence of the dead.

⁸³ Easterling (1978: 144): ‘The main idea seems to be that the evil is passed from generation to generation, through time, but perhaps the notion that it spreads laterally is also present.’

⁸⁴ Cf. Easterling 1978: 142 and Winnington-Ingram 1980: 164–72, who both emphasise that there is no mention of a curse or a specific transgression in the ode.

⁸⁵ For the textual problems of the line, see Easterling 1978 on 586.

⁸⁶ Cf. Finglass 2011: 395. See also M. L. West 1966: 197.

⁸⁷ In addition to the storms of *Seven against Thebes* 758–61 and Solon 13.17–25 (see p. 239), Easterling (1978: 145) mentions *Il.* 16.384–92 and M. Griffith (1999: 224) *Il.* 9.1–8 as a Homeric parallel for the storm of divine vengeance.

Just as the simile embeds the ideas of the preceding statement in its imagery, the following stanza embeds the imagery of the simile in the expression of its ideas. The light (φῶς) that is spread out in the house of Oedipus (600) is a contrast to the darkness of the deep in the first strophe, and the roots (ρίζαι) of the household form a parallel to the foundations of the seabed.⁸⁸ The return of the sufferings from the dead (595) recalls the black sand from the bottom of ἔρεβος coming back to the surface, and the recurrent movement of πῆματᾶ ('miseries') falling on πῆματᾶ follows naturally on the image of the wave in the storm.⁸⁹ The first antistrophe begins with the word ἀρχαῖα, placing the emphasis squarely on the age of the πῆματᾶ, and the fact that the pain that is assaulting the household is one that continues woes from the deep past. The ancient origin of the πῆματᾶ is further underlined by the reference to the dead, a clear indication that the continuity of the calamity crosses the generations and is not bound by individual lives. As the whole strophe, like the one before it, stresses the theme of recurrence, of return from the past, like the sand of the deep coming back to the surface or the ash of the infernal gods being heaped *again* (αὖ) in the house, it seems preferable to read φθιτῶν with πῆματᾶ rather than with πῆμασι.⁹⁰ The old pains of the house, the pains of the dead, are falling on the pains of the present, something that makes the object of the chorus's vision much more vivid in the sentence: the chorus is seeing this spectral return right now, as it happens.⁹¹ There is no end to this transmission of pain, no λύσις. No generation can liberate the family from its torment, meaning that no past suffering has released the *genea*, and the worst is always to come.⁹² One of the gods is ruining the household.

The next five lines are presented as an explanation (γάρ) of that statement. The text is problematic but far from hopeless if we read it in

⁸⁸ See Easterling 1978: 146–7 for various parallels from tragedy. ⁸⁹ Cf. Hdt. 1.67.

⁹⁰ M. Griffith's (1999: 225) case for saying that 'φθιτῶν is to be taken with πῆμασι' is word order, and the fact that ἀρχαῖα is predicate. Neither that observation nor Easterling's longer note on the question (1978: 145–6) really addresses Lloyd-Jones' (1957: 16) simple remark that it is difficult to call the woes of the living 'ancient'. The emphasis of the text is indeed on the *inheritance* of evil, as Easterling writes, something that is not, I think, 'less clearly conveyed' by reading φθιτῶν with πῆματᾶ. The point of the statement, more importantly, is that the chorus can see these woes. Saying that they can see ancient miseries returning from the past to fall on the present is a much more striking statement than saying that they can see the calamities at hand. φθιτῶν is Hermann's correction of the φθιμένων found in the manuscripts (see Lloyd-Jones 1957: 16).

⁹¹ As Easterling (1978: 146) writes: 'The first-person witness gives weight to the *exemplum* of the Labdacids: "I see with my own eyes." This insistence on the act of witnessing the presence of the ancestral fault can be compared to the *Agamemnon*, where the status of the chorus as μάρτυροι of the ancestral fault is a recurrent concern in the later part of the play; see p. 400.

⁹² See Easterling 1978: 146 for the echo of γενεᾶς (585) in the γενεάν of 596.

the context of the ode's imagery. The statement is based on the opposition between the past of the pluperfect (ἐ)τέτατο and the present of κατ' . . . ἄμᾳ.⁹³ One reading would be that, although a light had spread over the last roots (of the family) in the house of Oedipus ('as sunshine above a plant', as Jebb (1900: 114) writes), bloody dirt, ashes drenched in the blood of murder, are now being heaped up over it.⁹⁴ While ὑπέρ seems preferable to ὅπερ at line 599, it is impossible to make a definite case for one or the other; if ὅπερ is right, then the light arises from, or consists of the last root, as Griffith (1999: 225) writes, and ἐτέτατο must be read as ὁ τέτατο to avoid having a sentence start with κατ' αὖ.⁹⁵ Whatever the case, I can see no valid reason to accept the old emendation of the transmitted κονίς to κοπίς at line 602.⁹⁶ As Liddell and Scott note, the meaning of 'heap up, heap upon' is attested for the rare verb καταμᾶν in archaic and classical poetry (Stephanus glosses it as *accumulo, aggero*), and even found used with κονίς in Josephus in another passage that has, ironically, been emended away on the basis of the verb's disappearance in the text of Sophocles.⁹⁷ There is little difficulty in seeing κονίς used actively as the subject of the verb in that sense through the poetical licence of a lyric ode, and no ground for seeing 'hack down, harvest' as the only possible meaning of the verb here. I can find no value to the statement of Jebb (1900: 115) that the result *must* be a verb that means 'destroys' or 'dooms to death'; the verb can be read as an equivalent to the καλύπτει of the scholiastic gloss.⁹⁸

The νιν of line 601 can refer either to the ρίζα or to the φῶς, depending on whether one adopts ἐτέτατο or ὁ τέτατο at 600.⁹⁹ In either case, what the text says is that the φοινῖα κονίς is being massed upon the bright hope of the family, cutting away the light that shines from the root or over it.¹⁰⁰ It comes from deep down below, the infernal gods, and it evokes the idea

⁹³ See M. Griffith 1999: 225–6.

⁹⁴ An excellent overview of the textual problems involved in the line and the various editorial solutions that have been proposed can be found in Lloyd-Jones 1957: 17–18.

⁹⁵ See Lloyd-Jones 1957: 17.

⁹⁶ Easterling 1978: 148–9 makes a brilliant case for κονίς. Cf. Lloyd-Jones 1957: 17–18.

⁹⁷ *Bj* 2.601: περιρρηγόμενος μὲν τὴν ἐσθῆτα, καταμησόμενος δὲ τῆς κεφαλῆς κόνιν, ἀποστρέψας δὲ ὀπίσω τὰς χεῖρας καὶ τὸ ἴδιον ξίφος ἐπιδήσας τῷ τένοντι.; cf. *Il.* 24.165 and Pherecrates 121. Both Niese and Naber favoured the *lectio difficilior* of καταμησόμενος, found in the *Laurentianus* and the *Suda*, over the καταπασόμενος of the other manuscripts, which is accepted by Pelletier. The combination of κονίς and καταμᾶν in both locations, at any rate, would be a noteworthy coincidence. It is interesting to note that the Homeric parallel appears in a setting of lamentation for the dead. The fact that the compounds of ἀμάομαι with this sense are found only in the middle voice is not sufficient ground for the radical change of meaning produced by the introduction of κοπίς in the text; cf. M. L. West 1966: 332.

⁹⁸ *Schol. in Soph. Ant.* 602: ἀμᾶ θερίζει καὶ ἐκκόπτει· ἢ καλύπτει.

⁹⁹ See M. Griffith 1999: 226. ¹⁰⁰ Cf. Easterling 1978: 146.

of funerary ashes and the dust of the grave smothering the light of the live root. The image clearly alludes to the burial of Polyneices by Antigone but should not be limited to it. Like the πήματα of the dead, it comes back (αὖ) into the house. The word κονία, related to κονίς, can mean simply sand; the κονίς wet with dark blood recalls the black sand of the bottom of the sea from the first strophe of the ode. The action of Antigone is thus reinterpreted as the literal expression of a much deeper background of meaning.

The κονίς is supplemented by two other subjects at line 603, the λόγου ἄνοια and the φρενῶν Ἐρινύς. Rather than read these two elements as literal appositions to φοινία κονίς, I find it preferable to see the construction as a zeugma, with κονίς, ἄνοια, and Ἐρινύς forming the three complementary subjects of καταμᾶ.¹⁰¹ The first presents a disaster that is defined by the gods of the underworld and the second puts forward the error of an individual will. The third places the divine action of the infernal Erinyes directly in the mind of the individual, combining divine and human agency. While the first subject describes the act itself, the second describes the speech that surrounds the act, and the third the mental process that motivates it. In any case, whether one reads line 603 as in apposition to κονίς or not, the verse does bring attention to the complexity of the agency involved in the calamity and the return of disaster in the house.¹⁰² The involvement of divinity in the act and in the mind at the moment when the πήματα fall anew on the family leaves little room for the independence of the individual will. That is the theme developed by the second strophe.

Zeus's power is located far above these human tribulations. In opposition to the abyssal darkness of the preceding lines, the great god is seated on 'the dazzling glares of Olympus'. Height and light are associated in contrast to the obscurity of the nether regions. In continuity with the logic of the preceding two strophes, the vertical axis of space is conceived of in terms of the depths of time. Neither the days nor the months nor the years can vanquish the ruler whom time cannot age.¹⁰³ Throughout time, in fact, the past, the present, and the future, this one law (νόμος) will be

¹⁰¹ See Long 1974: 213–14 and Easterling 1978: 148 against Lloyd-Jones 1957: 18.

¹⁰² Cf. M. Griffith (1999: 226): 'In either case, the interplay of human/divine, material/mental, agencies is extraordinary'; cf. Saïd 1978: 130. The reference to an 'Erinyes of the mind' certainly does not point to a 'pervasive network of Erinyes lying behind the action of the play', as Sewall-Rutter (2007: 118–19) writes, but that in no way reduces the significance of the image in the passage.

¹⁰³ Peroni 2003. See Easterling 1978: 150 and M. Griffith 1999: 227 on the problematic παντογῆρος of line 606.

sufficient (ἐπαρκέσει): 'to none among mortals shall great wealth come without disaster'. Although the passage is difficult, and it will continue to defy certainty, Lloyd-Jones' reading, whose Loeb translation is reproduced above, is by far the most satisfactory one. The πάμπολις of the manuscripts cannot be accepted and the emendation πάμπολυς is wholly unproblematic. If the accusative οὐδένα as an object of ἔρπει is 'harsh', as Griffith (1999: 228) writes, it is not unattested, and βίोटος πάμπολυς functions well enough as a variation on the idea of wealth or abundance.¹⁰⁴ The verb ἔρπει at 613 recalls the ἔρπον of 585, with exactly the same combination of οὐδέν and ἄτας, and the calamity of the house is thus given a more precise definition. What is shown to creep through the generations in the first strophe is now creeping through past, present, and future, as the law of Zeus wields the same punishment over and above time.¹⁰⁵ The transgression (ὑπερβασία) of mortals mentioned at the beginning of the stanza is no threat to the power of Zeus and its inevitable punishment is a confirmation of its law.

Following the second strophe, the second antistrophe expands on the dangers of gain and acquisition and the lures of profit. Hope, longing, and the desire for more are presented as the manifestations of *atē*. No mortal is able to distinguish real gain, ὄνησις, from the ἀπάτα ('deception') of 'thoughtless longings', a word that resonates with ἄτα. It literally creeps – ἔρπει again – on the man who knows nothing until he burns his foot in the fire. This new recurrence of ἔρπειν, combined with οὐδέν for a third time, is bound to recall the other usages of the verb in the ode. Great wealth, as we had been told in the previous stanza, always leads to *atē*. This stanza describes how. The knowledge of the man who has made some gain amounts to nothing. Disaster will strike unexpectedly, from down below, burning the foot that supports the body – a fire as dangerous as the water of the first stanza, the earth of the second, or the sky of the third.¹⁰⁶ The elements are united in their punishment of the transgressor. It is, however, the one who is punished who steps on the fire himself. The act is his. Unable to distinguish good from bad, he walks into his own calamity. The god only leads the φρένες of a man to *atē*; the mortal is the one who actually will place his foot in it. Only the small man (ὀλίγος) escapes this lot, 'faring through his time' without calamity, ἐκτὸς ἄτας, the closing phrase of the stanza, pointing to the ἐκτὸς ἄτας at the end of the second

¹⁰⁴ Easterling 1978: 151–2; Lloyd-Jones and Wilson 1990: 130; M. Griffith 1999: 228–9.

¹⁰⁵ See p. 364. ¹⁰⁶ For the notably bold imagery of the ode, see Hester 1985.

strophe, and the contrasting fates of the man of great wealth and the man of no means in the grand scheme of the gods.¹⁰⁷

The person who is led to *atē* by the gods for his desire of wealth knows nothing *until* (πρίν) he burns his foot in the fire.¹⁰⁸ By his suffering he presumably learns the teaching that is presented in the next line, the ‘famous saying’ (κλεινὸν ἔπος) that has been revealed (πέφανται) in wisdom (σοφίᾳ) by someone, the *gnōmē* of 621–5, which restates in condensed form the meaning of the last two stanzas of the ode. The theological pronouncement of the chorus in the second *stasimon* of the *Antigone* is presented as the expression of a revelation of knowledge, traditional wisdom that is reactivated, illustrated, and understood anew by the torment of the characters on stage. Students of the play have described its relation to the course of the drama in predictably different terms. Most have argued that the elevated perspective of the ode on suffering and misfortune is, at least in part, a direct commentary on the action that precedes it, Antigone’s principled defence of her deeds and her subsequent condemnation to death by Creon.¹⁰⁹

Scholars generally read the ode as an attempt to make sense of Antigone’s suffering, but many also see references to Creon in the portrait it offers.¹¹⁰ The problem of finding direct links between the *gnōmai* of the chorus and the actions of the characters has often been remarked upon. After all, Antigone is far from being motivated by mere gain in the play, and the attention she gives to the care of her brother’s corpse can hardly be described simply as an evil that is mistaken for a good. She certainly does not advance into disaster unaware of the danger in front of her. How then is the ode a commentary on the dramatic action at hand? The answer has generally revolved around the importance of the family theme in the song, the emphasis of the first two stanzas on the transmission of calamity through the generations, and its applicability to the main characters of the play. The first antistrophe’s focus on the Labdacids very explicitly activates the whole web of myths surrounding the recurrent disasters that struck the house of Antigone in time, but it does not mention any specific event or identify an origin or a cause.

This does present the recent (νῦν) calamities of the *genos* as a continuation of the calamities that struck it in previous generations and thus uses

¹⁰⁷ For the reading of ὀλίγος as “poor” or “weak” and in contrast with μέγας in the sense of “great” or “rich”, see Lloyd-Jones 1957: 21–2. For repetition in the ode, see Easterling 1978: 154.

¹⁰⁸ See Easterling 1978: 153; for the otherwise unattested verb προσάω, see Griffith 1999: 299.

¹⁰⁹ Cf. Else 1976: 74–6. ¹¹⁰ See e.g. Easterling 1978: 156–7.

the present suffering of Antigone as an illustration of the general principle of divine *atē* laid out in the first strophe. Offering a framework for the understanding of the torment unfolding on stage, it elevates the perspective above the moment at hand to a much broader view of its place in time, one that extends the pain of the individual by emphasising its links to other generations. The pathos of Antigone's fate is thus given a further, abyssal depth, lined with the horrors of the past, while at the same time foreshadowing the future death of Haemon, Creon's son. As has rightly been noted, Haemon arrives on stage immediately after the ode, thus bringing attention to the other main line of filiation in the *Antigone*, and its link to the bleak view of kinship that informs the song.¹¹¹ The solidarity of generational suffering moves in both directions in the play, backward and forward, a testimony to the chorus's ability to offer a vision to the audience that resonates beyond the moment.

The next two stanzas of the ode make sense in relation to the first two.¹¹² The transgression singled out in the text, acquisition, and the blind hopes of gain that accompany it in the second antistrophe's description of *atē* hardly befit Antigone's behaviour in the play. There is no doubt that the condemnation of the 'folly in the speech' and the 'Erinyes in the mind' should be read at least in part as a reference to Antigone's actions, but it is less clear what the *ὑπερβασία* (605) against Zeus's power, the *βίोटος πάμπολυς* (614), the *ἐλπὶς* (615) and the *ἀπάτᾳ* (617), or the *κακὸν δοκεῖν ἐσθλόν* (622) have to do with her, as none of these corresponds even remotely to what she does. To say that these negative terms and ideas, the specific transgressions singled out in the text, are simply reflections of the poetic tradition, generalising tropes of the gnomic wisdom that the ode channels to elevate its vision of human frailty before divine punishment, is basically a way of avoiding the question. Why are these precise traditions used here – why these particular crimes chosen to illustrate the principle at play? A Sophoclean ode is not an arbitrary collage of *gnōmai*.

Part of the answer to the question surely has to do with the emphasis of the last two stanzas on the effects of wealth, the *βίोटος πάμπολυς* of the man who acquires great riches, as opposed to the meagre means of the *ὀλίγος*. If Antigone herself clearly has no interest in wealth, she is first and foremost the daughter of Oedipus, and the descendant of the royal house whose possession of the land and control of the city has been at the centre

¹¹¹ Griffith 1999: 232.

¹¹² Cf. Easterling 1978: 142–3 (with 155–6), who warns against separating the two clearly distinct halves of the ode too clearly.

of all its calamities. Similarly, Haemon is the last heir of the *Spartoi*, the ancient line of the sown men who have shared power over the city with the Labdacids, and whose father is now asserting his rule over the city. The play has absolutely nothing to say about the deep past of either house, the specific calamities that struck it in time, the Dragon and Cadmus or the rape of Chrysippus. It does, however, bring attention to the status of these scions of the Theban elite and the importance of their households, linked to both kingship and tyranny, and their (disastrous) attempt to establish a dynasty. At lines 37–8, already, Antigone presents the choice of her sister as a question of εὐγένεια: ‘you will soon show whether your nature is noble or you are the cowardly descendant of valiant ancestors’.¹¹³

The high status of Antigone and Ismene, Creon and Haemon, is brought out even more clearly by the contrast with the chorus of anonymous aged citizens singing the ode.¹¹⁴ Summoned by Creon as a Council of Elders (159) to resolve the crisis, they are defined by their active involvement in the affairs of the city. While they are emphatically citizens, πολῖται (806), the action of Antigone is portrayed, both by Ismene and by Antigone, as something that is done βίᾳ πολιτῶν (79; 907). They embody the authority of a generation and the most distinguished voice of the Theban people, distinct from that of those who would rule over it as kings or tyrants.¹¹⁵ Old men of some means (842–3) at the end of their lives, they perfectly embody the last line of the *stasimon*, the lot of these men who live out their existence away from *atē*, and fulfil their time, their χρόνος, without divine attention or punishment, bringing to mind the εὐδαίμονες of the first line, whose αἰών remains free from evil.¹¹⁶ When the elders are later referred to as κοιρανίδαι by Antigone at 941 in the very last speech before her final exit (and it is worth mentioning that they have not been referred to as κοιρανίδαι before then), the point is that they are not βασιλεῖδαι.¹¹⁷ ‘Look, rulers of Thebes, upon the last of the royal house.’ It is not their social status that is underlined in that

¹¹³ 37–8: οὕτως ἔχει σοι ταῦτα, καὶ δείξεις τάχα | εἴτ’ εὐγενὴς πέφυκας εἴτ’ ἐσθλῶν κακῇ. M. Griffith 1999: 126 references 379–80; 486–7; 823–5 and 866 as parallels.

¹¹⁴ See M. Griffith 1999: 56–7. ¹¹⁵ See Rohdich 1980; Rose 1992: 185–94.

¹¹⁶ The πολυκτῆμονες of 843 should not be pushed too far as a characterisation of the elders. It serves in part as a contrast to Antigone’s own destitution in that passage, and a mark of the city’s prosperity. The point of the address is that they represent the *polis*.

¹¹⁷ 940–1: λεύσσετε, Θήβης οἱ κοιρανίδαι, | τὴν βασιλειδῶν μούνην λοιπὴν; cf. M. Griffith 1999: 282–3 on what this says about Ismene. πολυκτῆμονες, similarly, only appears late in the play (after the second *stasimon*, at any rate). Those who insist on the elite status of the Theban elders in the play, without further qualifications, usually have little to say about the sequence in which the relevant passages occur, and their rhetorical context.

statement, but a transfer of sovereignty. A hint of irony can be read in that address, just as in 988, when Tiresias refers to them as Θήβης ἄνακτες. The old men of Thebes are old men of Thebes, nothing more, nothing less. The πῆματᾶ of the aristocratic characters in the play are framed as the πῆματᾶ of privilege, of the powerful houses that rule the city through dynasty, in contrast to the lot of the citizens. Their difference from the chorus marks them out as a specific group, circumscribed from the people of the city, and it echoes their difference from the audience.

The pain of Antigone is recast as a paradigm of the fate reserved to the children of the great dynastic houses. The force of that perspective is built in great part on the pointed intertextual activations of the ode. Most scholars who have commented on the second *stasimon* of the *Antigone* have remarked on the deeply traditional nature of the song and noted copious parallels between the language and imagery of the ode and earlier poetry.¹¹⁸ The second *stasimon* of Aeschylus' *Seven against Thebes*, in particular, with its imagery of the storm at sea used to describe the calamities transmitted through the generations of the Labdacids, has been presented as a model for the text, a thematic antecedent, even if its presence in the ode can be overplayed.¹¹⁹ The two odes share the same subject matter, the misfortunes transmitted through the generations of the Labdacids. Words such as αἰών, ῥίζα, and ὑπερβασία are bound to reappear in such accounts, without establishing any direct activation of one by the other, let alone a genetic trajectory of one as the offshoot of the other, as Else argued in his 1976 book on the ode, and the storm of the *Seven* is nothing like that of the *Antigone* in the articulation of its details, as we have seen. Whatever the case, a number of similarities with the ode and related statements in the work of Hesiod, Theognis, Bacchylides, and Pindar have been identified and referenced. These echoes are the material of the thematic and linguistic register activated by the ode, the traditional texture of the language that conveys the gnomic wisdom of authoritative poetry.¹²⁰ The intertextual embedding of the *Antigone*'s second *stasimon* in the material of the poetic archive corresponds exactly to what one would expect in the expression of an elevated choral perspective such as the one it presents.

There is, however, one voice that stands out very clearly from the rest in this intertextual activation: Solon's *Elegy to the Muses*. Commentaries and analysis of the passage invariably give pride of place to the elegy in their

¹¹⁸ See for instance Easterling 1978: 143; 154–5; M. Griffith 1999: 218–19.

¹¹⁹ Else 1976: 16–18; cf. Easterling 1978: 144–5. ¹²⁰ See Cuny 2002–3.

lists of parallels, and the famous poem of Solon comes back as a recurrent 'cf.' in the discussions of the ode.¹²¹ What we have there is not a simple collection of parallels, similarities owing to the traditional poetic language of the ode, but a clear, open reference of one text to another text. The *Elegy to the Muses* is a poem centred on the dangers of wealth.¹²² It warns against the consequences of overstepping one's bounds, and the risks of divine punishment that remain attached to the wealth that has been acquired against the will of the gods. The more has been amassed, the more the inheritance is a threat, and the principle of ancestral fault that Solon placed at the heart of the poem ensures that the transmission of wealth through the generations can be accompanied by the transmission of sanction for the crime that brought it about. This ancestral punishment can strike at any time, suddenly, bringing back calamity from the foundation to the top. It falls on those who are unaware of its menace, living in the hope of gain and profit, blind to the real inheritance of their kinship line. A corollary to the dangers of *elpis*, *atē* maddens those who are marked for punishment and leads them to seek further wealth and the concomitant certainty of disaster.

The second *stasimon* of the *Antigone* is not only modelled on this poem but points to it. Like the *Elegy to the Muses*, it is divided into two symmetrical sections, with the first one portraying the perspective of calamity as divine punishment striking through the generations of a house, and the second half looking at calamity from the perspective of mortal blindness, the perils of *elpis*, and the blows of *atē*, a very distinctive symmetrical pairing based on the fundamental differences of perception that separate the logic of divine action from human limitations. The idea of ancestral fault is placed at the heart of both and described in explicit terms as a fundamental principle regulating misfortune in time. The image of the storm is used in both cases to illustrate the nature of this calamity returning from the past. Contrary to the second *stasimon* of the *Seven against Thebes*, which centres its depiction of the storm on the tradition of the ship of state, the *Elegy to the Muses* and the ode of the *Antigone* both focus on the bottom of the sea, the movement that leads from the further depths to the surface, and the links that bring together land, water, and sky in the confusion of the storm. Just as the doomed house of the *Antigone* song is 'shaken' by the gods, and the seabed raked by the storm, the sea floor of the *Elegy to the Muses* is shaken by the force of the powerful wind from heaven.¹²³ The high number of parallels between the two texts is not a coincidence. There are profound differences between the ode of

¹²¹ See e.g. Easterling 1978: 142; 151; 153.

¹²² See p. 228.

¹²³ Cf. pp. 230–1.

Sophocles and the poem of Solon, obviously, namely the insistence of the latter on justice, and its usage of generation as a mechanism for the delay of punishment, rather than the link between recurrent disasters in time. Neither text is the equivalent of the other. But the later poem, the Sophoclean ode, clearly reproduces the distinctive patterns of the earlier one and activates a reference to it.

The *Elegy to the Muses* is by far the most quoted piece of Solonian poetry in antiquity.¹²⁴ The masterwork of the most famous Athenian poet – excluding drama – for an audience of the time of Sophocles, it embodies the spirit of the reforms that were associated with him, the foundational wisdom of ‘Solon’s Laws’ at the heart of the very idea of Athens as a community of equal citizens that was so emphatically distinct from the past and from the other cities of the present in its own view of itself.¹²⁵ Pointing to this poem in an ode that foreshadows the downfall of two great aristocratic houses is a powerful statement. The play gives its chorus of aged citizens a song that embodies the old poem of the Athenian sage in the theatre.

A striking example of tragedy’s ability to juxtapose worlds on stage in a clash of contrast between past and present voices, it also illustrates the tragic ode’s openness to other – not necessarily choral – poetry and individual texts.¹²⁶ What does it mean for the *Elegy to the Muses* to be activated there in the play? Solon’s poem is one of the most powerful attacks of Greek literature against the idea of inherited privilege. The application of what could arguably be described as a poetic charter of Athenian society to the paradigmatic downfall of a great house of myth brings a whole range of associations to the scene. The demise of Antigone becomes a consequence of the weight of the past in this vision, another one of the calamities that have affected the house through the generations, the expression of divine disfavour with the families that have acquired too much wealth. The traditional story of royal tyrants put down unfolding on stage is rethought through the lenses of traditional Athenian wisdom on wealth and heredity, and the Athenian text rethought through the precise example of the traditional myth. This is a particularly striking instance of the web of references at work in the tragic staging of ancestral fault.

¹²⁴ See p. 227. While the figure of Solon in comedy has received a lot of attention in recent scholarship (see Telò 2004 and 2007; Bakola 2008), his presence in tragedy has been much less discussed, apart from the occasional reference in commentaries to ‘archaic thought’.

¹²⁵ See p. 231.

¹²⁶ For the chorus’s mediation of the actions on stage for the perspective of the audience in the play, see Zimmermann 2003a. For the notion of choral mediation, see Gagné and Hopman 2013.

A monument of traditional Athenian wisdom is transposed at the heart of mythical Thebes with this song.

Its expression of ancestral fault neatly ties in with the earlier statements of lines 2–3 and 49–60, and it will be picked up by lines 853–71.¹²⁷ It clearly has a role of some importance in the play, but it would be an error to overemphasise it and make the ode some kind of key to the *Antigone*.¹²⁸ The elevated vision of the chorus on the suffering of the protagonists at that point in the play does not give the audience a privileged understanding into its meaning. It contributes a very distinctive note to the characterisation of the group of old men, of their attempts to make sense of the events, their relation to Antigone and Creon, the power relations at work behind the hopes and ambitions of both families and their claims to dominance in the city, and it conjures up the logic of the vast temporal background in which the drama ultimately evolves.¹²⁹ The vision of the ode, more importantly, sets up a canvas against which to better paint the contours of Antigone herself. Reference to the predetermined disaster of her family or the ‘Erinyes in the mind’ inherited from her house challenges the audience’s assessment of Antigone’s will, the nature of her determination, and the meaning of her total devotion to family bonds. It opens paths and dead ends that will lead different spectators to many different destinations, a cognitive process that it is not the place of this study to discuss. The point, here, is that the song forces a violent confrontation of perspectives on the audience, and a marked choice as to the evaluation of the past’s relevance for the evaluation of Antigone’s present intransigence and resolve. Ancestral fault is used by Sophocles as a complex and powerful tool of characterisation, not a narrative explanation or a theological key.

Phoenissae

The treatment of the Labdacid ancestral fault in Euripides’ *Phoenissae* and its engagement with the *Seven against Thebes* differs from the *Antigone* on almost every count.¹³⁰ This is a text that has played a major role in shaping later receptions of ancestral fault, as we have seen.¹³¹ Part of the so-called

¹²⁷ See p. 362.

¹²⁸ Else 1976 is a case in point; cf. Coleman 1972; Sewell-Rutter 2007: 70–1, who correctly emphasises the fact that there is no reference to an ancestral *curse* in the play.

¹²⁹ On the errors of the chorus in the play, see McDevitt 1991. For the ruling families’ opposition to ‘family values’ in the play, see Rehm 2006.

¹³⁰ See Sewell-Rutter 2007: 35–48; cf. Ierano 2006. ¹³¹ See pp. 95–6; cf. pp. 348–9.

Byzantine triad, the *Phoenissae* was one of the most popular plays of late antiquity and later, and it amassed a significant amount of scholia over the centuries, which have a lot to say about the old crimes of the Labdacids.¹³² This is where we find the so-called Pisander scholion, for instance. The manuscript *hypotheses* to the play give a particularly rich overview of the ancestral curse coursing through the family, including references to the rape of Chrysippus and the curse of Pelops, but nothing indicates that this information, just like the relevant information of the scholia, can tell us anything meaningful about the play itself, rather than its later frames of reception. It is unclear, for instance, whether the play was part of a connected trilogy or not, and the tantalising idea that the *Chrysippus* preceded it cannot be demonstrated.¹³³ The following discussion will treat it as an individual unit.

The main passage of the *Phoenissae* in which the idea of ancestral fault has an explicit role to play is the revelation of Tiresias to Creon.¹³⁴ After Eteocles has gone off to fight his brother beyond the walls, the prophet he had summoned earlier to reveal the course of the battle arrives on stage, wearing a crown of gold and led by his daughter and Menoeceus, the son of Creon himself. The old man uncovers the interrelated events of past and future in two speeches that put the present in ever greater perspective. In the first speech (865–95) Tiresias shows Creon the terrible bloodshed that is about to fall on Thebes. The two brothers will die, together with countless other men from Thebes and Argos. Their demise, the fulfilment of the curse that Oedipus cast on his sons, continues a long series of calamities that have struck the Labdacids through the generations. Thebes is diseased (867: νοσεῖ), just as Oedipus is diseased (877: νοσῶν), and the city is threatened with destruction.¹³⁵ There has been a sickness on the land ever since Laius disobeyed the gods to have a child, a statement that points back to Jocasta's description of Laius' transgression at the beginning of the play (18–20), and Apollo's prediction that the whole house 'would be embroiled in bloodshed'.¹³⁶ Oedipus' crime of incest led to his blindness, a σόφισμα of the gods that was also an ἐπίδειξις for

¹³² Bremer 1984; Criboire 2001; Bussès 2004; see *P.Oxy.* 67.4566.

¹³³ Mastronarde 1994: 13; 36–8; cf. M. L. West 1999: 43; Sewell-Rutter 2007: 45.

¹³⁴ See Mastronarde 1994: 391–3 and 400–1. On Tiresias in the play, see Papadopoulou 2001.

¹³⁵ For the theme of disease in Euripides, see Lloyd 2003: 91–7.

¹³⁶ 868: βίῃ θεῶν. See Mastronarde 1994: 401 on the reminiscence of the δαιμόνων βίῃ of line 18. He rejects the view that 868 is an interpolation. Swift 2009 rightly insists on the sexual nature of the transgressions that follow the two families through time and the resulting distortion of their kinship roles but downplays the murder of the Dragon and the theme of sacrifice in the play. Cf. Amiech 2006.

Greece (870–1).¹³⁷ But Oedipus' sons tried to cover up this example of punishment, and their treatment of Oedipus provoked the curse of the father against his sons.

The curse, in other words, is the product of two forces, the fact that Oedipus is diseased, like the land, and the fact that he has been dishonoured by Eteocles and Polyneices. The sons of the last Labdacid generation provoke their punishment by their own acts, just as Oedipus' acts are his own, and Laius decided by himself to disobey the gods. But just as Oedipus' crime is a consequence of the fault of his father, the affront of Eteocles and Polyneices triggers a curse that is based on the disease of Oedipus, which itself has deep roots in a previous generation. Disease and curse are united with the transgressions of three successive generations to create a long chain of imbricated, recurrent calamity. If all later events are linked to the fault of Laius, the transgression 'from which' (ἐξ οὗ) disease came upon the land to strike him and his descendants, it is, strictly speaking, wrong to call this transmission of interlocked disasters a 'curse' at this point in the text. There is one *ara* in the passage, the imprecation of Oedipus against his sons. It appears in Tiresias' speech as a continuation of the ills that have fallen on the house in previous generations, but no other moment of the tale is properly a curse. The ancestral fault that animates the suffering of the house of Labdacus in this prophetic vision is a more complex force. The same is true of the ancestral fault presented in Tiresias' second speech.

In 930–59, which, to a line, has the same number of verses as the first speech of Tiresias to Creon in the transmitted text, the prophet delivers a harsh message to Jocasta's brother. Only the sacrifice of Menoeceus, the last of the pure Sown Men, the *Spartoi*, will allow Thebes to survive the war. The conflict between the two brothers threatens the existence of the city, and there is only one possible way to avert the disaster. Creon is presented with a brutal choice: either save yourself, or save the city. The sacrifice of Menoeceus is to serve as an appeasement for a primordial crime. An ancient wrath, παλαιὰ μῆνιματᾶ (934), has kept Ares seeking vengeance for the slaughter of the Dragon by Cadmus, the violent death out of which the city came into being. The founding act of Thebes is revealed as the fault that now threatens its existence.

When Cadmus killed the Dragon he sowed the teeth of the beast in the earth, and armed men came out of the ground, an old tale made famous

¹³⁷ Kovacs translates as 'the gods' subtle contrivance for giving a lesson to Greece'. See Mastronarde 1994: 402.

throughout the Greek world in poetry and images.¹³⁸ The men fought with each other in the field, an archetypal conflict for the internecine struggle of the two brothers now ripping the city apart. Those who survived became the original inhabitants of the city, a *genos* that has maintained the 'purity' (943) of its line all the way down to Menoeceus.¹³⁹ The sacrifice of Menoeceus is a direct answer to the slaying of the Dragon, a parallel to the original act of foundation necessary to ensure its continued survival, something like a refoundation.

The sacrifice of Menoeceus will be pleasing to Earth, the mother of the beast, a γηγενής (931), and to Ares, the divinity moved by an ancient wrath for the serpent's slaughter, and the one who now enacts vengeance (τιμωρεῖ) for it.¹⁴⁰ While the text nowhere identifies Ares explicitly as the father of the Dragon, it activates those versions of the myth that do. It is the only link that would explain Ares' special connection to the creature and the severity of his μνημέατα, and the beast is presented as the δράκων Ἄρεος ('Dragon of Ares') at 657–8.¹⁴¹ The sacrifice of Menoeceus is to serve as an expiation to the two parents of the snake. The prophet reveals that one offspring's life must be exchanged for another, and that mortal blood must flow for the blood of the Dragon. The use of the word καρπός (937) to describe the offspring of Earth, who both gave birth to the δράκων and 'once sent forth the gold-helmeted harvest of the Sown Men', is no coincidence.¹⁴² The children of the Earth are 'fruits' in that they are indigenous products of the soil, autochthonous equivalents of the same matrice. One life must be given where the other was born, one καρπός for another: a human fruit of flesh sacrificed as a beast, and a libation of blood offered to Gè, the undionysiac offering of a perverted world dominated by Ares. In time, the cycle of life and death follows its course among the fruits of the earth, one calling on the other, both united in a complementary opposition. Earth is both the grieving mother of the slain Dragon, and the πατρῷα γαῖα that must be 'saved' by the sacrifice of the autochthonous Menoeceus (948).

The foundation of the city is grounded in conflict and marked by the presence of Ares. Father of the Dragon, the god also presides over

¹³⁸ See Vian 1963; Gantz 1993: 467–71. ¹³⁹ See Mastronarde 1994: 417; cf. Rawson 1970.

¹⁴⁰ Cf. Kyriakou 2009: 41–5. For the personification of Earth in the play, see Mastronarde 1994: 416.

¹⁴¹ Mastronarde (1994: 339): 'Eur. is not as explicit as other sources . . . in making Ares father of the Theban dragon, but the warlike nature of the dragon's offspring fits this genealogy.'

¹⁴² Mastronarde (1994: 416): 'By using this term Tir. assimilates the human sacrifice to the first-fruits of harvest: Earth produced the dragon, but she also produced the *Spartoi* and their descendants, and now she can be thought to demand a return of some portion of her bounty.'

the slaughter of the hoplite *Spartoi*. The union of Earth and Ares generates a legacy of perpetual strife for the land built out of its offspring. Both the foundation of the city and its survival through victory demand the slaying of an autochthonous creature. The death of kin is the ground on which Thebes is built – the parallel between the complementary deaths of Dragon and Sown Men and the mutual slaughter of Eteocles and Polyneices is no coincidence. One echoes the other in a clear pattern of internal violence at the heart of the *polis*. What, then, is the precise relation between the two? How is the conflict of the two brothers tied to the slaying of the serpent? How are the two speeches of Tiresias linked?

It is against Cadmus that the ancient wrath of Ares is directed (934).¹⁴³ Cadmus, the grandfather of Labdacus, is the ancestor of Oedipus and his children. The ancient μῆνιματᾶ of the god of war for the slaying of the Dragon is attached to the line of Laius. Still active, the fault is being avenged right now. The founding act of the city is also the crime of its ruling family. By projecting his vision further into the past, Tiresias has identified the original crime of house and city, and the means of its atonement. The paying of the penalty for the death of the beast by the equivalent, parallel sacrifice of Menoeceus, will fulfil the anger of Ares once and for all. The end of the ancient μῆνιματᾶ will also correspond to the end of the long, recurrent misfortunes of the Labdacids. The atonement of Ares' wrath will allow Thebes to survive, destroying the continuity of the House of Laius with the mutual slaughter of the two brothers, and extirpating the rule of its kin from the city. It is a new *polis* that will emerge from the punishment of the ancient crime. The two cycles of ancestral fault are imbricated in each other; the two speeches of Tiresias uncover different aspects of the same past.

The ancient wrath of Ares has endured over six generations. Neither curse nor pollution, it becomes visible again at the moment when war threatens the city and the foundation of the city is questioned anew by fratricidal slaughter. Menoeceus, the last of the pure *Spartoi*, is himself a product of the Dragon's death, the offspring of Cadmus' murder. The γένος that he belongs to is defined by the γένος of the serpent, the jaw of the slain beast from which Cadmus sowed the teeth in the earth (948).¹⁴⁴ Out of these lives that sprang from the killing of the creature one child must now be killed for the city to live, a parallel to the slaughter of the two brothers that emphasises the bond that united the misfortunes of the

¹⁴³ See Mastronarde 1994: 415 on the choice of the objective genitive Κάδμου over Κάδμω.

¹⁴⁴ See Mastronarde 1994: 417.

Labdacids with those of the *Spartoi*. The ancient line of intertwined crime that has long united the fates of the two houses with that of the city culminates in a final moment of creative destruction that liberates Thebes from the threat of its past – the ultimate *katharsis*.

The generational misfortunes of the Labdacids are nowhere linked to the slaughter of the Dragon by Cadmus before the *Phoenissae*.¹⁴⁵ Usually associated with the punishment of Cadmus himself by Ares, or the fate of the *Spartoi*, the dragon is not an element of the traditional tale of Oedipus in the extant record of early Greek poetry. Whether it is an ‘innovation’ or not, whether or not the *Phoenissae* is the first text to unite the foundational slaughter of Cadmus with the crime of Laius, which it very well could be, that version of the events stands out from the other contemporary Labdacid tales. There is no trace of it, for instance, in the *Seven against Thebes*, the *Antigone*, or the *Oedipus at Colonus*. The embedding of the Labdacid misfortunes in the longer chronological perspective of Ares’ ancient wrath is a distinctive feature of its temporal infrastructure. By making the curse of Eteocles and Polyneices the last event of a long series of related transgressions that ultimately go back all the way to the foundation of the city, it paints a unique vision of the *polis*’s mythical past and of its relevance for the understanding of the drama unfolding on stage.

The *ara* of the two brothers comes out of the sickness of Oedipus, who is as ill as the sickness of the land that saw his birth, suffering the consequences of his own father’s transgression. The first speech of Tiresias explicitly defines that transgression as the violation of Apollo’s order to abstain from begetting children.¹⁴⁶ That Laius received an order from Delphi to refrain from procreation is explicitly mentioned in the drama, but not the reason for that order. There is no reference to the rape of Chrysippus in the play, not even the hint of an indirect allusion. The first speech of Tiresias creates a deep link between the generations, recasting the curse of Oedipus against his sons as the continuity of a punishment for earlier crimes that has coursed through the house from father to son to grandsons. It is the transgression of Laius that is shown to lie behind all the later misfortunes that fell on the *oikos*, but the nature of that transgression is left entirely open. Why was Laius forbidden to have children? What was the cause of Apollo’s insistence that Labdacus’ line come to an end with his son? The deaths of Eteocles and Polyneices push back for two generations what the childlessness of Laius would have achieved, the termination of the royal line of Thebes. But the speech

¹⁴⁵ Cf. Saïd 1985.

¹⁴⁶ See n. 377.

has nothing to say about the reason for this to happen. It leaves us with an open-ended perspective into an obscure past.

The second speech of Tiresias brings the temporal depth of that perspective to another level of distance from the present. Rather than the fault of Laius, it is the fault of Laius' great-grandfather, Cadmus, that is shown to affect the course of the present crisis so many generations later, and the ancient wrath of Ares is revealed as a persistent source of danger for the *oikos* of Cadmus, the *genos* of the *Spartoi*, and the *polis* of Thebes as a whole. By pushing his vision of the relevant past so far back before the time of Laius, Tiresias identifies a common origin to the woes of the various protagonists in the play, a moment that unites them all through the consequences of an ancestral fault.

The further vision of the prophet gives an original *aition* to the open-ended perspective of the first speech, and a clear indication of the action needed to answer that primordial fault, a sacrifice that will forever close the age of foundation, the lines of Cadmus and the *Spartoi*, and usher in a new beginning in the life of the *polis*. With this attachment of the generational misfortunes of the Labdacids to the very foundation of the city, the second speech of Tiresias fundamentally transforms the meaning of the actions taking place in the tragedy, locating them in a precise temporal infrastructure that channels a whole world of significance into the suffering of the protagonists. Placed at the very centre of the play, it serves to provide a frame for the interpretation of the subsequent plot and comments back on the first half of the drama, retrospectively conveying another layer of understanding to the clashing perspectives of the characters on stage.

The incapacity of Jocasta to see what it is that animates the misfortunes of Oedipus' line (350–4), for instance, or where the disaster of his *genos* began (379–84), is presented in a thoroughly different and unexpected light in Tiresias' unveiling of the ancient punishments coursing through the families of Thebes. The portrait presented by Jocasta in the genealogy of the prologue (1–87), more importantly, where she emphasises the descent of Laius from Cadmus, her own identity (and thus Oedipus' and their children's) as a descendant of the *Spartoi*, and where she describes the recurrent afflictions that have plagued the house of Laius ever since he disobeyed Apollo and had a child – that disjointed portrait of the prologue that initially offered an obscure, fragmented background of perpetual suffering for the action of the play is entirely recast by the revelation of Tiresias.¹⁴⁷ The fuller, clearer perspective of the prophet into the temporal

¹⁴⁷ Cf. Sewell-Rutter 2007: 37–8.

infrastructure of the events taking place completes the previous glimpses of the characters into the relevant past.

But it is with the other generalising views of the past presented in the play, the songs of the chorus, that the vision of Tiresias is in particularly close dialogue. Although I am unable to see the choral odes following the clear linear progression in time identified by Marilyn Arthur in her influential 1977 article on the *Phoenissae*, it is true that the odes successively depict all moments of the city's past in their sung commentary on the action of the drama.¹⁴⁸ Constant allusions to the protagonists of earlier times and explicit references to their misfortunes create a particularly deep temporal background to this play – every event mentioned by Tiresias can be found in the choral odes. The *parodos* (202–79) emphasises the importance of Cadmus as the founder of the city and the presence of Ares in the land of Dionysus.¹⁴⁹ The statement that Ares is bringing the 'woe of the Erinyes' (πημονὸν Ἐρινύων) to the sons of Oedipus at 253–5 can be understood as a simple reference to the fratricidal war of Eteocles and Polyneices before the speech of Tiresias, but it acquires an entirely different layer of meaning after the revelation of the prophet. The first *stasimon* (638–89), similarly, centred on the foundation of Thebes by Cadmus, relates in detail the slaying of the Dragon and the slaughter of the Sown Men.¹⁵⁰ Brought to the fore by the chorus early on in the play as important figures of the city's distant past, the Dragon of Ares and the murder of the *Spartoi* are shown to be central to the present and the future of Thebes by Tiresias.

The second *stasimon* (784–833) returns to the race of the *Spartoi* – 'the fairest reproach that Thebes can hear' – and their role in the foundation of the city, and in a quick succession of abrupt transitions it mentions the pains that the goddess Strife has inflicted on the Sown Men and the Labdacids, focusing on the exactions of the Sphinx and the conflict of the sons 'so unlawfully begotten' by the impure union of Oedipus with his mother.¹⁵¹ Ending with a reference to the crowns of Ares, the ode began with the striking image of the choruses of Ares disturbing the revelry of Dionysus in the ground of his own city. The group of young Phoenician girls does not know why the god of war has found his way into the feasts of Bromius (784–5): the ode emphasises the lack of understanding of the

¹⁴⁸ Arthur argues that the historical pattern developed in the odes presents a pessimistic portrait of the foundations of civilisation that moves from prehistory to the imminent slaughter of Eteocles and Polyneices. She charts a path for the curse of the family from the city itself to the two sons of Oedipus.

¹⁴⁹ Mastronarde 1994: 207–8. ¹⁵⁰ Mastronarde 1994: 329–32.

¹⁵¹ See Mastronarde 1994: 373–5; cf. Sewall-Rutter 2007: 42–3.

chorus before so much suffering in the *polis*. Immediately before the speech of Tiresias, then, as Eteocles has just left to fight his brother and all hope seems lost, the ode presents a portrait of the recurrent disasters that have fallen on the house of Labdacus and the Sown Men of Cadmus as an obscure string of terrible misfortunes. Oedipus' victory over the Sphinx, echoing Cadmus' victory over the Dragon, is the condition of the present catastrophe in this perspective. All the events of the city's past are brought together in a breathless dance of woe, but the chorus is incapable of arranging them in any kind of meaningful order. Its knowledge, based on the 'barbarian tale' it heard at home (819), is confused.¹⁵²

By revealing the sequence of the misfortunes and the real *aitia* of the punishments that course through the history of the *polis*, Tiresias transforms the perspectives of the chorus as well as those of the characters and the audience, reshapes how they understand the temporal infrastructure of the events taking place and Oedipus' role in them. When the chorus sings the third *stasimon* at 1018–66, right after the speeches of Tiresias and Menoeceus, the death of the Dragon occupies a prominent position in their depiction of the relevant past, a fault that is presented in causal terms by the young girls. It is from the slaying of the beast by Cadmus, sings the chorus at the end of the ode, that the *ata* of the gods rushed upon the land with its 'snatchings' (ἀρπαγαῖσι).¹⁵³ The snatchings of the Sphinx presented at the beginning of the song, in other words, the impure transgressions of Oedipus after his victory over the beast, his curse against his sons, their fratricidal conflict, all are consequences of this initial slaying by Cadmus. The chorus attaches the ancient transgressions of the city's founder to the generational misfortunes of the Labdacids – it reproduces the lesson of Tiresias. Celebrating the resolve of Menoeceus to die for his city and save it from destruction, it restates the link between the sacrifice of Creon's son and the primordial death of the Dragon, and it acclaims this model of filiation that stands in such clear contrast with the generational strife of the Labdacids. The extirpation of the Cadmean royal family from the land of Thebes staged in the rest of the play similarly fulfils Tiresias' words. The civilising role of Athena, as the main causal force behind the slaying of the Dragon and the sowing of its teeth, the witness of Menoeceus' salvific sacrifice and the wishes of the Phoenician maidens to bear such children ('May we be mothers!'), is reaffirmed in contrast to the role

¹⁵² Cf. 679bis and 680bis.

¹⁵³ 1066; cf. 46. I agree with Mastronarde 1994: 445 in favouring ἀρπαγαῖσι δαιμόνων over δαιμόνων ἄτα.

of Ares (1060–6).¹⁵⁴ Thebes becomes the model of the long and painful road out of savagery.

When Oedipus proceeds to tell the stories of his calamities ‘from the beginning’ (ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς) towards the end of the play (1595–1624), he mentions *arai* that he has received from his father and transmitted to his sons (1611).¹⁵⁵ The language of inheritance used to describe the movement of the curses over three generations and the agency of Oedipus in taking the curses from his father and giving them to his sons are notable aspects of the sentence. It is impossible to know exactly what kind of curse is intended by ἀρὰς . . . Λαίου, but there is no reason to presuppose that it alludes specifically to the rape of Chrysippus, as that episode does not appear elsewhere in the play.¹⁵⁶ The *arai* of his father are not specified, but they clearly activate the theme of generational calamity that figures so prominently in the drama. It is interesting to note that this inheritance of misfortune is presented as a curse at that moment in the play, whereas the language of the imprecation only appears in relation to the curse of Oedipus for his sons before this passage. In any case, the point is that, here, as elsewhere, the speeches of Tiresias stand out as an essential temporal background for the second half of the play. They constitute a turning point in the tragedy and the understanding of their own fates by the characters, providing the audience with a novel, unexpected insight into the meaning of the Labdacid misfortunes, one that now goes back all the way to the origins of the *polis* in a primordial slaying. By transforming the old story of generational doom into a tale of civic refoundation, the *Phoenissae* opens a vast space for its exploration of the weight of time. The temporal infrastructure of the play, unusually complex even for a Euripidean tragedy, uses the idea of ancestral fault to connect different moments of the city’s past into one massive web of correspondences and contrasts. The long history of the city is itself placed in a broader framework of common descent with other lands. The chorus of Phoenician girls constantly comments on its origins, and the link that exists between its homeland and the founder of Thebes.¹⁵⁷ It also refers repeatedly to the figure of Io as a common ancestor

¹⁵⁴ Cf. Swift 2009.

¹⁵⁵ 1608–11: κτανὼν δ’ ἑμαυτοῦ πατέρ’ ὁ δυσδαίμων ἐγὼ | ἐς μητρὸς ἦλθον τῆς τάλαιπώρου λέχος | παῖδ’ ἀδελφοὺς ἔτεκον, οὓς ἀπώλεσα, | ἀρὰς παραλαβὼν Λαίου καὶ παισὶ δούς. Mastronarde 1994: 603–4 dismisses the view that line 1611 is an interpolation. He refers to the ἀλάστορες of lines 1556 and 1593 for the idea of ‘Oedipus as an intermediary in the transmission of troubles’. Cf. line 624, with Sewell-Rutter 2007: 40–1.

¹⁵⁶ See Mastronarde 1994: 603 on the various interpretations of ἀρὰς . . . Λαίου.

¹⁵⁷ Mastronarde 1994: 208–9; Morin 2009.

to the Phoenicians and the Thebans, an ancestor of the Argives too, as the city finds its way back out of strife.¹⁵⁸ The play's emphasis on the centrality of Cadmus as ancestor and descendant serves as a cornerstone of the links that unite the various characters in the same story.

By pushing back the boundaries of relevant time ever further, the tragedy retraces the trajectory of an entire city in the long cycles of myth. The chain that unites the misfortunes of generations in the *Phoenissae* binds one form of punishment to another to reveal consistency behind the appearance of blind chance. The ancestral fault constructed by Euripides associates many disparate elements together in a coherent vision of generational punishment and release. The succession of perspectives presented by the various characters in the play is at once united in a common, exhaustive picture of the past. With Tiresias' identification of the primordial fault of Thebes and the means of its atonement, an axis is found around which the other moments of the past can be attached. The complex variants of the mythical traditions are united in this original fresco. One element in the astoundingly rich fabric of the play, the idea of ancestral fault allows the author to embed the various misfortunes of Thebes in a vertiginous articulation of the deep past. The rewriting of the idea, built on clear antecedents, is taken in a radically new direction.

Oedipus at Colonus

Produced just a few years after the *Phoenissae*, Sophocles' *Oedipus at Colonus* is the latest play of the three tragedians to mention the ancestral fault of the Labdacids.¹⁵⁹ The main reference to the idea of an ancient generational punishment in the play is in Oedipus' bitter answer to Creon at 960–1013. After Creon's attempt to carry Oedipus away from the grove is foiled by the arrival of Theseus, Oedipus answers the taunt of his enemy and rebuts the accusations levelled against him. The case he builds seeks to establish his lack of guilt. He argues in detail for his innocence in the misfortunes that have struck him. The emphasis of his speech is responsibility. He did not know that Laius was his father when he met him on the road. He did not know that Jocasta was his mother when he married her. Anyone would have done the same in his place. The transgressions of Oedipus have been committed without intent or knowledge;

¹⁵⁸ 677; 828.

¹⁵⁹ See e.g. Käppel 2007, who reads the play through the agency of Oedipus' attempt to put an end to the 'Geschlechterfluch' of the Labdacids; cf. Lloyd-Jones 1983: 117–20.

they are the consequences of circumstances that he could not control. The acts themselves cannot justify the abominable accusations of Creon. Oedipus is ἄκων, not ἐκών, an important distinction in the judicial imagination and practice of the time (985–7).¹⁶⁰ His crimes do not belong to him. The misfortunes of his fate make him a pitiful victim, not a dangerous wrongdoer.

Oedipus' tirade is based on reversal. Here, as elsewhere in the play, he speaks last in the *agōn*, and his case illustrates the cunning intelligence and the combative, unrepentant character of the play's main protagonist.¹⁶¹ The speech, forming an elegant ring structure, answers the accusation point by point. Direct addresses, a barrage of questions, hypothetical propositions, depictions of Creon's unseemly slander against his own family, questions concerning his motivation and justice, allow Oedipus to deconstruct the words of his uncle/brother-in-law. Deftly using the standard rhetorical tropes of the forensic defence speech, the old man turns the argument and the self-presentation of his enemy on its head. Creon's accusation, he shows, is actually nothing more than an accusation against Creon himself. It is Creon who is ἐκών in constantly charging Oedipus with the reproach of parricide and incest, knowing that he shares none of the blame. There is no 'fault to reproach', ἀμαρτίας ὄνειδος (967), in Oedipus for the crimes he has committed (ἡμάρτανον) against himself and his own (968).¹⁶² In the man himself (καθ' αὐτόν γ'), in other words, the blame of the fault can be distinguished from the committing of the fault. It is in fact Creon who is guilty of offence against the gods in trying to take away a defenceless suppliant from their altar under false pretences.

The gods are invoked as defenders by Oedipus at the end of his speech (1010–13).¹⁶³ The *Semnai Theai*, protectresses of the grove, are asked to come to his help against Creon. Far from being the hated opponent of the gods described by Creon, Oedipus presents himself as their worthy obligé fighting an impious man. The gods are to be the agents of his salvation, as they have been responsible for his misfortune. The κακά that Oedipus has encountered were placed there by them (997). The θέσφατον which predicted to Laius in an oracle that he would die at the hands of his own son was pronounced before that son was born (969–73).¹⁶⁴ Divinity has inflicted the terrible fate endured by Oedipus. It has been pleasing to

¹⁶⁰ For the legal distinction between 'involuntary' and 'purposely' reflected in the play, see Szlezák 2007; Giordano 2009: 240–5.

¹⁶¹ J. P. Wilson 1997: 11–18; Kelly 2009: 121–33.

¹⁶² See Kelly 2009: 56–9; cf. Saïd 1978: 216–20.

¹⁶³ Burian 1974. ¹⁶⁴ See Leroy 1982.

the gods to bring about 'the killings, marriages, and disasters' that Oedipus had to suffer, he says. But there is no attempt to ascertain what the precise origin of that divine hostility might be, no claim to know where it comes from, but merely the expression of a possibility. Perhaps, according to Oedipus, the gods 'had long felt anger against my *genos*'.¹⁶⁵ The sentence emphatically underlines the uncertainty of the proposition, with the τὰχ' ἄν reinforced by the indeterminate τι. The possibility of a μῆνις exercised by the gods against the family of Oedipus is the lone explanation presented in the speech for the relentless assaults of fate.¹⁶⁶

Where that anger might come from is not even raised in the speech. What matters is that it is ancient, πάλαι, that it comes from the past. The fact that its origin is undetermined is precisely the point. It is older than the single life of Oedipus; it reaches back before his birth. It makes little sense to invoke the story of Chrysippus or another version of the Labdacid 'curse' here, as nothing in the text points in that direction.¹⁶⁷ It is enough to establish that Oedipus cannot possibly have been responsible for what an oracle predicted would happen before he was even conceived. The μῆνις of the gods orchestrated a miserable fate for him independently of his will and actions. Directed at his *genos*, it has punished his father and mother as well as himself. Implied in the present of the verb μνηϊοῦσιν is the idea that it continues into his children. Oedipus does not seek to explain what the ultimate cause of the wrath might be, or where it will stop, or discuss the many ramifications of its impact on his *genos*, but he points to its effect on him as an individual.¹⁶⁸ The ancient μῆνις, in the logic of the speech, does not implicate the person in the crimes it generates. The idea of ancestral fault is used here by the protagonist to exculpate himself from his crimes, to separate the reproach of the ἀμαρτία ('fault') from the act of ἀμαρτάνειν. Oedipus, as a consequence, can present himself as someone who is not κακός, even though he does not deny the horrible nature of his actions. The speech makes a case for a transmission of punishment through generations that does not involve the personal responsibility of the descendant as a culprit.

Oedipus' apology in lines 960–1013 builds on the premises of his earlier apologies in 258–74 and 510–48 and develops them.¹⁶⁹ The theme of his

¹⁶⁵ 964–5: ἤνεγκον ἄκων· θεοῖς γὰρ ἦν οὕτω φίλον, | τὰχ' ἄν τι μνηϊοῦσιν ἐς γένος πάλαι.

¹⁶⁶ Käppel 2009. ¹⁶⁷ Cf. J. P. Wilson 1997: 153–64.

¹⁶⁸ Cf. Easterling 1978: 152, on the second *stasimon* of the *Antigone*: 'But although Sophocles gives emphasis to the theme of transgression and punishment he does not insist on it as a moral lesson; as usual, he is more interested in the fact of human suffering than in its cause.'

¹⁶⁹ Cf. J. P. Wilson 1997: 145–53; Markantonatos 2002: 65–8; 2007: 94–7; Kelly 2009: 53–5.

unwilling transgressions found in both places is expanded in this longer speech and the role of the gods given much greater prominence.¹⁷⁰ The character portrait that comes out of those recurrent justifications of Oedipus for his actions is that of a stubborn, highly intelligent man who holds on to an absolute certitude as to his understanding of what he has done and what he must do. Exiled, weak and wounded in his tattered clothes, marked by the scars of his horrible past, he stands up straight before the calamities that face him in the knowledge that the gods who orchestrated all the evils of his earlier life now lead him to a better lot in death. The asperities of his intransigent character are the very stuff of his future role as an avenger and a protector of Athens against its enemies. Oedipus is a man with a singularly strong determination and a single goal, to obey the oracle that has brought him to the grove of the *Semnai Theai*, and he will not let his enemies get in his way or bring him back to Thebes. The past cannot be righted. Far from being a source of weakness or shame for Oedipus, it is the basis of his powerful and effective anger.¹⁷¹ For Oedipus to become the heroic figure of Colonus, he must be just the man he describes, the unlikely person who has committed the most horrible crime imaginable without incurring reproach for it. By hinting at the traditional, well-known framework of generational punishment in which that is possible, ancestral fault, the speech provides the play with a theological canvas for defining its vision of Oedipus.

There is no accusation against divinity in the speech. Here, as elsewhere in the play, the old man presents the actions of the gods without judging them. The horrible fate which it has been their *pleasure* to inflict on Oedipus, the ancient wrath against his family, their continued pursuance of a course that leads to conflict do not result in the expression of theological pessimism or doubts about the nature of divine justice, no dark vision of a world separated from meaning. It is a *just* god who will exalt Oedipus in the afterlife (1567).¹⁷² The gods, while not directly active on stage until the end, are ever there in the cultic landscape, the language of ritual, the oracles, the prayers and the thoughts of the characters in the play, and they are presented throughout the drama dressed in the full reverence of their awesome power.

The causes of their actions, their motivations, their aims, are of no concern to the new vision acquired by the old Oedipus. It is the simple fact of their superior existence that matters. Anger and revenge, might and

¹⁷⁰ See Saïd 1978: 216. ¹⁷¹ See Käppel 2007; Markantonatos 2007: 140–56; cf. Rosenmeyer 1952.

¹⁷² Markantonatos 2007: 111; cf. Lloyd-Jones 1983: 117–20.

benefit are the expressions of their supremacy. As has often been noted, the association between Oedipus and the Erinyes grows stronger over the course of the play, with Oedipus and 'his' Erinyes united against his sons, with his eternal vengeance against Thebes, and his progressive acceptance and integration into the grove of the *Semnai Theai*.¹⁷³ Oedipus' transformation into a dangerous hero of retribution at the moment of his death is prepared throughout the play by the staging of his unshakable anger and his distance from normal human society. The notion of purification that recurs in the speech of the characters is an important element of that process.

The pollution of Oedipus is never disputed, even if the notion of *miasma* itself is not explicitly mentioned in the play. Creon's accusation revolves around the idea that Athens could not possibly accept a man who is so tainted, ἀναγνος, the polluted killer of his father, πατροκτόνος, and the father of such an impure (ἀνόσιος) union (944–6).¹⁷⁴ The chorus initially shrink from contact with him when they first learn his identity and they ask him to leave the land before it suffers from his presence. Oedipus himself knows that, as a 'father-slayer', πατροκτόνος (600–1), he can never return to Thebes, and that it is not *themis* for him to touch Theseus.¹⁷⁵ Born miserable, ἄθλιος, he shares his house with pollution, he is its ξύνοικος (1134).¹⁷⁶ That κηλὶς κακῶν, the taint of his household and his actions, should not come into contact with one who is free from such miseries. While he freely clings to his daughters, Oedipus will let no one else near him.¹⁷⁷

It comes as no surprise, then, considering the importance of pollution in the text, to see the notion of purification playing a role in the *Oedipus at Colonus*. For the old man to be accepted by the divinities whose sacred grove he has transgressed, a ritual of propitiation must be performed.¹⁷⁸ Described at length by the chorus, it involves an elaborate libation of water and honey, the manipulation of olive wood twigs, and a prayer of supplication intoned in a low voice.¹⁷⁹ Presented as a *katharmos*, it aims to placate the dread goddesses for the Theban exile's intrusion into their

¹⁷³ See Tilg 2004; cf. J. P. Wilson 1997: 167–86; Calame 1998; Kelly 2009: 71–5; Markantonatos 2007; Käppel 2009.

¹⁷⁴ Jebb 1900: 152–3; cf. Kelly 2009: 73–4. Giordano 2009 (see p. 233) rightly stresses the close interaction between ideas of law and pollution in the play.

¹⁷⁵ 1130–6: καὶ μοι χέρ', ὦναξ, δεξιὰν ὄρεξον, ὥς | ψαύσω φιλήσω τ', εἰ θέμις, τὸ σὸν κάρα. | καίτοι τί φωνῶ; πῶς σ' ἄν ἄθλιος γεγώς | θιγεῖν θελήσαιμι' ἀνδρὸς ᾧ τίς οὐκ ἔνι | κηλὶς κακῶν ξύνοικος; οὐκ ἔγωγε σε, | οὐδ' οὖν ἔασω. τοῖς γὰρ ἐμπείροις βροτῶν | μόνοις οἷόν τε συνταλαιπωρεῖν τάδε.

¹⁷⁶ Jebb 1900: 180–1. ¹⁷⁷ Cf. Burian 1974: 414; Kaimio 1988: 85–6.

¹⁷⁸ See Lardinois 1992: 322; Morin 1996; Kelly 2009: 73–4. ¹⁷⁹ Cf. Calame 1998: 334–42.

sanctuary (466).¹⁸⁰ Ismene will successfully perform it for her father. Complementary to this ritual of entry into the grove, another ritual will be performed at the end of the play to prepare Oedipus for death and his passage into the afterlife.¹⁸¹ Described by the messenger in his report of the last moments of the old man to the chorus, the ritual consists of a purificatory washing and libation performed by Ismene and Antigone, their final act before letting their father go (1600–2). If that cleansing of Oedipus' body by his daughters just before his death is indeed a preparation for his translation to heroic status, in no way does it constitute a purification of his κηλὶς κακῶν, 'taint of evils'. There is no washing away of the polluted past for Oedipus in the *Oedipus at Colonus*.

Oedipus never sheds the stain that he carries with him at the beginning of the play. In his answer to Creon's accusation, which puts so much emphasis on his pollution, he has nothing to say about this pollution. Whereas he methodically answers every point made by his enemy, he does not even mention that one. His argument is based on the dissociation of his crime from his intent, on the proposition that the act itself, as terrible as it is, does not involve his character. Although he is a πατροκτόνος, Oedipus is not κακός (988). In his first address to the chorus already, he had presented himself as a man who is not κακός φύσιν (270), and more, as one who is sacred and pious, ἱερὸς εὐσεβῆς τε (286). It is that subjective aspect of his will, of his character, that must count in the end in the acceptance of Oedipus in the land by the chorus, Theseus, and by the gods, not the objective fact of his crime. Driving a wedge in the ancient opposition that was always felt between the generational transmission of punishment and the responsibility of the descendant, it makes a clear and detailed case for the possibility of a moral innocence that is independent from the acts one has been forced to commit. Oedipus can be 'holy and pious', and he is not κακός, even if he does not deny the crimes he has committed and the consequences of their pollution. That rare and distinctive position, which is nowhere contested in the play, presents a powerful negation of the idea of double motivation and moral inheritance that informs so much contemporary thought on ancestral fault in tragedy and elsewhere. Creating a tension between the ancient wrath of the gods and the unwitting actions of its victim allows Sophocles to shape the figure of a man who is simultaneously stained beyond measure and completely innocent. It allows Oedipus to keep all the potency and the threat of the pollution that he will channel in his wrath against his sons as well as in his

¹⁸⁰ Jebb 1900: 81; Kamerbeek 1984: 1982.

¹⁸¹ See Calame 1998: 349–51.

dangerous new role as a defender of the land, and to be accepted by the city and the audience as the beneficial hero who has been led to his new seat of power by the gods themselves.¹⁸²

At 361–84, when she informs her father about the situation of his sons in Thebes, Ismene describes the attempt of Eteocles and Polyneices to step down from their claims to power and leave the kingship to Creon. They wanted to avoid polluting the city (χραίνεσθαι πόλιν) in that way, ‘considering the nature of the ancient (πάλαι) ruin of the family that oppressed your miserable house’ (368).¹⁸³ They were, however, unable to stay away from the throne, motivated by ‘one of the gods and their own accursed minds’, and they entered a terrible internecine strife for tyrannical rule. Although they tried to escape the ancient ruin, they were brought back to it by the corruption of their own mind, their ἄλιτηρός φρήν, and the action of a divinity.¹⁸⁴ The very double motivation that Oedipus denies for himself is what continues to carry the ancestral fault into the next generation. The old φθορά (‘ruin’) of the Labdacids did not die with the horrible fate of Oedipus, and no amount of effort could put an end to it. Oedipus knows this well when he refers to the ‘fated strife’ of his sons in lines 421–2.

In the early part of the play, then, we are explicitly presented with the idea that the long generational misfortune of the Labdacid *genos* is very much active still, that it is dangerously polluting, and that the sufferings of Oedipus are but a moment in a much longer chain of transmission. The many curses that Oedipus casts at his sons in the course of the play and that he embodies in his implacable anger are but another element of this ancient ruin coursing through the man. That is what Polyneices acknowledges when he describes his lot as a result of his father’s Erinys in the later parts of the play (1299; 1432–4).¹⁸⁵ This insistence on the continuity of the ancestral fault that has plagued this house before the time of Oedipus and that continues to follow it allows the play to better emphasise the potency of the danger carried by the Labdacid, and the distinctiveness of his piety and innocence in the midst of the horror he inherited – the singularity of the power he wields, and of the very deliberate choice he made, in accord with the gods, to give it to Athens. The writing of ancestral fault in the *Oedipus at Colonus* is used to flesh out and deepen the character of the protagonist and some of the main themes developed in the tragedy. Sophocles taps into all earlier expressions of the idea in the process and uses them to create expectations against which to stage the play. That new

¹⁸² Cf. Bacon 2001. ¹⁸³ Markantonatos 2007: 85–6.

¹⁸⁴ See Käppel 2007; cf. Kelly 2009: 40–41. ¹⁸⁵ Jebb 1900: 221.

instrumentalisation of ancestral fault, in turn, developed further the by now distinctive implicit theology of the idea, most notably the opposition between individual will and the weight of ancestral fault, which was always present in the background of the earlier record but rarely given this sharp, elegant formulation. That expression of ancestral fault at the end of the fifth century is the product of a mature tradition looking back upon itself. It is built on a hardened web of references. The same pattern is found, if only with much clearer contours, in the evolution of ancestral fault within the Atridae tragedies.

*Tragic reconfigurations: Atridae**Oresteia*

The *Oresteia* looms over the rest of tragedy's engagement with the ancestral fault of the Atridae to a much greater extent than the Ladbacid trilogy does over the later Oedipus plays. It offers what is probably the most famous and influential expression of ancestral fault in classical literature. While often discussed in terms of the broad patterns of evolution of the idea reviewed in Chapters 1 and 2 of this book, and referenced innumerable times in the gargantuan bibliography of scholarship on the plays, it has received surprisingly few detailed studies of its language, imagery, and dramatic effect in recent years.¹ The prevailing pattern of ideas in texts where it is mentioned is to assert the traditional, archaic nature of the doctrines it expresses about generational punishment, deny them, or limit their significance altogether for interpretations of the three plays. The following pages will simply seek to review the evidence and place it in its proper narrative background within the plays and the trilogy as a whole. Without pretending to offer an exhaustive study of the topic in all its ramifications, something that would need a monograph by itself, I will try to do justice to the complexity of the material and its position in the dramatic games of perspective where it is staged. As the *Agamemnon* is the play where most of the expressions of ancestral fault in the *Oresteia* are found, the bulk of the discussion will focus on that play.

Aeschylus' *Agamemnon* is indeed without parallels in the extant corpus of Greek tragedy for the richness and intricacy of its temporal texture.² The play is filled with an astounding variety of references to past and future. Almost all of its characters have their eyes set on some distant event at one

¹ See e.g. Daube 1939: 166–78; H. Fraenkel 1964; Lloyd-Jones 1962; 1983: 89–91; Dover 1973; Gantz 1982; cf. Sewall-Rutter 2007: 20–4; M. L. West 1999: 37.

² See for instance Duchemin 1967; de Romilly 1967; Vernant 1972: 40; Chodkowski 1978; Schein 1982; Goldhill 1984: 13–33; Scodel 2008a; Kyriakou 2009: 89–90; Grethlein 2013.

point or another in the text, and the chorus consistently projects itself in a different temporal dimension, what Jonas Grethlein has called 'choral intertemporality'.³ Foreshadowing images and similes play a prominent role in the text and the unfolding of the drama builds on a long series of ominous announcements.⁴ Prophecies, more importantly, directly performed on stage or related by others, open and confirm strong links between different moments and indelibly mark the chains that bind the present to what has happened and what is to come.⁵ The thick apparatus of proleptic allusions, hints, and activations of the events of the past presents the audience with an intricate and constantly changing picture of the play's relevant time.

Behind the complexity of the process, however, lies a simple, elegant structure. The play is built on a carefully balanced tension between the anticipation of the future and the unveiling of the past. The progressive revelations of one lead to the further uncovering of the other, and the ominous position of the house at the heart of the stage is recurrently reaffirmed as the centre of an ever-widening reach of concentric rings. This is a pattern that begins early, at the very start of the play, with the arrival of the beacon, a sign simultaneously announcing that something has happened, Troy has fallen, and that something is about to happen, Agamemnon will return (22–39).⁶ That distant blaze brings attention to the chiaroscuro of the present, the opacity of the situation in the house, the uncharacteristic staging of a narrative barrier in the prologue that is emphatically brought to the fore by the watchman's famous refusal to speak and say what is going on behind the doors of the *oikos*: 'a great ox stands on my tongue' (36–7).⁷ As the present state of the house is made progressively clearer to the audience, the scope of its ramifications in past and present is shown to extend further in each direction. The *Agamemnon* is structured as a gradual, measured revelation, as if the light of the beacon continues to advance throughout the course of the drama. While perspectives flicker back and forth between the relevant past and what lies ahead, the meaning and place of the present in the larger scheme of time is constantly redefined.

What I will call the horizontal, spatial axis of the play is laid down at the very beginning of the tragedy. The beacon at once brings a light that

³ Grethlein 2013. ⁴ See Garvie 1986: xxxvi, n. 84.

⁵ Roseman 1980; Aélion 1984; Adrados 1989; Moreau 1997.

⁶ Bollack and Judet de la Combe 1981–2: 26–36; Wildgruber 2007.

⁷ See H. Fraenkel 1950: 23–4 on the proverbial connotations of the expression; cf. lines 14 and 18–19.

connects the house to the wider world, as the prologue stages a massive extension of the geographical confines of the stage, expanded by Clytemnestra's speech at lines 281–316.⁸ The significance of the ominous tribulations that hide behind the door on the σκηνή is clearly laid out. The house is the origin and endpoint of events that span the reaches of the Aegean; the secrets of the *oikos* ultimately concern the whole world, every *oikos*, and every city. This rapid and extensive setting up of the horizontal axis contrasts with the construction of time in the text. The corresponding vertical, temporal axis of the play unfolds at a much slower, methodical pace.

The projections of the past in the *Agamemnon* succeed each other in ever-deeper reaches. In the long *parodos* (40–257), the chorus emphasises the launch of the expedition and the sacrifice of Iphigenia.⁹ The first (355–488) and second (681–781) *stasima* go further back to relate the tale of Helen and Paris and the causes of the war, and the song of Cassandra will bring our attention back to the ancient crimes of Thyestes and Atreus, an emphasis on the deep past that is reasserted by both Clytemnestra and Aegisthus.¹⁰ Further references to the earlier ancestors of the clan will follow: Pelops at 1600, Tantalus himself at 1469, and the enigmatic Pleisthenes at 1569 and 1602. By the end of the play, the scope of the action extends over some five generations. While the first words of the chorus in the *parodos* are δέκατον μὲν ἔτος τόδ' ('This is the tenth year'), everything seems to revolve around the significance of ancient crimes in the later part of the drama, ancient blood, the ancient demons of the house, the πρῶταρχος ἄτη (1192) sung by the chorus of Erinyes.¹¹ The progressive unveiling of earlier times goes back to a deep backdrop of origins and causes.

Most projections of the past in the play are answered by a foreshadowing of the future. The murder of Agamemnon will echo the corrupted sacrifice of Iphigenia and announce the slaughter of Clytemnestra and Aegisthus. The adultery of Clytemnestra and Aegisthus answers the adultery of Helen and Paris, as well as that of Thyestes and Aerope. The return of Agamemnon answers the return of Thyestes, and the return of Orestes predicted by Cassandra will answer the return of Aegisthus. The proleptic vision of the Erinyes described by Cassandra, the glimpse of a chorus yet to come on stage (1184–93), is thoroughly grounded in the

⁸ Quincey 1963; Tracy 1986.

⁹ Lebeck's (1971: 32–3; 177) argument that the curse of the Atridae is implied in the prophecy of Calchas is unconvincing; cf. Saïd 1978: 164, n. 75; Kyriakou 2009: 105–12.

¹⁰ Goldhill 1984: 59–66; cf. n. 43. ¹¹ See p. 407; cf. Saïd 1978: 111.

ancient past of the crimes they embody.¹² The progressive, methodical expansion of the play's temporal horizon prepares the following events just as much as it brings their remote antecedents to view. A vertiginous vision of the causes and consequences of the actions taking place on stage pits the house at the heart of a vast web of ramifications in time. Repetition, more importantly, the merciless, inexorable recurrence of the same patterns of crime and violence, consistently pushes forward the notion of permanence.

As the temporal landscape of the play continues to expand, the fact that the offences and disasters of the household continue to match each other through the generations is confirmed over and over again. The one point of continuity is the presence of the house.¹³ The house endures; it remains the same as the generations pass. The play stages a powerful centripetal movement towards the door of the *oikos*. Just like the fire of the beacon in the prologue, the return of Agamemnon and the arrival of Cassandra, the return of Aegisthus and the future return of Orestes, all the figures of the play gravitate in the same direction. It has often been remarked that the door of the *oikos* draws everything towards it in the play, and that Clytemnestra's control of the door is the one dominant feature of its stagecraft.¹⁴ The audience is constantly reminded of the diabolical power of attraction of the door and what lurks behind it, the permanent, stable presence of that ominous passage, as if the house engulfs the past and the future in a perpetual present. The constant recurrence of the same patterns suggests the nightmare of a cycle without end.

A powerful expression of that logic is found in the striking confusion of times staged in Cassandra's song (1072–1177) and speeches at 1226–45 and 1256–94.¹⁵ Able to reach deep into the past, the song also presents a vision of the future, and it is defined first and foremost by its foregrounding of the immediate present, the simultaneous description of the events taking place behind the door as they happen. The speeches are marked by quick transitions from one to the other, a maddening movement of abrupt changes enmeshing the various temporal layers together and characterised by a constant return to the unyielding presence of the past. The climax is in the brutally clear announcement of Agamemnon's imminent murder (1246).¹⁶ The vision of Cassandra integrates past and future into an unveiling of the present and its significance.

¹² See pp. 407–8. ¹³ Cf. Fartzoff 1984. ¹⁴ Taplin 1977: 300.

¹⁵ H. Fraenkel 1950: 494; 548–50; cf. p. 407. ¹⁶ See H. Fraenkel 1950: 516.

A similar logic is found in Clytemnestra's statement at lines 1497–1504:

αὐχεῖς εἶναι τόδε τοῦργον ἐμόν,
 <μὴ > μὴδ' ἐπιλεχθῆς,
 Ἀγαμεμνονίαν εἶναί μ' ἄλοχον·
 φανταζόμενος δὲ γυναικὶ νεκροῦ
 τοῦδ' ὁ παλαιὸς δριμύς ἀλάστωρ
 Ἀτρέως χαλεποῦ θοινατῆρος
 τόνδ' ἀπέτεισεν
 τέλεον νεαροῖς ἐπιθύσας.

You think this deed is mine?
 <Do not suppose so,> nor reckon
 that I am the spouse of Agamemnon:
 no, the ancient, bitter avenging spirit
 of Atreus, the furnisher of the cruel banquet,
 has taken the likeness of this corpse's wife
 and paid him out,
 adding a full grown sacrificial victim to the young ones
 (trans. Sommerstein).

When Clytemnestra appears after the murder, she *is* the ancient demon of the house, both aesthetically, through the visual experience of the stagecraft, and in speech.¹⁷ There is no contradiction between her responsibility and the deeper forces that lie behind it, she says, something that the chorus is unable to understand.¹⁸ Its refusal to accept the striking statement that the deed is not hers comes at the heart of a long exchange of incomprehension between the elders and Agamemnon's wife, covered in blood, sword in hand, standing at the front of the door she has just come out of.

The chorus first insists that by killing her husband, Clytemnestra has become an enemy of the community (1407–11).¹⁹ During her successful challenge of their authority, she replies by reminding the chorus of elders of Agamemnon's sacrifice of Iphigenia, and their complicity in the crime (1412–25 and 1431–47). In their answer, the old men go further in the past, positing a direct link between the death of Agamemnon and the adultery of Helen, insisting on the fact that the two sisters share the responsibility

¹⁷ Judet de la Combe 2001: 686–8; cf. Neuburg 1991.

¹⁸ Denniston and Page (1957: 208): 'there is nothing in the text to suggest that Clytemnestra is suddenly aware of the horror of the deed, and looking round for an excuse or an explanation. She coldly tells what she consistently supposes to be the truth – that her killing of Agamemnon is not an act of individual impulse, but the working out of the rule of divine vengeance, of which she is the minister.'

¹⁹ H. Fraenkel (1950: 665) refers to the later 'stoning in the clash of the chorus with Aegisthus (1615f.); cf. Gantz 1983.

for all the suffering, and that Helen's presence in the house 'then' (τότε) was connected to the disastrous work of a 'stirring-up Strife' (1448–61).²⁰ They will expand on this idea a few lines below and predicate the existence of a spirit, a *daimōn*, that embodies the danger of the two sisters in assailing the house and the two kings (1468–74).²¹ The queen recognises that they are right in seeing the work of a *daimōn* in the calamities of the house, but she identifies it as the 'thrice-fattened spirit of this family' (1475–80), a crucial distinction that locates the spirit deeper in time, placing it in a succession of events, without asserting what these events precisely are, only that the wound is ancient (παλαιόν).²² It singles out its lust for blood (ἔρως αἱματολοιχός), rather than its lust, reorienting the sexual connotations of the chorus's accusations to another, macabre form of desire, and, more significantly, situates the spirit clearly in the house, a force that is not portrayed as assailing the house from outside but resides within it, a crucial difference from the image of the chorus.

The reaction of the old men is to displace the responsibility yet again to a different location, bringing forward the will of Zeus as the main motivating factor of the situation, and focusing on the treacherous agency of Clytemnestra in killing the king through deception and ruse (1480–8).²³ The *daimōn*, if we accept Wilamowitz's emendation, is reaffirmed as a force that destroys the house, in this round of the exchange between the elders and Clytemnestra, οἰκοσινῇ, and its strength and heavy wrath (βαρύμηνιν) are entirely subordinated to the distant, all-encompassing will of Zeus.²⁴ They attempt to push it out of sight. The queen's answer is to make it visible in flesh and blood, to show it to them (and the audience) in all its horror, as the one driving force of the action on stage. She reaffirms its ancient presence in the house, and the succession of crimes from within. 'You think this deed is mine?' The agency of the crime is entirely ascribed to the παλαιός δριμύς ἀλάστωρ.²⁵ Continuing the struggle of readjusting perspectives, the chorus strongly rejects the idea that Clytemnestra bears

²⁰ Judet de la Combe 2001: 656–8; cf. H. Fraenkel (1950: 692): 'The audience are left to fill in the details of the picture: they may or may not connect this Eris with the Eris made responsible, in an earlier song (698), for the flight of Helen and her being pursued by the Greeks.'

²¹ See Neitzel 1985b. ²² See Denniston and Page 1957: 206. ²³ Cf. Langwitz 1973.

²⁴ H. Fraenkel 1950: 703; cf. Denniston and Page 1957: 207.

²⁵ Daube 1939: 181–5; H. Fraenkel 1950: 711–12; Kyriakou 2009: 90–101; cf. Sewell-Rutter 2007: 84, who rightly disagrees with the view that δαίμων, ἀλάστωρ, and ἐρινύς are 'used more or less interchangeably' (Dodds 1960: 55; cf. H. Fraenkel 1950: 711, n. 1). On ἀλάστορες in general, and the new information of the Selinous inscription, see Jameson, Jordan, and Kotansky 1993: 116–20, Sommerstein 1989: 6–12; Clinton 1996 and Marino 2010. On Erinyes in general, see Henrichs 1984; A. L. Brown 1984; Lloyd-Jones 1989; 1990b; Johnston 1999: 250–87; De Santis 2005.

no responsibility for the murder, that she is ἀνάτιος ('innocent'), but it acknowledges the fact that she shares the blame with the spirit (1505–12).²⁶ No longer an indefinite *daimōn*, it is now precisely identified; the term *alastōr* used by the queen is repeated by the chorus (1507).²⁷ Crucially, the old men now agree to locate the spirit in the house, to say that it might be an internal force, a product of the crime of Agamemnon's father, a πατρόθεν συλλήπτωρ, rather than an intrusive female power targeting the house from outside, as they tried to insist earlier.²⁸ The optative with ἄν is as far as they will go in their concession, the acceptance of a possibility which they cannot understand, and which has no witness.²⁹ That concession is an important element of Clytemnestra's victory over the old men in the exchange. By accepting the terms of the queen in this way, explicitly seeing the murder as the possible consequence of a long sequence of ancestral fault running through the generations, the chorus recognises the central claim of Clytemnestra in the exchange.

This is the first time in the play where the old men actually mention ancestral fault as a possible agent in the disaster. Their statement that the bloody stream of an ancient crime runs into the present not only reproduces the claims of the queen but points back directly to the revelations of Cassandra some three hundred lines earlier. The direct reference to Atreus' feast leaves no doubt as to the identification of the event that set everything else in motion. After numerous rejections of the idea, the old men accept the deep weight of the ancient past in the calamities of the present. The chorus, at this point, finally sees what has been in front of it all this time. It can be worth noting that the exchange reproduces the vertical axis of the play: it moves from the murder by Clytemnestra through the deception of Helen to the ancestral crime of the house. The temporal progression staged throughout the play up to this point is condensed and reasserted in this one scene. The link between the different moments of the past is re-emphasised as the echo of one ancient transgression. Following that impulse, each crime repeats the previous one and prepares the way for the next. The crime that now unfolds on stage is but one rung in an old, endless ladder of misery.

It is in that cycle of recurrent violence that Clytemnestra locates the acts that have been committed. Agamemnon repeats the atavistic crime of his

²⁶ See Saïd 1978: 156–7. ²⁷ Judet de la Combe 2001: 690–1.

²⁸ See H. Fraenkel 1950: 714 on συλλήπτωρ; cf. Daube 1939: 191–3. See Conacher 1974 on the change of attitude of the chorus in the exchange.

²⁹ On the important resonances of μαρτυρεῖν in the the play, see H. Fraenkel 1950: 543; 548–50; cf. Wians 2009.

father, a murder of a kin child, something that Clytemnestra presents as a calamity for the house (1521–9). The crime of Agamemnon repeats the crime of Atreus, and it shares in the same injustice against the *oikos*. The murder by Clytemnestra, on the other hand, is a reaction of the house itself, a just and deserved punishment for the crime that has been committed against it. Clytemnestra, as the mother of Iphigenia, is the avenger of an attack against the family bonds that hold the house together. She presents her vengeance, paradoxically, as the act that reunites the *oikos* and makes it whole (1551–9).³⁰ Iphigenia will welcome her father in the underworld, throw her arms around his neck and kiss him. It is a hand of the family that has killed him, and a hand of the family will bury him. There will be no grieving by those outside the *oikos*.

With statements like that, Clytemnestra underlines the profound division that separates her perception of the events from that of the chorus during the long epirrhematic exchange.³¹ She has indeed convinced them that a spirit of the house is active in the calamities at hand, but their respective identifications of what that spirit is remain fundamentally different, and that difference will not be resolved. For Clytemnestra, the spirit of the house has acted through her hand in revenge. Now that the crime of Agamemnon has been washed in blood, that it has been paid, she believes that the house can be free of its presence and take a new course (1567–76):

ἐς τόνδ' ἐνέβης ξὺν ἀληθείᾳ
 χρησμόν· ἐγὼ δ' οὖν
 ἐθέλω δαίμονι τῷ Πλεισθενιδᾶν
 ὄρκους θεμένη τάδε μὲν στέργειν
 δύσκλητὰ περ ὄνθ', ὃ δὲ λοιπόν, ἰόντ'
 ἐκ τῶνδε δόμων ἄλλην γενεάν
 τρίβειν θανάτοις αὐθένταισιν·
 κτεάνων δὲ μέρος βαιὸν ἐχούση
 πᾶν ἀπόχρη μοι, μανίας μελάθρων
 ἀλληλοφόνους ἀφελούση.

You have struck on this oracular saying
 with truth: but be that as it may,
 I am willing to make a sworn agreement
 with the spirit of the Pleisthenids
 that I will be content with what has happened,
 hard though it is to endure, but that for the future it should leave

³⁰ See Denniston and Page 1957: 212 on her 'contemptuous and cynical reply': 'she does not shelter any longer behind the daimon'. Cf. Fartzoff 2008.

³¹ H. Fraenkel 1950: 660–2; R. Thiel 1993: 363–412.

this house and vex some other family
 with internecine killings.
 Even if I am left with only a small part of our possessions
 anything is enough for me if I can remove
 the madness of mutual slaughter from our house (trans. Sommerstein).

The identification of the spirit as a δαίμων Πλεισθενιδῶν is not a mere equivalence of Ἀτρειδῶν or Πελοπιδῶν.³² By linking it specifically to Pleisthenes, Clytemnestra restricts its activity to a line that includes Agamemnon and Menelaus but excludes Aegisthus, and she uses a name with few precise associations. The *alastōr* has become a generic *daimōn*. Pleisthenes functions as a neutral value, a euphemism for the distress of the family. Clytemnestra offers an oath to the spirit of the Pleisthenids, swearing that she demands no more, and she presents this as an incentive for it to leave the house and ‘vex another family’, with mutual slaughters.³³ The striking nature of this last statement is worth emphasising. What Clytemnestra is wishing for in that last intervention of the chorus in the epirrhematic exchange is a dissociation of the house and the spirit that has been plaguing it. She wishes for the spirit to leave the house and visit another *genea*, as if the two can be separated.³⁴ For Clytemnestra the debt is paid, and the house is an acquisition, κτεάνων, not an inheritance, which she wants to keep as a possession now free from its past. In her eyes, what she has done is remove the madness of ‘mutual slaughter’ (μυνίας ἀλληλοφόνους) from the house by the murder of Agamemnon. This vision of closure and salvation, emphatically ending the long exchange between her and the chorus, pushes forward all the obvious warnings of delusion, and comes to the audience, who know better, as a doomed and naive hope. The fact that it clashes so thoroughly with the chorus’s own evaluation of the situation helps to frame it even better as a blind, tragic error.

For the group of old men, the house is certainly not about to be free from the spirit. After portraying the *daimōn* as a foreign force threatening the house from outside, the chorus accepts Clytemnestra’s view that it was indeed produced by the crime of Agamemnon’s father.³⁵ But rather than present it as a debt that could be paid or a presence that would leave the *oikos* now that vengeance has been met, the chorus sees the two as being

³² Dalzell 1970; see H. Fraenkel (1950: 740): ‘We cannot tell at what point in the family tree of Atreus Aeschylus fixed Pleisthenes; it is very doubtful if he intended to fix him at all.’

³³ Judet de la Combe 2001: 711–13.

³⁴ See H. Fraenkel 1950: 740–1, with references to ‘this type of prayer, the ἀποπομπή’; cf. Denniston and Page 1957: 212; Hame 2004.

³⁵ See p. 400; cf. Kyriakou 2009: 124–42.

inextricably bound together, and held fast by kin.³⁶ The *daimōn* in the house is great and destructive (1481–2).³⁷ The house is now falling, sings the chorus, and it describes in the fourth strophe what it sees as the blood storm that will bring it down (1530–6). The central idea of the strophe is that of a sequence with a definite end. One shower might stop, but it will be followed by another. Another punishment will follow another crime. The present disaster is but one element in a long succession of misfortunes that will lead to a final collapse.

The image returns in the fourth antistrophe, where the chorus states the inextricable association of the family to the house (1565–6):

τίς ἄν γονὰν ἀραῖον ἐκβάλοι δόμων;
κεκόλληται γένος πρὸς ἄτᾱ.

Who can cast the seed of the curse out of the house?
The family is glued fast to ruin.

In a choral passage where reminiscences of Solon's *Elegy to the Muses* have been identified, the situation is described on the model of a curse, an event with consequences that go far beyond the initial act.³⁸ There is a cursed seed lodged in the house. That γονή cannot be separated from the γένος of the following line, of course, and the *genos* is literally 'attached to *atē*'.³⁹ The seed of the curse is tied to the ruin of the family in the house. The notion that the vengeful spirit of the family could be separated from the house makes no sense at all in that logic. The chorus's vision sets up a tragic foil to Clytemnestra's tragic hope.

While Clytemnestra insists on her right to embody the *oikos* and define its justice from within, in opposition to all those outside it, especially the chorus, to whom she says that 'it is not your business to trouble yourself with that concern', the chorus repeatedly invokes the presence of Zeus and the cosmic laws that govern the world while he sits on his throne.⁴⁰ The brutal exchange of the scene pits the justice of Moira looking at the *oikos* from outside against the justice of the mother looking at it from inside. The opposition will be further expanded by the following confrontation between Aegisthus and the chorus.

³⁶ Cf. (p. 450) the distinction between the *elasteros* that is ξενικός and the one that is πατρῶος in the contemporary Selinous inscription.

³⁷ See Denniston and Page 1957: 206–7.

³⁸ On the presence of the *Elegy to the Muses* in the play, see Poetscher 1987; cf. Hommel 1974. Ameduri 1970–1 argues for echoes of the *Eunomia* in the *Eumenides*.

³⁹ H. Fraenkel 1950: 737; cf. Neuberg 1993.

⁴⁰ 1485–8; 1535–6; 1562–4; cf. H. Fraenkel 1950: 112–14; Schein 2009.

The chasm between Clytemnestra's lover and the elders of Argos quickly turns into a series of threats, where the chorus opposes its hatred of tyranny and, following Cassandra (1279–90), the return of Orestes to Aegisthus' assertion of brute force and power over the city.⁴¹ Clytemnestra intervenes at the end to calm the violent tension and reassert her hope that the present troubles can come to an end (1654–61):

μηδαμῶς, ὦ φίλτατ' ἀνδρῶν, ἄλλα δράσωμεν κακά·
 ἄλλα καὶ τάδ' ἐξαμῆσαι πολλά, δύστηνον θέρος.
 πημονῆς δ' ἄλις γ' ὑπάρχει· μηδὲν αἵματώμεθα.
 ἴστέιχτε δ' οἱ γέροντες πρὸς δόμους πεπρωμένους τοῦσδε†
 πρὶν παθεῖν ἔρξαντα †καιρὸν χρῆν† τάδ' ὥς ἐπράξαμεν.
 εἰ δέ τοι μόχθων γένοιτο τῶνδ' †ἄλις γ' ἐχοίμεθ' ἂν†
 δαίμονος χηλῇ βαρεῖαι δυστυχῶς πεπληγμένοι.
 ὦδ' ἔχει λόγος γυναικός, εἴ τις ἀξιοῖ μαθεῖν.

Dearest of men, please let us not do further harm. What we have is enough to have reaped, a terrible harvest. There is sufficient grief already: let us not get blood on our hands. Go now, honourable elders, to your homes, <yielding to fate> before you suffer. These things must <be accepted> as we have done them. If, I tell you, a cure for these troubles were to appear, we would accept it, after having been so wretchedly struck by the heavy talon of the evil spirit. Such are the words of a woman, if anyone sees fit to learn from them (trans. Sommerstein).

This only heightens the sense of desperation that accompanies her wishes for the future. No longer claiming to be the agent of the *daimōn*, she portrays herself as part of a group that has been badly hurt by it and expresses a desire for healing that, coined in the future less vivid conditional of an optative + ἂν, seems ever less likely.⁴² The nature of the exchange between Aegisthus and the chorus make that doubt a certitude.

Aegisthus, when he first appears, immediately proceeds to discuss at length (1577–1611), in all its horror, and for the first time in the play, an event that had long played a major role before then, but only through vague references and allusions.⁴³ The feast of Thyestes is reasserted, very prominently, as the one event from the past out of which followed all the other disasters of the family. The curse of Thyestes plays a major role in

⁴¹ Cf. Kyriakou 2009: 101–4. It is worth noting that they insist on the fact that he acted voluntarily, ἐκῶν (1613); see Denniston and Page 1957: 217; cf. Goldhill 1984: 96–8. On 1279–90, see Neitzel 1989; cf. Pontani 2007 on Aeschylus' reorganisation of the traditions about the return of Orestes in the trilogy.

⁴² See H. Fraenkel 1950: 795–6 on the textual issues of 1659; cf. Sevieri 1991 on 1661 and Rösler 2009.

⁴³ See Neitzel 1985c; cf. Zamarou 1994; Kyriakou 2009: 112–24. On the various traditions concerning the feast of Thyestes, see Gantz 1993: 548–50; cf. Saïd 1978: 163–6.

this description, both appearing as an indirect portrayal (1600: *μόρον δ' ἄφερτον Πελοπίδαις ἐπεύχεται*), and being quoted directly (1601: *οὕτως ὀλέσθαι πᾶν τὸ Πλεισθένους γένος*).⁴⁴ The fact that the object of the curse is different in each case, Pelopids in the first and Pleisthenids in the second, is certainly interesting, as the two are not equivalents. The direct quotation links the words of Thyestes to the statement of Clytemnestra just a few lines before, as the name of Pleisthenes is rare enough to be particularly memorable when mentioned in such quick succession, and, if we accept that Pleisthenes is attached to Atreus and his descendants, to the exclusion of Thyestes, it makes perfect sense in regard to the events at hand.⁴⁵ The reference to Pelops is more surprising. Indeed, if the curse is addressed to all the descendants of Pelops, Aegisthus would then be presenting a situation where Thyestes launches his imprecation not only against his enemy and his enemy's family, but also against himself and his own descendants.⁴⁶

Many interpretations have been proposed. Is line 1600 an interpolation? Is this a meaningless oversight, a simple product of variation? Is Aegisthus presenting himself as a cursed agent of his father's vengeance? Is there unintended irony in his reference to the Pelopids and his own implication in the imprecation? Should we simply dismiss the imprecation against the Pelopids of line 1600 from the more specific call for the destruction of the Pleisthenids in line 1602 – one a part of the other, but the two in no way equivalent? Various readings can be defended, and none can, or even perhaps should, be established to the exclusion of the others. The principal effect of the passage is to insist on Aegisthus' grounding in the deep past of the story. The death of Agamemnon, he emphatically asserts, is the consequence of an ancient crime, and he is the physical embodiment of that original cause. The past has finally revealed its true nature and returned to claim its due. Everything else is mere detail; the son of Thyestes could now die happy. This reasserts the fundamental importance of the feast as the crime that set everything else in motion. It confirms the vision of Cassandra, and the conclusions of the epirrhematic exchange between Clytemnestra and the chorus. One ancient crime is put forward by various characters, in a progressively more marked manner, as the essential impulse of disaster. One thing that distinguishes Aegisthus' description from the ones that precede it is its insistence on the effects of

⁴⁴ See Denniston and Page 1957: 216; cf. Sewell-Rutter 2007: 71–6.

⁴⁵ For the genealogical positions of Pleisthenes in the accounts of myth, see Gantz 1993: 552–6; cf. p. 462.

⁴⁶ The solution of H. Fraenkel (1950: 755–6), following Wilamowitz, is to delete the line.

the curse. Successively portrayed as a consequence of divine wrath, pollution, the work of a *daimōn* or an *alastōr*, or children repeating the crimes of their father, it now appears as the effect of a curse from earlier generations. Like every explanation before it, this understanding of the forces at work in the generational misfortunes of the household is grounded in the rhetorical logic of the passage where it is found. Aegisthus insists on the curse of his father to mark the agency of Thyestes in his vengeance and, by extension, his own agency in the murder of Agamemnon, even though he was 'not in the house' (ἄρ' οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν οἴκῳ) at that moment (1608).⁴⁷ The curse is not the missing piece of information that finally explains the long series of misfortunes of the family at the end of the play; one element of the equation put forward by one character from the perspective of that character at that moment in the play, it does not exclude the evaluations and interpretations presented earlier, and certainly does not provide a privileged key for making sense of the events.⁴⁸

The numerous parallel, and often discordant views presented throughout the play to explain or characterise the repeated misfortunes of the family do not portray a clear, consistent picture. There is no analytically coherent ideology of inherited guilt or ancestral fault in the *Agamemnon*, and certainly no doctrine somehow taught to the city by Aeschylus. The play's ideas about punishment through generations do not provide the answer that explains the suffering on stage. But it would be perverse to deny, as some have done, that the notion of punishment through generations occupies a central place in the architecture of the tragedy. Completely absent from the first half of the play, mirroring by this delay the slow progression of the vertical, temporal axis on which the drama is built, the idea that the events that are taking place now are the consequence of an ancient crime from another generation violently bursts on the scene with the mad ravings of Cassandra (1072–1330), and from there hardly leaves the play.⁴⁹ At the fore of Clytemnestra's justification of her act, it also figures prominently at the beginning of Aegisthus' monologue. In all three cases, the idea is that a horrible deed committed long ago, many years before Agamemnon's sacrifice of Iphigenia, long before Helen's seduction of Paris, is the essential background and the root cause of the present calamities. All these passages suggest or point explicitly to one event, the feast of Thyestes. But they do so differently, taking clearly diverse views on what the agency of the punishment for the ancient crime is.

⁴⁷ See Neitzel 1985a. ⁴⁸ See Sewell-Rutter 2007: 21; 71–6.

⁴⁹ See Bollack and Judet de la Combe 1981–2: liv; lxxxiii; cxxiv; 189.

For Cassandra, past and future merge in one permanent present.⁵⁰ The sacrificed children are there in the house, holding their guts in their hands (1096–7 and 1219–22).⁵¹ The adulterers are still there, with the ancient crime of Thyestes and Atreus' wife mirrored in the union of Clytemnestra and Aegisthus, a mention of the ancient sexual transgression that even precedes the children's feast and clashes with the later statements of Clytemnestra and Aegisthus on the topic. It is probably no coincidence that Cassandra is the only character to mention the ancient sexual transgression of Agamemnon's father in the play. Depending on how one reads line 1192, she can even be seen to present it as the original error, the *πρώταρχος ἄτη* out of which everything else unfolded, the event from which the horrible feast of children itself came about. If the *πρώταρχος ἄτη* is to be separated from what follows and thus refers to the feast, rather than the adultery, the fact remains that the two are very closely associated.⁵² Whatever the case, when she first opens her mouth, Cassandra expresses horror for the slaughter under the roof of the house (1090–2), and she sees the perpetrators and the victims of different crimes together in the same vision.⁵³ The oracular, open-ended language of her speech can accommodate a plurality of readings. The unmelodic chorus that lay hidden in the house is there now, besieging the rooms of the house (δῶμα), gorging itself in blood, and refusing to leave (1184–93):

καὶ μαρτυρεῖτε συνδρόμῳ ἵχνος κακῶν
 ῥινηλατούσῃ τῶν πάλαι πεπραγμένων.
 τὴν γὰρ στέγην τήνδ' οὐποτ' ἐκλείπει χορὸς
 ξύμφθογγος οὐκ εὐφωνος· οὐ γὰρ εὖ λέγει.
 καὶ μὴν πεπωκῶς γ', ὥς θρασύνεσθαι πλέον,
 βρότειον αἶμα κῶμος ἐν δόμοις μένει,
 δύσπεμπτos ἔξω, συγγόνων Ἑρινύων·
 ὕμνοῦσι δ' ὕμνον δώμασιν προσήμεναι
 πρῶταρχον ἄτην, ἐν μέρει δ' ἀπέπτυσαν
 εὐνὰς ἀδελφοῦ τῷ πατοῦντι δυσμενεῖς.

I want you to testify that I am following close on the scent of evils perpetrated in former times. There is a group of singers that never leaves

⁵⁰ Fraenkel (1950: 624): 'It is as if she were catching almost unconsciously at bits of strange tunes that the wind carries to her from somewhere'; cf. Schein 1982. On Cassandra more generally in the play, see e.g. Ludin 1969; Karamitrou 1999; Mazzoldi 2002; Matteuzzi 2008; A. Doyle 2008; Debnar 2010; cf. Vernant 1972: 40.

⁵¹ H. Fraenkel 1950: 496–7; cf. Judet de la Combe 2001: 522–3; Saïd 1978: 158–61.

⁵² The referent of the *πρώταρχος ἄτη* is fittingly ambiguous; see Lloyd-Jones 2002: 12; cf. H. Fraenkel 1950: 545; Saïd 1978: 336–8.

⁵³ See Neitzel 1985a.

this house. They sing in unison, but not pleasantly, for their words speak of evil. Moreover, this revel band drinks human blood, thus emboldening itself, and then remains in the house, hard to send away – the band of the house's kindred Furies. Besetting the chambers of the house, they sing a song of the ruinous folly that first began it all, and one after another they show their abhorrence of the brother's bed that worked harm to him who defiled it (trans. Sommerstein).

Kindred Erinyes, avengers of the family slaughter that took place within the bounds of the *oikos*, they sing the original madness that launched the household on its path to ruin, and they continue to wait for their prey.⁵⁴ Appropriating the earlier references to the Erinyes made in the play, and foreshadowing the future chorus of the *Eumenides* in a speech addressed to the dancers who will perform them on stage, they perfectly embody the blurred vision of parallel times expressed by Cassandra.⁵⁵ The infernal chorus is invisible, and it fully occupies the house. It is concerned with all the crimes of the household, with the feast and the adultery, with the blood of all those who died under its roof. A direct presence of the past, it is characterised first and foremost by the fact that it remains, that it stays, that it does not leave, the *kōmos* of a banquet that will not end. The spirits of vengeance of Cassandra's vision are inextricably attached to the house.

Contrary to Cassandra, Clytemnestra does not know that she will be a victim of the house and that her blood will in turn be spilled through kin. Her view of herself as the just hand of the *daimōn*, rejected by the chorus, is a powerful expression of the *atē* that has struck the queen. Her tragic hope that the *daimōn*'s vengeance has been fulfilled and that he will now leave the house for another family foregrounds her ominous inability to see clearly the situation in which she now stands. Aegisthus offers a much more limited perspective on the events, exclusively focusing on the consequences of the feast, without even mentioning the adultery of his father, and offering a very specific view of the agency at play, the curse of his father, through which all the subsequent misfortunes came about, and as a part of which he sees his own role in the demise of Agamemnon. That *ara* has nothing to do with a *daimōn* in his speech, with pollution, heredity of character, or even with the house. A direct threat on the heads of its targets, it has now been vindicated.

⁵⁴ H. Fraenkel 1950: 544–5 insists too much on the connection of συγγόνων Ἐρινύων to the actual house, rather than the kinship line.

⁵⁵ Judet de la Combe 2001: 500–2; cf. P. Wilson and Taplin 1993 on the metatheatrical game of choral perspective.

As different as these three evaluations of the past are, they all have in common the idea that an ancient crime, committed many years ago, in another generation, is motivating the terrible events of the present. Ancestral fault is a central theme of the last third of the play; not as a doctrinal statement established through the tragedy, but as a point of discord between the characters, a fracture in their perspectives about the past. The depth of the disagreement is increased by the reaction of the chorus to each expression of ancestral fault. Fittingly unable to understand Cassandra's last prophecy, it fails to see what the connection is between the past of the dark crimes she relates and what is going on now.⁵⁶ Later moved by Clytemnestra's persuasion to accept the fact that the vengeful spirit of another generation is at work somehow in the fall of Agamemnon, it opposes the idea that this frees Clytemnestra from the murder she has committed. Squarely siding against Aegisthus and his tyrannical arrogation of power, it champions the future and the return of Orestes against the past, pressing the rights of one *dikē* against another, and pushing forth the insight that what has happened is no closure to the orgy of violence, and that more is to come, from yet another generation. That fragmentation of perspectives on the transmission of punishment through generations for the crimes of Atreus and Thyestes draws from every contemporary facet of ancestral fault. The sheer variety of views on the topic presented in the play, and their marked difference as they appear in the mouth of each individual character, is a testimony to the multivalence and fluidity of ancestral fault in the hands of Aeschylus, and its usefulness in shaping the temporal texture of the drama. An open value with no fixed characteristics, it can be reconfigured at will by the playwright to shape character differences and convey a certain idea of the past. At the end of the play, that idea of the past, fragmented and contested, is thoroughly anchored in the very distinctive notion that ancient crimes are haunting the present.

Considering the prominence of ancestral fault at the end of the *Agamemnon*, it is all the more striking to see how small a role it plays in the *Choephoroi*. The deep temporal texture of the *Agamemnon* disappears almost entirely from the second play of the trilogy. With the attention of the characters and chorus all focused on the murder of Agamemnon and the dilemma of his children, the immediate, urgent concerns of the moment dominate the whole tragedy; even if the preceding play never entirely vanishes from the mind's eye of the audience, of course.⁵⁷ The choices of the characters, the emotional involvement of their confrontation

⁵⁶ See Greenhalgh 1969; cf. Fraenkel 1950: 588–9.

⁵⁷ Garvie 1986: xxxi–xxxii, with bibliography.

with each other, the portrayal of their agency, their internal conflict, the different levels of responsibility at work in the enactment of their plan are all conveyed with greater vividness by not being further linked with ancestral fault. The bonds of the family, the force of kinship and the duties of blood are of course front and centre to the economy of the play, but they do not reach to ancestors and the deep past. Agamemnon is the central figure of the previous generation for Orestes and Electra – together with Clytemnestra, obviously. The fraternal love of siblings, along with the conflicting allegiances of mother and father, constitute the bulk of the kinship background in the play.⁵⁸ When Orestes talks about the punishment that comes late (382), he refers to his vengeance for his father.⁵⁹ When Clytemnestra mentions a curse (912), it is her imprecation against her son.⁶⁰

Only the chorus of old servants refers to the legacy of crime in the *oikos*.⁶¹ In lines 471–5 already it presents the misery of the household as something that is congenital, kin-based, an affliction that can only be healed through vengeance from within, and the theme returns in the last stanza of the first *stasimon* 646–52, where the plan of Orestes is presented as the sword of destiny; the strophe emphatically ends with the word Erinyes, the first reference to that divine figure in the play, and a clear reminder of the Erinyes of the *Agamemnon*.⁶²

Δίκας δ' ἐρείδεται πυθμὴν,
προχαλκεύει δ' Αἴσα φασγανουργός·
τέκνον δ' ἐπείσφerei δόμοις
αἰμάτων παλαιτέρων
τίνειν μύσος χρόνῳ κλυτὰ
βυσσόφρων Ἑρινύς.

But the foundations of Justice are firmly set,
and the swordsmith Destiny is preparing the weapon;
and a child is being imported into the house,
to pay at last for the stain
of older deeds of blood, by the far famed,
deep thinking Fury (trans. Sommerstein).

The Erinyes of that ode is at once famous (κλυτά), a reference to the lasting reputation of the household vengeance, to what actually brought the story all the way down to the audience.

⁵⁸ See Alaux 1995.

⁵⁹ Cf. *Ag.* 58; see Garvie 1986: 144–5.

⁶⁰ Garvie 1986: 297.

⁶¹ See McCall 1990 on the social characterisation of the chorus.

⁶² Neitzel 1976; Kyriakou 2009: 161–7; cf. Garvie 1986: 222–3 on the ambiguity of αἰμάτων παλαιτέρων.

The length of the delay (χρόνῳ) for the punishment is underlined. Like the spirit of the *Agamemnon*, this one is concerned with murder from the past, and the further slaughter is presented as a just vengeance for the crimes of another time. The introduction of a child to the household is portrayed as the weapon that will defend the foundation of justice trampled underfoot by the transgressor.⁶³ It is a stain, a *mosos*, that needs to be paid for, that of an ancient blood, an ominous reference of particular efficiency for its lack of specificity, even if it certainly suggests the very specific crime of Thyestes for those members of the audience reminded of the *Agamemnon*.⁶⁴ The ode that crowns the decision of the siblings to enact their bloody punishment on Clytemnestra and Aegisthus and that immediately precedes the actual unfolding of the plan on stage foregrounds the theme of the divine agency at work in punishing the stain of an ancient crime. It temporarily brings back to the fore a level of meaning that links the action on stage more closely to the visions of the earlier play and suddenly reopens their vertiginous temporal vista. The fact that this fleeting mention so abruptly clashes with the earlier silence of the play on ancestral fault only makes it stand out more vividly.

A similarly efficient reference to ancestral fault is found in the second *stasimon* (783–837), where the chorus excitedly comments on the imminence of Aegisthus' murder, an act it has just facilitated, and praises the prospect of its outcome. The whole song is built as a prayer to the various divinities of the house and the domains of the *oikos* they preside over.⁶⁵ The second strophe (800–6), placed at the centre of the song, restates the idea of vengeance as a purification for the ancestral fault:

οἳ τ' ἔσωθε δωμάτων
 πλουτογαθῇ μυχὸν ἐνίζετε,
 κλῦτε σύμφρονες θεοί·
 ἄγετε < >
 τῶν πάλαι πεπραγμένων
 λύσασθ' αἶμα προσφάτοις δίκαις·
 γέρων φόνος μηκέτ' ἐν δόμοις τέκοι.

And you who within the house
 tend the inner storeroom that rejoices in its wealth,
 hear us, gods who share our wishes!
 Bring <back our master, and>

⁶³ Garvie 1986: 220–1 on the images of the passage.

⁶⁴ On the idea of pollution and purification in the trilogy, see n. 66.

⁶⁵ See Garvie 1986: 261.

remove the blood of long past deeds
 by a fresh act of justice:
 may the ancient murder breed no more in the house
 (trans. Sommerstein).

The just murder is to cleanse the blood of ancient crimes.⁶⁶ The imagery of justice purifying the blood of the house, more importantly, underlines the direct link between the violence that is about to take place and the one that has taken place before. The fact that this earlier violence is located *πάλαι* obviously places it back earlier than the death of Agamemnon. A *γέρων φόνος* ('ancient murder') from the deep past, it continues to hold sway over the present; the allusion, again, hinting back to the *Agamemnon*, strongly points to the feast of Thyestes.

The strophe marks a contrast between the old and the new and opposes the ancient crime to the imminent justice.⁶⁷ The divinities of the *oikos* are called in as witnesses to the deliverance of the household from the stains of the past. The ability of the ancient crime to continue breeding in the house is to come to an end. The destruction of the adulterous union between Clytemnestra and Aegisthus is surely one of the targets of this image of procreation: their death will end the generation of crime.⁶⁸ Like the statement of the first *stasimon*, this strophe expresses the hope that a just vengeance will release the house from the hold of the ancient φόνος. The irony of this would not have been lost on the audience, who would not fail to realise that the murders that are about to take place, far from ending the murderous cycle of misery of the *oikos*, actually continue it.

The hope of the chorus in the second strophe of the second *stasimon* reactivates the theme of ancestral fault last mentioned at the end of the previous ode. As in lines 646–52, it gives a prominent place to the reference in the *stasimon*, but little space, just a few lines quickly sung, and its language remains studiously vague and general. A glance back to the *Agamemnon*, a rapid reminder of the larger architecture of the trilogy, it contributes to the choral framing of the final episode of the play and discreetly returns to the background.

The *Eumenides* makes a similarly modest usage of ancestral fault. When the Erinyes first become visible, and even more so when they appear on stage as a chorus, the many references to the spirit of vengeance made in the *Agamemnon* come back to the fore, and the terrifying, hidden chorus, bloodthirsty and unmelodious, described by Cassandra in

⁶⁶ Cf. Duchemin 1983; Neitzel 1991; Sidwell 1996; Georgantzoglou 2002.

⁶⁷ See Manuwald 2000. ⁶⁸ Cf. Gagarin 1976: 62.

her speech, cannot be far from the mind of the audience.⁶⁹ But whereas the infernal chorus of Cassandra's vision is totally bound to the house, besieging its rooms and refusing to leave, and it sings the ancient origins of the disasters that have fallen on the household, the *πρώταρχος* ἄτη that set it all in motion (1192), this chorus is emphatically not bound by the house, able to move from location to location in the striking change of scene at the beginning, and nowhere in the play, not even once, does it refer to an ancient crime or the transmission of punishment through generations.

The fact is that the chorus of Furies is insistently concerned with the determination of responsibility, and its references on the topic invariably limit themselves to the choices and the actions of individuals. At 199–200, for instance, they say to Apollo: 'you yourself are not jointly responsible for this; you did it, from first to last, and you're entirely responsible'.⁷⁰ When they refer to themselves as *Arai* (417), there is absolutely no indication that this might point to some idea of ancestral curses; the curse of Clytemnestra, introduced in the *Choephoroi* (912) and so prominently staged at the beginning of the play, is much more readily activated.⁷¹ The Erinyes of the play define themselves as the defenders of crimes against kin.⁷² While their language is at times uncannily close to the one used by Clytemnestra to justify her acts in the *Agamemnon*, it never concerns itself with the legacy of earlier generations. The crimes against kin they avenge are not matters of ancient inheritance.

Nowhere does the chorus of the *Eumenides* present itself as the avenger of an ancestral crime. In light of the *Agamemnon*'s notable investment in the theme, the absence of references to ancestral fault in the *Eumenides* is even more striking than that of the *Choephoroi*. This makes the statement of Athena at the end of the play in lines 927–37 even more surprising:

τάδ' ἐγὼ προφρόνως τοῖσδε πολίταις
 πράσσω, μεγάλας καὶ δυσαρέστους
 δαίμονας αὐτοῦ κατανασσαμένη·
 πάντα γὰρ αὗται τὰ κατ' ἀνθρώπους
 ἔλαχον διέπειν.
 ὃ γε μὴν κύρσας βαρεῶν τούτων
 οὐκ οἶδεν ὅθεν πληγαὶ βιότου·
 τὰ γὰρ ἐκ προτέρων ἀπλακήματά νιν

⁶⁹ See Loraux 1988; Frontisi-Ducroux 2006.

⁷⁰ αὐτὸς σὺ τούτων οὐ μεταίτιος πέληι, | ἀλλ' εἷς τὸ πᾶν ἔπραξας ὡς παναίτιος; cf. 465. See Sommerstein 1989: 117.

⁷¹ Sommerstein 1989: 259. ⁷² See Sewell-Rutter 2007: 89.

πρὸς τάσδ' ἀπάγει, σιγῶν <δ> ὄλεθρος
καὶ μέγα φωνοῦντ'
ἐχθραῖς ὀργαῖς ἀμαθύνει.

It is out of goodwill towards my citizens
that I do this, inviting these great divinities,
hard to please, to settle here.
Their allotted function is to manage
all human affairs.
And he who meets with their enmity
does not know whence come the blows that fall upon his life;
for the sins that come from his ancestors
hale him before them, and silent destruction
loud boaster though he may be
crushes him because of their hostile wrath (trans. Sommerstein).

Nothing earlier on in the play itself has prepared us for this statement from the goddess. She makes it right after the chorus finally decides to let go of its anger and accept the goddess's offer to settle in her land and protect it.⁷³ It is the first declaration presenting the new role that the chorus is to have and keep in the city of the audience.

Alan Sommerstein is absolutely right to say that 'this does not mean that the Furies will be punishing innocent Athenians for the sins of their ancestors'.⁷⁴ The object of their wrath in the speech is a man who does not see the silent doom that is about to fall on him, the σιγῶν ὄλεθρος. Loudly boasting, blinded by a false confidence in his fortune, he is about to be crushed; nothing indicates that he is innocent. There are, moreover, hardly any innocents in the *Oresteia*.⁷⁵ But nothing indicates either that 'the sentence should be read in the light of the assumption that children can be expected to inherit the character and dispositions of their parents', as Sommerstein writes in the same note of the Loeb edition, or that 'Athena, having saved a matricide from the Erinyes' wrath, cannot now welcome the prospect of their destroying the innocent', as he writes in his commentary to the play.⁷⁶ The fact that the transgressions of Agamemnon and Aegisthus almost exactly reproduce those of Atreus and Thyestes is indeed a prominent feature of the *Agamemnon*'s portrayal of generation. But to say that this is presented exclusively as an inheritance of character and dispositions there would be wrong. Surely the statements of the chorus about the heredity of the lion at *Agamemnon* 727–8 need to be considered

⁷³ See n. 80. ⁷⁴ Sommerstein 2009: 470–1.

⁷⁵ Rosenmeyer 1982: 295; Garvie 1986: xxviii.

⁷⁶ Sommerstein 1989: 234.

next to the later speeches of Cassandra, Clytemnestra, and Aegisthus about ancestral fault in the same play, and the chorus's evolving and often combative views about the weight of ancient crimes in its reactions to these speeches, which we have reviewed above.⁷⁷ The hidden, silent concerns of spirits of vengeance for the crimes of ancestors is a prominent theme of the *Agamemnon*; if there is one notion from that play that is brought to mind by τὰ ἐκ προτέρων ἀπλακήματα of line 934, that is it. But the words of Athena do not single out a precise referent for τὰ ἐκ προτέρων ἀπλακήματα. There are many aspects to the idea of ancestral fault in the *Agamemnon*, and no good reason to believe that one is referenced to the exclusion of the others in Athena's statement. What is certain is that the statement does point us back to the *Agamemnon*, where the idea is so prominent, in contrast to its near absence from the *Choephoroi* and the *Eumenides*.

Athena's statement comes as something of a shock. Just after having acquitted Orestes, she now establishes the Erinyes as the judges of ancestral faults in Athens.⁷⁸ No statement of the play prepares us for this very specific function, and the idea seems to clash with the repeated emphasis of the chorus on the personal responsibility of transgression it has pursued throughout the tragedy. The statement is counterintuitive; it stands out in the strophe. Activating a prominent idea of the first play at the end of the trilogy, it affirms its relevance for what has just taken place, and its significance for the world of the audience. There is no question of punishing innocents here or elsewhere in the play. But dark forces are at work behind the choices we make, and the disasters of *atē* do not come from any random place. They are not mere products of chance. Ancient crimes continue into later generations. The murder by Orestes, and the punishment he has suffered on stage, are ultimately the consequences of crimes committed generations before. This in no way denies the responsibility of Orestes for his acts; it places it in a larger chain of causality. There is of course no reason to introduce an opposition between free will and predetermination in this text, where the crimes of the present are thoroughly embedded in the crimes of the past. The long exploration of choice and agency staged in the *Choephoroi*, and the long exploration of responsibility and punishment staged in the *Eumenides*, are simply reinscribed in the much broader temporal framework of the *Agamemnon* with this statement.

⁷⁷ Knox 1952; Saïd 1978: III.

⁷⁸ See Bernek 2004.

Strongly linking the end of the trilogy with the beginning, it reaffirms the long vertical axis of the first play.⁷⁹ Athena's privileged perspective confirms that vision and reshapes the nature of its threat. The barely achieved acquittal of Orestes is no vindication of his act, and it certainly does not negate the privileges of the Furies; quite the opposite.⁸⁰ No longer confined to the household, and no longer invisible, the infernal chorus of vengeance is now lodged at the heart of the city, with an overview of everything that goes on within it, and a central role in furthering the prosperity of the *polis*.⁸¹ Its special interest in the punishment of ancestral fault cannot be separated from its new civic concern for marriage and childbirth.⁸² The Eumenides are to be the defenders of the family in the city and its perpetuation in time.⁸³ Ancestral fault is redefined through the integration of the Furies into the civic body as a constant presence. The play does not consecrate its rejection as an archaic notion but stages the aetiology of the city's protection against it. Now a constant concern of the Eumenides guarding Athens, it is kept at bay by their watchful eye. Every member of the audience is thus guarded by their 'violent hatred' for it but also subjected to their gaze as the inheritor of a household. With this statement, the play weaves the idea of ancestral fault staged in the trilogy right into the religious imagination of the present.

Iphigenia in Tauris

It was to remain there for centuries to come. It had become part of what the myth was. After the *Oresteia*, ancestral fault recurrently appears as an integral part of the tradition. A perfect example of this is found in Sophocles' *Electra*, where the murder of Clytemnestra is presented by the chorus at the end of the play as the result of a curse, with the blood of the victims flowing back to those who died long before (1417–21):⁸⁴

⁷⁹ Cf. Macleod 1973; Garvie 1986: xxxv–xli.

⁸⁰ The resolution of the play, which mostly used to be read in triumphant tones, is now generally presented as a problem, a much more open-ended and ambiguous staging of closure. See e.g. Goldhill 1984: 262–83; 2000; Glau 1998; D. H. Porter 2005; 2005–6; Scardino 2009; cf. Seaford 2003.

⁸¹ See the more recent insights of Kennedy 2006; Revermann 2008; Easterling 2008; Hose 2010 on this old question of scholarship, with ample bibliography.

⁸² Bacon 2001. ⁸³ Chiasson 1999–2000.

⁸⁴ Finglass (2007: 517): 'Despite its familiarity, the motif here is not unthinking or trite. The regular "the dead are killing the living" is replaced by the altogether more striking and paradoxical "the killed are killing the killers". The method of killing is also out of the ordinary: the dead man drains the blood from the living, an activity characteristic of various monsters (785n.) through which he procures new life for himself (cf. γάπ in 1420). The metaphorical implications of the principle of blood for blood are here pushed to their startling limits.'

τελοῦσ' ἀραί· ζῶσιν οἱ
 γὰς ὑπαὶ κείμενοι.
 παλὶρρυτον γὰρ αἶμ' ὑπεξαιροῦσι τῶν κτανόντων
 οἱ πάλοι θανόντες.

The curses are at work! Those who lie beneath the ground are living, for the blood of the killers flows in turn, drained by those who perished long ago! (trans. Lloyd Jones)

At (504–15), at the end of the first *stasimon*, the chorus had earlier sung of the ancient crime of the family as the point of origin of its unceasing troubles and emphatically presented it as the antecedent of the crimes and the punishments that followed:⁸⁵

ὦ Πέλοπος ἅ πρόσθεν
 πολύπονος ἱππεία,
 ὥς ἔμολες αἰανῆς
 τᾷδε γᾶ.
 εὔτε γὰρ ὁ ποντισθεῖς
 Μυρτίλος ἐκοιμάθη,
 παγχρύσων δίφρων
 δυστάνοις αἰκείαις
 πρόρριζος ἐκριφθεῖς,
 οὐ τί πω
 ἔλιπεν ἐκ τοῦδ' οἴκου
 πολύπονος αἰκεία.

O ride of Pelops long ago, bringer of many sorrows, how dire was your effect upon this land! For since Myrtilus fell asleep, plunged into the sea, hurled headlong from the golden chariot with cruel torment, never yet has the torment of many troubles departed from this house (trans. Lloyd Jones).

This is a beautiful example of the kind of background role that the idea can take in a play of the Atreid cycle in the later part of the fifth century, an expected element of the tradition that can be clearly and rapidly indexed, rewritten, compressed or expanded. That is the type of expectation that is manipulated by Euripides in the *Iphigenia in Tauris*.

The play contains an important reference to ancestral fault in the last part of the *parodos*.⁸⁶ After Iphigenia, revealing her dream to the chorus of young girls in lines 143–78, laments the death of her brother and the

⁸⁵ See Finglass 2007: 247–8; Kyriakou 2009: 339–42. Note the parallel of the Erinyes' portrait in the preceding lines with the son of Horkos in Hdt. 6.86 (see p. 283).

⁸⁶ See Sewell-Rutter 2007: 66, n. 55, who notes that there is no reference to the curse of Pelops in the play (or indeed to Pelops himself in that passage). I agree with him that Murray's supplement at 192 cannot be used to say anything about the ancient crime. The text reproduced here is that of Kovacs.

collapse of her house, the chorus answers her with ἀντιψάλμους ᾠδὰς ('antiphonal songs') that intone a funeral dirge for the House of Atreus and the reduplicated calamities that have struck it (178–202):⁸⁷

ἀντιψάλμους ᾠδὰς ὕμνων τ'
 Ἀσιητᾶν σοι βάρβαρον ἀχάν,
 δέσποιν', ἐξαυδάσω < γώ >,
 τὰν ἐν θρήνοις μοῦσαν
 νέκυσιν μέλεον, τὰν ἐν μολπαῖς
 Ἄιδας ὕμνεϊ δίχα παϊάνων.
 οἶμοι τῶν Ἀτρειδᾶν οἴκων.
 ἔρρει φῶς σκηπτρόν < τ' >, οἶμοι,
 [πατρῶων οἴκων].
 ἦν ἐκ τῶν εὐόλβων Ἄργει
 βασιλέων < τᾶς νῦν ἄτας > ἀρχά.
 μόχθος δ' ἐκ μόχθων ἔσσει
 δινευούσας ἵπποισιν < ἐπεῖ >
 πταναῖς ἀλλάξας δ' ἐξ ἔδρας
 ἱερὸν < μετέβασ' > ὅμμ' αὐγᾶς
 Ἄλιος, ἄλλοτε δ' ἄλλα προσέβα
 χρυσέας ἀρνὸς μελάθροισι ὀδύνα,
 ἱφόνος ἐπὶ φόνῳ ἄχεα ἄχεσιν†.
 ἔνθεν τῶν πρόσθεν δμαθέντων
 ἐκβαίνει ποιινὰ Τανταλιδᾶν
 εἰς οἴκους, σπεύδει δ' ἀσπουδάστ'
 ἐπὶ σοὶ δαίμων < δυσδαίμων >.

Songs antiphonal to yours and the foreign
 clamor of Asian hymns
 to you, mistress, shall I intone,
 music for the dead amid dirges,
 the unblest tunes which Hades sings
 (no paean these) among his songs.
 Ah me, the light of the house of the Atridae
 and its sceptre have perished, ah me
 [of my ancestral home]!
 From the blessed kings in Argos
 <this disaster> took its beginning,
 and trouble from trouble came,
 <ever since> with his whirling winged steeds
 Helios changed from its station
 the sun's holy radiant face,

⁸⁷ The text is particularly damaged. See Kyriakou 2006: 93–5. For the characterisation of the chorus in the play, see Kyriakou 1999; 2006: 36–7.

and now at one time, now at another there came to the house
 woe from the golden lamb,
 slaughter upon slaughter, grief upon grief.
 Hence from those long dead sons
 Of Tantalus breaks out affliction
 against the house, and not to be pushed forward are the designs
 against you that your <ill starred> fate is hastening on (trans. Kovacs).

The disaster of the household is portrayed as a series of misfortunes that have struck repeatedly over the generations and that are closely linked to each other. One ordeal follows the other in their attacks against the *oikos*. The sequence of disasters has been long and uninterrupted. The sun has changed its course, and the pain of the golden lamb has struck the house over and over again in different ways.⁸⁸ Murder has followed murder, disaster has followed disaster. The *πoinά* that comes to the house, the ransom of all these transgressions, is the consequence of all those ancient deaths among the house.⁸⁹ There is no primordial event singled out as the initial transgression, as far as we can tell, no dominating agency of retribution lurking in the house, just a long, vast accumulation of grief in the household that spills on to now, with moments and characters that stand out. An obscure, indeterminate divine force (*daimōn*) is channelling that pain on Iphigenia. The text of that song is notoriously corrupt, unfortunately, and it is possible that it contains some lacunae, but its main articulations are not in doubt.⁹⁰

This condensed tableau of recurrent disasters is the centrepiece of the chorus's song in the *parodos*. I would not describe its language as a suppression of the long history of misfortunes that have afflicted the household of Iphigenia, as some have argued.⁹¹ If the play had wanted to suppress the recurrent disasters of the Tantalids, it would simply not have mentioned them, something that was well within the range of its possibilities. Rather, what we have in this passage and elsewhere in the play is a clear reference to the continued disaster of the household, which must be

⁸⁸ Kyriakou (2006: 97–198): 'It seems beyond reasonable doubt that the reversal was not a reaction to Thyestes' banquet because this crime is implied at 197–201 and thus must be assumed to have followed the reversal.' I disagree with Cropp (2000: 188) that 'the passage is . . . similar (though abridged) to *Or.* 987–1012 where Electra laments Pelops' chariot-race and murder of Myrtilus, the curse of Myrtilus, the sending of the golden lamb, Thyestes' seduction of Aerope, the changing of the Sun's and the Pleiads' courses caused by strife, and the feast of Thyestes'. There is no such sequence in our passage, and no reference to Pelops or the murder of Myrtilus; cf. O'Brien 1988a. On the golden lamb and the change of the sun's course, see n. 123.

⁸⁹ Kyriakou (2006: 99): 'Vengeance for the deaths of Tantalids at the hands of Tantalids can only be sought within the house and annihilates it.'

⁹⁰ See n. 87. ⁹¹ See Kyriakou 2006: 12–13; 82–3; cf. Sansone 1975; O'Brien 1988a.

understood on its own terms. It is true that the lines of the *parodos* that refer to the numerous calamities that have afflicted the *oikos* through the generations are remarkably compressed and allusive, and this is probably not entirely thanks to the poor state of the manuscript tradition. That mode of presentation must be part of the explanation for the distinctive presence of ancestral fault in this passage.

The activation of the previous generations of the *oikos* in the *parodos* is directly paralleled in other passages of the tragedy. One is the prologue, starting with the very first lines of the play (1–9), where Iphigenia presents herself and her genealogy in these terms:

Πέλοψ ὁ Ταντάλειος ἐς Πῖσαν μολῶν
 θοαῖσιν ἵπποις Οἰνομάου γαμεῖ κόρην,
 ἐξ ἧς Ἀτρεὺς ἔβλασθεν· Ἀτρέως δὲ παῖς
 Μενέλαος Ἀγαμέμνων τε· τοῦ δ' ἔφυν ἐγώ,
 τῆς Τυνδαρείας θυγατρὸς Ἰφιγένεια παῖς,
 ἣν ἄμφι δῖνας ἄς θάμ' Εὐριπος πυκναῖς
 αὖραις ἐλίσσων κυανέαν ὄλα στρέφει
 ἔσφαξεν Ἑλένης οὐνεχ', ὥς δοκεῖ, πατήρ
 Ἀρτέμιδι κλειναῖς ἐν πτυχαῖσιν Αὐλίδος.

Pelops the son of Tantalus went to Pisa and with his swift horses won as his bride the daughter of Oenomaus. She gave birth to Atreus, whose sons in turn were Menelaus and Agamemnon. It is from this last that I was begotten, I, Iphigenia, daughter of Tyndareus' daughter. Near the eddies which the Euripus with its frequent breezes sets rolling, churning up the dark blue sea, my father sacrificed me so it is believed to Artemis for Helen's sake in the famous clefts of Aulis (trans. Kovacs).

She begins her speech with a genealogy that goes back to Tantalus, the arrival of Pelops in Greece and his victory over Oenomaos, the generation of Atreus, and her birth from his son Agamemnon.⁹² There is no question of her genealogy from her mother's side. The very first lines of the text, in other words, are concerned with foregrounding the Tantalid generations of the house to which Iphigenia belongs. That is no mere Euripidean convention.

Just as generations of the *oikos* and their relevance to the present are made to open the text, we also find them taking pride of place in the middle of the play, at the precise moment when it transitions into an 'escape tragedy'.⁹³ The recognition scene of lines 811–26 is based on tokens

⁹² Cropp 2000: 171–2; cf. R. Hamilton 1978.

⁹³ See M. Wright 2005: 307 on the 'inadequacy of Orestes' proof'.

that Orestes presents to his sister.⁹⁴ Each one is linked to a different generation. The first is the weaving of Atreus' quarrel with Thyestes over the golden lamb, an image which also contains a depiction of the sun's change of course (811–17). The second is the exchange of nuptial water and locks of hair between Iphigenia and her mother, mentioned by Orestes (818–21). And the third, the one mentioned at greater length, is the spear of Pelops, the one used to kill Oenomaos when Pelops took his daughter Hippodameia for a wife (822–6).⁹⁵ The ancient spear, hidden in the recesses of the virgins' quarters in the old palace of Agamemnon, was seen by Orestes himself.

Three of the four generations mentioned in the prologue are represented in the recognition scene, the same three generations found in the song of the chorus in the *parodos*. The construction of the recognition between brother and sister on the tokens of different generations is a unique and distinctive strategy that stands out from other recognition scenes for its emphasis on the chronological depth of the household. Like the prologue, it places its focus on the depth of generation, where the conventions of the genre point in a different direction. Those three passages shape the specifically *oikos*-based temporal dimension of the play. They cannot be separated from the other mentions of the *oikos* in the text. The dream of Iphigenia, in particular, the tale that begins the play and moves the chorus to react with its song of ancient grief in the *parodos*, is a key passage for making sense of the time of the household developed in the play.⁹⁶

At lines 44–50 Iphigenia relates that she has seen her paternal house collapse in a dream. Escaping from the maiden chambers, she sees the roof fall down. Only one pillar remains in place, a high στῦλος whose top section, uttering human sounds, seems to take on the form of a head with blond hair.⁹⁷ Iphigenia purifies it with water, something she usually does to the victims she is about to kill, and she interprets this as a reference to the fact that Orestes is dead. Certain of her brother's demise, she believes her household has been destroyed. The chorus's dark review of the household calamities is a direct reaction to the girl's vision.

One interesting element of Iphigenia's dream is the image of purification she uses in the passage. Her sprinkling of the column with

⁹⁴ Cropp (2000: 222): 'Their recollection here and their reduction to relics seems to consign them to the past and to suggest the opening of a new chapter as the play's turning-point is reached'; cf. Kyriakou 2006: 274–6.

⁹⁵ See Cropp 2000: 223–4.

⁹⁶ Mirto 1994; Schwindt 1998; Walde 2001: 157–74; Kyriakou 2006: 62–6; Trieschnigg 2008.

⁹⁷ Cropp 2000: 177; Kyriakou 2006: 65.

water is a purification of those who are about to die, as she says in lines 53–8.⁹⁸ This cannot be limited to the reflection of a ritual model of sacrifice, however, as the idea of purification plays such an important part elsewhere in the play. At 691–4, Orestes contrasts his house to that of Pylades, which is pure (καθαρὰ) and not suffering from sickness (νοσοῦντα), while his is impious and unfortunate.⁹⁹ The theme comes back at 939–86, where Orestes describes his unsuccessful attempt at release from the pursuit of the Erinyes, and his dealings with the tribunal set up to cleanse Ares of his *miasma* (946).¹⁰⁰ The oracle of Apollo sent him to Tauris to find a release from his madness, and the entire escape plot of the later part of the play revolves around the purification of the sacrificial victims. Out of eighteen attestations of χέρνιψ and cognates in the Euripidean corpus, seven are found in the *Iphigenia in Tauris*.¹⁰¹ The purification of Orestes is a persistent theme of the play, starting with the dream of Iphigenia.

Dreams and oracles do not usually lie in tragedy, and there is no reason to believe that Iphigenia's vision is an exception. She has obviously misunderstood it, something that is made clear a few seconds after she describes the dream, when Orestes and Pylades step on stage (67). Her mistake is an invitation to the audience, of course, and the meaning of the vision remains an open cipher for the remainder of the play, something that makes for an outstanding level of narrative tension.¹⁰² That Orestes is still standing is obviously not a reference to his recent death, but to the fact that he is still alive. The house might have collapsed, but the pillar that supports it is still in place. Its purification does refer to the actual cleansing of the sacrificial victim, but the image goes far beyond a simple reference to the escape stratagem of the two siblings. The escape of Orestes with the statue and his sister will achieve what the Areopagus could not: the cleansing of his crime, liberation from the Erinyes, and the cure of his madness. Apollo's words, Athena's action, Poseidon's help, and Artemis' approval support this final stage of Orestes' salvation.¹⁰³

The pillar is standing, and the house can be preserved. What Orestes asks Iphigenia to do is to 'save the paternal household' in 984.¹⁰⁴ While Iphigenia laments the destruction of her *oikos* at the beginning of the play,

⁹⁸ See Cropp 2000: 177, who refers to the 'lustral water . . . used in sacrificial ceremonies to purify the sacred area and participants and to consecrate the victim'; cf. Goff 1999. For the theme of human sacrifice in the play, see Bremmer 2013.

⁹⁹ Kyriakou 2006: 233–4. ¹⁰⁰ See M. Visser 1984; Kyriakou 2006: 304–6; cf. 1047; 1178; 1226.

¹⁰¹ Another seven are found in the *Iphigenia at Aulis*, one in the *Electra*, one in the *Hercules*, one in the *Phoenissae* and one in the *Orestes*.

¹⁰² See Mirto 1994. ¹⁰³ Papadopoulou 2005. ¹⁰⁴ Kyriakou 2006: 319.

a concern emphatically greater for the fate of her household than it is for her own in the dream or the *parodos* exchange with the chorus, she expresses great hope at the possibility of saving the house once she realises that Orestes is alive (845–9; 991–7). Orestes is similarly concerned with the survival of the δόμος πατρῶος (695–8) and the continuity of the Pelopids (984–6).¹⁰⁵ The messenger at the end of the play tells Thoas that Poseidon is hostile to the Pelopids and that the children of Agamemnon will soon fall into his hands at 1414–19, something that will be immediately disputed by Athena.¹⁰⁶ With Orestes' salvation from his 'present agonies' (1441) and his escape from madness, with Iphigenia's return and her new escape from the sacrificial altar, it is the entire household that is preserved. The house can be rebuilt with solid, pure foundations.

It was only once the house had fallen that its one standing pillar could be purified. In line with the chorus's view that the misfortunes of the *oikos* plunge deep in a past with no one precise origin, Iphigenia dismisses the story of Tantalus' cannibalistic feast for the gods, just as she dismisses the idea that Artemis demands human sacrifice, as a macabre imposition of mortal fantasies on the gods, as no god can be called *kakos* (385–91).¹⁰⁷ In lines 811–26, similarly, Orestes describes the weaving of Atreus' feud over the golden lamb by his sister, and the subsequent change of course of the sun, and the presence of Pelops' spear in her chambers.¹⁰⁸ The tokens of both generations of the *oikos*, the representation of the terrible feud between brothers and its cosmic consequences, on the one hand, and the actual weapon with which Pelops killed the father of his wife are portrayed as domestic items from inside the house. One has become a story woven on a tapestry, the harmless tale of a time long past and tamed by domestic representation, and the other was hidden in the παρθενῶνες, the same room from which Iphigenia escapes in her dream to see the house collapse.¹⁰⁹ An object that defines the union through which the family came about now locked in the chaste chambers of the virginal girl promised to marriage, it encapsulates everything that the family has been, and a secret hope of continuity.

¹⁰⁵ See O'Brien 1988a.

¹⁰⁶ See Buxton 1992 on the 'happy-ending' of the play; cf. Wright 2005: 378–84.

¹⁰⁷ See Kyriakou (2006: 144–5): 'The primary point of Iphigeneia's theodicy has to be the denial that the gods partook of Pelops' flesh, whether Tantalus hosted the terrible banquet or not'; cf. Cropp 2000: 201.

¹⁰⁸ See n. 95.

¹⁰⁹ Cf. Kyriakou (2006: 275): 'A very important reason why Euripides invented the detail that the spear was stored in a room that only family members could enter was that the location of the spear could serve as the decisive proof of Orestes' identity'; cf. O'Brien 1988a: 113–14.

The distant calamities of the past have lost all sense of immediacy, threat, or terror. The most pressing crime of the household, more importantly, the one that set in motion the whole cycle of disaster that tore this generation apart, actually never happened. Iphigenia was not sacrificed, the crime that motivated the vengeance of Clytemnestra and the retaliation of Orestes was not committed. Iphigenia, interestingly, shows great affection for her father (e.g. 991–3).¹¹⁰ With the return of Iphigenia to Greece and her abandonment of the sacrifices she was herself forced to perform in echo of her quasi-execution at Aulis, it is the last of the great series of disasters that have beset the house over the generations which is neutralised and rendered inoffensive. The entire cycle of grief that has traditionally coursed through the generations of the household from Tantalus to Agamemnon is undone in that play.

An anti-*Eumenides*, the *Iphigenia in Tauris* rejects the judgment of the Areopagus as a closure for Orestes and lets the Erinyes loose on the young man even after the trial.¹¹¹ Another release is needed, the savage statue of Artemis in Tauris, the quest for which brings Orestes on a voyage to the end of madness. As the play progresses, the terrible past of the household is emptied of its menace, the immediate presence of the ancient ordeals and murders recurring through the generations is neutralised or brushed away from sight. The weight of the past is severed from the present, and the *oikos* made into something that can be cherished and rebuilt around the standing pillar of the purified Orestes, a household as strong and lasting as the Attic cults that continue to commemorate the events.¹¹² The physical deconstruction of the house in Iphigenia's dream is enacted throughout the entire play. The recovery of Iphigenia by Orestes is accompanied by an evacuation of the suffocating legacy of the ancient crimes and the madness that came to him from previous generations. The *oikos* is finally free from these old, harmless tales from the past. By separating Orestes so completely from the continued misfortune of his line, the *Iphigenia in Tauris* evokes the possibility of a *tabula rasa*, full closure, a far different outcome from the ambiguous ending of the *Eumenides*.¹¹³ As in lines 1415–19 at the end of the play, the dark perspective of permanent calamity over the household presented by the chorus in lines 179–202 is completely undercut by the evolution of events. An ancient misfortune, associated simultaneously with

¹¹⁰ Kyriakou 2006: 32–3; 322. ¹¹¹ See Kyriakou 2006: 22, with bibliography (n. 15).

¹¹² See Graf 1979; C. Wolff 1992; Ekroth 2003; Despini 2005; Kyriakou 2006: 26–30; Calame 2009; Kowalzig 2013.

¹¹³ Cf. Belpassi 1990; Mirto 1994.

pollution, divine wrath, madness, sickness, divine agency, and chance, is reduced to a mere story. Ancestral fault is rethought in that play as a menace that can be denied, a threat that can be tamed once and for all. The tradition is revisited as an innocuous, safe foil to the refoundation of the *oikos*.

Orestes

While it plays such a recurrent role in the *Iphigenia in Tauris*, the idea of ancestral fault has only one possible echo in the *Electra*, in the *deus ex machina* scene at the end of the play, where Castor tells the siblings that:¹¹⁴

κοιναὶ πράξεις, κοινὸι δὲ πότμοι,
μία δ' ἀμφοτέρους
ἄτη πατέρων διέκναισεν.

Just as your acts were in common, so too were your fates, and it was a single ruin derived from your ancestors that has crushed you both (trans. Kovacs).

A much more complex staging of ancestral fault is found in the *Orestes*. Like the *Iphigenia in Tauris*, the *Orestes* also begins with a mythical genealogy.¹¹⁵ Electra opens the prologue with a review of the punishments that have struck the successive generations of the household, beginning with Tantalus (4–10): ‘now he is suspended in the clouds, they say, in constant fear of a rock hanging over his head’.¹¹⁶ Tantalus’ punishment is contrasted with his previous good fortune. The crime of Tantalus in that version is described as the fact that he had an ‘unbridled tongue’ at the gods’ shared table.¹¹⁷ There is no reference, here or elsewhere in the play, to the gory feast of tradition, and Pelops is rapidly passed over. The crimes of

¹¹⁴ Lines 1305–7. Cropp (1988: 190) is right to say that ‘ἄτη πατέρων need not refer to inherited guilt, any more than ἄταν πατέρος, “ruin brought about by their father”, in *HF* 917–8. The fathers have destroyed the children by passing on ruinous family feuds.’ But it is worth stating that the ambiguity of the formulation, in the context of a late Atreid play, certainly makes that reading possible. Whatever the case, this is the only place in the play where there might be a reference to the notion of an ancestral fault, as abstract and general as it is, and as distinct from the curse of Agamemnon or Clytemnestra, such as those found in 40–2 or 1321–4. For the reference to the golden lamb and the change of the sun’s course in the play, cf. p. 123.

¹¹⁵ Willink (1986: 79): ‘the treatment of the progenitor here is more than usually elaborate’; cf. Fuqua 1976.

¹¹⁶ See Willink 1986: 81 for other sources and parallels; cf. di Benedetto 1965: 9. As Wecklein (1906: 15) notes, ‘die Vorstellung dass Tantalos in der Luft schwebte, findet sich nur bei Euripides’. On the figure of Electra in the play, see Synodinou 1988.

¹¹⁷ See M. L. West 1987a: 180. As West writes, ‘there are several alternative accounts of Tantalus’ errors that do not involve his tongue’.

Atreus, similarly, are not described in any detail. They are ἀρρητὰ ('But why should I go over the shocking tale?', says Electra). We are told only that a divinity (Fate, Eris?) orchestrated conflict between him and his brother Thyestes, and Electra, who says 'I pass over intervening events', moves on to enumerate the children that Agamemnon had with Clytemnestra, that 'godless mother', and his death at her hands.¹¹⁸ Again, Electra underlines her reticence to say more: 'Why she did so it does not befit a maiden to say: for discussion in public I leave this unclear.' She then goes on to tell of Clytemnestra's death, Orestes' madness and the fate that has been following them. In that prologue, the first words of the play, Electra at once places the long history of her family's crimes and punishments at the heart of the tragedy. Her reserve and silence are underlined, pointing emphatically to the importance of what she refuses to say.¹¹⁹ But the presentation of the family misfortunes of the passage is quick and cursory. This strongly contrasts with another speech of Electra later in the play, her song at 982–1012, where she sheds all restraint and openly portrays the succession of family misfortunes in all their blunt horror.

In that song, performed in answer to the song of the chorus, Electra relates the long series of crimes and punishments that have followed the generations of the Atreid household in time.¹²⁰ This review of the generations is strongly reminiscent of the genealogy at the beginning of the play, with clear references retrospectively linking one passage to the other. One element of Electra's sung lamentation that does create a link to her genealogy in the prologue is the role she gives to Eris in her description of Atreus' story (1001).¹²¹ Eris appears also in line 13 of the prologue, where she is prominently linked to the fratricidal war between Atreus and Thyestes, another parallel between the two passages. The mention of Tantalus at the beginning of the song, more importantly, points the audience back to the Tantalus of the prologue, where the focus is on the punishment of the original ancestor and the very distinctive image of the rocky mass held aloft between heaven and earth. Electra imagines herself going to the location of this ancestral punishment to cry out a lamentation of all the calamities (*atai*) that have struck the house (982–8):

¹¹⁸ For θεά or ἔρις as the subject of ἐπέκλωσεν, see Willink 1986: 82; di Benedetto 1965: 8–9.

¹¹⁹ M. L. West 1987a: 181. Against West, I agree with di Benedetto (1965: 9), Willink (1986: 83) and Diggle in seeing line 15 as an interpolation, and I believe neither that 'the question would be feeble as a way of leaving the subject', nor that '16 would read awkwardly as the next subject'.

¹²⁰ See Willink 1986: 245–6; cf. M. L. West 1987a: 281.

¹²¹ Willink 1986: 253 sees there an echo of the cosmological views of Heraclitus and Empedocles.

μόλοιμι τὰν οὐρανοῦ
 μέσον χθονός <τε> τεταμέναν
 αἰωρήμασιν
 πέτραν ἀλύσει χρυσέαις,
 φερομέναν δίναισι,
 βῶλον ἐξ Ὀλύμπου,
 ἵν' ἐν θρήνοισιν ἀναβοάσω
 γέροντι πατέρι Ταντάλῳ,
 ὃς ἔτεκεν ἔτεκε γένετορας ἐμέθεν, δόμων
 ᾗς κατεῖδον ἄτας·

O that I might go
 to the rock hung aloft
 between heaven <and> earth
 from golden chains,
 a rocky mass from Olympus
 borne on the heavens' rotation!
 There in lamentation would I loudly proclaim
 To old Tantalus, my ancestor,
 Who sired, who sired my forefathers,
 What ruin I have seen in the house (trans. Kovacs).

The image is powerful: the first genitor, the one who 'sired' the forefathers of Electra, is made to hear the long list of disasters that have struck the generations of his descendants. Tantalus, at the site of his punishment, is transformed into a witness of the interminable suffering of his kin by a maiden of the last generation of his *oikos*. The portrait that Electra gives of those recurrent disasters, however, is strikingly different from the one she gives at the beginning of the play.

In the sung lamentation of the monody, as opposed to the prologue, she relates in detail how Pelops threw Myrtilus over the sea when he crossed the Aegean on his chariot, and she describes the crime as the origin of the family's further pain: ὅθεν δόμοισι τοῖς ἑμοῖς | ἥλθ' ἀρὰ πολύστονος.¹²² It is 'from there' that came the 'curse of many wailings', the ἀρὰ πολύστονος on the house, the nature of which is defined by apposition. The golden lamb is a direct consequence of the murder of that previous generation, the legacy of a curse from the past born into the flocks of the household.¹²³

¹²² 996–7: 'From this deed for my house came a curse laden with groaning.' See p. 419. As Willink (1986: 336) notes, the fall of Myrtilus from his winged chariot echoes the later alteration of the sun-chariot's course. For the idea that the figure of Pelops is mirrored in Menelaus in the play, see Kyriakou 1998.

¹²³ Cf. 812. A scholion to verse 995 says that the story of the golden lamb was found in the lost epic *Alkmaeonis* (F 6 Bernabé) as well as in 'Pherecydes' (3 F 133 *FGH*). A version of the myth is also

The lamb is a terrible portent of things to come, a monstrous sign for Eris to intervene and transform the shape of the world. It is Eris who changes the course of the sun, from East to West, as well as the movement of the stars at night, so that the present cosmic structure of the dramatic time and the time of the audience, the alternation of day and night and the circulation of the heavenly bodies, is a direct consequence of the crime of the Atreid household.¹²⁴ The very nature of the world was forever transformed by the ancient transgression.

This celestial upheaval follows on the first event of the review, the punishment of Tantalus by suspension from the golden chain, revolving in the sky with the rock from Olympus, 'borne on the heavenly rotations'. The way the word δῖνῃ is used here, as has often been remarked, is a staple of late fifth-century cosmic speculation on the heavens and the movement of the stars, something that would not have escaped the audience.¹²⁵ Combined with the creative reinterpretation of the golden chain of Olympus, an image from the *Iliad* (8.19) adapted to the context of Tantalus' punishment, the tableau presented by Electra at the beginning of the song evokes the language of contemporary cosmological wisdom, with its association of the new naturalistic science and the old poetic authority of the ancient texts.¹²⁶ The reference is not to a specific body of doctrines, but to a mode of discourse.

Electra opens the song with a vision of the heavens that is followed by another vision of the heavens in the story of the golden lamb. The first punishment leads to the appearance of a new heavenly body, a floating rock borne by the δῖναι between earth and sky (983), and the appearance of the lamb leads to the complete transformation of the pathways of the stars

found in the second *stasimon* of Euripides' *Electra* (699–750), as well as in a number of fragments of Sophocles and Euripides, but not in Aeschylus; see Rosivach 1978 and especially Gantz 1993: 545–50. It is interesting to note that the story of the lamb and the ἡλίου μετὰστασις related in the second *stasimon* of the *Electra* are in no way connected to the notion of ancestral fault in that passage (see Gagné and Hopman 2013).

¹²⁴ I agree with M. L. West (1987a: 254) that the change of course presented in the text of the *Orestes* is permanent, just as in the second *stasimon* of the *Electra*, not a temporary alteration. It is most probable, as Lloyd-Jones writes (2002: 12–14), that the tale was current in archaic epic, but it is only attested in the classical period, in tragedy and texts such as Plato, *Plt.* 269a (Gantz 1993: 547–8). In some versions it precedes the feast, while it follows it in other texts; cf. Hall 1993.

¹²⁵ See J. S. Morrison 1970; Willink 1983; Hall 1993; M. Wright 2008: 133–7.

¹²⁶ The scholia already underline the link between the images of the passage and contemporary cosmological thought, pointing out that Euripides was a 'student' of Anaxagoras; see Willink 1986: 253–6. It is particularly interesting to note that one of Anaxagoras' disciples, Oenopides of Chios (41 F 10 DK), claimed to have discovered traces of the sun's changed course in his astronomical investigations, something he ascribed to the Θυέστεια δειπνα. As Willink argues, F 397b Kannicht of Euripides' *Thyestes* might reflect that modern 'scientific' view.

in the sky. This striking focus on the effects of the household transgressions of the Atridae over the configuration of the sky appears suddenly and without preparation in the play. Something that thoroughly stands out from the simple reference to the floating rock at lines 6–7, for instance, it forces a clear contrast with what has gone on in the text before. What is most apparent when one considers these two speeches of Electra together, contrasting one review of Atreid misfortune to the other, is the profound difference of emphasis that separates them.

In the prologue Electra says nothing of the crimes of Atreus; more, she even refuses to name them. ‘Why should I recount these obscenities?’, says the chaste young girl at the beginning of the play, a reserve she reproduces a few lines later when she declines to name the adultery of her mother with Aegisthus, as it is not seemly for a *parthenos* to talk about such things (26–7). This is a reticence she no longer has in the lamentation of 982–1012. There, she directly refers to the adulterous affair of Thyestes and her grandmother Aerope, the bed of the ‘deceiver in marriage deceitful’ (1009–10), and the feast that bears the name of Thyestes.¹²⁷ These crimes come after the appearance of the golden lamb, and the change of the heaven’s course by Eris, a sequence that is at odds with the most usual tradition, where the sun changes its course in revulsion at the crimes of Atreus and Thyestes, not as a prefiguration of them.¹²⁸ The τῶν of line 1007 refers to ‘that affair’, as West translates it, the death of Myrtilus, the death for which other deaths are exchanged, the force of the event out of which the golden lamb, the heavenly transformations, the cannibalistic feast, and the adultery all derive.¹²⁹ The horrible crimes of the later generation are not the motivating factors of a cosmic upheaval, as is usual in relations of this myth, but the consequences of a world already transformed by an ancient transgression, as the last two lines of the song illustrate: ‘and to end all it has come to me and my father by the toil-fraught law of the house’.¹³⁰ The force of that primordial crime continues into the present, and the last two generations are condensed in as few words as possible. The predicaments of the generations of Agamemnon and Electra, discussed at length elsewhere throughout the play, are here briefly mentioned at the conclusion of the passage. The emphasis of the song is very much on the overbearing weight of the past.

It is true, as Martin West writes in his commentary to the song, that ‘no one who did not know the stories already would understand them from

¹²⁷ See di Benedetto 1965: 195.

¹²⁸ Willink 1986: 254.

¹²⁹ M. L. West 1987a: 254–5.

¹³⁰ 1010–12: τὰ πανύστατα δ’ | εἰς ἐμὲ καὶ γενέταν ἐμὸν ἤλυθε | δόμων πολυπόνοις ἀνάγκαις. For the problem with γενέταν, see Willink 1986: 258; M. L. West 1987a: 255.

this account'.¹³¹ No member of the Athenian audience, of course, was unfamiliar with the famous calamities of the Attridae in 408, and the monody could rely on a deep pool of shared knowledge in its handling of this shared material, as the sheer number of plays, extant and lost, that deal with this material shows.¹³² Allusion is indeed the stuff of this song, references to events and activations of stories known from elsewhere, but that hardly means that the review is based on a 'loosely additive style'. On the contrary, the succession of periods is shown as a tightly interconnected whole, where the event of one generation carries on exchanging murder for murder over three successive generations, where the first genitor of the line is given a vision of the many woes of his house by a survivor of the last generation, the celestial movement of the Tantalid punishment is echoed in the celestial movement of the tale of Atreus, and the *domos* is shown to be ruled by a necessity of pain and torment throughout its history. The review of generations presented by Electra is an uncharacteristically long vision of connected time, something usually reserved to the gods, the chorus, or individuals gifted with the knowledge of prophecy. Its only real parallel is the extended vision of ancestral fault presented by Tiresias in the *Phoenissae*.

The image of the original ancestor, Tantalus, dominates the passage, as a figure of perpetual punishment, an eternal embodiment of the alternation of prosperity and desolation that characterises human life.¹³³ His presence in the sky is a constant witness of the household pains. Every generation thereafter is marked by the recurrence of murder and trickery. It is the transgression of his son, Pelops, that generates an *ara*, a curse literally born into the property of the house in the form of the golden lamb, whose force alters the course of the world and continues to run through one generation after the other of the *oikos*. The song of Electra offers a singularly powerful insight of temporal depth for the suffering of the characters on stage. I fail to understand how Martin West can describe the curse as something that is 'merely a convenient justification for filling up songs with mythical retrospects' in his commentary on the passage.¹³⁴ 'Mythical retrospects' are hardly innocent, 'mere' fillers in tragedy, here or elsewhere. More importantly, the thorough imbrication of the deep chronology of kinship woe presented in the song with other passages of the play, and with the

¹³¹ M. L. West 1987a: 251–2.

¹³² Sophocles' *Atreus* and Euripides' *Chrysippus*, *Oenomaus*, and *Thyestes* are just some of the relevant plays that have been lost.

¹³³ See M. Wright 2008: 62.

¹³⁴ M. L. West 1987a: 253.

very structure of the drama, in fact, shows how central its perspective is to the understanding of the *Orestes*.

It is an undeniable fact that the Atreid curse described in the play is different from the one portrayed in Aeschylus' *Oresteia*, where it is 'a real abiding force through which the past bleeds into the present'. That hardly means that the recurrence of generational calamities presented in the song is an insignificant filler. Difference from the masterpiece of the great Aeschylean trilogy is the point of all later representations of Atreid misfortune in tragedy. How will the play shape its vision of the house in time? What role will this tale of eternal conflict between the generations give to the distant events of its grim past? How will the most memorable evocation of the corrupted *oikos* proposed by Aeschylus be met by the rival play of his successor? How does the text answer the challenge of tradition, in other words? Confrontation with the themes and imagery of the Aeschylean work that so thoroughly left its mark on the tradition is a necessary part of any tragic representation of the Atreid material in the later classical period. It would have been possible for Euripides to ignore altogether or downplay the past woes of the house, as he does in the *Helen*, for instance, or in the *Iphigenia at Aulis*. This is not what he does in the *Orestes*. The theme of ancestral fault fills an entire monody, and it resonates with the rest of the play.

If the passage is in direct dialogue with the speech of Electra at the beginning of the play, it also echoes the temporal perspectives presented by the chorus earlier (960–82).¹³⁵ It is, in the first place, a direct response to the choral song of the preceding lines. At 960 the chorus of young Argive girls reacts with a formal sung lament to the speech of the messenger, who describes the failure of Orestes and Pylades to convince the assembly to let them live, and the death sentence they have received in the end.¹³⁶ The last hope of the siblings and their friend has been torn apart by the mob and there is now no way out. At that precise moment, everything is lost. In a cry of bitter despair at the turn of events, the chorus projects its anguish for the children of Agamemnon on a gnomic tableau of human misfortune in the antistrophe (971–81).¹³⁷ The young women lament the change of fortune of the house of Atreus and the instability of human affairs. Gods take away what we have out of jealousy, *phthonos*. The situation of wretched, ephemeral men is one of total blindness before the strokes of fate. *Moirai* constantly crosses through expectations and a different pain awaits a

¹³⁵ See Willink 1986: 240–1 and M. L. West 1987a: 249 for the attribution of the lines; cf. Damen 1990.

¹³⁶ See Seidensticker 2008. ¹³⁷ Di Benedetto 1965: 192–3; cf. Fuqua 1978.

different man. In the course of 'long time', all expectations are dashed (980–1).¹³⁸ The temporal span of human misfortune cannot be measured, sings the chorus, as the dancers beat their heads in ritual lament, involving 'the infernal mistress of all below, the fair-child goddess (963–4)'.¹³⁹

This striking song carries the emotional intensity of the situation to a height of despair. It gives a powerful, palpable form to the collapse of hope reached by the characters at this point in the play. Expressed in the traditional, formalised language of choral anguish, it marks a transition in the economy of pain of the drama. The song signals a turn in the course of the play, a darker realisation of horror. In a tour de force of dramatic intensity, Electra's answer to the lament of the young girls pushes this further. Her astrophic song functions as a discordant epode to the two strophes that precede.¹⁴⁰ The rhythmical and metrical difference of her melody from the choral song, and the contrast of a single voice against the collective words of the group, mark the lines of Electra as both a continuation of and an opposition to the lamentation of lines 960–81. While the two choral strophes take twenty-one lines, the song of Electra takes twenty lines. The two are perfectly balanced in their difference.

To the image of human blindness in the face of unexpected calamity and divine *phthonos* presented by the Argive girls, Electra opposes an entirely different vision of the fate suffered by her family. With the authoritative words of a language that combines the codes of traditional poetic wisdom and the imagery of the new scientific cosmology, Electra corrects the despairing picture of the situation presented in the two preceding strophes and offers an alternative. She very markedly appropriates the elevated perspective of the chorus for herself.

While the chorus turns its gaze to 'the infernal mistress of all below' and the dark recesses of the underworld, she looks up above to the sky and the movement of the stars. For the group of young girls, the calamities that strike the house are the work of the χρόνος μακρός, the long time in which everything that stands up is crushed down, and the αἰών of mortals, a wonderfully ambiguous term that simultaneously brings together the individual lives of men and the broad cycles of life of kin and states, the course of existence itself. The αἰών is ἀσταθμητός, that is, the opposite of what is σταθμητός, measurable, fixed (981).¹⁴¹ The idea of ἀσταθμητός in this

¹³⁸ Wecklein 1906: 72; M. L. West 1987a: 251. ¹³⁹ See Willink 1986: 242–3.

¹⁴⁰ Willink 1986: 245–6; cf. M. L. West 1987a: 281 on the characteristic style of late-Euripidean monodies; cf. di Benedetto 1965: 196–7; 199; M. Wright 2008: 83–7.

¹⁴¹ Willink 1986: 245; cf. 352.

passage is that of irregularity, unevenness, lack of clear boundaries or patterns. It is diametrically opposed to the portrait painted by Electra, where the precise measure of time is a dominant idea. The song consists of a review of all the generations that have made the house. It starts with the first ancestor and ends with the last of his descendants, enumerating the succession of three other generations in the process, and gives a complete vision of the household's lifespan, from beginning to end. The αἶών of the household is precisely measured in the fullness of time, just as the individual days punctuated by the movement of the sun and the stars. It is time itself, in other words, that has been reshaped as a result of the crime, measuring with its new course every day the *ara* born into the house and transmitted through its generations. Electra has 'seen' the *atai* of her house, and she figuratively shows them to Tantalus in a nightmarish vision of perpetual disaster (987).¹⁴²

In contrast to the song of the chorus, where the obscurity of a world of chance and change sees one disaster randomly strike one man and another disaster another man, the perspective of Electra sees one murder generating other murders. Disaster is not passively suffered through the agency of divine *phthonos* but reproduced through crime. This is the law of the house, its ἀνάγκαι (1012), coursing through the line from the initial punishment of Pelops all the way to the very end, πανύστατα, as clear and consistent in the gaze of Electra as the divine fortune described by the chorus is opaque.¹⁴³ The opposition between the visions of Electra and the chorus in this sung exchange is nothing short of striking. To understand the full significance of its meaning for the play, it is necessary to consider where the temporal perspective of that choral passage fits in relation to the other choral songs of the tragedy.

In the first choral song of the play (316–47) the young girls insist on the objective reality of the Erinyes who are pursuing Orestes and portray the distress of the present situation as an illustration of the reversal of fortune that has struck the house: 'great prosperity among mortals is not lasting': ὁ μέγας ὄλβος οὐ μόνιμος ἐν βροτοῖς (340).¹⁴⁴ The *olbos* inherited from the past has been destroyed by some *alastōr* (337: τις ἀλαστώρων), some *daimōn* intent on the vengeance of the mother's blood.¹⁴⁵ The house of

¹⁴² See Willink 1986: 248 and M. L. West 1987a: 253 on the possibility that the house or the ancestors might be the subject of the verb.

¹⁴³ Di Benedetto 1965: 201–2.

¹⁴⁴ Willink (1986: 143) refers to Solon's *Elegy to the Muses* 17–25; cf. the fuller list of references and comparanda in M. L. West 1987a: 206. As he writes, 'the idea that prosperity *never* lasts does not appear before the 5th century'.

¹⁴⁵ See Willink 1986: 142.

Tantalus – and it is significant that the first ancestor is singled out here again in the play – has now fallen, an *oikos* born out of a divine marriage.¹⁴⁶ No house can hence be revered for its felicity. The present trouble of the two siblings is a contrast to the past prosperity of their *domos*.

That perspective anchored in the idea of a reversal of fortune brought about by the murder of Clytemnestra and her Erinys is of a rather different cast from the one found in the next song of the chorus, some four hundred lines later, at 807–43, where the young girls present the loss of *olbos* of the Atridae as something that has a distant origin in the past (πάλαι) and that comes back (πάλιν) to the house, a return that is emphasised by the reduplication of πάλιν in lines 810 and 811.¹⁴⁷ The origin is the *eris* of the golden lamb that pitted Atreus against his brother (812), a conflict that never abandoned the double line of Atreus.¹⁴⁸ Murder has followed on murder ‘through blood’ (δι’ αἵματος), and the terrible children’s feast of Atreus is echoed in the terrible matricidal crime of Orestes.¹⁴⁹ The reaction of the chorus to the events staged in the preceding scene (the condemnation of Tyndareus, the weakness of Menelaus, and the ominous plan of the two friends to beseech the hostile assembly) is a combination of hostility towards Orestes and pity for his fate. The horror of the situation is strengthened by its presentation as the return of an ancient affliction, a murderous strife attached to the family. The temporal depth opened by the perspective suitably follows on the unravelling of the bonds that bind Orestes to his maternal grandfather and to his paternal uncle, and it offers a contrast to the undoing of the house that is unfolding on stage. The chorus takes a very precise stand in this song, identifying the generation of Atreus as the origin of a pattern of murder that has recurrently plagued the house.

This portrait of the situation is far from the one offered in 316–47. It is also strikingly different from the one found in the song that appears a few dozen lines later, 960–81, the song that immediately follows on the messenger speech. The two choral passages frame the messenger speech, the turning-point of the drama at the very centre of the play. Both present

¹⁴⁶ See O’Brien 1988b for the figure of Tantalus in the play.

¹⁴⁷ Di Benedetto (1965: 160): ‘Ἀνῆλθε ἐὶν qui usato nel senso di “ritornare”. Infatti la casa dei Tantalidi aveva ben conosciuto l’infelicità anche prima della guerra troiana.’ Cf. Willink (1986: 215): ‘... possibly with a faded metaphor of *stream-reversal*’.

¹⁴⁸ See n. 123.

¹⁴⁹ Willink 1986: 217 notes the image of the ‘currency-medium ... of the perpetual “exchange”’ expressed in lines 816–18. They present a particularly clear example of the language of equivalence used in the play to describe the ancestral fault of the Atridae.

wide temporal perspectives giving a broader context to the action underway, but each one draws from a distinct form of tradition. In the song of 960–81, the present misfortune is an unexpected stroke of fate, a sudden adversity that contrasts with the earlier felicity of the house and demonstrates the inability of mortals to see beyond their hopes. The difference between that choral understanding and the one just before it at 807–43 is more than a simple example of the inconsistencies in the outlooks of the play, different reactions to the immediate events, or random, meaningless activations of different gnomic traditions. The parallel juxtaposition of difference between the songs of the chorus is purposeful. The chorus, significantly balancing between pity for Orestes and condemnation of his acts, is shown as a rudderless and confused group of young girls overtaken by the events, incapable of understanding their meaning, and the connotations of the language it uses.¹⁵⁰ Its shifts and turns in perspective are part of its hopeless uncertainty before the ever-worsening evolution of the situation. The chorus constantly alternates between positions and successively activates the different perspectives of the gnomic tradition. This is the voice that Electra opposes in her astrophic countersong of 982–1012. This is the vision of doubt and shifting despair that she corrects with the broad sweep of her own darker portrait.¹⁵¹

Electra's review of generations sets the stage for the second part of the play, like a new beginning. Rewriting in much more sombre notes the review of generations that opens the play, discarding the discordant and feeble attempts of the chorus at providing a meaningful framework to the suffering of the siblings, she presents a vast and masterful panorama of the pain that has always coursed through her family. This is not a story of reversal and loss of felicity, or a case of survival and endurance before the strokes of fortune. Punishment has always been a part of the house, and one crime has followed the other, without interruption. The same curse has run through the generations since the time of Pelops and each following transgression has been more horrible than the preceding one. There is nothing hidden, obscure, or unexpected about the nature of the calamity that afflicts the house. It has changed the course of the universe for all to see, and its days have been precisely measured. If its origins are well known, the end is now clear. This is the generation of the πανύστατα. The heir of uninterrupted calamity, the house will now fall once and for all. These are the last moments of the Tantalids.

¹⁵⁰ See Zeitlin 1980.

¹⁵¹ On the clashes of knowledge in the play, see M. Wright 2006.

The song of Electra opens an uncompromising, hopeless vision of nightmare where the characters stare straight at the horror of their situation until they embrace it without flinching, as the culmination of what they have always been. The panoptic view of perpetual crime presented by the daughter of Agamemnon is the framework of this new resolve that will see her and her brother decide to embody the crimes of the family and push their destructive logic to the end. Δόμος is the operative word for the Tantalid household in the play, not οἶκος, and the second half of the drama stages this literally in the scene of the hostage-taking, where Electra, Orestes, and Pylades take Helen and Hermione by force and barricade themselves in the house. The *domos* of Tantalus that everyone has been talking about throughout the play is the same as the physical *domos* in which the siblings have taken refuge, the ancestral palace of Tantalus.¹⁵² They are preparing to set it ablaze and let the ruins collapse over their bodies and that of Hermione, the daughter of Menelaus, the only other Tantalid of their generation. The death of the last descendants of the line is paralleled in the physical destruction of the house, the spectacular outburst of one last Tantalid crime. The scene perfectly embodies the review of generations presented by Electra in her monody of 982–1012.

Apollo intervenes, of course, and the god saves the house and reconciles the strife of the family, putting an end to its misfortune and pointing the way to the reintegration of Orestes into the community.¹⁵³ The two sides of the conflict that has continuously plagued the Atreid household are literally united in the planned marriage of Orestes and Hermione, and the *deus ex machina* imposes a resolution that turns the end of the drama upside down. However one reads that divine intervention, few will contest that the second part of the tragedy sets the audience on a course to the bleakest imaginable picture, something that can better be contrasted with the reversal of the god's speech. The clearest expression of the suffocating mood of the action at the end of the play is the last song of the chorus at lines 1537–48:

ἰὼ ἰὼ τύχα,
 ἕτερον εἰς ἀγῶν' ἕτερον αὖ δόμος
 φοβερόν ἀμφὶ τοὺς Ἀτρεΐδας πίτνει.
 τί δρῶμεν; ἀγγέλλωμεν ἐς πόλιν τάδε
 ἢ σίγ' ἔχωμεν; ἀσφαλέστερον, φίλοι.
 ἴδε πρὸ δωμάτων ἴδε προκηρύσσει
 θοάζων ὅδ' αἰθέρος ἄνω καπνός.
 ἄπτουσι πεύκας ὡς πυρῶσοντες δόμους

¹⁵² Willink 1986: 338–9.

¹⁵³ See Gärtner 2005; M. Wright 2008: 69–71; Scardino 2009.

τοὺς Τανταλείους οὐδ' ἀφίστανται φόνου.
 τέλος ἔχει δαίμων βροτοῖς,
 τέλος ὅπῃ θέλῃ.
 μέγала δέ τις ἂ δύναμις καὶ ἀλαστόρων·
 ἔπεσ' ἔπεσε μέλαθρα τάδε δι' αἱμάτων
 διὰ τὸ Μυρτίλου πέσῃμ' ἐκ δίφρου.

Ah, ah, fate!

Into another fearful trial, another, concerning the Atridae
 the house again falls.

What shall we do? Shall we bear this news to the city
 or keep silent? Silence is safer, my friends.

See, before the house, see, leaping high into the air
 smoke is bringing a first message.

They are lighting torches in order to set fire
 to the house of Tantalus, they do not rest from toil.

The outcome for mortals is sent by God,
 the outcome as he wishes.

But great too is the power of avenging spirits.

This house has been thrown, been thrown into the midst of blood
 by Myrtilus' fall from the chariot (trans. Kovacs).

The house is falling and the end, the τέλος, is about.¹⁵⁴ With the statement that 'God controls the outcome for men, controls it in the way he wants', the chorus activates a gnomic position similar to that of the third ode on the instability of fortune, something that is made even more interesting by the next line, where the δέ indicates that a different point is added to the obscure divine will of lines 1545.¹⁵⁵ In addition to the inscrutable will of invisible divinity, in other words, there is *also* a force of vengeance at work, in the great power of the *alastores*, with a very specific cause and a very specific *telos*. The reference to the force of the *alastores* is singled out as something that is distinct from the inscrutable will of God.

Just as lines 1545–6 echo the same gnomic position as the one found in 960–81, line 1547 is parallel to the portrait of the *alastores* found in 337–8. But whereas the *alastores* of the first choral song are pursuing Orestes for the killing of his mother, this one is targeting the entire house for the slaughter of Myrtilus – the same cause for the misfortunes of the *domos* as the one identified by Electra in her monody (990). The song begins with the statement that the house is falling (πίπτει), and ends with the emphatically

¹⁵⁴ See Waanders 1976.

¹⁵⁵ Willink (1986: 338): 'the universal sway (τέλος) of δαίμων has already been asserted, and 1546 must be making a *further* point'. The adverbial καὶ is West's correction of the unmetrical and problematic δι' found in the manuscripts. He has καὶ ἀλάστωρ rather than καὶ ἀλαστόρων (1987b: 286).

reduplicated ἔπεσ' ἔπεσε, an aorist indicating that it has fallen. That fall, more strikingly, directly reproduces the fall (πέσημοι) of Myrtilus in the sea, the ultimate cause of the house's collapse. The final punishment of the *domos* is a direct expression of the crime itself that motivated it so many generations ago, but whereas Myrtilus fell in the sea, the house falls amid the flow of blood.¹⁵⁶

That last choral song of the play combined all the positions of the previous song in one coherent vision of divine action. As the drama is drawing to a close and the household collapses in on itself in one final crime of self-destruction, the chorus offers a perspective that brings together all of its previous positions, subordinating them to the vision of Electra's monody and the view that the present calamity perpetuates Pelops' ancient crime. The inescapability of the long temporal outcome it presents here brings back to the fore the bleak portrait offered by Electra in her monody some five hundred lines earlier and contributes to giving a final shape to the despair progressively built by the play before the appearance of the *deus ex machina*.

The theme of ancestral fault is no innocent activation of tradition in the *Orestes*, here or elsewhere, but an integral part of the temporal infrastructure of the play and its engagement with earlier tragedies on the Atreid murders. The *Orestes* manipulates the expectations of an audience well acquainted with the nuances, the details, and the variants of the story.¹⁵⁷ The precise means of its presentation recurrently activates a response that can be used to characterise a voice in a certain way at that moment in the play and build the specific and particularly complex temporal texture of this tragedy. The picture of the ancestral fault coursing through the house embedded in this drama is a central element of its allusive play with tradition. It writes an image of the idea over those of the other plays that tell the same myth. It is the late product of a long chain of interwoven references. That being said, it is worth remembering that references to ancestral fault are not limited to the tales of the Atridae and the Labdacids in tragedy. The *Hippolytus* (832–3 and 1379–83) is a case in point, for which I refer the reader to a forthcoming study.¹⁵⁸

Conclusion

There is no doctrine of ancestral fault in Greek tragedy. While one character can refer to the continued misfortunes of a family as an example

¹⁵⁶ Cf. p. 427.

¹⁵⁷ See M. Wright 2008: 79–83.

¹⁵⁸ Gagné (forthcoming a).

of the obscure forces at play beyond the limits of human perception, another character can use the precise knowledge of a seer or a master of tradition for identifying the cause of an ancient divine wrath, and trace it through the generations of a household. Some crimes are repeated in time and the emphasis of the text lies squarely on the choice of the person who reproduced the crime of his ancestor. That direct agency can be presented as a matter of inherited *ethos*, a madness coursing through the family as a result of some earlier crime, or the overconfidence of excessive wealth. Alternatively, the tragedy can portray the fate of the descendant who is punished for the crimes of his ancestors as the target of an *erinyes* or an *alastôr*, a spirit who seeks a counterpart of the transgressor to pay a penalty that is equivalent to the crime; it can relate the lot of an ancestral curse's heir, or that of the bearer of a taint, a pollution that precedes his birth.

Most of these ideas concerning generational punishment are absent from any one play where ancestral fault is found. But in almost all of these plays where ancestral fault is found, the reference to one type of generational punishment will be associated with one or more other types, and a web of equivalences and differences involving character perception and dramatic sequence can be shown to be in place. The range of combinations in the extant tragedies is impressive; when we consider how few plays out of the total production of the fifth century have been preserved, that variety of associations, links, imbrications, and equivalences made between the different types of generational punishment in our plays appears even more significant. These different types of generational punishment are not so many facets of the same 'doctrine', each one activated by the other, nor are they discrete notions randomly brought into contact but better kept separate in analysis. Unless 'belief' is redefined to make it mean something completely different from what is usually meant by the word, there is no reason to imagine that a single belief lies behind all of them, or a string of code in the cultural grammar of early Greek imagination.

The reality of the situation, in my view, is a lot messier. In the dynamic, fluid, ever-changing and non-doctrinal context of early Greek thought, the shifting sands of a complex culture in constant flux, the idea that a crime committed by ancestors long ago tells us something about the disasters suffered by their descendants was reconfigured over and over again in tragic plays of the fifth century, using different references, different modes of agency, and opening their own distinctive perspectives. Each expression of the idea is the product of a specific context, its content determined by the nature of the message, rather than the activation of a fixed

programme.¹⁵⁹ That is one of the many reasons why a history of ancestral fault in this period of implicit theology can only be so heavily context-specific. That being said, the repetition of the motif is striking, and the fact is that its various attestations are obviously related to each other. They share a limited number of words and expressions, and a similar node of ideas about crime, punishment, and generation. They also tend to appear in relation to the same households, characters, and events. With each iteration of the motif, further links are made with earlier examples, the resemblances become clearer, and patterns are reinforced. With the constitution of an ever-tighter net of references in the background, the patterns that emerge stand out more clearly, and in turn exert greater influence on those that follow.

The accumulation of ancestral-fault expressions in tragedy is without parallel in the earlier record. The number and prominence of its appearances in Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides is unlike anything else that we can see in earlier authors. This is not, as Martin West and others have been perfectly right to argue, because it is a 'fixed, primary' element of the myth, as the many earlier and contemporary expressions of these traditional stories that contain no reference to it attest particularly well. It appears so prominently in tragedy because it plays a role that has specific resonances for that genre. Repetition is the heart of the problem in this question. What are the forces at play that motivated the tragedians to return so insistently to this idea in their plays?

The answer can only be tentative and speculative, but a good part of it must have something to do with the specific role that kinship plays in the genre. Kinship, genealogy, and the linked stories of the ancient houses of myth are at the heart of the contemporary poetry of Pindar, yet ancestral fault plays no real part in it. What distinguishes tragedy from everything else is a logic that is internal to tragedy. The dissolution of the household, the instrumentalisation of generational conflict, the recurrent questioning of wealth and inheritance, the dramatisation of the household as a space of transgression, explorations in the declinations of vengeance within the closest bonds of *philia*, filiation as a trap of individual identity – so many themes that exist before and outside of tragedy but that came to be placed front and centre of the new tragic project. The focus of Attic tragedy on the travails of the *oikos* and its place in the rapidly changing democratic *polis*, the reconfiguration of the heredity of kings and tyrants as a source of internal, civic, and cosmic upheaval, created a uniquely ideal environment

¹⁵⁹ See R. C. T. Parker 2009.

for the idea of ancestral fault. In that setting, ancestral fault can be seen to fill a need at the thematic core of the genre, one that has no parallel in any other genre.

Tragedy's self-conscious engagement with the traditional stories of myth, its massive involvement in the redefinition of the collective past and of its meanings for the individual, the house, and the city, and its constant questioning of the actual weight of earlier times in the course of the present must be part of the relevant picture. The specific experiment of tragedy with time and cognition is certainly a major aspect of its recurrent interest in ancestral fault. No earlier poetic genre has put so much emphasis on the role of perception in shaping memory, the fragmentations of perspective running through the social group. In tragedy, more than anywhere else in early Greek literature, even in Herodotus or Thucydides, the past is contested ground, with one portrayal of its relevance opposed to another, one claim to authority undermining the last one, and every event of the drama inscribed in long temporal sequences that tend to go back far into the past and often project forward into the present as aetiology. The emphasis on conflict, the lack of agreement that pits voice against voice in every play, and the privileged role taken by the revelations of prophecy in the genre make for particularly diverse and varied temporal textures. The distinctive role of the tragic chorus in the construction of these elaborate frescoes of relevant time produced year after year in Athens adds another level of complexity to the picture; it is no coincidence that the great majority of references to ancestral fault in tragedy, if they do not appear in the speeches of prophets, are found in choral odes. With its powerful claim on meaning in time, the idea of punishment through generations meets a distinctive demand of the genre.

Another consideration, probably more important than the last two, but certainly more difficult to define properly, is what can be called the theological investment of tragedy. Elevated to the loftiest heights of poetic authority as the master genre of imperial Athens, tragedy was able to tap into every other form of discourse about the gods, earlier and contemporary, and channel their message into its own. The poetic and ritual traditions of the entire Greek world, the knowledge of all its expounders, and the many representations of divinity that competed and coexisted in the arenas of civic religion were material for appropriation and contestation in the tragic spectacle. Tragedy opened a field of thought and experimentation about divinity and human agency, with a horizon of possibilities and vigour of transformation, that was without precedent in Greek culture. The counterintuitive idea that children can be punished for the faults of

their ancestors was immensely appealing for tragic explorations of human freedom and agency. In the very middle of the existential paradoxes set up and deconstructed by tragedy over the years, it was particularly malleable, open to a limitless number of adaptations, and it could be reconfigured at will to embody this or that message. Every prominent type of ancestral fault found in the earlier record, such as the portrait of theodicy at the centre of Solon's *Elegy to the Muses*, and every tale of generational misfortune attached to the myths about the great houses, such as the Attridae and the Labdacids, found its way to tragedy, where it was echoed and amplified. By the end of the fifth century it had taken more shapes and played more roles in the many performances of tragedy than in all the preceding centuries of Greek literature combined.

Whatever his antecedents were in earlier traditions of myth, or whether there really were any, Aeschylus put the idea to great use in the *Agamemnon* and the *Seven against Thebes*. In both plays, the temporal perspective of the text progressively builds up the anticipation of a deeper presence of the past that is made to explode on stage later in the second half of the dramatic sequence.¹⁶⁰ An element of surprise is built into the appearance of the idea, and the power of its effect on the audience augmented by the shock of its sudden uncovering. Whereas it is used to further link the last play of the trilogy to the earlier two in the case of the *Seven against Thebes*, and thus retrospectively reassert the temporal perspective of the connected plays, it appears more prominently than anywhere else in the first play of the *Oresteia* and serves as a background and a contrast to what follows, better to reappear with a brief but significant reference at the end of the *Eumenides*. A dark intimation of the weight of the past, it is fragmented in a spectrum of unresolved character perspectives in the *Agamemnon*, but conveyed through the majestic vision of one choral ode in the *Seven against Thebes*. In both cases, the idea is traced back to an origin, the cause of an ancient crime, whose effects continue to reverberate in the actions and language of the present. The households of both trilogies are staged as continuous wholes over three generations spanning cycles of interlocked crime and punishment, and the justice of Zeus offered to the gaze of the audience as a vertiginous vision of inhuman time. Ancestral fault, in each case, is a pillar of the edifice.

The situation in Sophocles is significantly different. Removing the references to ancestral fault in the *Antigone* or the *Oedipus at Colonus* would not transform the essence of these plays: the outcome would be a

¹⁶⁰ Cf. Sewall-Rutter 2007: 123–5; cf. de Romilly 1968: 87–112.

loss of characterisation, a poorer framework of interpretation. No precise causes are identified for understanding the continued misfortunes of the Labdacid household in either play, and no clear divine framework of intelligible justice and retribution.¹⁶¹ With or without ancestral fault, the realm of divinity remains almost entirely opaque. There is no fragmentation of perspective concerning the idea in these plays, pitting one interpretation of ancestral fault against another, and no privileged view of its extent and reality. What we find, in each case, is reference to earlier formulations of the idea, and its instrumentalisation as a subtle web of inferences and images to better flesh out the characters and add further connotations to the consequences of their choices. The social stakes of the crisis in the city and the ethical contours of its various actors, including the chorus, are given many new shades of meaning through the ancestral fault of the second *stasimon* of the *Antigone*, and the Oedipus of the *Oedipus at Colonus* would be an altogether different figure without his rich usage of this theme in his last 'apology'. One of the details that makes that usage of ancestral fault particularly stand out in the late play of Sophocles is the level of its self-consciousness. The many tragic portraits of the Labdacid ancestral fault lie behind Oedipus' very cunning usage of the theme in his speech. His ability to transform it into a tool of rhetoric is based on the shared expectations of the audience, which Sophocles manipulates to great effect.

Euripides plays a much more radical game with the idea of ancestral fault, bringing the patterns found in the work of his predecessors to their logical limits. Greatly expanding on the temporal depth achieved by Aeschylus with his generations linked in crime, he pushes the origins of the cycles of transgression and punishment much further back for both houses. Whereas in the *Seven against Thebes* the woes of the family are traced to the crime of Laius in begetting a child, with no further indication, and no explanation as to why that was a crime, the *Phoenissae* insists on the antecedents of Laius' disobedience and dwells at length on earlier events, the slaughter of the Dragon by Cadmus, a killing that brings together the families of both Oedipus and Creon in the same act of bloodshed, and sets up a background for making sense of the internecine killing of the present through the killings of the past and the ancient wrath

¹⁶¹ Something, however, that is not true for the *Electra*. In identifying the common characteristics of authors in tragedy, scholars tend to make sweeping statements and reproduce patterns that ultimately go back to the *Frogs* and Aristotle, and thus to downplay the specificities of the individual texts. That being said, the usage of the idea of ancestral fault in the *Antigone* and the *Oedipus at Colonus* is distinctively 'Sophoclean'.

of Ares still seeking an equivalent sacrifice. The primordial foundation act of the city is reinterpreted as the very threat to its continued existence.

In the *Orestes*, similarly, probably produced a year or two later, the Aeschylean model of the *Oresteia* is also given a greatly expanded chronology. While the original transgression is the feast of Thyestes in the *Agamemnon*, or possibly the adultery of Atreus, the scope of the past is made to include the murder of Myrtilus by Pelops a generation before, and the continued punishment of the original ancestor Tantalus. It appears here as an event that reaches to the dawn of time, and that has even contributed to giving the cosmos itself its present shape, affecting the course of the heavenly bodies; a fitting context for the pitilessly dark world of the play, and for the final decision of the siblings to destroy the house themselves once and for all.¹⁶² The *Iphigenia in Tauris* offers a similarly sweeping experimentation with the meaning of the family's past, rendering it inoffensive this time by transforming the tokens of its ancient transgressions as so many harmless domestic heirlooms, while in the *Chrysippus* the ancestral fault of one household could be tantalizingly read through that of the other, with the rape of Chrysippus, Pelops' son following the murder of Myrtilus, the cause of Laius' curse, and everything else that followed for the Labdacids.¹⁶³ The range of Euripidean experimentations with the temporalities and irony of ancestral fault is matched only by its role in characterisation, from the archaising prophecy of Tiresias in the *Phoenissae* to the emphatically modern, scientific tone of Electra in the *Orestes*. The versatility of ancestral fault is greater in Euripides than it is anywhere else.¹⁶⁴

Repetition is at the heart of what ancestral fault is in tragedy, and the stories of two families at the heart of this repetition. Over the course of the fifth century a large number of plays returned to the generational travails of the Atridae and Labdacids and revisited the notion that ancestral crimes were active in the punishment of their descendants. If every expression of the idea is unique and follows its own logic, it also activates references to other such expressions, and, with time, as the archive continued to grow and accumulate parallel upon parallel, the stories came with ever-clearer patterns of expectations – expectations that could be met, subverted, circumscribed, or ignored. In the *Oedipus Tyrannus*, to give the most famous example, there is no reference to ancestral fault, not even a hint,

¹⁶² On the debates about the 'tone' of the play, see M. Wright 2008: 119–24, with bibliography.

¹⁶³ See p. 377. Note that contact between the two families is probably attested in the Hesiodic *Catalogue* already (F 193 MW).

¹⁶⁴ Cf. Saïd 1978: 443–7.

and reading the play through the ancestral curse of the Labdacids is as unjustified as it is wrong. The fact that it is not present is what can be called an emphatic absence, a denial of expectations that says something about the play, its rewriting of tradition, and the limitations of knowledge and cognition staged in it. The theme of ancestral fault, at any rate, is not limited to these two houses of myth, and we find it attested in cycles as diverse as that of Heracles or the story of the Danaids. It probably played a role in some of the dramas devoted to the families of Athamas and Cresphontes, and, considering its place in the limited corpus that has made its way to us, it must have appeared elsewhere in the mass of the plays that have been lost.¹⁶⁵ The extent of the idea in the full range of tragedy and its familiarity to the audience, beyond the scope of the Atreid and Labdacid stories, will never be known. But, by 428, it was possible for Euripides to activate the complex of ideas, and its whole range of connotations and associations, however vaguely, with just a few words and images in the *Hippolytus* – without reference to a single event of myth.¹⁶⁶

References to ancestral fault in tragedy played a part in the genre that was motivated first and foremost by internal logic. The unprecedented repetition of the idea in tragedy, year after year, play after play, the accumulation of its patterns and the consequent construction of expectations that followed them, its emphatic reinscription at the heart of the mythical tradition, made its ramifications and its value as an idea appear ever more clearly. There was never any doctrine of ancestral fault in Greek tragedy, but the process of crystallisation at play in fixing the words, images, and stories associated with the idea gave it a prominent node of references, and the contours of a circumscribed substance. By the end of the fifth century, tragedy can be said to have hardened the patterns of implicit theology into visible shape.

I have lost track of the times I have seen references to ancestral fault in tragedy as survivals of archaic or primitive thought. Statements of this kind turn the evidence on its head. Even if we discover a papyrus tomorrow that shows the presence of an ancestral curse in the *Oedipodia*, the fact will remain that tragedy gave an unprecedented prominence to ancestral fault, insistently exploring its many facets over and over again, exploring its echoes and connotations in myriad ways. The many configurations of the idea, in return, contributed in making tragedy what it is. Ancestral fault is not 'the Archaic doctrine'. It is nowhere more at home than at the heart of the 'Classical Enlightenment'.

¹⁶⁵ For Athamas in tragedy, see Gagné 2013.

¹⁶⁶ See Gagné (forthcoming a).

Conclusion

The long experimentation of tragedy with ancestral fault in the fifth century presents us with the portrait of a consolidation of the idea around a few core themes, images, stories, and words. It shows a convergence of all the earlier trajectories of ancestral fault in one large web of equivalences. This is part of a much broader process of synchronic development. Parallel to what we can see in Herodotus, it can also be compared to some patterns that can be observed in the contemporary evolution of religious life in the classical *polis*, both in the cultural imagination of ritual purification, and in the deployment of the our concept in oratory.

The old *agos* of the Alcmaeonids was a burning issue during the time of Cleisthenes and in the early days of the Peloponnesian War, if we can trust our sources.¹ It was a question that clearly divided Athenian society, as it must have had some currency, and a certain hold on people's hopes and fears for the city, for it to be used by the Spartans at all in their official communications, even if their demands were rejected in both cases, and the taint of Alcmaeonid filiation was not a sufficiently strong motivation to make the cities abandon support of their implicated leaders. The range and extent of the pollution, the risks it involved, its significance for the community, and what it said about the past on the affairs of the present were matters of discord and disagreement, debate and competing evaluations in the group. The nature of the ancestral fault at play, and of the effect it had on *genos* and *polis*, was a fracture point in the internal conflicts of the city. When it came to the concrete matters of ritual action or political deliberation, the evaluation of the idea was a matter of sharp opposition; different responses to it often concluded in antagonism and contested claims to authority, and they remained a source of contention throughout the period.

Shared ancestors could define a group of any size, from the tiniest household to the city, the ethnic group, or humanity in general.

¹ See pp. 206–9 and 306–25.

Tritopatores (or Tritopateres, or Tritopatreis), for instance, cult figures of ancestors found in many parts of the Greek world, are attested for individuals, the *genos*, cities, and the whole of mankind.² In the fifth century one could pour libations to the Tritopatores of a specific group, or refer to *the* Tritopatores. With the prevalence of kinship imagery as a model of group identification in the classical city, determining the nature and the value of someone's ancestors remained an important source of knowledge and potential conflict. Identifying the presence of an ancestral fault, and thus a major source of risk, was a claim that could be used to attack an individual, or a precious insight into the causes of a present misfortune, and the (potentially lucrative) ways of its deliverance. The kind of conflict and questioning that surrounded the *agos* of the Alcmaeonids in the fifth century was found at all other levels of kinship.

The story of the Aegidai presented by Herodotus 4.149 shows the power of the ancestral fault of the Labdacids making its way to the recent past, through more than ten generations, into the world of the classical period.³ The 'Erinyes of Laius and Oedipus' are identified by the oracle as the responsible force behind the childlessness of their very distant descendants:

Οἰολύκου δὲ γίνεται Αἰγεύς, ἐπὶ οὗ Αἰγεῖδαι καλέονται, φυλὴ μεγάλη ἐν Σπάρτῃ. Τοῖσι δὲ ἐν τῇ φυλῇ ταύτῃ ἀνδράσι οὐ γὰρ ὑπέμειναν τὰ τέκνα, ἰδρύσαντο ἐκ θεοπροπίου Ἑρινύων τῶν Λαΐου τε καὶ Οἰδιπόδεω ἱρόν· καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο ὑπέμειναν. <Συνέβη δὲ> τῷτο τοῦτο καὶ ἐν Θήρῃ τοῖσι ἀπὸ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τούτων γεγονόσι.

He had a son born to him, Aegeus, from whom the Aegidae, a great Spartan clan, take their name. The men of this clan, finding that none of their children lived, set up, by the instruction of an oracle, a temple of the avenging spirits of Laius and Oedipus, after which the children lived. Thus it fared also with the children of the Aegidae at Thera (trans. Godley).

The Erinyes of the two paradigmatic figures who suffered violence at the hands of their sons thus continue to threaten the survival of their descent centuries later.⁴ Herodotus' tale revolves around the problem of kinship continuity and conflict between the generations. The refusal of son to follow father, and the barrenness of both following this conflict, obviously echoes the generational conflict of their Labdacid ancestors. Only the foundation of a sanctuary, the commemoration of the primordial spirits in cult, will allow for the punishment to cease and the line to continue, in

² See e.g. Gagné 2007b.

³ Cf. Paus. 9.5.14. For the Aegidae in historiographical tradition, see Vannicelli 1992.

⁴ See Asheri *et al.* 2007: 676.

Thera and in Sparta – that is, both the lines of the father in the colony and that of his son in the metropolis. The story told in Herodotus 4.149, if it gives us absolutely no information concerning the real foundation of an actual cult in seventh-century Sparta, is a fascinating witness to the tales that could be spun around the dangerous inheritance of Laius and Oedipus a generation after the *Oresteia*, at the time of the Peloponnesian War. Similar aetiological tales explained the contemporary practices of cult of certain kinship groups as expiation for the crime of an ancestor; examples include the human sacrifices of the Athamantidae staged at Alos described by Herodotus 7.197, which echoed the attempted sacrifice of Phrixos by Athamas, or the temple service of the Locrian maidens for the rape of Cassandra by Ajax, a peculiar local cult mentioned in a number of texts, including by Plutarch in the *De sera numinis vindicta* (12: 557c).⁵ Both ritual complexes were, according to the stories that were told, established through the consultation of an oracle, and their significance reverberated over the entire community. But the majority of our sources concern the fears of individuals with the weight of their ancestry.

One particularly rich document is the so-called *lex sacra* of Selinous, the mid-fifth-century inscription, composed of two columns on a lead tablet, that details a number of ritual prescriptions of sacrifice and purification.⁶ The first column explains how and when one should sacrifice to various divinities with special links to the household, including Zeus Eumenes and the Eumenides. In the second column the text describes rituals of purification from *Elasteroi*. It is not clear how the two columns of the tablet are related to each other, and what was its actual function.⁷ Is it a ritual manual designed for the usage of specialists? A codification of local sanctuary practice? The new regulations of a public reform? Different views have been defended over the past twenty years, and more will undoubtedly emerge. The fundamental divergence between the interpretation of the *editio princeps* presented by Jameson, Jordan, and Kotansky in 1993 and the more recent 2010 monograph of Robertson is an indication of the extent of the disagreement. This is not the place to enter that debate; I will limit myself instead to noting the possible echoes of ancestral fault in each column, and reviewing its configuration in the text.

⁵ See Graf 2000; Redfield 2003: 85–150; Budin 2008: 228; Gagné 2013; cf. Burkert 1984.

⁶ See Jameson, Jordan, and Kotansky 1993; Dubois 1995; Clinton 1996; Burkert 1999; Johnston 1999: 46–63; Georgoudi 2001; Lupu 2005: 359–87; Robertson 2010.

⁷ See Jameson, Jordan, and Kotansky 1993: 50–60; Clinton 1996; Lupu 2005: 365–6; cf. Robertson 2010: 4–5.

In the middle of column A, the text explains how one is to sacrifice to the Tritopatreis. Two types of sacrifice are famously distinguished: one is to be made ‘as to the heroes’, while the other is to be made ‘as to the gods’.⁸ The recipients of the first sacrifice, which involves a libation poured ‘through the roof’ (11: δι’ ὀρόφο), are the impure Tritopatreis (9–10: τοῖς Τριτοπατρεῦσι τοῖς μιαιοῖς), and the ‘sprinkling round’ that accompanies the sacrifice (12–13: καὶ περιρᾶναντες καταλινάντο) probably designates a gesture of purification.⁹ The text is careful to specify that only ‘those who have the right shall sacrifice’ (12: καταγιζόντο τοῖς ἁγίοις), a restriction that is parallel to the statement found at the beginning of the column, specifying that ‘the persons of the household’ are to consecrate some offering (3: καθαιγίζεν δὲ τὸς ἁποσπεύους).¹⁰ The ritual manipulation of offerings to the tainted Tritopatreis is a source of danger for the involved descent groups, and only some can perform it without breach.

There is no such restriction for the sacrifice to the pure Tritopatreis (13: τοῖς καθαροῖς), which are to receive a libation of honey-mix, and an elaborate sympotic setting, as if to consecrate their continued commensality with the group by *theoxenia*.¹¹ One sacrifice follows the other (κῆπειτα); they are not opposed as alternatives but united as a sequence. Selected kinsmen, possibly in a house (A 20–1: Φοῖβοι), perhaps in a sanctuary, are periodically to enact some kind of propitiation of these ancestral figures of cult, whose division into pure and impure covers all eventualities.¹² There is no question of identifying specific ancestors here, but rather a careful concern for including them all in the ritual action, and dividing them in the appropriate categories. Through these sacrifices and purifications, the danger of tainted ancestors is thus circumscribed and held in check, and the continuity of descent preserved. The periodical nature of the sacrifice indicates that the group is never entirely free from the impure Tritopatreis, and that their ominous presence can continue to be taken for granted.

⁸ Jameson, Jordan, and Kotansky 1993: 36; Scullion 2000; Georgoudi 2001; Ekroth 2002: 236; Henrichs 2005: 55; Parker 2005b; Robertson 2010: 160–1; 164–5.

⁹ Jameson, Jordan, and Kotansky 1993: 73–6; Robertson 2010: 162–4. As part of his interpretation of the inscription as a document of civic religion centred on the agricultural calendar, Robertson (2010: 155–65) reads the reference to the impure Tritopatreis in the context of the seasonal cycle. Most other interpreters (Jameson, Jordan, and Kotansky 1993: 29–34; 67–73; Clinton 1996: 170–2; Georgoudi 2001) have seen the impurity of the ancestral Tritopatreis as either a legacy from the past or, more improbably, a later pollution of the ancestors by their descendants.

¹⁰ Robertson (2010: 156; 160, n. 22) believes that this refers to ‘a priestly clan exercising a special skill’. Whatever the case, the fact is that the ritual action surrounding the impure Tritopatreis is more tightly controlled than that concerning the pure ones.

¹¹ Lupu 2005: 375–6; Robertson 2010: 161; 165; cf. 213–28. ¹² See Lupu 2005: 367.

A more specific deliverance is aimed at by the text of column B, which indicates how one can be purified of an *elasteros*. Although this has been put into question by some, I can see little reason to doubt that the *elasteros* of the inscription is related to the *alastôr* of tragedy.¹³ Like *alastôr*, it has a special link to the household, it can appear as a consequence of murder, it is a source of pollution that can be purified, and it is defined by how it is perceived: the text distinguishes the *elasteros* that is heard (ἐπακουστός) from the one that is seen (ἐφορατός). Another distinction made in the text is that between the guest-*elasteros*, the ξενικός, and the ancestral one, the πατρῷος.¹⁴ The difference is one between space and time, the ξενικός coming in from outside, and the πατρῷος being inherited from an earlier generation. In both cases, the *elasteros*'s presence is due to the actions of someone else, something that the text recognises by distinguishing these two types of *elasteroi* from the one that punishes a man who has himself committed murder. The emphasis on the αὐτο- of αὐτορέκτας is key here, as the element that distinguishes the *elasteros* of lines 1–3 from those of lines 7–8.¹⁵ Although individual responsibility is singled out, the type of polluting force exercised by the *elasteros* is ultimately the same in all cases, and so is the purificatory procedure.

On both columns of the Selinous inscription, the idea that an ancestral pollution can be purified plays a central part in the text. Whereas the attention is centred on the polluted Tritopatris in column A, it is placed on the individual who wants to be delivered of an *elasteros* in column B. Column A refers to the sacrifices that have to be performed by a group, presumably a household, but very possibly a larger kinship unit. Column B, on the other hand, describes the purification of an individual. And while the first text deals with a periodical ritual event, the second seems to be concerned with the punctual occurrence of an occasional purification. The two columns are obviously complementary in their difference, but the exact modality of their relation cannot be satisfactorily resolved in the

¹³ Jameson, Jordan, and Kotansky 1993: 40–56; 70–6; 116–20; Dubois 1995: 138–44; North 1996: 295–8; Clinton 1996: 174–9; Giuliani 1998; Matthaiou 1999; Burkert 1999: 29–33; 2000; Lupu 2005: 371–2; Robertson 2010: 229–40; Patera 2010.

¹⁴ See Lupu 2005: 385; Robertson 2010: 220–2, with references; cf. *LSS* 115 B 29–37. Perhaps this has something to do with the exchange between Clytemnestra and the chorus in the *Agamemnon* at 1497–1576 (see p. 403), where the queen eventually insists that the *alastôr* is a host of the house, and it might be convinced to leave and visit another family, while the chorus insists that it is tied to the house and the *genos*. That disagreement on the nature of the *alastôr* is a parallel to the distinction of the Selinous inscription between the *elasteros* that is ξενικός or πατρῷος. The *Agamemnon* scene, it can further be noted, puts emphasis on how the *alastôr* is perceived.

¹⁵ Jameson, Jordan, and Kotansky 1993: 44; Lupu 2005: 382; Robertson 2010: 214–15; 225–8; cf. p. 388.

present state of knowledge. One common element is the prescriptive nature of the text found in both columns, which is one of the many reasons why the inscription has been called a law.¹⁶ There is no good reason to continue referring to this inscription as a law, but the prescriptive tone of the text should be a necessary element of any serious attempt to make sense of it. What matters, for us, is that it conveys a sense of authority, a position of superior knowledge allowing for the codification of important practices of cult. Somebody, somehow, has the mandate to tell others how these things must be done. The reference to *δóíá* and *πατρῴα* suggests that tradition is an important element of the authority claimed by the text, but if it rested on accepted tradition alone it would hardly have needed to enter into so many details, or even to be written at all. The authority of the ritual prescription derives from a special source. What that source is we do not know, but it had sufficient weight to support serious claims on the purification of ancestral fault. The periodical offering to the polluted Tritopatreis and the ritual deliverance of an individual from the pollution of an ancestral *elasteros* were part of a larger programme of authority asserted by the text on the ritual practices of a group. There can be little doubt that that authority, whatever its nature, was not accepted by all.

A more detailed picture of the conflicts involved in the claims of some to know how to purify the taint of ancestral fault can be found in the famous passage from the second book of Plato's *Republic*, where Adeimantus refers to the 'fault of the ancerstors', *ἀδίκημα . . . προγόνων* (364c).¹⁷ That passage is generally referred to as a disparaging reference of Plato (few ever even note who is speaking at that point in the dialogue) to the creed of 'Orphic' initiations by scholars of Greek religion. The text, I believe, is both more complex and more interesting than that. Adeimantus presents the claims of the itinerant ritual specialists as an example of the challenges offered by traditional poetic and religious authority to the acceptance of justice as a guide of conduct. Completing the speech of his brother Glaukon, he tries to show that appearances, perception, and reputation are at the heart of the present debate on justice, and that this allows one to turn what the traditional and the more contemporary religious authorities say about the superiority of justice on its head (362c–367e).¹⁸ Seeming, together with the spectacles of rewards and punishments adduced by poets

¹⁶ On the problematic category of sacred laws, see now Carbon and Pirenne-Delforge 2012.

¹⁷ See the very full list of references in Bernabé 2004–7, vol. II: 138–40; cf. Graf 2011: 60–2.

¹⁸ Cf. Moors 1981.

and writers to demonstrate the triumph of justice, can as easily be used to make a case for injustice instead. The challenge, for Socrates, as Adeimantus says at the end of his speech, is to show ‘what it is that each inherently does to its possessor – whether he does or does not escape the eyes of gods and men – whereby the one is good and the other evil’ (367e).¹⁹ The different understandings that one can have of ancestral fault are used as an element of this demonstration.

Some poets, including Homer and Hesiod, clearly state that the just will be rewarded and the unjust punished, and they use the concepts of afterlife sanction and generational punishment to make the point that no one, despite all appearances to the contrary, gets away with injustice (363a–e). In addition to the rewards and punishments that await us in the afterlife, one incentive sung by poets to celebrate justice is the idea that one’s actions have consequences on descendants. The statement that the children’s children of the pious man who keeps his oath, and his *genos* thereafter, are rewarded, echoes the famous line of Hesiod’s *Works and Days* quoted by Herodotus in 6.86, and the language of the sentence is close to *Iliad* 20.308, one of the lines quoted by Celsus as a traditional teaching of Hellenic religion to illustrate the principle of ancestral fault in his attack against Christianity.²⁰ The same passage also echoes a *topos* close to the lamentations of Theognis about the fundamental injustice of ancestral fault (364b).²¹ The speech of Adeimantus casts a very wide net in its review of the literature on the perceptions of justice and gives a significant role to the idea of ancestral fault in its demolition of the values of these teachings.

Against the reference to Hesiod’s *Works and Days* 285, it quotes *Works and Days* 287–9 at length to illustrate the ease of vice (364cd).²² Against the fear that terrible punishments await the transgressor or his descendants in the underworld, it refers to those poets who complain that many good men live a life of suffering and many unjust men enjoy abundance. And more importantly, against those who say that pollution attaches itself to the transgressor or his descendants, it brings forward the point that the same people make, to the effect that ritual purifications can release from ancient

¹⁹ Cf. Vegetti 1998: ‘Alla fine la diagnosi di Adimanto sullo stato della cultura ateniese è impietosa . . . La giustizia diventa così un valore puramente retorico.’

²⁰ 363d: οἱ δ’ ἔτι τούτων μακροτέρους ἀποτείνουσιν μισθοὺς παρὰ θεῶν· παῖδας γὰρ παίδων φασὶ καὶ γένος κατόπισθεν λείπεσθαι τοῦ ὁσίου καὶ εὐόρκου. ταῦτα δὴ καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα ἐγκωμιάζουσιν δικαιοσύνην.

²¹ See pp. 267–72.

²² For the usage of Hesiod in the *Republic*, see the excellent discussion of Van Noorden 2010.

taints. The various prose and poetic authorities that define justice can be pitted against one another, or used to defend the opposite point from the one they are making. The notion of ancestral fault is used in that discussion as an example of a statement from the cultural authorities of Greek religion on justice that can be instrumentalised and co-opted for the exact opposite aim. Ancestral fault, which serves as a bulwark against the unjust acquisition of wealth in Solon's *Elegy to the Muses*, plays a different role in this scenario.

It is in that context that Adeimantus mentions the ἀδίκημα . . . προγόνων that the itinerant priests and diviners claim to know how to purify. They profess to have a special power from the gods, which they activate through initiations and sacrifices to heal or to cure, and they know how to perform their rituals through the books of Musaios and Orpheus (364b–365a). Their purifications are presented as initiations, which they offer to both individuals and cities, and the implication of the text is that they seek a maximum of profit from it. The purification can be directed at the living, or, more surprisingly, at the dead (365a), a statement that could be related to the type of ritual action for the polluted Tritopatris pictured in column A of the Selinous inscription. The hereditary transmission of pollution for the fault of an ancestor and punishment in the afterlife are thoroughly imbricated in that portrait, as two sides of the same coin, not competing systems.

One particularly noteworthy aspect of the passage is its reference to the many books of Musaios and Orpheus, 'according to which' the ἀγύρται and μάντιες conduct their rituals, and mention of the power (δύναμις) from the gods which they have acquired through sacrifices and incantations. The heart of the operation is their ability to convince people that their power does in fact exist (364b: πείθουσιν; 364e: πείθοντές) and that there are truly (note the ἄρα at 364e) deliverances and purifications from the faults by which their clients are tainted. The condescension of the picture painted by Adeimantus clearly shows how little respect he has for their claims to authority and their prescriptions for the release of ancestral fault. The passage offers a vivid evocation of the types of conflicts in which the idea of ancestral fault could be made to play a part.

Adeimantus' speech reflects the image of the oath-keeper's descendants from Hesiod's *Works and Days*, and it echoes traditional poetry such as Theognis' poem about ancestral fault. But what stands out in the passage from the point of view of the web of written references on which the idea of ancestral fault is written is the fact that the books used by the ἀγύρται and μάντιες are ascribed to Musaios and Orpheus and are thus hexametric

poems. In other words, there was, Adeimantus tells us, a hubbub of hexametric poems that described how to purify individuals and cities of ancestral fault. The language of these texts, written in the archaising style of classical apocrypha, was bound to use and echo the language of earlier texts, and poems ascribed to Orpheus in this period, or read by interpreters of his poetry, could also contain references to the most up-to-date theories of contemporary scientific thought, as the Derveni papyrus shows.²³ Another text, the *Physika* of Orpheus, where the Tritopatores were presented as the common ancestors of mankind, the keepers of the winds, and the guardians of the threshold of life and death, illustrates the interweaving of 'Presocratic' thought and traditional poetic language and imagery of this literature.²⁴ If the hubbub of books mentioned by Adeimantus looked anything like this, its references to the earlier formulations of ancestral fault could have included any and all parts of the earlier and contemporary literary record. The explicit theology of some of these texts, and of all their exegesis, must have elaborated precise shapes and functions for this idea that played such a clear role in the activities of the ἀγύρται and μάντεις. That is very possibly the context where an explicit theology of ancestral fault, written over and through the implicit theology of earlier literature, was first made possible. The fact that this further textualisation of Greek religion provoked such ridicule and condemnation as the ones found in Plato, and developed or hinted at elsewhere, gives us an idea of the kind of environment in which opposition to the explicit theology of ancestral fault might have first taken shape as well.

The plurality of books mentioned by Adeimantus is an important element of the passage.²⁵ He is not presenting the ἀγύρται and μάντεις as the agents of one religious movement here, or the upholders of a creed, but as a type of free religious actors with a claim to authority and no institutional attachment.²⁶ The gist of the passage is to use the authorities of Greek culture against each other, and to exploit their contradictions to make them say everything and its opposite. There is no reason to believe that the reference to ancestral fault is any different. The plurality of books used by the itinerant initiators is underlined as an example of the variety of views and contradictions that undermine the validity of their message.

²³ See Betegh 2004: 278–348; Martín 2008.

²⁴ Gagné 2007b.

²⁵ See Bernabé 2008a; cf. Eur. *Hipp.* 952–4.

²⁶ The passage is often compared to Theophrastus' reference to Ὀρφεοτελεσταί (*Char.* 16.12); cf. also Pl. *Meno* 81a: οἱ μὲν λέγοντες εἰσι τῶν ἱερέων τε καὶ τῶν ἱερειῶν ὅσους μεμῆλκε περὶ ὧν μεταχειρίζονται λόγον οἷοις τ' εἶναι διδόναι; Hippoc. *Morb. sacr.* 2.1–2 Jouanna (see pp. 339–41) and ὅσοι δὲ παρὰ τοῦ τέχνην ποιουμένου τὰ ἱερά of P.Derveni col. xx. See Jiménez 2008.

The passage is not evidence for the ‘Orphic doctrine of inherited guilt’, as we often read, but for the fact that the purification of faults committed by ancestors can be attributed to itinerant religious initiators who used books ascribed to Musaios and Orpheus. The representations of ancestral fault found in these books, for all we know, could have been as numerous and varied as the books themselves. The one thing that the passage does say about the ancestral stain that the ἀγύρται and μάντεις claim to know how to purify is that it is ‘some fault’ or another (τι ἀδίκημά του γέγονεν αὐτοῦ ἢ προγόνων), and that it can be equated to the fault committed by an individual himself; again, the parallels with the Selinous inscription are worth noting. Whatever the case, the point is that this passage is, very clearly, not a reference to the idea of a primordial, original crime.²⁷ The purifications of that text have nothing to do with the so-called Zagreus myth.

The Zagreus myth is an anthropogonic story describing the creation of mankind from the consequences of an ancient crime.²⁸ The Titans lured baby Dionysus to his death with a series of toys set up as traps; after they killed him they boiled and roasted his flesh and then ate it. Athena saved his heart, allowing for the god to be reborn, and Zeus punished the Titans by reducing them to ash with his thunderbolt. The titanic substance of the cannibal deities was mixed up with the divine substance of Dionysus in the conflagration, and humanity was born out of this cataclysmic violence. Persephone, the mother of Dionysus, has held it responsible for her grief ever since. The tale is often read as the account of ‘Orphic original sin’.²⁹

The myth, however, in something close to this form, is only attested with any level of precision in a version related by the sixth-century Neoplatonic philosopher Olympiodorus in his commentary on Plato’s *Phaedo*.³⁰ Luc Brisson, followed by Radcliffe Edmonds, has rightly insisted on the fact that some of the details of Olympiodorus’ text are expressions of distinctively late alchemical theories, and that they could not possibly go

²⁷ Cf. Graf and Johnston (2007: 147): ‘Plato was thinking of concrete ancestors as objects of the rituals in the passage from the *Republic*.’

²⁸ See Graf 1974: 74–5; R. C. T. Parker 1995: 495–498; Graf and Johnston 2007: 66–93; Bernabé 2008b; Henrichs 2011.

²⁹ See e.g. Zhmud 2012[1997]: 229.

³⁰ 1.3–6, with Westerink 1976: 40–1. For the debt of Olympiodorus’ commentary to the lost commentary of Proclus, see n. 41. For Orphism and references to Orpheus in Neoplatonic literature, see now Brisson 2008, with references. For Orphism in late antiquity more generally, see Herrero 2010.

far back in time to an earlier source.³¹ It is a fact that the myth of Zagreus has largely been understood through the works of late Neoplatonist philosophers, to the complete exclusion of what these same philosophers had to say elsewhere about ancestral fault more generally. That being said, Alberto Bernabé has, I believe, convincingly shown that the myth of Zagreus, with its relevance to tales of anthropogony, is in fact much older than Olympiodorus, that its references and allusions are numerous, and that they can be traced back at least to the classical period.³² It does seem to have been seen as the secret account of a *hieros logos* and to be associated with the language of mysteries and *teletai*, and we certainly find it linked to the name of Orpheus more than once. But unless one believes that ‘Orphism’ is a clearly defined religious movement with a central body of texts and doctrines and a sociologically remarkable continuity in time (I certainly do not), the call for seeing the Zagreus myth, its bloody account of anthropogony, and concomitant ideas about ancestral pollution and purification as a necessary background element in the ‘Orphic’ texts where it is not explicitly attested or alluded to cannot be convincingly defended. It strikes me as equivalent to reading Sophocles’ *Oedipus Tyrannus* through the idea of ancestral fault. I agree with those who refuse to impose a rigid model of Orphism on the sources and believe in limiting our usage of the relevant texts to the distinctive features of the language they use.

In a fragment of poetry from Orpheus quoted by Damascius in his commentary to Plato’s *Phaedo* (F 232 Kern = 350 Bernabé), sacrifices are associated with the performance of mystery rites, *orgia*, and a search for release from unjust ancestors.³³ There is unfortunately no way to date the fragment. The lines are quoted by Damascius in the context of Socrates’ reference (62b) to the fact that, according to some secret accounts (ἐν ἀπορρήτοις), we are at present in a prison and must find a release (λύειν) from it. This has led scholars to read an allusion to the myth of Zagreus in the reference to ἐκτελέσουσι λύσιν προγόνων ἀθεμίστων, something that

³¹ Brisson 1992; Edmonds 1999 and 2004. Edmonds’ case, which is based on a reconstruction of the historiography of Orphism, especially the legacy of Comparetti’s work, and the impact of Christian theology on the formulations of scholarship, has contributed to sharpening the debate on the question. It should be developed further in his forthcoming *Redefining Ancient Orphism*.

³² Bernabé 2002 and 2003; cf. the impressive list of references to the scholarship in Bernabé 2004–7, vol. 1: 287, and to the relevant sources at the bottom of page 288.

³³ *In Phaedonem* v. 1, sect. 11.2: ὅτι ὁ Διόνυσος λύσεώς ἐστιν αἴτιος· διὸ καὶ Λυσεύς ὁ θεός, καὶ ὁ Ὀρφεύς φησιν· ἄνθρωποι δὲ τελέεσσας ἑκατόμβας | πέμπουσιν πάσῃσιν ἐν ὥραις ἀμφιέτῃσιν | ὄργια τ’ ἐκτελέσουσι λύσιν προγόνων ἀθεμίστων | μαϊόμενοι· σὺ δὲ τοῖσιν ἔχων κράτος, οὓς κε θέλησθα | λύσεις ἐκ τε πόνων χαλεπῶν καὶ ἀπείρονος οἴστρου; see Westerink 1977: 34–5.

might be true but is far from certain, considering that Damascius, as he so often does, might be reading the lines that he quotes through a completely different filter of interpretation, one that has nothing to do with the context of the passage itself.³⁴ From λύειν, he goes on to talk about Dionysus Λυσεύς, and then the teaching of Orpheus. The relevance of these lines to the interpretation of the passage from Plato's *Phaedo* being discussed in Damascius' commentary is itself a pure product of the late Neoplatonic interpretative grid, of course, and that should make us wary of necessarily reading his interpretation of Dionysus into the lines of Orpheus. It is important to note that Olympiodorus' own commentary on the *Phaedo*, from which comes our one extended description of the Zagreus myth, is itself based on a lost part of Damascius' commentary.

This notwithstanding, that fragment has been used as a reference for the 'Orphic myth of Zagreus' and is often mentioned in discussions of other texts where the myth might be found to play a role.³⁵ At the beginning of the famous Gurôb papyrus (F 31 Kern = 578 Bernabé), for instance, a tantalising text of the third century BC found in the Fayum region of Egypt, which describes in detail the ritual procedure of what seems to be a secret initiation ceremony involving the toys of baby Dionysus (the text is often described as a *hieros logos*), the fragmentary text . . .]ατ εμον ποινας πατερ[. . . has been restored to δῶρον δέξ]ατ' ἐμόν ποινὰς πατέρ[ων ὀθμίστων by Martin West, with an explicit reference to Pindar F 133 Maehler and the lines of Orpheus quoted by Damascius.³⁶ Following perfectly good method, one text is used to reconstruct another. Although separated by almost one thousand years, the two are thus seen as expressions of the same or a related idea, and the ancestral fault of one can be presented as an equivalent to the ancestral fault of the other.

The same logic is at play in the interpretation of texts such as Pindar F 133 Maehler (= 443 Bernabé), to take another example, where the enigmatic reference to the fact that Persephone will accept (δέξεται) the ποινὸν παλαιοῦ πένθεος is read by many as an atonement for the primordial murder of her son Dionysus.³⁷ That logic, more prominently, has had pride of place in reading the famous texts of the funerary gold leaves, where

³⁴ See Graf and Johnston 2007: 147.

³⁵ Bernabé 2004–7, vol. 1: 288 refers approvingly to Kern's statement that 'ad generis humani vitiositatem insitam, cuius auctores Titanes sunt, referenda est.'

³⁶ M. L. West 1983: 170–1; cf. Hordern 2000: 136; Bernabé 2004–7, vol. 11: 151. For the text as a *hieros logos*, see e.g. Burkert 1987: 70–1; Hordern 2000: 131–2; cf. Graf and Johnston 2007: 150–5.

³⁷ See Bernabé 2004–7, vol. 1: 374, with full bibliography; add Graf and Johnston 2007: 117–18; Santamaría 2008.

a *poinē* to Persephone is also found, references to a final deliverance and purity, claims of kinship with Earth and Starry Heaven, a '*poinē* for unrighteous deeds' (7.4 Graf–Johnston = 489 Bernabé: πο<ι>νὰν δ' ἀνταπέ<ι>τε<ις> ἔργων ἔνεκα οὐ<ι>τι δικα<ι>ων), and the γένος ὄλβιον, or γένος οὐράνιον, to which the initiate now belongs.³⁸ As a tablet from Pherae says: 'the initiate is redeemed' (ἄποινος . . . ὁ μύστης).³⁹ The most common strategy of interpretation in the scholarship on these texts has long been to read that complex of images through the myth of Zagreus and see the initiations they echo as attempts to escape from the taint of the original crime at the beginning of humanity, and thus return to the divine, Dionysiac origins of our souls. If that is indeed the nature of the evidence, we have in these texts an expansion of the idea of ancestral fault to the whole of humanity, polluted in its entirety by a primordial crime transmitted through kinship, and continuously avenged by the wrath of Persephone. The combination of that fault from the original ancestors with the possible reference of some gold tablets to reincarnation and the punishments of Hades would be somewhat reminiscent of the combination of ancestral fault with eschatology found in Plutarch's *De sera numinis vindicta* and in Proclus' *De decem dubitationibus circa Providentiam*. Proclus' reference to *revelationes et telete* (and the *lysii dii*) at the beginning of Question Nine certainly points to more than a few inferences from the dialogues of Plato, and very possibly to the texts and practices of actual telestic traditions.⁴⁰ It is worth mentioning, in that regard, that Damascius' commentary to the *Phaedo*, from which the Orphic fragment that refers to the λύσιν προγόνων ἀθεμίστων comes, is also largely based on the lost original of Proclus.⁴¹

The notion of an ancestral crime of the Titans that derives from the collocations of sources such as the ones mentioned above has been used to paint the image of a central creed of 'Orphism'. The myth of Zagreus, the reflection of the world it embodies, its direct criticism of the traditional

³⁸ For *poinē* in the tablets: 6 (F 490 Bernabé); 7.4 (F 489 Bernabé). For the application of F 232 Kern 350 Bernabé to the interpretation of the Pelinna tablets, see Graf 1991. For claims of kinship with Earth and Starry Heaven: 1.10 Graf–Johnston (F 474 Bernabé); 2.6–7 (F 476 Bernabé); 5.3 (F 488 Bernabé); 6 (F 490 Bernabé); 7 (F 489 Bernabé); 8.12 and 15 (F 475 Bernabé); 10.3 (F 478 Bernabé); 11.3 (F 479 Bernabé); 12.3 (F 480 Bernabé); 13.3 (F 482 Bernabé); 14.3 (F 483 Bernabé); 16.3 (F 481 Bernabé); 18.3 (F 484a Bernabé); 25.8 (F 477 Bernabé); 29.3–4 (F 484 Bernabé). See Herrero 2008 and Betz 2011 on the usage of kinship imagery in Orphic literature, with references. For the history of scholarship on the gold tablets, see e.g. Edmonds 2011; Bernabé and Jiménez de San Cristóbal 2011; Graf and Johnston 2007: 50–66.

³⁹ 27.4–5 Graf–Johnston F 493 Bernabé.

⁴⁰ See p. 38.

⁴¹ Westerink 1977: 15–17.

accounts of religion, and the powerful justification it gives to the rituals of purification and initiation of the wandering initiation specialists who use the secret books of Orpheus have been placed at the centre of what people mean when they refer to Orphism. The fragmentary nature of the evidence, and the fact that the texts it echoes were secret and hidden, means that any attempt at reconstruction must combine a number of divergent pieces into some coherent shape. The resulting image is an aggregate of fragments, a composite form based on the juxtaposition of apparently related pieces, like an incomplete mosaic.

The problem is that the pieces of the mosaic could easily be rearranged into a different pattern or separated altogether into a number of different mosaics.⁴² The myth of Zagreus, as has often been remarked, most forcibly by Radcliffe Edmonds in recent years, is not explicitly mentioned in the gold leaves, or indeed in most of the 'Orphic' sources where scholars have identified it, and only by accepting a certain model of Orphism can the strategy of reading it as a necessary part of the background be justified. Many have argued that the gold leaves have nothing to do with Orphism, while most will now agree with Graf and Johnston in privileging their link to the Dionysiac mysteries instead.⁴³ A more intricate model is emerging to make sense of the evidence, where the various types of telestic literature, theogonies, cosmogonies, and eschatological texts commonly ascribed to Orphism are seen as criss-crossing, often parallel, sometimes significantly divergent realities.⁴⁴ While few will deny the many shared elements of language and imagery found in apocryphal telestic literature, whether ascribed to Orpheus or not, it is possible to argue for a model less determined by categories (this is Orphic; this is Bacchic; that is clearly Sabaziac; this, on the other hand, is Orphico-Dionysiac), and more by networks and interconnections, an eye for the traces of the multifarious and often contradictory forces at play in producing the specificities of this or that text, and the individual characteristics of its involvement with tradition: what Graf and Johnston have called its *bricolage*.⁴⁵

Here is obviously not the place to enter that complicated and ongoing debate. But the question does have a direct impact on the interpretation of

⁴² See Henrichs 2010. The debates surrounding the nature of Orphism have a long history of fundamental disagreements; cf. the excellent discussions of Herrero 2010: 1–30; Edmonds (forthcoming); Graf and Johnston 2007: 94–184.

⁴³ Graf and Johnston 2007. See now the stimulating collection of essays in Edmonds 2011.

⁴⁴ The seminal study in that direction remains Burkert 1977; cf. Burkert 1982. See more recently Bremmer 2010; Henrichs 2010; Eidinow 2011; and Kindt 2012: 12–35, with bibliography.

⁴⁵ 2007: 70–8; 84–94.

ancestral fault in a number of texts. If we do not accept the notion of a unified Orphism with a clearly defined creed and tradition, then it becomes hard to read the Gurôb papyrus through the Orphic fragment cited by Damascius, or to juxtapose the *poinē* of Pindar F 133 with that of the gold leaves (see n. 38) or the Derveni papyrus.⁴⁶ The gold leaves, without the key of the Zagreus myth, become even more mysterious. The many references to the crimes of ancestors that can be purified by privileged initiators in our various sources are no longer seen as expressions of the same reality (i.e. derived from the taint of the Titans), in that view, rather than so many adaptations, improvisations, rewritings, and developments – exactly what we would expect from a culture without the staying power of a Church or a fixed canon. Some texts might allude to the Zagreus myth, or to a common crime of mankind. Others clearly do not. A number of them might have built their claims on elaborate theogonies, or precise knowledge about the past, while others could have offered more generic projections concerning the dangers of inheritance. Perhaps some of these texts involved the Tritopatores. The point is that ancestral fault, in that view, is not a determined value ('the Orphic doctrine of inherited guilt'), but a resonant idea with many possible shapes, configurations, and ramifications in time and kinship. It is a notion that offered a powerful range of potential meaning to the concerns of telestic literature with origins, purity, and salvation.

One text that shows how important the notion of ancestral fault could be in the imagination of initiations and purifications is the famous reference to telestic madness in *Phaedrus* 244de.⁴⁷ The second madness, described by Socrates after the mantic madness and before the poetic madness of the Muses, is that force of *mania*, later ascribed to Dionysus (265e), which results in a release from the hold of an ancient wrath. The predicament is described as a sickness, νόσος, and great pains, πονοί μέγιστοι, a reference to the severity of the conditions cured by telestic madness. The release, the ἀπαλλαγή, is linked to prayers and services to the gods, and to purifications and *teletai*. It is the prophecy of a madness that indicates these methods of release.⁴⁸ The madness, often associated with the punishment of an ancestral fault in other sources, is here portrayed as the impulse of safeguards against it. It constitutes a form of efficient knowledge which leads the afflicted individual to seek and

⁴⁶ Col. vi: τὴν θυσ[ία]ν τούτου ἔνεκε[ν] π[οιοῦσ]ι[ν] οἱ μά[γο]ι, ὥσπερ εἰ ποινὴν ἀποδίδοντες; cf. Pind. *Ol.* 2.58.

⁴⁷ See still the classic studies of Linforth 1946a and b; cf. Ballériaux 1990; Yunis 2011: 133.

⁴⁸ 244d: ἡ μανία ἐγγενομένη καὶ προφητεύσασα.

perform the rituals that will defend him against the threats of the past. Reason is of no avail in such situations of communication with the divine.

The madness makes the sufferer ἐξάντης ('out of danger') to actual and future ills. It is a protection for him, not his *genos*. It provides him with a λύσις against the threats of the present, but the passage has nothing to say about a *poinë* for the causes of the anger. The *genos*, presumably, remains subject to the ancient anger. The anger, in any case, can manifest itself as a disease, and purifications are effective on the individual. It comes from the deep past, without any indication concerning the identification of its precise cause. Various aspects of ancestral fault are coalesced into one in this image. It is thus particularly striking to note that the reference to the ancient wrath in the passage echoes Euripides' *Phoenissae*.⁴⁹ The words παλαιῶν ἐκ μηνιμάτων are clearly a poeticism, and the unlikely scenario of a common source to Euripides and Plato should be abandoned: ἐκ μηνιμάτων can hardly fit into a hexameter. Plato, as he so often does, is citing from tragedy in the course of a sentence. The remarkable fact is that in the process the ancestral fault of *teletai* and purifications is associated with the ancestral fault of the Labdacids from tragedy. The passage is a witness to the consolidation of the web of references concerning the idea in this period.

The portrayal of telestic madness in *Phaedrus* 244de illustrates particularly well the familiarity of the idea of ancestral fault in the context of initiations and purifications for the audience of Plato. Elliptically mentioned as a given between references to the *maniai* of divination and poetry, it is presented as a well-known element of Greek culture, against which to better trace the contours of the erotic madness with which the dialogue is concerned. Other texts, however, can show how far the idea could be pushed in unfamiliar territory. One such example is Empedocles B 115, which possibly opened the great poem of purifications of the Sicilian master of wisdom, the *Katharmoi*.⁵⁰ The text is an aggregate of lines quoted in different contexts, and almost every element of the passage is a matter for dispute.⁵¹ I will not attempt to revisit any of these debates here. The only point I want to underline is that a fault is placed at the beginning

⁴⁹ 934: Κάδμου παλαιῶν Ἄρεος ἐκ μηνιμάτων. See p. 378.

⁵⁰ Plutarch (*De exilio* 607cd) presents the passage as being placed ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς φιλοσοφίας of Empedocles. For conflicting interpretations of what this means, see e.g. C. Osborne 1987: 30–1; Inwood 2001: 16–19; Bollack 2003: 61. Most scholars place B 112 at the beginning of the poem. The question of the relation between the *Katharmoi* and the *Physika*, and whether there were even two different poems, has been greatly complexified by the publication of the Strasbourg papyrus (see A. Martin and Primavesi 1999; Primavesi 2007b). It remains controversial.

⁵¹ See Hershbell 1973: 191–3; C. Osborne 1987: 30–1; Gagné 2006: 83–7.

of the *daimōn*'s descent into matter and the cycles of reincarnation, and the long succession of births over innumerable generations is imagined as an atonement for that ancient transgression.⁵² The fault is described in two problematic lines, verse 3, which is found only in Plutarch, and verse 4, which appears only in Hippolytus. The two lines are complementary. The first one describes the actual fault, and the second presents that fault as a perjury, a transgression of the 'ancient, eternal decree, sealed by oaths', with which the fragment begins. The μῆνη of line 3 (an emendation of Estienne) presents the fault as a pollution, something that resonates with the title of the poem, and it is placed squarely in the realm of the body. It is a pollution that taints the φίλα γυῖα of the *daimōn*, a statement that is presumably related to the innumerable bodies, the robes of flesh, that the soul will have to travel through in its long odyssey through the macabre landscapes of blood and carcasses described by the poem. The nature of the ἀμπλακίαι that lead to this plurisecular pollution is probably indicated by the dative of the preceding word in the line. The problem is that that word is, in most editions, a sixteenth-century correction. While the great majority of scholars accept Estienne's emendation φόνω, which is much easier to make sense of, some periodically recall the fact that the manuscripts of Plutarch are unanimous in having φόβω instead, which is more difficult to interpret, but certainly not nonsensical.⁵³ If we read the line with φόνω, the ancient crime at the beginning of the cycle of purification is a slaughter, something that fits well with the insistence of the poem on the horrors of sacrifice and the eating of meat. If we read φόβω, a more abstract force of transgression is invoked. Considering our fragmentary knowledge of the poem, and the fact that B 115 might very well be incomplete, it would be imprudent to dismiss that second possibility entirely.⁵⁴

Whatever the case, the fault is presented as a perjury in the next line, the breaking of an oath, and the text goes on to describe at length the consequences of that ἐπιπορκία, and the length of the exile that results from it, the separation from the community of the gods. The activation of the reference to Hesiod's description of the Styx, and of divine perjury on its waters, is developed in the passage, something that is emphasised by the quotation of line 800 of the *Theogony* in line 12 of the passage.⁵⁵ I agree with Jean Bollack in seeing another citation in that passage, that of

⁵² See the fascinating reading of that theme through the physical theories of Empedocles in Primavesi 2007b.

⁵³ M. R. Wright 1981: 272–3; A. Martin and Primavesi 1999: 61–3 (a position that Primavesi retracted in 2001; cf. 2007a); Bremmer 2002: 14 and 141.

⁵⁴ See Gagné 2006. ⁵⁵ See Bollack 2003: 66; Garani 2007.

Aeschylus' *Agamemnon* 1282 in line 13.⁵⁶ The words of Cassandra, used to describe the plight and return of Orestes, are applied to the *daimōn*, and the lot of the last descendant of his *genos* hunted by the ancient fault of an ancestor is thus juxtaposed with the condition of the *daimōn* at the end of his exile through the generations. The *Katharmoi* uses these and other elements of earlier and contemporary poetic tradition to build its unique, profoundly original image of an ancient crime extending its taint through the rebirths of many generations – a deeply unfamiliar reworking of tradition.⁵⁷ I would not insist on describing B 115 as an example of ancestral fault, but it shows something of the impact that the idea could have on parallel notions of the time, and the almost limitless range of configurations in which its echoes could be found.

At the absolute opposite end of such esoteric speculation, and right at the heart of the public space of the lawcourt, the idea of ancestral fault could be referenced as a perfectly clear notion for the members of the jury and used as a rhetorical tool to paint the adversary in a certain way.⁵⁸ There is no better example of this oratorical instrumentalisation of ancestral fault than the symmetrically opposed roles we find it playing in the Lysianic corpus. In the pseudo-Lysianic *Against Andocides*, the accuser explicitly describes the principle of ancestral fault (6.20):

ἐλπίζω μὲν οὖν αὐτὸν καὶ δώσειν δίκην, θαυμάσιον δὲ οὐδὲν ἂν μοι γένοιτο. οὔτε γὰρ ὁ θεὸς παραχρῆμα κολάζει, [ἀλλ' αὕτη μὲν ἐστὶν ἀνθρωπίνη δίκη] πολλαχόθεν δὲ ἔχω τεκμαιρόμενος εἰκάζειν, ὁρῶν καὶ ἐτέρους ἡσεβηκότας χρόνῳ δεδωκότας δίκην, καὶ τοὺς ἐξ ἐκείνων διὰ τὰ τῶν προγόνων ἀμαρτήματα ἐν δὲ τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ δέη πολλὰ καὶ κινδύνους ὁ θεὸς ἐπιτέμπει τοῖς ἀδικοῦσιν, ὥστε πολλοὺς ἤδη ἐπιθυμῆσαι τελευτῆσαντας τῶν κακῶν ἀπηλλάχθαι. ὁ δὲ θεὸς τέλος τούτῳ λυμηνάμενος τῷ βίῳ θάνατον ἐπέθηκε.

Well, I hope that he will indeed pay the penalty, and there would be nothing to surprise me in that; for the deity does not punish immediately, as I may conjecture by many indications, when I see others beside who have paid the penalty long after their impious acts, and their descendants punished for the ancestors' offences. But in the meantime the deity sends upon the wrongdoers many terrors and dangers, so that many men ere now have desired that their end had come and relieved them of their troubles by death. At length, it is only when he has utterly blasted this life of theirs that the deity has closed it in death (trans. Lamb).

⁵⁶ Bollack 2003: 69.

⁵⁷ On the dialogue between the *Katharmoi* and the *Agamemnon* more generally, see Judet de la Combe 2001: 555–558.

⁵⁸ See Dover 1974: 263–4.

The voice of the accuser portrays itself as a religious authority in the speech, a figure with precise knowledge about the gods, ritual, and sacrilege.⁵⁹ Its description of the threat of the ‘ancestors’ offences’ (τὰ τῶν προγόνων ἀμαρτήματα) on the descendants of the transgressor is part of the larger pattern of character definition staged in the speech. The reminder of the fact that gods punish sacrilege through generations, rather than immediately (παρραχρήμα), serves to further isolate Andocides from the rest of the community, to highlight the severity of his crime and evoke a background of divinely sanctioned harshness for the punishment that the city should exercise. It also serves, more importantly, to paint him as an immediate threat for the assembled members of the jury. The preceding section of the speech relates that the polluted Andocides had no qualms about boarding a boat, knowing that his condition put the entire ship in danger. Immediately, following that statement, this section presents him as a potential target of divine wrath for generations to come.⁶⁰ The implication being, of course, that the city itself, if not now, then in later generations, could suffer as well when punishment does strike. Ancestral fault is used here to deepen the special characterisation of Andocides as a source of collective risk. Andocides, it is worth noting, actually managed to turn it on its head, arguing in his own defence speech that his accuser Callias was an ἀλιτήριος (1.130–1), that he was a perjurer who had exposed his own children to divine punishment for his fault, and that the jurors themselves, who had all sworn the μέγας ὄρκος of their function, exposed their own households to a similar risk of *exōleia* if they made the wrong choice. He was acquitted.⁶¹

In another Lysianic speech, a fragment of the ὑπὲρ Φανίου παρανόμων, we can see the exact opposite of the statement expressed in [Lysias] 6.20.⁶² In that passage, found in a quotation from Athenaeus, Lysias ends his description of the punishments that have fallen on the sacrilegious *Kakodaimonistai* with this damning indictment of Kinesias (Athenaeus 552a = F 195 Carey):

ἐκείνων μὲν οὖν ἕκαστος ἀπώλετο ὥσπερ εἰκὸς τοὺς τοιούτους. τοῦτον δὲ τὸν ὑπὸ πλείστων γιγνωσκόμενον οἱ θεοὶ οὕτως διέθεσαν ὥστε τοὺς ἐχθροὺς βούλεσθαι αὐτὸν ζῆν μᾶλλον ἢ τεθνάναι παράδειγμα τοῖς ἄλλοις, ἵν’ εἰδῶσιν ὅτι τοῖς λίαν ὕβριστικῶς πρὸς τὰ θεῖα διακειμένοις οὐκ εἰς τοὺς

⁵⁹ Todd 2007: 408–411.

⁶⁰ On the theme of the polluted man boarding a ship, see e.g. R. C. T. Parker 1983: 129; cf. S. C. Todd 2007: 455. A rebuttal of this charge is sometimes seen in Andocides 1.137–9.

⁶¹ See Furley 1996: 112–14; Gagné 2009b. ⁶² See Calhoun 1913: 32; O. Murray 1990b: 157.

παῖδας ἀποτίθενται τὰς τιμωρίας, ἀλλ' αὐτοὺς κακῶς ἀπολλύουσι, μείζους καὶ χαλεπωτέρας καὶ τὰς συμφορὰς καὶ τὰς νόσους <αὐτοῖς> ἢ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις προσβάλλοντες.

But the fact is that they all died just as one would expect people like that to. As for the most widely known of them, the gods treated him in such a way that his enemies would have wanted him to go on living rather than die, making him an example to others, so that they realize that the gods do not wait and punish the children of people who behave in an utterly outrageous way where divine matters are concerned, but destroy the individuals in question themselves, by striking them with greater and harsher misfortunes and diseases than they impose on others (trans. S. D. Olson).

The wretchedness of Kinesias is a living proof of the infallibility of divine justice. Contrary to the guesses and inferences of [Lysias] 6.20 on the mechanisms of divine punishment (ἔχω τεκμαιρόμενος εἰκάζειν), it is a brilliant, spectacularly clear demonstration of the direct concern of the gods for the punishment of sacrilege. There is no need for arguing that the gods operate beyond our perception. The situation of Kinesias is the embodiment of a theological principle of direct retribution. The passage's condemnation of ancestral fault is designed to underline the justice of the portrait it describes, and its conformity to a world of order and meaning.

A contemporary parallel to that rejection of ancestral fault is chapter 25 of Isocrates' *Busiris*:

καὶ γὰρ τὴν ἀρχὴν οἱ τὸν φόβον ἡμῖν ἐνεργασάμενοι τούτων αἴτιοι γεγόνασι τοῦ μὴ παντάπασι θηριωδῶς διακεῖσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους. ἐκείνοι τοίνυν οὕτως ἀγίως περὶ ταῦτα καὶ σεμνῶς ἔχουσιν ὥστε καὶ τοὺς ὄρκους πιστοτέρους εἶναι τοὺς ἐν τοῖς ἐκείνων ἱεροῖς ἢ τοὺς παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις καθεστώτας, καὶ τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων ἕκαστον οἶσθαι παραχρῆμα δώσειν δίκην, ἀλλ' οὐ διαλήσειν τὸν παρόντα χρόνον, οὐδ' εἰς τοὺς παῖδας ἀναβληθήσεσθαι τὰς τιμωρίας.

For actually, those who in the beginning inspired in us our fear of the gods, brought it about that we in our relations to one another are not altogether like wild beasts. So great, moreover, is the piety and the solemnity with which the Egyptians deal with these matters that not only are the oaths taken in their sanctuaries more binding than is the case elsewhere, but each person believes that he will pay the penalty for his misdeeds immediately and that he will neither escape detection for the present nor will the punishment be deferred to his children's time (trans. Van Hook).

The cultural superiority of the Egyptians is illustrated in that passage by their refusal to believe that people are punished for the perjuries of their ancestors. Or rather, the fact that they do not need to fear that the gods

might strike their descendants in order for them to keep their oaths. With statements that parallel Hesiod's views on what separates humans from animals in *Works and Days* 272–85, Isocrates argues that it is fear of the gods that allows humans to avoid behaving against each other as wild beasts do.⁶³ Adopting the relativist religious constructionism that many intellectuals of his day championed, he explains that the ability of religion to convince people that their actions will generate rewards or sanctions is a fundamental benefit to humanity.⁶⁴ The key point is that it influences the behaviour of individuals, even if it is not entirely true, or 'made to appear more certain than they prove to be'. The fact that the Egyptians believe that perjury will be immediately (παραχρημα) sanctioned, without their even having to fear that punishment might strike their children instead, shows how extravagantly effective the improbable impact of Busiris' teaching has been on his people.⁶⁵ It emphatically surpasses, in other words, the effect of Hesiod's teaching on the Greeks themselves. Ancestral fault appears in the *Busiris* as an element in the rhetoric of playful humour of the display speech.⁶⁶

A somewhat parallel use of ancestral fault as an instrument of beneficent religious manipulation is found in Isocrates' rival Plato. In *Laws* 854ac, the Stranger of Athens tells Clinias what should be done with temple robbers:⁶⁷

προοίμια δὲ τούτοις, κατὰ τὸν ἔμπροσθεν λόγον ὁμολογηθέντα, προρρητέον ἅπασιν ὡς βραχύτατα. λέγοι δὴ τις ἂν ἐκείνῳ διαλεγόμενος ἅμα καὶ παραμυθούμενος, ὃν ἐπιθυμία κακῇ παρακαλοῦσα μεθ' ἡμέραν τε καὶ ἐπεγείρουσα νύκτωρ ἐπὶ τι τῶν ἱερῶν ἄγει συλήσοντα, τάδε· ὦ θαυμάσιε, οὐκ ἀνθρώπινόν σε κακὸν οὐδὲ θεῖον κινεῖ τὸ νῦν ἐπὶ τὴν ἱεροσυλίαν προτρέπον ἵναί, οἷστρος δέ σε τις ἐμφυόμενος ἐκ παλαιῶν καὶ ἀκαθάρτων τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἀδικημάτων, περιφερόμενος ὀλιτηριώδης, ὃν εὐλαβεῖσθαι χρεὼν παντὶ σθένει· τίς δ' ἐστὶν εὐλάβεια, μάθε. ὅταν σοι προσπίπτῃ τι τῶν τοιούτων δογμάτων, ἴθι ἐπὶ τὰς ἀποδιοπομπήσεις, ἴθι ἐπὶ θεῶν ἀποτροπαίων ἱερὰ ἱκέτης, ἴθι ἐπὶ τὰς τῶν λεγομένων ἀνδρῶν ὑμῖν ἀγαθῶν συνουσίας, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄκουε, τὰ δὲ πειρῶ λέγειν αὐτός, ὥς δεῖ τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ δίκαια πάντα ἄνδρα τιμᾶν· τὰς δὲ τῶν κακῶν συνουσίας φεῦγε ἄμετασ-
τρεπτή. καὶ ἂν μὲν σοι δρῶντι ταῦτα λωφῇ τι τὸ νόσημα· εἰ δὲ μή, καλλίω θάνατον σκεψάμενος ἀπαλλάττου τοῦ βίου.

And in accordance with our rule as already approved, we must prefix to all such laws preludes as brief as possible. By way of argument and admonition

⁶³ See p. 160. ⁶⁴ Cf. Bons 2006. ⁶⁵ Livingstone 2001: 152–3.

⁶⁶ For humour in the speech, see Livingstone 2001: 91–2; cf. Harding 1988.

⁶⁷ See Reverdin 1945: 233; Schöpsdau 2011: 257–9.

one might address in the following terms the man whom an evil desire urges by day and wakes up at night, driving him to rob some sacred object 'My good man, the evil force that now moves you and prompts you to go temple robbing is neither of human origin nor of divine, but it is some impulse bred of old in men from ancient wrongs and unexpiated, which courses round wreaking ruin; and it you must guard against with all your strength. How you must thus guard, now learn. When there comes upon you any such intention, betake yourself to the rites of guilt averting, betake yourself as suppliant to the shrines of the curse lifting deities, betake yourself to the company of the men who are reputed virtuous; and thus learn, partly from others, partly by self instruction, that every man is bound to honour what is noble and just; but the company of evil men shun wholly, and turn not back. And if it be so that by thus acting your disease grows less, well; but if not, then deem death the more noble way, and quit yourself of life' (trans. Bury).

Those who, refusing to heed the admonitions of this 'prelude', will be caught robbing temples, should be either exiled (foreigners and slaves) or executed (citizens). The aim of the prelude, as elsewhere in the *Laws*, is to convince the individual to act rightly of his own accord. Tradition is mobilised to give meaning and force to this attempt at persuasion, and it is grounded in the practices of cult and social exchange. To be effective, the story has to channel a model of action that is accepted by the potential transgressor. Ancestral fault is ideally suited for that task, as it allows the lawgiver to convince that the sacrilegious urge of the individual is not his own, but the product of an inborn impulse transmitted through the generations, and it gives him the means to attempt to cure it, by incitations that encourage the cultivation of the noble and the good. The source of the evil is the innate, hereditary presence of a goad, an οἶστρος, which itself derives from ancient, unpurified faults.⁶⁸ That statement that it is neither a human nor a divine force that moves him to temple robbery transforms the problem into a clinical condition demanding a specific therapy. No divine wrath is involved, no *daimōn* of vengeance, but a congenital disease.

The 'prelude' of the law thus takes a familiar idea, recognised by all, and transforms it into an instrument of therapy adapted to its own specific portrayal of justice.⁶⁹ The ancient ἀλιτῆριος is refashioned into the rare

⁶⁸ Cf. the reference to an οἶστρος in F 232 Kern 350 Bernabé; cf. Bernabé 2004–7, vol. 1: 288 for further parallels.

⁶⁹ For the idea that the wrongful appropriation of the ἱερά χρήματα of a sanctuary can constitute 'an offence in the eyes of the gods' (καταλιπεῖν . . . τοῖς πασιὶν ἐγκλημα τοῦτο πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς) that the transgressors leave to their children 'for all time' (εἰς τὸν αἰὲ χρόνον), see e.g. Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.34, where it is successfully used to sway the vote of an assembly.

and more medical-sounding ἀλιτηριώδης. For that strategy to work, the idea had to have a resonance with his intended audience, and a recognised association with cultural practices such as ἀποδοισπομπήσεις or the θεῶν ἀποτροπαίων ἱερά. For the statement of that passage to make any sense, the notion of ancestral fault must have had something of a field of reference, a discernible shape with connotations and a certain place in religious practice. That expression of ancestral fault, like the one found in the *Against Andocides*, the ὑπὲρ Φανίου παρὰ νόμων and the *Busiris*, presupposes that the notion had a distinctive shape for the audience's imagination of society here and now. They could only appear at the end of the long trajectories of implicit theology that we have been following in this book.

The Athenian Stranger does not present the idea of ancestral fault as an actual diagnostic and a cure for the potential temple robber, but as the material for a story that can be used to veer him in the right direction (even if the chances of success are slim). He does not, in other words, present ancestral fault as an explanation, or a principle of justice. Nowhere does it appear as such in the *Laws*.⁷⁰ It does not, in fact, appear as a principle of justice anywhere in the Platonic corpus. Perfectly at odds with the cosmic view of individual responsibility and justice defended in the *Timaeus* and elsewhere in Plato, it has no place in the philosophical structures of the dialogues.⁷¹ When Plato mentions ancestral fault, as in the *Cratylus*, the *Phaedrus*, the *Republic*, the *Theaetetus*, or the *Laws*, it is always as a reference to tradition, or to the practices of the city. Ancestral fault is not an element of Platonic justice.

Neither does it appear anywhere in Aristotle. But while it has no role to play in his system, that hardly means that it had suddenly vanished from the concerns of Greek society. We know that Aristotle's student Bion attacked it, for instance, as was mentioned in Chapter 1, undermining its validity, and showing its incompatibility with any true notion of justice.⁷² That attack is obviously launched at its opposite, the suggestion that ancestral fault is a valid principle or a true notion of justice. In the early Hellenistic period such confrontations with the explicit theology of ancestral fault were bound to become more frequent. Now an object of philosophical debate, the idea could be defined, analysed, compared,

⁷⁰ The discussion of 856cd (with Schöpsdau 2011: 275) is the exception that proves the rule. It is stated there that children will never be punished for the faults of their fathers, except one whose great-grandfather, grandfather, and father have all been condemned to death, in which case the person is to be expelled from the city.

⁷¹ Cf. *Tht.* 173d. See e.g. Mackenzie 1981; Saunders 1993; Van den Berg (forthcoming).

⁷² See p. 53.

criticised, or explored, the trigger to a whole range of associations from the records of the written archive. From that moment on, our sources concerning ancestral fault take the form either of attacks against it or of defences of its validity. It had become a doctrine to be buttressed or refuted, an opposition that was to take its clearest form in the disputations of the Stoics and Epicureans reflected in Cicero and Plutarch. From the time of the late classical period onwards, ancestral fault mostly appears to us as an object of explicit theology. As such, it will continue to change, of course, with its own history, transformations, adaptations, and new range of associations, all the way into its eventual inscription at the heart of Platonism with the work of Plutarch and the later Neoplatonists. But that trajectory of explicit debate and systematic theological investigations constitutes a wholly different type of history than the more diffuse and inchoate evolution of implicit theology which we have been tracking. It offers material for another sort of study.

The point of starting from the end in Chapter 1 with the explicit theology of ancestral fault was to define a *telos* for the conduct of the study. This book was conceived as an attempt to discern the different paths that have led to the explicit theology of ancestral fault. If it is fundamentally opposed to the evolutionary model of much previous scholarship, which tended to see the idea as a vestige from primitive beliefs, a survival in various stages of decay, it has tried to map the contours of a different type of evolution. Two main processes are at play. One is the progressive expansion of the idea. From the confines of the institutional and ritual logic of the oath, we can see the notion of ancestral fault occupy a much larger field over the course of the centuries, to the point of appearing in almost every genre of later classical literature. Used in the dynastic struggles of the archaic period, it found an ideal environment in the conflicts and celebrations of the aristocratic symposium, and the reflections on the ethics of heredity it fostered. It is in the symposium and its distinctively agonistic concern with kinship that we first see the idea of ancestral fault appear independently of perjury in the record. From there, it was repeatedly adapted to many other environments; its role largely surpassed the simple necessity of explaining injustice in the world. The usefulness it had as a tool of knowledge about the past, its ability to identify causes, to locate the sufferings of the present in a coherent sequence, even one that could be accused of being thoroughly unjust, the role it could play in developing notions of the self that surpassed the will and action of the individual, its position at the heart of kinship, heredity, and the transmission of wealth, its resonance with different

notions of pollution and disease, and the challenges it made to understanding the actions of divinity gave that idea a significant range of potential meaning within Greek culture. That potential was fully developed in the classical period.

Ancestral fault is intrinsically tied to authority. For people to take seriously the claim that someone is being punished because of a crime committed by ancestors, or that a precise transgression might have repercussions on descendants, a special position of insight is needed. How do you know this? Why should I believe you? The 'revolutions of wisdom' of the fifth century, the profound, rapid, and unprecedented social and cultural transformations that energised and fragmented the positions of knowledge in the *polis*, the contests of authority, the redefinitions of community and tradition, and the recurrently new claims about the nature and meaning of the past created the perfect conditions for a novel and massive interest in the idea of ancestral fault. The many different forms of authority developed different aspects of ancestral fault in their texts or even experimented with different aspects of it in the same work, and the process of expansion of the idea was thus pushed much further than it had ever been before. Ancestral fault was given a powerful role (as well as a number of less significant ones) in Herodotus, and magical healers used it to explain the nature of their power. It was reconfigured in a variety of shapes in the texts and practices of the *teletai* performed by wandering initiators. Oratory could instrumentalise it to opposite aims, using its resonance to say something about the *persona* of the speaker, and the authority he claimed as an accuser or a defender. Tragedy, more prominently than any other genre, found a productive usage for the idea in many plays, where it generated an often explosive set of meanings for its explorations into the horrors of violence within the *oikos*, the conflict of generations, the threat of the past, and the meanings of divine justice.

It is important, still, to recall that this was a notion that could be ignored as easily as it could be reconfigured. Most tragedies contained no mention of ancestral fault. An author like Thucydides had no use for it, and it played no role in the systems of Plato or Aristotle. The expansion of ancestral fault in the classical period is one important example among many of the experimentations of the time with ideas, and, it goes without saying, not a tectonic shift in the grammar of Greek culture. Although there can be no doubt that some, and probably many, people during this time 'believed' in ancestral fault in one way or another, what we see in our sources is not merely a reflection of these beliefs, but adaptations of the idea to specific messages. Did Sophocles believe in

ancestral fault, whatever that means? Did Lysias? We do not know, we never will, and, frankly, I am not sure we should care. We do know what they said about it, and how it fits in the rhetoric, the imagery, the themes and ideas of the texts where it is found. The sheer variety of shapes given to it in the period is an indication of the richness and complexity of its functions, and of the interest in making sense of it in the texts and the genres where it continued to evolve.

It would be difficult to deny that the trajectory of the idea is indeed an evolution of sorts. With the gradual constitution of a written archive, the accumulation of stable references elevated to canonic status, with the intertextual web of language and metaphors being woven ever more tightly through the generations, the expressions of the idea entered into closer contact with their predecessors, new connections were added, parallels recognised, and the contours of the notion located around a central body of shared elements slowly made to emerge. The second main process in the evolution of ancestral fault is aggregation. References like the lines of Hesiod's *Works and Days* concerning the great oath, or Solon's *Elegy to the Muses*, were recurrently revisited in later expressions of ancestral fault, and the various aspects of the idea came to be more regularly associated with each other in time. Distant parallels crystallised in common ground, as the same words, themes, and images coalesced into the progressively more recognisable shape of a principle. Something of that process is discernible in the record of tragedy, where the trajectories of reference from the plays of Aeschylus concerning the Atridae and Labdacids to the later plays of Sophocles and Euripides show the ever more present weight of the preceding plays in later rewritings of the idea. It is no coincidence that the earliest concentration of terms naming ancestral fault is found in tragedy (παλαιγενής παρβασία; παλαιαὶ ἁμαρτίαι; τὰ ἐκ προτέρων ἀπλακήματα; ἄτη πατέρων; τὰ τῶν τεκόντων σφάλματα).⁷³ The constitution of a written archive, as the progressive hardening of a canon, saw the idea of ancestral fault acquire a more distinctive shape.

The two processes, expansion and aggregation, are complementary, in that one supports the other. As different authors continued to find a role for ancestral fault and configured the idea to conform to the message of their text, they also wrote upon the earlier configurations that they and their audiences knew. But as one force pushed towards ever greater diversity, change, and divergence, the other resulted in further integration, cohesion, and stability of reference. That is the tension that ultimately lies

⁷³ See p. 3, n. 1.

behind the transition from the implicit theology of the archaic and classical periods to the explicit theology of later centuries. As the range of applications of the idea continued to grow, the coherence of its references deepened, to the point where one could allude to the whole complex of texts and references with a simple statement. The definitions of explicit theology simply gave a more concrete form to what was already there. We can only discern traces of these processes at work in that complex evolution through the centuries, but these traces, if we take the time to read them properly, and to set them side by side, can provide us with a real glimpse into the messy dynamics of ancient culture in movement. Between the old illusions of the grand narrative and the ultimate defeat of empirical atomism, contours can be observed and patterns are visible in the comprehensive contrast of our many fragments, opening the vertiginous prospect of an uninterrupted trajectory through millennia.

Bibliography

- Abdel Nour, F. 2003. 'National responsibility', *Political Theory* 31: 693–719.
- Adam, C. D. 1919. *Aeschines. The Speeches*. London.
- Adams, J. 1908. *The Religious Teachers of Greece*. Edinburgh.
- Adcock, F. and Mosley, D. J. 1975. *Diplomacy in Ancient Greece*. London.
- Ademollo, F. 2011. *The Cratylus of Plato: a Commentary*. Cambridge.
- Adkins, A. W. H. 1960. *Merit and Responsibility. A Study in Greek Values*. Oxford.
1982. 'Divine and human values in Aeschylus' *Seven against Thebes*', *AC&A* 28: 32–68.
- Adrados, F. R. 1965. 'El tema del torrente en la literatura griega arcaica y clásica', *Emerita* 33: 7–14.
1989. 'La divination dans les chœurs de l'*Agamemnon* d'Eschyle', *REG* 102: 295–307.
- Aélión, R. 1984. 'Songes et prophéties d'Eschyle. Une forme de mise en abyme', *Lalies* 3: 133–46.
- Aghiorghoussis, M. 1977. 'Sin in Orthodox dogmatics', *St Vladimir's Theological Quarterly* 21: 179–90.
- Agoratsios, E. 2006. 'The Alkmeonidae: what kind of family were they?', *AH* 36: 163–8.
- Alaux, J. 1995. 'Sur quelques pièges de la parenté: sœurs et frères dans la tragédie athénienne', *ASNP* 25: 219–42.
- Albertz, R. (ed.) 2001. *Kult, Konflikt und Versöhnung: Beiträge zur kultischen Sühne in religiösen, sozialen und politischen Auseinandersetzungen des antiken Mittelmeerraumes*. Münster.
- Alderink, L. J. 1981. *Creation and Salvation in Ancient Orphism*. Chico.
- Alesse, F. 2001. 'La tripartizione dell'uomo nel mito di Tespesio: la sua origine "socratica" e alcuni suoi effetti sulla filosofia del II sec. d.C.', in Pérez Jiménez, A. and Casadesús Bordoy, F. (eds.), *Estudios sobre Plutarco: misticismo y religiones mistericas en la obra de Plutarco*. Madrid, pp. 45–55.
- Alexandre, J. 2004. 'Aux sources de la conception augustinienne du péché originel: l'*originis uitium* de Tertullien', in Jay, P. and Nauroy, G. (eds.), *Chartae caritatis*. Paris, pp. 419–36.
- Allen, A.L. 2007. 'Masters of manipulation: Euripides' (and Medea's) use of oaths in *Medea*', in Sommerstein, A. and Fletcher, J. (eds.), *Horkos: the Oath in Greek Society*. Bristol, pp. 113–24.

- Allen, A.W. 1949. 'Solon's prayer to the Muses', *TAPhA* 80: 50–65.
- Allen, D. S. 2000. *The World of Prometheus*. Princeton.
- Allen, W. 2006. 'Divine justice and cosmic order in early Greek epic', *JHS* 126: 1–35.
2009. 'Performing the will of Zeus: the Διὸς βουλή and the scope of early Greek epic', in Revermann, M. and Wilson, P. J. (eds.), *Performance, Iconography, Reception: Studies in Honour of Oliver Taplin*. Oxford, pp. 204–16.
- Allison, J. W. 2009. 'Cosmos and number in Aeschylus' *Septem*', *Hermes* 137: 129–47.
- Almeida, J. A. 2003. *Justice as an Aspect of the Polis Idea in Solon's Political Poems: a Reading of the Fragments in Light of the Researches of New Classical Archaeology*. Leiden.
- Aloni, A. 1983. 'Eteria e tiaso. I gruppi aristocratici di Lesbo tra economia e ideologia', *DArch* 1: 21–35.
- Alt, K. 1979. 'Solons Gebet zu den Musen', *Hermes* 107: 386–409.
- Alweiss, L. 2003. 'Collective guilt and responsibility: some reflections', *European Journal of Political Theory* 2: 307–18.
- Aly, W. 1921. *Volksmärchen, Sage und Novelle bei Herodot und seinen Zeitgenossen: eine Untersuchung über die volkstümlichen Elemente der altergriechischen Prosaerzählung*. Göttingen.
- Amandry, P. 1950. *La mantique apollinienne à Delphes*. Paris.
- Ambaglio, D. 1991. 'La Periegesi di Pausania e la storiografia greca tradita per citazioni', *QUCC* 39: 129–38.
- Ameduri, O. 1970. 1. 'L'Eunomia di Solone e le Eumenidi di Eschilo', *AFLN* 13: 15–22.
- Amiech, C. 2006. 'Le concept d'*hybris* s'applique t il à la lecture des *Phéniciennes*', *Kentron* 22: 67–87.
- Andersen, L. 1987. *Studies in Oracular Verses: Concordance to Delphic Responses in Hexameter*. Copenhagen.
- Anderson, G. 2003. *The Athenian Experiment: Building an Imagined Political Community in Ancient Attica, 508–490 BC*. Ann Arbor.
- Andrewes, A. 1936–7. 'Athens and Aegina 510–480 BC', *ABSA* 37: 1–7.
1961. 'Philochoros on phratries', *JHS* 81: 1–15.
- Anhalt, E. K. 1993. *Solon the Singer*. Lanham, Md.
- Appiah, K. A. 2005. 'Thick translation', in Venuti, L. (ed.), *The Translation Studies Reader*, 2nd edn. London, pp. 389–401.
- Ardley, G. W. R. 1973. 'Cotta and the theologians', *Prudentia* 5: 33–55.
- Arend, W. 1933. *Die typischen Szenen bei Homer*. Berlin.
- Arieti, J. A. 1995. *Discourses on the First Book of Herodotus*. Lanham, Md.
- Armstrong, J. 1958. 'The arming motif in the *Iliad*', *AJPh* 79: 337–54.
- Arthur, M. B. 1977. 'The curse of civilization. The choral odes of the *Phoenissae*', *HSPH* 81: 163–85.
- Asad, T. 1993. *Genealogies of Religion*. Baltimore.
- Asamoah Gyadu, J. K. 2004. 'Of "sour grapes" and "children's teeth": inherited guilt, human rights, and processes of restoration in Ghanaian Pentecostalism', *Exchange* 33: 334–53.

- Asheri, D. 2006. *Erodoto*, vol. ix. Milan.
- Asheri, D. et al. 2007. *Commentary on Herodotus Books I IV*. Oxford.
- Assmann, A. 2012 [1999]. *Cultural Memory and Western Civilization: Functions, Media, Archives*. Cambridge.
- Assmann, J. 1999. *Das kulturelle Gedächtnis: Schrift, Erinnerung und politische Identität in frühen Hochkulturen*. Munich.
2000. *Religion und kulturelles Gedächtnis*. Munich.
2005. 'Moses as go between: John Spencer's theory of religious translation', in Höfele, A. and von Koppenfels, W. (eds.), *Renaissance Go-Betweens: Cultural Exchange in Early Modern Europe*. Berlin, pp. 163–74.
- 2011 [1992]. *Cultural Memory and Early Civilization: Writing, Remembrance, and Political Imagination*. Cambridge.
- Athanassiadi, P. 1993. 'Persecution and response in late paganism', *JHS* 113: 1–29.
- Aubriot, D. 1991. 'Formulations possibles du serment et conceptions religieuses en Grèce ancienne', *Kernos* 4: 91–103.
- Aubriot Sévin, D. 1992. *Prière et conception religieuse en Grèce ancienne*. Paris.
- Auvray Assayas, C. 1991. 'Le livre I du *De natura deorum* et le traité *De signis* de Philodème: problèmes de théologie et de logique', *REL* 69: 51–62.
1998. 'Le rire des Académiciens: la citation comique dans le *De natura deorum* de Cicéron', in Trédé, M. and Hoffmann, P. (eds.), *Le rire des anciens*. Paris, pp. 293–306.
- 1999a. 'Existence et providence des dieux dans la théologie stoïcienne: remarques sur l'ordre de l'exposé du *De natura deorum* (livre 2) d'après la tradition manuscrite', *EPh* 1: 91–104.
- 1999b. 'Lucrèce dans le *De natura deorum* de Cicéron: une réflexion sur les implications de la poétique atomiste', in Poignault, R. (ed.), *Présence de Lucrèce*. Tours, pp. 101–10.
2005. 'Deux types d'exposé stoïcien sur la providence d'après le *De natura deorum* de Cicéron', in Gourinat, J. B. (ed.), *Les stoïciens*. Paris, pp. 233–46.
- Avezzi, G. 2006. 'Eschilo in Sofocle', *Lexis* 24: 63–75.
- Bachvarova, M. R. 2007. 'Oath and allusion in Alcaeus 129', in Sommerstein, A. and Fletcher, J. (eds.), *Horkos: the Oath in Greek Society*. Bristol, pp. 179–88.
- Bacon, H. H. 2001. 'The Furies' homecoming', *CPh* 96: 48–59.
- Badelon, F. 2012. 'Lectures anglaises de Plutarque au XVIIIe siècle', in Guerrier, O. (ed.), *Plutarque de l'âge classique au XIXe siècle*. Grenoble, pp. 247–60.
- Bakker, E. J. 2005a. 'How oral is oral composition?' in Bakker, E. J. (ed.), *Pointing at the Past*. Cambridge, Mass., pp. 38–55.
- 2005b. 'Remembering the god's arrival', in Bakker, E. J. (ed.), *Pointing at the Past*. Cambridge, Mass., pp. 136–53.
- Bakola, E. 2008. 'The drunk, the reformer and the teacher: agonistic poetics and the construction of *persona* in the comic poets of the fifth century', *CCJ* 54: 1–29.
- Baldarelli, B. 2004. *Accius und die vortrojanische Pelopidensage*. Paderborn.
- Baldassarri, M. 1994. 'La difesa della provvidenza: nello scritto plutarco De sera numinis vindicta', *AncW* 25: 147–58.

- Ballériaux, O. 1990. 'Mantique et téléstique dans le *Phèdre* de Platon', *Kernos* 3: 35–43.
- Baragwanath, E. 2008. *Motivation and Narrative in Herodotus*. Oxford.
- Barber, C. and Jenkins, D. 2006. *Reading Michael Psellos*. Leiden.
- Barker, E. 2006. 'Paging the oracle: interpretation, identity and performance in Herodotus' *History*', *G&R* 53: 1–28.
- Barker, P. S. D. 1995. 'Caritas Pirckheimer: a female humanist confronts the Reformation', *Sixteenth Century Journal* 26: 259–72.
- Barkhuizen, J. H. 1989. 'Theognis on friendship', *Akroterion* 39: 209–14.
- Barrett, J. 2007. 'Aeschylus', in De Jong, I. and Nünlist, R. (eds.), *Time in Ancient Greek Literature*. Leiden, pp. 255–73.
- Barrett, J. L. 1999. 'Theological correctness: cognitive constraint and the study of religion', *Method & Theory in the Study of Religion* 11: 325–39.
2000. 'Exploring the natural foundations of religion', *Trends in Cognitive Sciences* 4: 29–34.
2004. *Why Would Anyone Believe in God?* Walnut Creek, Calif.
2007. 'Cognitive science of religion: what is it and why is it?', *Religion Compass* 1: 768–86.
- Barrett, J. L. and Lanman, J. A. 2008. 'The science of religious beliefs', *Religion* 38: 109–24.
- Barrett, J. L. and Nyhof, M. 2001. 'Spreading non natural concepts: the role of intuitive conceptual structures in transmission in culture', *Journal of Cognition and Culture* 1: 69–100.
- Barrett, W. S. 1992. *Hippolytos*. 2nd edn. Oxford.
- Bataillon, L. J. 1989a. 'Quelques utilisateurs des textes rares de Moerbeke (Philopon, *Tria opuscula*) et particulièrement Jacques de Viterbe', in Brams, J. and Vanhammel, W. (eds.), *Guillaume de Moerbeke. Recueil d'études à l'occasion du 700e anniversaire de sa mort*. Leuven, pp. 83–90.
- 1989b. 'L'usage des mots hybrides gréco latins par Guillaume de Moerbeke', in Brams, J. and Vanhammel, W. (eds.), *Guillaume de Moerbeke. Recueil d'études à l'occasion du 700e anniversaire de sa mort*. Leuven, pp. 295–300.
- Bauer, O. 1963. 'Sapphos Verbannung', *Gymnasium* 70: 1–10.
- Baumans, A. 1995. 'Original sin, the history of salvation and the monastic ideal of St Odo of Cluny in his *Occupatio*', in Verbeke, E. (ed.), *Serta devota in memoriam Guillelmi Lourdaux*, vol. 11: *Cultura mediaevalis*. Leuven, pp. 335–57.
- Beatrice, P. F. 1978. *Tradux peccati. Alle fonti della dottrina agostiniana del peccato originale*. Milan.
- Beaujeu, J. 1959. 'La religion de Plutarque', *IL* 11: 207–13.
- Beekes, R. S. P. 2010. *Etymological Dictionary of Greek*. 2 vols. Leiden.
- Beierwaltes, W. 1977. 'Pronoia und Freiheit in der Philosophie des Proklos', *FZPhTh* 24: 88–111.
1987. 'Proklos. Ein "systematischer" Philosoph? Einleitung', in Pépin, J. and Saffrey, H. D. (eds.), *Proclus lecteur et interprète des anciens*. Paris, pp. 351–68.

- Belloni, L. 1999. 'L'αἶών di due sovrani secondo Bacchilide: Creso e Ierone nel terzo epinicio', in Belloni, L., Citti, V., and De Finis, L. (eds.), *Dalla lirica al teatro: nel ricordo di Mario Untersteiner (1899 1999)*. Trento, pp. 47 58.
- Belpassi L. 1990. 'La follia del genos: un analisi del discorso mitico nella *Ifigenia Taurica* di Euripide', *QUCC* 63: 53 67.
- Benedetto, V. di 1955. 'Pittaco e Alceo', *PP* 41: 97 118.
1965. *Orestes*. Florence.
- Benedict, F. 1871. *De oraculis ab Herodoto commemoratis*. Diss. Bonn.
- Benveniste, É. 1969. *Le vocabulaire des institutions indo-européennes*. 2 vols. Paris.
- Berg, E. 1982. *Zwischen den Welten: über die Anthropologie der Aufklärung und ihr Verhältnis zu Entdeckungs-Reise und Welt-Erfahrung mit besonderem Blick auf das Werk Georg Fosters*. Berlin.
- Bergk, T. 1878 82. *Poetae Lyrici Graeci*, 4th edn. Leipzig.
- Berman, D. W. 2001. 'Cultural representation and the "myth" of the Seven against Thebes in early Greek narrative'. Diss. Yale.
- Bernabé, A. 1996. *Poetarum epicorum Graecorum: testimonia et fragmenta. Pars I*, 2nd edn. Stuttgart.
1998. 'Platone e l'Orfismo', in Sfameni Gasparri, J. (ed.), *Destino e salvezza tra culti pagani e gnosì cristiana. Itinerari storico-religiose sull'orme di Ugo Bianchi*. Cosenza, pp. 33 93.
2002. 'La toile de Pénélope: a t il existé un mythe orphique sur Dionysos et les Titans?', *RHR* 219: 401 33.
2003. 'Autour du mythe orphique sur Dionysos et les Titans. Quelques notes critiques', in Accorinti, D. and Chuvin, P. (eds.), *Des Géants à Dionysos. Mélanges offerts à F. Vian*. Alessandria, pp. 25 39.
- 2004 7. *Orphicorum et Orphicis similitum testimonia et fragmenta. Poetae epici graeci. Pars II*. 3 vols. Munich.
- 2008a. 'Características de los textos órficos', in Bernabé, A. and Casadesús, F. (eds.), *Orfeo y la tradición órfica*, vol. 1. Madrid, pp. 241 6.
- 2008b. 'El mito órfico de Dioniso y los Titanes', in Bernabé, A. and Casadesús, F. (eds.), *Orfeo y la tradición órfica*, vol. 1. Madrid, pp. 579 90.
- Bernabé, A. and Jiménez de San Cristóbal, A. 2001. *Instrucciones para el más allá. Las laminillas órficas de oro*. Madrid (trans. as *Instructions for the Netherworld: the Orphic Gold Tablets*, Leiden, 2008).
2011. 'Are the "Orphic" gold leaves Orphic?', in Edmonds III, R. (ed.), *The 'Orphic' Gold Tablets and Greek Religion: Further along the Path*. Cambridge, pp. 68 101.
- Bernadete, S. 1967. 'Two notes on Aeschylus *Septem*, I', *WS* 80: 22 30.
1968. 'Two notes on Aeschylus' *Septem*, II', *WS* 81: 5 17.
- Berneke, R. 2004. *Dramaturgie und Ideologie: der politische Mythos in den Hikesiedramen des Aischylos, Sophokles und Euripides*. Munich.
- Bernofsky, S. 1997. 'Schleiermacher's translation theory and varieties of foreignization: August Wilhelm Schlegel vs. Johann Heinrich Voss', *Translator: Studies in Intercultural Communication* 3: 175 92.
- Berry, E. G. 1961. *Emerson's Plutarch*. Cambridge, Mass.

- Berve, H. 1967. *Die Tyrannis bei den Griechen*. Munich.
- Betegh, G. 2004. *The Derveni Papyrus*. Cambridge.
- Bethe, E. 1891. *Thebanische Heldenlieder*. Leipzig.
- Betz, H. D. 2011. "A child of Earth am I and of starry Heaven": concerning the anthropology of the Orphic gold tablets', in Edmonds III, R. (ed.), *The 'Orphic' Gold Tablets and Greek Religion: Further along the Path*. Cambridge, pp. 102–19.
- Bianchi, U. 1966. 'Péché originel et péché antécédent', *RHR* 170: 118–26.
- Bickerman, E. J. 1976 [1951]. 'Couper une alliance', in Bickerman, E. J. (ed.), *Studies in Jewish and Christian History*, vol. 1. Leiden, pp. 1–32.
- Bicknell, P. J. 1970. 'The exile of the Alkmeonidai during the Peisistratid tyranny', *Historia* 19: 129–31.
1982. 'Herodotos 5.68 and the racial policy of Kleisthenes of Sikyon', *GRBS* 23: 193–201.
- Biehl, W. 1965. *Euripides: Orestes*. Berlin.
- Bielohlawek, K. 1940. 'Gastmahls und Symposionslehren bei Griechischen Dichtern', *WS* 58: 11–30.
- Billacois, F. (ed.) 1989. *Le serment: recueil d'études anthropologiques, historiques et juridiques*. Paris.
- 1991a. 'Le corps jureur: pour une phénoménologie historique des gestes du serment', in Verdier, R. (ed.), *Le serment*, vol. 1. Paris, pp. 93–102.
- 1991b. 'Rituels du serment: des personnages en quête d'une 'voix off'', in Verdier, R. (ed.), *Le serment*, vol. 1. Paris, pp. 23–35.
- Billigmeier, J. C. and Dusing, M. S. 1981. 'The origin and function of the *naukraroi* at Athens. An etymological and historical explanation', *TAPhA* 111: 11–16.
- Blaise, F. 2005. 'Poésie, politique, religion: Solon entre les dieux et les hommes (l' *Eunomie* et l' *Élégie aux Muses*, 4 et 13 West)', *RPhA* 23: 3–40.
2006. 'Poetics and politics: tradition re worked in Solon's *Eunomia*', in Blok, J. H. and Lardinois, A. P. M. H. (eds.), *Solon of Athens: New Historical and Philological Approaches*. Leiden, pp. 114–33.
- Blanc, A. 2003. 'La faute et le parricide en grec, le dommage indo iranien et la peine germanique: formes de la racine *h₂ley', *REG* 116: 17–53.
- Blickman, D. R. 1986. 'The myth of Ixion and pollution for homicide in archaic Greece', *CJ* 81: 193–208.
1987. 'Styx and the justice of Zeus in Hesiod's Theogony', *Phoenix* 41: 341–55.
- Blois, L. de 2006. 'Plutarch's *Solon*: a tissue of commonplaces or a historical account?', in Blok, J. H. and Lardinois, A. P. M. H. (eds.), *Solon of Athens: New Historical and Philological Approaches*. Leiden, pp. 429–40.
- Blok, J. H. 1998. "Romantische Poesie, Naturphilosophie, Konstruktion der Geschichte": Karl Otfried Müller's understanding of history and myth', in Calder III, W. M. and Schlesier, R. (eds.), *Karl Otfried Müller und die antike Kultur*. Hildesheim, pp. 55–97.
- Blok, J. H. and Lardinois, A. P. M. H. 2006. 'Introduction', in Blok, J. K. and Lardinois, A. P. M. H. (eds.), *Solon of Athens: New Historical and Philological Approaches*. Leiden, pp. 1–12.

- Bluhm, H. 1965. *Martin Luther, Creative Translator*. Saint Louis.
- Blumer, H. 1969. *Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective and Method*. Englewood Cliffs.
- Blundell, M. W. 1989. *Helping Friends and Harming Enemies. A Study in Sophocles and Greek Ethics*. Cambridge.
- Boer, W. den 1979. 'Les historiens des religions et leurs dogmes', in Boer, W. den (ed.), *Les Études Classiques aux XIXe et XXe ss.: leur place dans l'histoire des idées*. Vandoeuvres, pp. 1 53.
- Böhme, I. 1975. *Proklos Diadochos. Zehn Aporien über die Vorsehung. Frage 6 10*. Cologne.
- Böhme, J. 1929. *Die Seele und das Ich im homerischen Epos*. Leipzig.
- Bollack, J. 1958. 'Styx et serments', *REG* 71: 1 35.
2003. *Empédocle: Les Purifications*. Paris.
- Bollack, J. and Judet de la Combe, P. (eds.) 1981 2. *L'Agamemnon d'Eschyle. Le texte et ses interprétations*. 3 vols. Lille.
- Bolmarcich, S. 2007. 'Oaths in Greek international relations', in Sommerstein, A. and Fletcher, J. (eds.), *Horkos: the Oath in Greek Society*. Bristol, pp. 26 38.
- Boncompain, C. and Vermale, F. 2004. *Joseph de Maistre*. Paris.
- Bonnard, J. B. 2003. 'Un aspect positif de la puissance paternelle: la fabrication du citoyen' *Métis* n.s. 1: 69 93.
- Bonnechere, P. 1994. *Le sacrifice humain en Grèce ancienne*. Liège.
- Bons, J. A. E. 2006. 'Isocrates on being religious and moral conduct', Lardinois, A. P. M. H. et al. (eds.), *Land of Dreams: Greek and Latin Studies in Honour of A. H. M. Kessels*. Leiden, pp. 259 66.
- Bos, E. P. and Meijer, P. A. 1992. *On Proclus and his Influence on Medieval Philosophy*. Leiden.
- Böse, H. 1960. *Tria Opuscula: De Providentia, Libertate, Malo*. Berlin.
1985. *Wilhelm von Moerbeke als Übersetzer der Stoiceiosis theologike des Proclus*. Heidelberg.
- Boss, G. and Seel, G. (eds.) 1987. *Proclus et son influence*. Zurich.
- Boudewijnse, B. 1995. 'The conceptualization of ritual. A history of its problematic aspects', *Jaarboek voor Liturgieonderzoek* 11: 31 56.
- Boulogne, J. 2003. *Plutarque dans le miroir d'Épictète*. Lille.
- Bourriot, F. 1976. *Recherches sur la nature du genos: étude d'histoire sociale athénienne. Périodes archaïque et classique*. 2 vols. Paris.
- Bouvier, D. 2002. *Le sceptre et la lyre: l'Iliade ou les héros de la mémoire*. Grenoble.
- Bowden, H. 2003. 'Oracles for sale', in Derow, P. and Parker, R. (eds.), *Herodotus and his world: Essays from a Conference in Memory of George Forrest*. Oxford, pp. 256 74.
- Bowie, A. M. 1993a. *Aristophanes: Myth, Ritual, and Comedy*. Cambridge.
- 1993b. 'Religion and Politics in Aeschylus' *Oresteia*', *CQ* 43:10 31.
- Bowie, E. L. 1986. 'Early Greek elegy, symposium and public festival', *JHS* 106: 13 35.
1990. 'Miles ludens? The problem of martial exhortation in early Greek elegy', in Murray, O. (ed.), *Symptotica: a Symposium on the Symposium*. Oxford, pp. 221 9.

1997. 'The *Theognidea*: a step towards a collection of fragments?', in Most, G. (ed.), *Collecting fragments=Fragmente sammeln*. Göttingen, pp. 53–66.
- Bowler, P. J. 1992. 'From "savage" to "primitive": Victorian evolutionism and the interpretation of marginalized peoples', *Antiquity* 66: 721–9.
- Bowra, C. M. 1934. 'Simonides in the *Theognidea*', *CR* 48: 2–4.
1938. *Early Greek Elegists*. Cambridge, Mass.
- Boyer, P. 1994. *The Naturalness of Religious Ideas*. Berkeley.
2001. *Religion Explained: the Evolutionary Origins of Religious Thought*. New York.
- Boyer, P. and Ramble, C. 2001. 'Cognitive templates for religious concepts: cross cultural evidence for recall of counter intuitive representations', *Cognitive Science* 25: 535–64.
- Bozonis, G. 1979. 'Métaphysique et anthropologie chez Proclus', *Platon* 31: 52–8.
- Bradley, O. 1999. *A Modern Maistre: the Social and Political Thought of Joseph de Maistre*. Lincoln.
- Brams, J. and Vanhammel, W. (eds.) 1989. *Guillaume de Moerbeke: Recueil d'études à l'occasion du 700e anniversaire de sa mort*. Leuven.
- Bremer, J. M. 1984. 'The popularity of Euripides' *Phoenissae* in late antiquity, I.', in Harmatta, J. (ed.), *Actes du VIIe Congrès de la Fédération Internationale des Associations d'Études classiques*. Budapest, pp. 281–8.
- Bremmer, J. N. 1980. 'Gelon's wife and the Carthaginian ambassadors', *Mnemosyne* 33: 366–8.
1998. '"Religion", "ritual", and the opposition "sacred vs. profane". Notes towards a terminological "genealogy"', in Graf, F. (ed.), *Ansichten griechischer Rituale. Geburtstags-Symposium für Walter Burkert*. Stuttgart, pp. 9–32.
2002. *The Rise and Fall of the Afterlife*. London.
2008. *Greek Religion and Culture, the Bible and the Ancient Near East*. Leiden.
2010. 'Manteis, magic, mysteries and mythography', *Kernos* 23: 13–35.
2013. 'Human sacrifice in Euripides' *Iphigeneia in Tauris*: Greek and barbarian', in Bonnechere, P. and Gagné, R. (eds.), *Sacrifices humains: perspectives croisées et représentations*. Liège, pp. 87–100.
- Brenk, F. E. 1973. '"A most strange doctrine". Daimon in Plutarch', *CJ* 69: 1–11.
1987. 'From rex to rana. Plutarch's treatment of Nero', *Il protagonismo nella storiografia classica*. Genoa, pp. 121–42.
- Bridgman, T. P. 2005. *Hyperboreans: Myth and History in Celtic Hellenic Contacts*. London.
- Briquel, D. 1996. 'Celse et les débuts de la réaction païenne', in *La divination dans le monde italique*, vol. VII: *Les écrivains du deuxième siècle et l'Etrusca disciplina: actes de la table-ronde de Dijon, 9 juin 1995*. Tours, pp. 27–36.
- Brisson, L. 1992. 'Le corps "dionysiaque": l'anthropogonie décrite dans le *Commentaire sur le Phédon de Platon* (1.3–6), attribué à Olympiodore, est elle orphique?', in Goulet Cazé, M. O., Goulven, M., and O'Brien, D. (eds.), *Σοφίης μαίητρος: chercheurs de sagesse: hommage à Jean Pépin*. Paris, pp. 481–99 (reprinted in Brisson, L. 1995. *Orphée et l'orphisme dans l'antiquité gréco-romaine*. Brookfield).

1999. 'La synthèse la plus achevée de l'Hellénisme', *REG* 112: 734–9.
2008. 'El lugar, la función y la significación del orfismo en el neoplatonismo', in Bernabé, A. and Casadesús, F. (eds.), *Orfeo y la tradición órfica*, vol. 11. Madrid, pp. 1491–1516.
- Broedel, H. P. 2003. *The Malleus Maleficarum and the Construction of Witchcraft: Theology and Popular Belief*. Manchester.
- Broger, A. 1996. *Das Epitheton bei Sappho und Alkaios: eine sprachwissenschaftliche Untersuchung*. Innsbruck.
- Bron, C. 2002. 'Le cosmos dans tous ses états', *Pallas* 60: 269–74.
- Brown, A. L. 1976. 'The end of the *Seven against Thebes*', *CQ* 26: 206–19.
1977. 'Eteocles and the chorus in the *Seven against Thebes*', *Phoenix* 31: 300–18.
1984. 'Eumenides in Greek tragedy', *CQ* 34: 260–81.
- Brown, J. P. 1995. *Israel and Hellas*, vol. 1. Berlin.
- Broze, M. and Van Liefveringe, C. 2007. 'Er le Pamphylien, ange et messager: de l'âme angélique chez Jamblique et Proclus', *RSPb* 91: 323–34.
- Brunner, F., Labjardt, A., and Spoerri, W. 1977. 'De decem dubitationibus circa Providentiam, q. 3, II 14', *FZPhTh* 24: 112–64.
- Bruzzese, L. 2010. 'Dai Sette contro Tebe di Eschilo all'*Antigone* di Sofocle: la dualità nel mito dei Labdacidi', in Belardinelli, A. M. and Greco, G. (eds.), *Antigone e le Antigoni: storia forme fortuna di un mito*. Florence, pp. 190–215.
- Büchner, K. 1959. 'Solons Musengedicht', *Hermes* 87: 163–90.
- Budin, S. L. 2008. *The Myth of Sacred Prostitution in Antiquity*. Cambridge.
- Burian, P. 1974. 'Suppliant and saviour. *Oedipus at Colonus*', *Phoenix* 28: 408–29.
- Burke, G. T. 1981. *Celsus and Late Second-Century Christianity*. Iowa City.
- Burke, P. 2005. 'The Renaissance translator as go between', in Höfele, A. and von Koppenfels, W. (eds.), *Renaissance Go-Betweens: Cultural Exchange in Early Modern Europe*. Berlin, pp. 17–31.
- Burkert, W. 1965. 'Demaratos, Astrabakos und Herakles. Königsmythos und Politik zur Zeit der Perserkriege (Herodot VI, 67–69)', *MH* 22: 165–77 (= *Kleine Schriften*, vol. VII: 173–85).
1974. 'Die Absurdität der Gewalt und das Ende der Tragödie. Euripides' *Orestes*', *A&A* 20: 97–109 (= *Kleine Schriften*, vol. VII, pp. 97–110).
1977. 'Orphism and Bacchic mysteries: new evidence and old problems of interpretation', in Wuellner, W. (ed.), *Protocol of the Twenty-Eighth Colloquy: 13 March 1977. The Center for Hermeneutical Studies*. Berkeley, pp. 1–48 (= *Kleine Schriften*, vol. III, pp. 37–46).
1980. 'Griechische Mythologie und die Geistgeschichte der Moderne', in van der Boer, W. (ed.), *Les Études Classiques aux XIXe et XXe ss.: leur place dans l'histoire des idées*. Vandoeuvres, pp. 159–207 (= *Kleine Schriften*, vol. IV, pp. 66–95).
1982. 'Craft versus sect: the problem of Orphics and Pythagoreans', in Meyer, B. F. and Sanders, E. P. (eds.), *Jewish and Christian Self-Definition*, vol. III: *Self-Definition in the Graeco-Roman World*. London, pp. 1–22 and 183–9 (= *Kleine Schriften*, vol. III, pp. 191–216).

1984. 'Sacrificio Sacrilegio: Il "Trickster" fondatore', *SS* 25: 835–45 (= *Kleine Schriften*, vol. 1, pp. 178–88).
- 1985a [1977]. *Greek Religion*. Cambridge, Mass.
- 1985b. 'Das Ende des Kroisos. Vorstufen einer herodoteischen Geschichtserzählung', in Schaeublin, C. (ed.), *Catalepton. Festschrift für Bernhard Wyss zum 80. Geburtstag*. Basel, pp. 4–15 (= *Kleine Schriften*, vol. VII, pp. 117–27).
1987. *Ancient Mystery Cults*. Cambridge, Mass.
- 1996a. *Creation of the Sacred. Tracks of Biology in Early Religions*. Cambridge, Mass.
- 1996b. 'Plutarch: Gelebte Religion und philosophische Theologie', in Gallo, I. (ed.), *Plutarco e la religione*. Naples, pp. 11–28 (= *Kleine Schriften*, vol. VIII, pp. 222–39).
1999. 'Von Selinus zu Aischylos: "Reinigung" im Ritual und im Theater', *Berichte und Abhandlungen: Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften* 7: 23–38 (= *Kleine Schriften*, vol. VII, pp. 37–52).
2000. 'Private needs and polis acceptance: purification at Selinous', in Flensted Jensen, P., Nielsen, T. H., and Rubinstein, L. (eds.), *Polis and Politics: Studies in Ancient Greek History Presented to M. H. Hansen*. Copenhagen, pp. 207–16 (= *Kleine Schriften*, vol. VII, pp. 210–19).
2001. *Kleine Schriften*, vol. 1: *Homerica* (ed. C. h. Riedweg). Göttingen.
- 2006a. *Kleine Schriften*, vol. III: *Mystica, Orphica, Pythagorica* (ed. F. Graf). Göttingen.
- 2006b. 'Ritual between ethology and post modern aspects. Philological historical notes', in Stavrianopoulou, E. (ed.), *Ritual and Communication in the Greco-Roman World*. Liège, pp. 23–35.
2007. *Kleine Schriften*, vol. VII: *Tragica et Historica* (ed. W. Rösler). Göttingen.
2008. *Kleine Schriften*, vol. VIII: *Philosophica* (ed. T. A. Szlezák and K. H. Stanzel). Göttingen.
2011. *Kleine Schriften*, vol. IV: *Mythica, Ritualia, Religiosa 1* (ed. F. Graf). Göttingen.
- Burnett, A. P. 1973. 'Curse and dream in Aeschylus' *Septem*', *GRBS* 14: 343–68.
1983. *Three Archaic Poets: Archilochus, Alcaeus, Sappho*. London.
1998. *Revenge in Attic and Later Tragedy*. Berkeley.
- Bury, R. G. 1926. *Plato: Laws*. 2 vols. London.
- Bussès, S. 2004. 'Euripides, *Phoenissae* 469 and a consular date', *Tyche* 19: 9–14.
- Butler, E. P. 2005. 'Polytheism and individuality in the henadic manifold', *Dionysius* 23: 83–103.
2008. 'The gods and being in Proclus', *Dionysius* 26: 93–113.
- Buxton, R. 1992. 'Iphigénie au bord de la mer', *Pallas* 37: 209–15.
- Byrne, L. 1997. 'Fear in the *Seven against Thebes*', in Deacy, S. and Peirce, K. F. (eds.), *Rape in Antiquity*. Swansea, pp. 143–62.
- Cairns, D. L. 1993. *Aidos: the Psychology and Ethics of Honour and Shame in Ancient Greek Literature*. Oxford.
2010. *Bacchylides: Five Epinician Odes (3, 5, 9, 11, 13)*. Cambridge.

- Calame, C. 1979. 'ἄράομαι', *LfggE* 1: 1168-76.
 1996. *Mythe et histoire dans l'Antiquité grecque: la création symbolique d'une colonie*. Paris.
 1998. 'Mort héroïque et culte à mystère dans l'*Oedipe à Colone* de Sophocle: actes rituels au service de la création mythique', in Graf, F. (ed.), *Ansichten griechischer Rituale*. Stuttgart, pp. 326-56.
 2004. 'Modes de la citation et critique de l'intertextualité: jeux énonciatifs et pragmatiques dans les "Théognidéa"', in Darbo Peschanski, C. (ed.), *La citation dans l'antiquité*. Grenoble, pp. 221-41.
 2006. *Pratiques poétiques de la mémoire. Représentations de l'espace-temps en Grèce ancienne*. Paris.
 2009. 'Iphigénie à Brauron: étiologie poétique et paysage artémisien', in Bodiou, L. and Mehl, V. (eds.), *La religion des femmes en Grèce ancienne : mythes, cultes et société*. Rennes, pp. 83-92.
 Calder III, W. M. and Schlesier, R. (eds.) 1998. *Karl Otfried Müller und die antike Kultur*. Hildesheim.
 Calhoun, G. M. 1913. *Athenian Clubs in Politics and Litigation*. Austin.
 Callaway, C. 1993. 'Perjury and the unsworn oath' *TAPhA* 123: 15-25.
 1998. 'Odysseus' three unsworn oaths', *AJPh* 119: 159-70.
 Cambiano, G. 1991. 'Eric Dodds entre psychanalyse et parapsychologie', *RHR* 208: 3-26.
 Cameron, H. D. 1964. 'The debt to earth in the *Seven against Thebes*', *TAPhA* 95: 1-8.
 1968. "'Epigoni" and the law of inheritance in Aeschylus' *Septem*', *GRBS* 9: 247-57.
 Campbell, D. A. 1982-93. *Greek Lyric Poetry*. 5 vols. Cambridge, Mass.
 Caquot, A. 1974. 'Les enfants aux cheveux blancs. Réflexion sur un motif', in *Mélanges d'histoire des religions offerts à H.-C. Puech*. Paris, pp. 161-72.
 Carawan, E. 2002. 'The Athenian amnesty and the "scrutiny of the laws"', *JHS* 122: 1-23.
 2007. 'Oath and contract', in Sommerstein, A. and Fletcher, J. (eds.), *Horkos: the Oath in Greek Society*. Bristol, pp. 73-80.
 Carbon, J. M. and Pirenne Delforge, V. 2012. 'Beyond Greek "Sacred Laws"', *Kernos* 25: 163-82.
 Carlier, P. 1977. 'La vie politique à Sparte sous le règne de Cléomène Ier', *Ktèma* 2: 65-84.
 Carrière, J. 1948. *Théognis de Mégare. Étude sur le recueil élégiaque attribué à ce poète*. Paris.
 1954. 'Nouvelles remarques sur l'époque et sur le texte de Théognis', *REG* 67: 39-68.
 Carson, A. 1984. 'The burners. A reading of Bacchylides' third epinician ode', *Phoenix* 38: 111-19.
 Casabona, J. 1966. *Recherches sur le vocabulaire des sacrifices en grec, des origines à la fin de l'époque classique*. Paris.
 Casevitz, M. 1989. 'A la recherche du kosmos. Là tout n'est qu'ordre et beauté', *TR* 10: 97-119.

2000. *Pausanias: Description de la Grèce*, vol. VII: *L'Achaïe*. Paris.
- Cassata, F. 2006. *Molti, sani e forti: l'eugenetica in Italia*. Turin.
- Càssola, F. 1964. 'Aristofane di Bisanzio e Solone', *PCP* 6: 43–52.
1973. 'La proprietà del suolo in Attica fino a Pisistrato', *PP* 28: 75–87.
- Catsanicos, J. 1991. *Recherches sur le vocabulaire de la faute*. Hitt. waš-tul et Gr. ἄ(F) ἄ-τη: deux représentants de la base I.-Eur. *H₂wem- 'faillir'. Paris.
- Cawkwell, G. 1993. 'Cleomenes', *Mnemosyne* 46: 506–27.
- Cerri, G. 1968. 'La terminologia sociopolitica di Teognide: I: L'opposizione semantica tra ἀγαθός ἐσθλός e κακός δειλός', *QUCC* 6: 7–32.
1979. *Legislazione orale e tragedia greca. Studi sull'Antigone di Sofocle e sulle Supplici di Euripide*. Naples.
1991. 'Il significato di sphregis in Teognide e la salvaguardia dell'autenticità testuale nel mondo antico', *QS* 17: 21–40.
- Chambers, C. 1973. 'Aristotle on Solon's reform of coinage and weights', *CSCA* 6: 1–16.
- Chantraine, P. and Masson, O. 1954. 'Sur quelques termes du vocabulaire religieux des Grecs: la valeur du mot *agos* et de ses dérivés', *Sprachgeschichte und Wortbedeutung. Festschrift Albert Debrunner*. Bern, pp. 85–107.
- Chantraine, P. et al. 2009. *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque. Nouvelle édition*. Paris.
- Chiasson, C. C. 1986. 'The Herodotean Solon', *GRBS* 27: 149–62.
- 1999–2000. 'Σωφρονοῦντες ἐν χρόνῳ: the Athenians and time in Aeschylus' *Eumenides*', *CJ* 95: 139–61.
2003. 'Herodotus' use of Attic tragedy in the Lydian "logos"', *CLAnt* 22: 5–35.
- Chinitz, J. 2000. 'Divine and human curses', *Jewish Bible Quarterly* 28: 87–92.
- Chirassi Colombo, I. 1994. 'Antropologia della *charis* nella cultura greca antica', in Galli, G. (ed.), *Interpretazione e gratitudine*. Macerata, pp. 65–104.
- Chodkowski, R. R. 1978. 'L'organisation du temps dans l'*Agamemnon* d'Eschyle', *Eos* 66: 5–15.
- Christes, J. 1986. 'Solons Musenelegie', *Hermes* 114: 1–19.
- Ciccio, M. 1983. 'Il santuario di Damia e Auxesia e il conflitto tra Atene ed Egina (Herod. v, 82–88)', *CISA* 9: 95–104.
- Cingano, E. 2000. 'Tradizioni su Tebe nell'epica e nella lirica greca arcaica', in Bernardini, P. A. (ed.), *Presenza e funzione della città di Tebe nella cultura greca*. Pisa, pp. 127–61.
2002. 'I nomi dei Sette a Tebe e degli Epigoni nella tradizione epica, tragica e iconografia', in Aloni, A. (ed.), *I Sette a Tebe: dal mito alla letteratura*. Bologna, pp. 27–62.
2003. 'Riflessi dell'epos tebano in Omero e in Esiodo', in Cristante, L., and Tessier, A. (eds.), *Incontri triestini di filologia classica*. 2, 2002–2003. Trieste, pp. 55–76.
- Clarke, M. 1999. *Flesh and Spirit in the Songs of Homer: a Study of Words and Myths*. Oxford.
- Clay, J. S. 2003. *Hesiod's Cosmos*. Cambridge.

- Clinton, K. 1988. 'Artemis and the sacrifice of Iphigeneia in Aeschylus' *Agamemnon*', in Pucci, P. (ed.), *Language and the Tragic Hero: Essays on Greek Tragedy in Honor of Gordon M. Kirkwood*. Atlanta, pp. 1 24.
1996. 'A new *lex sacra* from Selinus: kindly Zeuses, Eumenides, impure and pure Tritopatores, and Elasteroi', *CPh* 91: 159 79.
- Clucas, L. 1981. *The Trial of John Italos and the Crisis of Intellectual Values in Byzantium in the Eleventh Century*. Munich.
- Cobb Stevens, B. 1985. 'Opposites, reversals, and ambiguities. The unsettled world of Theognis', in Figueira, T. J. and Nagy, G. (eds.), *Theognis of Megara: Poetry and the Polis*. Baltimore, pp. 159 75.
- Cobet, J. 1971. *Herodots Exkurse und die Frage der Einheit seines Werkes*. Wiesbaden.
1977. 'Wann wurde Herodots Darstellung der Perserkriege publiziert?', *Hermes* 105: 2 27.
- Cocchini, F. 1980. 'Interpretazione origeniana della parabola del fariseo e del pubblicano nel commento all'lettera ai Romani', *SSR* 4: 305 12.
- Cohen, E. 2007. *The Mind Possessed. The Cognition of Spirit Possession in the Afro-Brazilian Religious Tradition*. Oxford.
- Cohen, H. 1980. 'Horkia and horkos in the Iliad', *RIDA* 27: 49 68.
- Cole, S. G. 1996. 'Oath ritual and the male community at Athens', in Ober, J. and Hedrick, C. (eds.), *Demokratia: a Conversation on Democracies, Ancient and Modern*. Princeton, pp. 227 48.
- Coleman, R. 1972. 'The role of the chorus in Sophocles' *Antigone*', *PCPhS* 18: 4 27.
- Colesanti, G. 2001. 'Dittografie e scambi simposiali nel corpus teognideo', *Athenaeum* 89: 459 95.
- 'Tra separatisti e unitari: l'Elegia alle Muse di Solone', in Nicolai, R. (ed.), *Ψυμός: studi di poesia, metrica et musica greca offerti dagli allievi a Luigi Enrico Rossi per i suoi settant'anni*. Rome, pp. 93 116.
- Collins, D. 2004. *Master of the Game: Competition and Performance in Greek Poetry*. Washington, DC.
- Conacher, D. J. 1974. 'Interaction between chorus and characters in the *Oresteia*', *AJPh* 95: 323 43.
- Condello, F. 2007. 'L'eredità del nobile: (Theogn. 409 s., 1161 s.)', *Lexis* 25: 177 83.
- Connor, W. R. 1985. 'The razing of the house in Greek society', *TAPhA* 115: 79 102.
- Conway, P. 1996. *Metaphysics of Aquinas: a Summary of Aquinas' Exposition of Aristotle's Metaphysics*. Lanham, Md.
- Copans, J. and Jamin, J. 1978. *Aux origines de l'anthropologie française*. Paris.
- Coray, M. 2009. *Homers Ilias Gesamtkommentar*, Bd. v1.19, Fasz. 2 (Kommentar). Munich.
- Corcella, A. 1996. 'A new fragment of the historian Theseus', *CQ* 46: 261 6.
- Cortina, F. 1994. 'Ζοφοδοπρίδαις (Alc. Test. 429 V = D. L. I, 81)', *AFB* 17: 55 8.
- Couloubaritsis, L. 1996. 'Genèse et structure dans le mythe hésiodique des races', in Blaise, F., Judet de la Combe, P., and Rousseau, P. (eds.), *Le métier du mythe. Lectures d'Hésiode*. Lille, pp. 479 518.

- Court, B. 1994. *Die dramatische Technik des Aischylos*. Stuttgart.
- Coward, H. G. 2003. *Sin and Salvation in the World Religions: a Short Introduction*. Oxford.
- Crahay, R. 1956. *La littérature oraculaire chez Hérodote*. Paris.
- Crane, G. 1996. 'The prosperity of tyrants: Bacchylides, Herodotus, and the contest for legitimacy', *Arethusa* 29: 57–85.
- Crawley, A. E. 1911. 'Cursing and blessing', *Hastings' Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*, vol. IV: 367–74.
- Creighton, M. R. 1990. 'Revisiting shame and guilt cultures: a forty year pilgrimage', *Ethos* 18: 279–307.
- Cribiore, R. 2001. "'The grammarians' choice". The popularity of the *Phoenissae* in Hellenistic and Roman education', in Too, Y. L. (ed.), *Education in Greek and Roman Antiquity*. Leiden, pp. 241–59.
- Criniti, N. 1979. 'Per una storia del plutarchismo occidentale', *Nuova rivista storica* 63: 187–203.
- Cromeey, R. D. 1979. 'Aristotle on the destruction of Dionysius the I's family', *RBP* 57: 5–17.
2000. 'Kleisthenes' 700 *Epistia*', *AC* 69: 43–63.
- Cropp, M. J. 1988. *Euripides: Electra*. Warminster.
2000. *Euripides: Iphigenia in Tauris*. Warminster.
- Crouter, R. 2005. *Friedrich Schleiermacher: Between Enlightenment and Romanticism*. Cambridge.
- Crubellier, M. 1996. 'Le mythe comme discours. Le récit des cinq races humaines dans les *Travaux et les Jours*', in Blaise, F., Judet de la Combe, P., and Rousseau, P. (eds.), *Le métier du mythe. Lectures d'Hésiode*. Lille, pp. 431–63.
- Crüger, O. 1882. *De locorum Theognideorum apud veteres scriptores exstantium ad textum poetae emendandum pretio*. Königsberg.
- Cuartero, F. J. 1968. 'La metáfora de la nave, de Arquíloco a Esquilo', *BIEH* 2: 41–5.
- Cunningham, M. B. 2006. "'All holy infant": Byzantine and western views on the conception of the Virgin Mary', *St Vladimir's Theological Quarterly* 50: 127–48.
- Cuny, D. 2002. 3. 'Les réflexions gnomiques du cœur d'*Antigone*', *CGITA* 15: 17–37.
- Curbera, J. B. 1999. 'Maternal lineage in Greek magical texts', in Jordan, D. et al. (eds.), *The World of Ancient Magic*. Bergen, pp. 195–204.
- Cürsgen, D. 2002. *Die Rationalität des Mythischen: der philosophische Mythos bei Platon und seine Exegese im Neuplatonismus*. Berlin.
- Dale, A. 2011. 'Alcaeus on the career of Myrsilos: Greeks, Lydians and Luwians at the east Aegean west Anatolian interface', *JHS* 131: 15–24.
- Dalfen, J. 1974. 'Zeus, die Hoffnung und die Klugheit des Menschen: Deutungen der menschlichen Existenz in frühgriechischer Dichtung', in *Probata probanda: Festschrift für F. Egermann zum 70. Geburtstag*. Munich, pp. 22–43.
- Dällenbach, L. 1977. *Le récit spéculaire. Essai sur la mise en abyme*. Paris.
- Dalzell, J. O. 1970. 'Pleisthenes in the *Agamemnon* of Aeschylus', *Hermathena* 110: 79–80.

- Damen, M. 1990. 'Electra's monody and the role of the chorus in Euripides' *Orestes* 960 1012', *TAPhA* 120: 133 45.
- D'Ancona, C. 2006. 'À propos du *De anima* de Jamblique', *RSPh* 90: 614 40.
- D'Ancona, C. and Luna, C. 2000. 'La doctrine des principes: Syrianus comme source textuelle et doctrinale de Proclus', in Segonds, A. P. and Steel, C. (eds.), *Proclus et la théologie platonicienne*. Paris, pp. 189 278.
- Dangel, J. 1987. 'Les dynasties maudites dans le théâtre latin de la République à l'Empire', *Ktèma* 12: 149 57.
1995. *Accius: Oeuvres*. Paris.
- Darbo Peschanski, C. 1987. *Le discours du particulier. Essai sur l'enquête hérodotéenne*. Paris.
- Daube, B. 1939. *Zu den Rechtsproblemen in Aischylos Agamemnon*. Leipzig.
- Daux, G. 1953. 'Serments amphictioniques et serment de Platées', in Mylonas, G. E. and Raymond, D. (eds.), *Studies Presented to D. M. Robinson*, vol. 11. Saint Louis, pp. 775 82.
- David Guignard, S. 2008. 'Le partage du pouvoir: les Étéocle de la tragédie', *Ktèma* 33: 331 46.
- Davies, J. 1994. 'The traditions about the first sacred war', in Hornblower, S. (ed.), *Greek Historiography*. Oxford, pp. 193 212.
- Davies, M. 1985. 'Conventional topics of invective in Alcaeus', *Prometheus*: 31 9.
2010. "'Sins of the fathers": omitted sacrifices and offended deities in Greek literature and the folk tale', *Eikasmos* 21: 330 55.
- Dawe, R. D. 1967. 'The end of *Seven against Thebes*', *CQ* 17: 16 28.
1978. 'The end of *Seven against Thebes* yet again', in Dawe, R. D., Diggle, J., and Easterling, P. E. (eds.), *Dionysiaca*. Cambridge, pp. 87 103.
- Debnar, P. A. 2010. 'The sexual status of Aeschylus' Cassandra', *CPh* 105: 129 45.
- DeFilippo, J. G. 2000. 'Cicero vs. Cotta in *De natura deorum*', *AncPhil* 20: 169 87.
- Defradas, J. 1958. 'Le rôle de l'allitération dans la poésie grecque', *REA* 60: 36 49.
- Degani, E. 2001. *Αἰών*. Bologna.
- Deichstetter, G. (ed.) 1982. *Caritas Pirckheimer. Ordensfrau und Humanistin ein Vorbild für die Ökumene. Festschrift zum 450. Todestag*. Cologne.
- De Lacy, P. h. H. and Einarson, B. 1959. *Plutarch's Moralia*, vol. VII. Cambridge, Mass.
- Delaney, C. 1998. *Abraham on Trial: the Social Legacy of Biblical Myth*. Princeton.
- Delattre, C. 2006. 'Entre mortalité et immortalité: l'exemple de Sarpédon dans l'*Iliade*', *RPh* 80: 259 71.
- Delcourt, A. 1998. 'Entre légende et histoire: Oreste et le prince', *LEC* 66: 61 72.
- del Grande, C. 1964. 'Solone: L'elegia alle Muse', *Vichiana* 1: 428.
- Delumeau, J. 1983. *Le péché et la peur. La culpabilisation en Occident (XIIIe XVIIIe siècles)*. Paris.
- Demont, P. 2009. 'Figures of inquiry in Herodotus's *Inquiries*', *Mnemosyne* 62: 179 205.
- Dempsey, T. 1918. *The Delphic Oracle: Its Early History, Influence, and Fall*. Oxford.

- Denniston, J. D. and Page, D. L. (eds.) 1957. *Aeschylus*. Agamemnon. Oxford.
- Denzin, N. 2001. *Interpretive Interactionism*. Thousand Oaks, Calif.
- De Santis, G. 2005. 'Las Erinias: configuración progresiva del personaje y definición simbólica en *Orestíada* de Esquilo. 1', *Ordia prima* 4: 37-74.
- Despinis, G. I. 2005. 'Iphigeneia und Orestes: Vorschläge zur Interpretation zweier Skulpturenfunde aus Brauron', *MDAI(A)* 120: 241-67.
- Detienne, M. 1970. 'L'olivier, un mythe politico religieux', *RHR* 178: 5-23.
2005. *Les Grecs et nous: une anthropologie comparée de la Grèce ancienne*. Paris.
- Deubner, L. 1932. *Attische Feste*. Berlin.
1942. *Oedipusprobleme*. Berlin.
- Develin, R. 1985. 'Herodotus and the Alkmaeonids', in Eadie, J. W. and Ober, J. (eds.), *The Craft of the Ancient Historian. Essays in Honor of Chester G. Starr*. Lanham, Md., pp. 125-39.
- De Vito, A. 1999. 'Eteocles, Amphiaraus, and necessity in Aeschylus' *Seven against Thebes*', *Hermes* 127: 165-71.
- Dewald, C. 2012. 'Myth and legend in Herodotus' First Book', in Baragwanath, E. and de Bakker, M. (eds.), *Myth, Truth, & Narrative in Herodotus*. Oxford, pp. 59-85.
- Di Blasi, F. 1999. *Dio et la legge naturale: una rilettura di Tommaso d'Aquino*. Pisa.
- Dickey, E. 2007. *Ancient Greek Scholarship. A Guide to Finding, Reading, and Understanding Scholia, Commentaries, Lexica, and Grammatical Treatises, from Their Beginnings to the Byzantine Period*. Oxford.
- Dickie, M. W. 1978. 'Δίκη as a moral term in Homer and Hesiod', *CPh* 73: 91-101.
1996. 'What is a *kolossos* and how were *kolossoi* made in the Hellenistic period?', *GRBS* 37: 237-57.
- Dirksen, H. 1965. *Die aischyleische Gestalt des Orest*. Nuremberg.
- Dodds, E. R. 1951. *The Greeks and the Irrational*. Berkeley.
1959. *Gorgias*. Oxford.
1960. 'Morals and politics in the *Oresteia*', *PCPhS* 6: 19-31.
- Domínguez Monedero, A. J. 2001. *Solón de Atenas*. Barcelona.
- Donato, R. di 1987. 'La cité de Fustel à Glotz. Méthode historique et science sociale', in Detienne, M. et al. (eds.), *Poikilia. Études offertes à Jean-Pierre Vernant*. Paris, pp. 451-61.
- Doniger, W. 1980. *The Origins of Evil in Hindu Mythology*. Berkeley.
- Donlan, W. 1970. 'Changes and shifts in the meaning of *demos* in the literature of the archaic period', *PP* 25: 381-95.
1980. *The Aristocratic Ideal in Ancient Greece. Attitudes of Superiority from Homer to the End of the Fifth Century*. Lawrence, Kans.
1982. 'Reciprocities in Homer', *CW* 75: 137-75.
1985. 'Pistos philos hetairoi', in Figueira, T. J. and Nagy, G. (eds.), *Theognis of Megara: Poetry and the Polis*. Baltimore, pp. 223-44.
- Dornseiff, F. 1939. *Echtheitsfragen antik-griechischer Literatur; Rettungen des Theognis, Phokylides, Hekataios, Choirilos*. Berlin.
- Dornseiff, J. 1966. *Isaak Sebastokrator: Zehn Aporien über die Vorsehung*. Meisenheim am Glan.

- Dörrie, H. 1973. 'La doctrine de l'âme dans le néoplatonisme de Plotin à Proclus', *RThPh* 1973: 116 34.
1977. 'Der Begriff *Pronoia* in Stoa und Platonismus', *FZPhTh* 24: 60 87.
- Dougherty, C. and Kurke, L. 2003. *The Cultures within Ancient Greek Culture: Contact, Conflict, Collaboration*. Cambridge.
- Douglas, M. 1966. *Purity and Danger. An Analysis of Concepts of Purity and Taboo*. London.
2007. *Thinking in Circles. An Essay on Ring Composition*. New Haven.
- Dovatur, A. I. 1972. 'Theognis von Megara und sein soziales Ideal', *Klio* 54: 77 89.
1977. 'La culpabilité héréditaire selon Solon, Théognis et Eschyle', *PhilClass* 1: 36 45 [in Russian].
- Dover, K. J. 1973. 'Some neglected aspects of Agamemnon's dilemma', *JHS* 93: 58 69.
1974. *Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle*. Oxford.
- Dovere, E. 2004. '*Hereditas personam dominae sustinet*: giacenza ereditaria e tradizione romanistica', *SDHI* 70: 13 54.
- Doyle, A. 2008. 'Cassandra: feminine corrective in Aeschylus's *Agamemnon*', *AClass* 51: 57 75.
- Doyle, R. E. 1970. 'ἄλβος, κόρος, ὕβρις and ἄτη from Hesiod to Aeschylus', *Traditio* 26: 293 303.
- Dozier, E. P. 1955. 'The Concepts of "Primitive" and "Native" in Anthropology', in Thomas, W. L. (ed.), *Current Anthropology*. Chicago, pp. 187 202.
- Dragona Monachou, M. 1976. *The Stoic Arguments for the Existence and the Providence of the Gods*. Athens.
- Dubarle, A. M. 1967. *Le péché originel dans l'Écriture*, 2nd edn. Paris.
1999. *Le péché originel: Écriture et tradition*. Paris.
- Dubois, L. 1995. 'Une nouvelle inscription archaïque de Sélinonte', *RPh* 69: 127 44.
- Duchemin, J. 1967. 'Le déroulement du temps et la composition de l'*Agamemnon* d'Eschyle', *Information littéraire* 19: 165 72.
1983. 'La triade des Euménides et la purification d'Oreste', in Limet, H. and Ries, J. (eds.), *Le mythe. Son langage et son message*. Louvain la Neuve, pp. 245 74.
- Duchet, M. 1971. *Anthropologie et histoire au siècle des lumières*. Paris.
- Duffy, J. 1995. 'Reactions of two Byzantine intellectuals to the theory and practice of magic', in Maguire, H. (ed.), *Byzantine Magic*. Washington, DC, pp. 83 97.
- Duffy, J. and O'Meara, D. J. 1989 92. *Michaelis Psellis Philosophica minora*. 2 vols. Leipzig.
- Dumas Champion, F. 1989. 'Le droit de maudire', in Billacois, F. (ed.), *Le serment: recueil d'études anthropologiques, historiques et juridiques*. Paris, pp. III 23.
- Duminil, M. P. 1984. 'Les théories biologiques sur la génération en Grèce antique', *Pallas* 31: 97 112.
- Dunbabin T. J. 1936 7. 'Ἐχθρη παλαιή', *ABSA* 37: 83 91.

- Dunn, J. 1972. *Modern Revolutions: an Introduction to the Analysis of a Political Phenomenon*. Cambridge.
- Duplouy, A. 2000. 'Le bûcher de Crésus: exploitation et transformation d'une tradition iconographique et textuelle à travers le Ve siècle', *RFIC* 128: 21–37.
2002. 'L'aristocratie et la circulation des richesses: apport de l'histoire économique à la définition des élites grecques', *RBP* 80: 5–24.
2003. 'Les Eupatrides d'Athènes, "nobles défenseurs de leur patrie"', *Cahiers du Centre Glotz* 14: 7–22.
2006. *Le prestige des élites. Recherches sur les modes de reconnaissance sociale en Grèce entre les Xe et le Ve siècles avant J.-C.* Paris.
- Durán, M. 1999. 'Oath and the settlement of disputes in Hesiod *Op.* 27–41', *ZRG* 116: 25–48.
- Durkheim, E. 1905. Review of Glotz's *La solidarité de la famille dans le droit criminel en Grèce* (1904), *L'Année sociologique* 8: 465–72.
- 1975 [1909]. Review of Lasch's *Der Eid* (1908), *Textes*, vol. 111. Paris, pp. 339–44.
- Duvick, B. 2007. *Proclus: On Plato's 'Cratylus'*. London.
- Dyck, A. R. 2003. *Cicero: De natura deorum. Liber I*. Cambridge.
- Easterling, P. E. 1978. 'The second stasimon of Antigone', in Dawe, R. D., Diggle, J., and Easterling, P. E. (eds.), *Dionysiaca*. Cambridge, pp. 141–58.
1985. 'Anachronism in Greek tragedy', *JHS* 105: 1–10.
2008. 'Theatrical furies: thoughts on *Eumenides*', in Revermann, M. and Wilson, P. J. (eds.), *Performance, Iconography, Reception: Studies in Honour of Oliver Taplin*. Oxford, pp. 219–36.
- Edmonds III, R. 1999. 'Tearing apart the Zagreus myth: a few disparaging remarks on Orphism and original sin', *CLAnt* 18: 35–73.
2004. *Myths of the Underworld Journey: Plato, Aristophanes, and the 'Orphic' Gold Tablets*. Cambridge.
2011. 'Who are you? A brief history of the scholarship', in Edmonds III, R. (ed.), *The 'Orphic' Gold Tablets and Greek Religion: Further along the Path*. Cambridge, pp. 3–14.
- (forthcoming). *Redefining Ancient Orphism*. Cambridge.
- Edmunds, L. 1985. 'The genre of Theognidean poetry', in Figueira, T. J. and Nagy, G. (eds.), *Theognis of Megara: Poetry and the Polis*. Baltimore, pp. 96–111.
1997. 'The seal of Theognis', in Edmunds, L. and Wallace, R. W. (eds.), *Poet, Public, and Performance in Ancient Greece*. Baltimore, pp. 29–48.
- Edwards, M. W. 1977. 'Agamemnon's decision. Freedom and folly in Aeschylus', *CSCA* 10: 17–38.
1991. *The Iliad: a Commentary*, vol. v: *Books 17–20*. Cambridge.
- Eidinow, E. 2011. 'Networks and narratives: a model for ancient Greek religion', *Kernos* 24: 9–38.
- Einarson, B. 1952. 'Plutarch's ancestry', *CPh* 47: 99.
- Einarson, B. and De Lacy, Ph. H. 1951. 'The manuscript tradition of Plutarch *Moralia* 548A–612B', *CPh* 46: 93–110.
- Eisenberger, H. 1984. 'Gedanken zu Solons *Musenelegie*', *Philologus* 128: 9–20.

- Eitrem, S. 1947. 'A purificatory rite and some allied *rites de passage*', *SO* 25: 36–53.
- Ekroth, G. 2002. *The Sacrificial Rituals of Greek Hero-Cults in the Archaic to the Early Hellenistic Period*. Liège.
2003. 'Inventing Iphigeneia? On Euripides and the cultic construction of Brauron', *Kernos* 16: 59–118.
- Eliot, C. W. Th. 1967. 'Where did the Alkmaionidai live?', *Historia* 16: 279–86.
- Ellis, J. R. 1994. 'Thucydidean method in the Kylon, Pausanias and Themistokles logoi', *Arethusa* 27: 165–91.
- Ellis, J. R. and Stanton, G. R. 1968. 'Factional conflict and Solon's reforms', *Phoenix* 22: 95–110.
- Else, G. F. 1976. *The Madness of Antigone*. Heidelberg.
1977. 'Ritual and tragedy in Aeschylean tragedy', *ICS* 2: 70–87.
- English Dominican Province. 1920–42. *The Summa Theologica of St Thomas Aquinas*, 2nd edn. 22 vols. London.
- Engmann, J. 1991. 'Cosmic justice in Anaximander', *Phronesis* 36: 1–25.
- Erbse, H. 1974. 'Zur Exodos der Sieben (Aisch. Sept. 1005–78)', in Heller, J. L. (ed.), *Serta Turyniana. Studies in Greek literature and Palaeography in Honor of Alexander Turyn*. Urbana, pp. 169–98.
1993. 'Die Funktion des Rechtsgedankens in Hesiods *Erga*', *Hermes* 121: 12–28.
- Erler, M. 1979. *Isaak Sebastokrator: Über Vorsehung und Schicksal*. Meisenham am Glan.
- Estienne, H. 1573. *Poesis philosophica, vel saltem, Reliquiae poesis philosophicae: Empedoclis, Xenophanis et al.* Geneva.
- Evans, J. A. S. 1955. 'Herodotus and the Gyges drama', *Athenaeum* 33: 333–6.
1979. 'Herodotus' publication date', *Athenaeum* 47: 145–9.
- Evans Pritchard, E. E. 1956. *Nuer Religion*. Oxford.
- Ewing, J. D. 2005. 'The Christianization of *pronoia*: Clement of Alexandria's conception of providence'. Diss. Graduate Theological Union, Berkeley.
- Fadabini, F. 1982. 'Origene e la necessità dell'allegoria nella lettura dell'Antico Testamento', *RIL* 116: 61–71.
- Fain, G. L. 2006. 'Apostrophe and σφρηγίς in the "Theognidean sylloge"', *CQ* 56: 301–4.
- Fantham, E. 2005. 'The family sagas of the houses of Aeacus and Pelops: from Ennius to Accius', *Dioniso* 4: 56–71.
- Fantuzzi, M. 2010. 'Sung poetry: the case of inscribed paeans', in Clauss, J. J. and Cuypers, M. (eds.), *A Companion to Hellenistic Literature*. Oxford, pp. 181–96.
- Faraggiana di Sarzana, C. 1978. 'Il commento di Proclo alle *Opere e i Giorni*. I. Plutarco fonte di Proclo', *Aevum* 52: 17–40.
1981. 'Il commento di Proclo alle *Opere e i Giorni*. II. Destinazione e fortuna dell'opera nella scuola d'Atene e dopo la sua chiusura', *Aevum* 55: 22–9.
1987. 'Le commentaire à Hésiode et la *paideia* encyclopédique de Proclus', in Pépin, J. and Saffrey, H. D. (eds.), *Proclus lecteur et interprète des anciens*. Paris, pp. 21–41.

- Faraone, C. A. 1993. 'Molten wax, spilt wine and mutilated animals: sympathetic magic in Near Eastern and early Greek oath ceremonies', *JHS* 113: 60–80.
2005. 'Curses and blessings in ancient Greek oaths', *Journal of Ancient Near Eastern Religions* 5: 139–56.
- Farnell, L. R. 1912. *The Higher Aspects of Greek Religion*. London.
- Fartzoff, M. 1984. '*Oikos et polis* dans l'*Orestie*. Quelques considérations', *Ktèma* 9: 171–84.
2008. 'Le héros et son action dans l'*Orestie* d'Eschyle: quelques considérations', in Auger, D. and Peigney, J. (eds.), *Φιλευριπίδης = Phileuripidès: mélanges offerts à François Jouan*. Nanterre, pp. 275–91.
- Federico, E. 2001. 'La *katharsis* di Epimenide ad Atene: la vicenda, gli usi e gli abusi ateniesi', in Federico, E. and Visconti, A. (eds.), *Epimenede Cretese*. Naples, pp. 77–128.
- Federico, E. and Visconti, A. (eds.) 2001. *Epimenede Cretesi*. Naples.
- Fédou, M. 1988. *Christianisme et religions païennes dans le Contre Celse d'Origène*. Paris.
- Fensham, F. C. 1962. 'Maledictions and benedictions in ancient Near Eastern vassal treaties and the Old Testament', *ZAW* 74: 1–19.
- Fernández Delgado, J. A. 1986. *Los oráculos y Hesíodo. Poesía oral mántica y gnómica griegas*. Cáceres.
1991. 'Das Orakel in der frühgriechischen Poesie', *WJA* 17: 17–39.
- Ferrari, F. 1987. 'Sulla ricezione dell'elegia arcaica nella silloge teognidea. Il problema delle varianti', *Maia* 39: 177–97.
1989. *Teognide. Elegie*. Milan.
- Ferrari, F. and Pontani, F. 1996. 'Alcaeus' grandfathers: a note on fr. 6, ll. 17–20 V', *ZPE* 113: 1–4.
- Ferrari, G. 1990. 'Figures of speech: the picture of *Aidos*', *Mètis* 5: 185–204.
- Festugière, A. J. 1966. 'Proclus et la religion traditionnelle' in Chevallier, R. (ed.), *Mélanges d'archéologie et d'histoire offerts à A. Piganiol*. Paris, pp. 1581–90.
- Figueira, T. J. 1981. *Aegina. Society and Politics*. New York.
- 1985a. 'Herodotus on the early hostilities between Aegina and Athens', *AJPh* 106: 49–74.
- 1985b. 'The Theognidea and Megarian society', in Figueira, T. J. and Nagy, G. (eds.), *Theognis of Megara: Poetry and the Polis*. Baltimore, pp. 112–58.
1986. 'Xanthippos, father of Perikles, and the *prutaneis* of the *naukraroî*', *Historia* 35: 257–79.
1988. 'The chronology of the conflict between Athens and Aegina in Herodotus Bk. 6', *QUCC* 57: 49–89.
1991. *Athens and Aigina in the Age of Imperial Colonization*. Baltimore.
2000. Review of Kurke 1999, *AJPh* 212: 642–6.
- Finglass, P. 2007. *Sophocles: Electra*. Cambridge.
2011. *Sophocles: Ajax*. Cambridge.
- Finley, M. I. 1997. 'The ancient city, from Fustel de Coulanges to Max Weber and beyond', *CSSH* 19: 305–27.

- Fisher, N. 2000. 'Hybris, revenge and stasis in the Greek city states', in Van Wees, H. (ed.), *War and Violence in Ancient Greece*. Swansea, pp. 83–123.
- Fisichella, D. 2005. *Joseph de Maistre, pensatore europeo*. Rome.
- Fitzgerald, J. T. 1997. 'Friendship in the Greek world prior to Aristotle', in Fitzgerald, J. T. (ed.), *Greco-Roman Perspectives on Friendship*. Atlanta, pp. 13–34.
- Fitzpatrick, J. 2010. 'Original sin or original sinfulness?', *New Blackfriars* 91: 66–82.
- Fletcher, J. 2003. 'Women and oaths in Euripides', *Theatre Journal* 55: 29–44.
2007. 'Horkos in the *Oresteia*', in Sommerstein, A. and Fletcher, J. (eds.), *Horkos: the Oath in Greek Society*. Bristol, pp. 102–12.
- Flintoff, E. 1980. 'The ending of the *Seven against Thebes*', *Mnemosyne* 33: 244–71.
- Fodor, J. 1998. *Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong*. Oxford.
- Fontenrose J. 1974. 'Work, justice, and Hesiod's five ages', *JPh* 69: 1–16.
1978. *The Delphic Oracle*. Berkeley.
- Forbes, P. B. R. 1950. 'Hesiod versus Perses', *CR* 53: 82–7.
- Ford, A. 1985. 'The Seal of Theognis: the politics of authorship in archaic Greece', in Figueira, T. J. and Nagy, G. (eds.), *Theognis of Megara: Poetry and the Polis*. Baltimore, pp. 82–95.
- Fornara, C. W. 1971a. *Herodotus, an Interpretative Essay*. Oxford.
- 1971b. 'Evidence for the date of Herodotus' publication', *JHS* 91: 25–34.
1981. 'Herodotus' knowledge of the Archidamian War', *Hermes* 109: 149–56.
- Forsdyke, S. 2001. 'Athenian democratic ideology and Herodotus' *Histories*', *AJPh* 122: 329–58.
- Foucault, M. 1966. *Les mots et les choses*. Paris.
- Fowler, B. H. 1970. 'The imagery of the *Seven against Thebes*', *SO* 45: 24–37.
- Fowler, H. N. 1914. *Plato: Euthyphro; Apology; Crito; Phaedo; Phaedrus*. London.
- Fowler, R. L. 2003. 'Herodotos and Athens', in Derow, P. and Parker, R. (eds.), *Herodotus and his World: Essays from a Conference in Memory of George Forrest*. Oxford, pp. 305–18.
2011. 'Mythos and Logos', *JHS* 131: 45–66.
- Foxhall, L. 1996. 'The law and the lady: women and legal proceedings in classical Athens', in Foxhall, L. and Lewis, A. D. E. (eds.), *Greek Law in its Political Setting: Justification Not Justice*. Oxford, pp. 133–52.
1997. 'A view from the top: evaluating the Solonian property classes', in Mitchell, L. and Rhodes, P.J. (eds.), *The Development of the Polis in Archaic Greece*. London, pp. 113–36.
- Fraenkel, E. 1963. *Zu den Phoenissen des Euripides*. Munich.
- Fraenkel, H. 1924. 'Eine Stileigenheit der frühgriechischen Literatur', *NGG* 63: 103.
- (ed.) 1950. *Aeschylus. Agamemnon*, vols. I–III. Oxford.
1964. 'Zum Schluss der *Sieben gegen Theben*', *MH* 21: 58–64.
1968. *Wege und Formen frühgriechischen Denkens*. Munich.
- 1975 [1951]. *Early Greek Poetry and Philosophy. A History of Greek Epic, Lyric, and Prose to the Middle of the Fifth Century*. Oxford.

- Frazier, F. 2012. 'Le "dialogue" de Joseph de Maistre et de Plutarque. Quelques remarques textuelles sur la version maistrienne des *Délais de la justice divine*', in Guerrier, O. (ed.), *Plutarque de l'âge classique au XIXe siècle*. Grenoble, pp. 289–305.
- Frede, D. 2002. 'Theodicy and providential care in Stoicism', in Frede, D. and Laks, A. (eds.), *Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath*. Leiden, pp. 85–117.
- Frede, M. 1997. 'Celsus' attack on the Christians', in Barnes, J. and Griffin, M. (eds.), *Philosophia togata. 2, Plato and Aristotle at Rome*. Oxford, pp. 218–40.
- Friis Johansen, H. and Whittle, E. W. 1980. *The Suppliants: Aeschylus*. 3 vols. Copenhagen.
- Frings, I. 1996. *Der Weise und der König: Solon und Kroisos bei Herodot und Lukian*. Toruń.
- Fritz, K. von 1943. 'νόος and νοεῖν in the Homeric poems', *CPh* 38: 79–93.
1945. 'νόος, νοεῖν, and their derivatives in pre Socratic philosophy (excluding Anaxagoras): I: from the beginnings to Parmenides', *CPh* 40: 223–42.
1967. *Die griechische Geschichtsschreibung*, vol. 1. Berlin.
- Fritzsche, F. H. T. 1870. 'Das Stichwort als Ordnungsprinzip der Theognideischen Fragmente', *Philologus* 29: 526–46.
- Frontisi Ducroux, F. 2006. 'L'étoffe des spectres', *Mètis* n.s. 4: 29–50.
- Fuqua, C. 1976. 'Studies in the use of myth in Sophocles' *Philoctetes* and the *Orestes* of Euripides', *Traditio* 32: 29–95.
1978. 'The world of myth in Euripides' *Orestes*', *Traditio* 34: 1–28.
- Fürer Haimendorf, C. von 1974. 'The sense of sin in cross cultural perspective', *Man* 9: 539–56.
- Furley, W. D. 1996. *Andokides and the Herms*. London.
- Fustel de Coulanges, N. D. 1870. *La cité antique*, 3rd edn. Paris.
- Gadamer, H. G. 1975. *Wahrheit und Methode*. New York.
- Gagarin, M. 1974a. 'Δίκη in archaic Greek thought', *CPh* 69: 186–97.
- 1974b. 'Hesiod's dispute with Perses', *TAPhA* 104: 103–11.
1976. *Aeschylean Drama*. Berkeley.
1992. 'The poetry of justice: Hesiod and the origins of Greek law', *Ramus* 21: 61–78.
- Gagné, R. 2006. 'L'esthétique de la peur chez Empédocle', *RPhA* 24.3: 83–110.
- 2007a. 'Inherited guilt in E. R. Dodds', *QS* 67: 16–33.
- 2007b. 'Winds and ancestors: the *Physika* of Orpheus', *HSPH* 103: 1–24.
2008. 'The sins of the fathers: C. A. Lobeck and K. O. Müller', *Kernos* 21: 109–24.
- 2009a. 'Atreid ancestors in Alkaios', *JHS* 129: 39–43.
- 2009b. 'Mystery inquisitors: performance, sacrilege, and authority at Eleusis', *CLAnt* 28: 211–47.
- 2009c. 'Spilling the sea out of its cup: Solon's *Elegy to the Muses*', *QUCC* 133: 23–49.
- 2009d. 'A wolf at the table: sympotic perjury in Archilochus', *TAPhA* 139: 249–72.

- 2010a. 'Haereditarium piaculum: aspects of Ancient Greek religion in the 17th century', in Bierl, A. and Braungart, W. (eds.), *Gewalt und Opfer. Im Dialog mit Walter Burkert*. Berlin, pp. 115–48.
- 2010b. 'Invisible kin: *Works and Days* 280–285 and the Myth of Races', *Hermes* 138: 1–21.
- 2010c. 'The poetics of *Exoleia* in Homer', *Mnemosyne* 62: 353–80.
2013. 'Zeus Laphystios and Athamas: Herodotus 7.197', in Bonnechere, P. and Gagné, R. (eds.), *Sacrifices humains: perspectives croisées et représentations*. Liège, pp. 101–18.
- (forthcoming a). 'Ideas, belief, unknowability: Euripides, *Hippolytus* 832–833 and 1379–1383', in Kavoulaki, A. (ed.), 'Reading' Greek Religion: *Essays in Honor of Christiane Sourvinou-Inwood*. Liège.
- (forthcoming b). 'Poétiques de la chrèsmodie', *Kernos* 26: 95–109.
- (forthcoming c). 'The world in a cup: ekpomatics in and out of the symposium', in Cazzato, V., Obbink, D., and Prodi, E. (eds.), *The Cup of Song: Studies on Poetry and the Symposium*. Oxford.
- Gagné, R. and Hopman, M. 2013. 'The chorus in the middle', in Gagné, R. and Hopman, M. (eds.), *Choral Mediations in Greek Tragedy*. Cambridge, pp. 1–34.
- Gallavotti, C. 1948. *Storia e poesia di Lesbo nel vii vi sec. a. C.*, vol. 1: *Alceo di Mitilene*. Bari.
1970. 'Aiace e Pittaco nel carme di Alceo', *BPE* 18: 3–29.
- Gallo, I. 2003. 'Funzione e significato dei miti nei dialoghi "moralì" di Plutarco', in López Férez, J. A. (ed.), *Mitos en la literatura griega helenística e imperial*. Madrid, pp. 197–208.
- Gantz, T. 1982. 'Inherited guilt in Aeschylus', *CJ* 78: 1–23.
1983. 'The Chorus of Aischylos' *Agamemnon*', *HSCP* 87: 65–86.
1993. *Early Greek Myth*. 2 vols. Baltimore.
- Garani, M. 2007. 'Cosmological oaths in Empedocles and Lucretius', in Sommerstein, A. and Fletcher, J. (eds.), *Horkos: the Oath in Greek Society*. Bristol, pp. 189–202.
- García González, J. and Campos Daroca, J. 1988. 'Apuntes para un enfoque estructural del término próphasis en Tucídides', in Pociña, A. and García González J. (eds.), *Studia Graecolatina Carmen Sanmillán in memoriam dicata*. Granada, pp. 189–95.
- Gärtner, T. 2005. 'Der mythische Held in saekularisierter Umgebung: zum *Orestes* des Euripides', *Prometheus* 31: 1–28.
- Garvie, A. F. 1986. *Aeschylus. Choephoroi*. Oxford.
- Garzya, A. 1988. 'La divinità e l'uomo in Teognide', *Vichiana* 17: 3–12.
- Gauthier, J. F. 1995. *Plutarque: sur les délais de la justice divine. Traduit du grec par Jacques Amyot*. Paris.
- Gavrilov, A. K. 2000. 'Zwei Vaterstädte des Theognis von Megara', *Hyperboreus* 6: 279–95.
- Geertz, A. W. 2004. 'Cognitive approaches to the study of religion', in Antes, P., Geertz, A. W., and Warne, R. R. (eds.), *New Approaches to the Study of*

- Religion*, vol. 11: *Textual, Comparative, Sociological, and Cognitive Approaches*. Berlin, pp. 347–99.
- Gehrke, H. J. 2006. 'The figure of Solon in the *Athēnaiōn Politeia*', in Blok, J. H. and Lardinois, A. P. M. H. (eds.), *Solon of Athens: New Historical and Philological Approaches*. Leiden, pp. 276–88.
- Genette, G. 1972. *Figures*, vol. 111. Paris.
1982. *Palimpsestes. La littérature au second degré*. Paris.
- Gentili, B. 1988. *Poetry and its Public in Ancient Greece*. Baltimore.
- Gentili, B. and Prato, C. 1988–2002. *Poetarum elegiacorum testimonia et fragmenta*, 2nd edn. 2 vols. Leipzig.
- Georgantzoglou, N. 2002. 'A note on μιάστωρ (Aeschylus, *Eumenides* 177)', *Mnemosyne* 55: 719–20.
- Georgoudi, S. 2001. "Ancêtres" de Sélinonte et d'ailleurs: le cas des Tritopatores', in Hoffmann, G. (ed.), *Les pierres de l'offrande: autour de l'oeuvre de Christoph W. Clairmont*. Kilchberg, pp. 152–63.
- Gerber, D. E. 1999a. *Greek Elegiac Poetry*. Cambridge, Mass.
- 1999b. *Greek Iambic Poetry*. Cambridge, Mass.
- Gernet, L. 1917. *Recherches sur le développement de la pensée juridique et morale en Grèce*. Paris.
- 1968[1954]. 'Mariages de tyrans', in Gernet, L., *Droit et institutions en Grèce antique*. Paris, pp. 229–49.
1983. 'Sur un point de la "théologie" de Pindare', in *Les Grecs sans miracle*. Paris, pp. 70–7.
- Gherchanoc, F. 1998. 'Le lien filial dans l'Athènes classique: pratiques et acteurs de sa reconnaissance', *Mètis* 13: 313–44.
- Ghinatti, F. 1970. *I gruppi politici ateniesi fino alle guerre persiane*. Rome.
- Giannini, P. 1973. 'Espressioni formulari nell' elegia greca arcaica', *QUCC* 16: 7–78.
- Gigante, M. 2001. 'Il bios laerziano di Epimenide', in Federico, E. and Visconti, A. (eds.), *Epiminede Cretese*. Naples, pp. 7–24.
- Giordano, M. 1999. *La parola efficace. Maledizioni, giuramenti e benedizioni nella Grecia arcaica*. Pisa.
2004. 'Edipo a Colono: la palinodia della colpa', *SemRom* 7: 183–205.
2006. 'Ritual appropriateness in *Seven against Thebes*: civic religion in a time of war', *Mnemosyne* 59: 53–74.
2009. 'Edipo a Colono II. Contaminazione e ereditarietà della colpa', *SemRom* 12: 231–51.
- Giorgieri, M. 2001. 'Aspetti magico religiosi del giuramento presso gli Ittiti e i Greci', in Ribichini, M. (ed.), *La questione delle influenze vicino-orientali sulla religione greca: stato degli studi e prospettive della ricerca: atti del Colloquio internazionale Roma*. Rome, pp. 421–40.
- Giraudeau, M. 1984. *Notions juridiques et sociales chez Hérodote. Études sur le vocabulaire*. Paris.
- Giuliani, A. 1998. 'La purificazione dagli ἐλάστεροι nella legge sacra di Selinunte', *Aevum* 72: 67–89.

1999. 'Il sacrilegio ciloniano: tradizioni e cronologia', *Aevum* 73: 21-42.
2000. 'Erodoto, Tucidide e gli indovinelli degli indovini: considerazioni sull'ambiguità del linguaggio oracolare', *Aevum* 74: 5-20.
- Giusti, A. 1929. 'Il suicidio di Cleomene', *AcR* 10: 54-76.
- Glau, K. 1998. 'Zur Diskussion um die Deutung des Schlusses der Aischyleischen *Eumeniden*', *Poetica* 30: 291-315.
- Glötz, G. 1901. '*Jusjurandum*', *Dictionnaire des antiquités grecques et romaines de Daremberg et Saglio*, t. 3, vol. 1. Paris, pp. 747-69.
1904. *La solidarité de la famille dans le droit criminel en Grèce*. Paris.
- Goblot Cahen, C. 1999. 'Les hérauts et la violence', *CCG* 10: 179-88.
- Godley, A. D. 1920. 5. *Herodotus*. 4 vols. London.
- Goetze, A. 1929. 'Die Pestgebete des Muršili', *Kleinasiatische Forschungen* 1: 161-251.
- Goff, B. 1999. 'The violence of community: ritual in the *Iphigenia in Tauris*', in Padilla, M. W. (ed.), *Rites of passage in ancient Greece: literature, religion, society*. Lewisburg, pp. 109-25.
- Goheen, R. F. 1951. *The Imagery of Sophocles' Antigone*. Princeton.
1955. 'Aspects of dramatic symbolism. Three studies in the *Oresteia*', *AJPh* 76: 113-37.
- Golden, L. 1964. 'The character of Eteocles and the meaning of the *Septem*', *CPh* 59: 79-89.
- Goldhill, S. 1984. *Language, Sexuality, Narrative, the Oresteia*. Cambridge.
1986. *Reading Greek Tragedy*. Cambridge.
2000. 'Civic ideology and the problem of difference: the politics of Aeschylean tragedy, once again', *JHS* 120: 34-56.
- Gomme, A. W., Andrewes, A., and Dover, K. J. 1941-79. *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides*, vols. 1-v. Oxford.
- González García, F. J. 1995. 'Los pretendientes de Helena: juramentos, sacrificios y cofradías guerreras en el mundo griego antiguo', *Polis* 7: 145-85.
- Görgemanns, H. et al., 2003. *Plutarch: Drei religionsphilosophische Schriften*. Munich.
- Gouillard, J. 1985. 'Le procès officiel de Jean l'Italien. Les actes et leurs sous entendus', *Travaux et mémoires du Centre de Recherche d'Histoire et Civilisation de Byzance* 9: 133-74.
- Grabmann, M. 1936. 'Die Proklosübersetzungen des Wilhelm von Moerbeke und ihre Verwertung in der lateinischen Literatur des Mittelalters', in Grabmann, M. (ed.), *Mittelalterliches Geistesleben*, vol. II. Munich, pp. 413-23.
1946. *M. Guglielmo di Moerbeke O.P. Il traduttore delle opere di Aristotele*. Rome.
- Graf, F. 1974. *Eleusis und die orphische Dichtung Athens in vorhellenistischer Zeit*. Berlin.
1979. 'Das Götterbild aus dem Taurerland', *AW* 4: 33-4.
1991. 'Textes orphiques et rituel bacchique: à propos des lamelles de Pélinna', in Borgeaud, P. (ed.), *Orphée et l'orphisme: en l'honneur de Jean Rudhardt*. Geneva, pp. 87-102.

1993. 'Dionysian and Orphic eschatology', in Carpenter, T. H. and Faraone, C. A. (eds.), *Masks of Dionysus*. Cornell, pp. 239–58.
- 2000 [1978]. 'The Locrian Maidens', in R. G. A. Buxton (ed.), *Oxford Readings in Greek Religion*. Oxford, pp. 250–70.
- 2005a. 'Eid', *ThesCRA* 3. Los Angeles, pp. 237–46.
- 2005b. 'Fluch und Verwünschung', *ThesCRA* 3. Los Angeles, pp. 247–70.
2011. 'Text and ritual: the *corpus eschatologicum* of the Orphics', in Edmonds III, R. (ed.), *The 'Orphic' Gold Tablets and Greek Religion: Further along the Path*. Cambridge, pp. 53–67.
- Graf, F. and Johnston, S. I. 2007. *Ritual Texts for the Afterlife: Orpheus and the Bacchic Gold Tablets*. London.
- Graham, A. J. 1983. *Colony and Mother City in Ancient Greece*, 2nd edn. Manchester.
- Graziosi, B. and Haubold, J. 2010. *Homer: Iliad 6*. Cambridge.
- Green, W. C. 1944. *Moirai: Fate, Good, and Evil*, in *Greek Thought*. Cambridge, Mass.
- Greenberg, N. A. 1985. 'Language, meter, and sense in Theognis (the role of *agathos*, "noble, good")', in Figueira, T. J. and Nagy, G. (eds.), *Theognis of Megara: Poetry and the Polis*. Baltimore, pp. 245–60.
- Greenhalgh P. A. L. 1969. 'Cassandra and the chorus in Aeschylus' *Agamemnon*', *RSC* 17: 253–8.
- Grethlein, J. 2006a. *Das Geschichtsbild der Ilias. Eine Untersuchung aus phänomenologischer und narratologischer Perspektive*. Göttingen.
- 2006b. 'Individuelle Identität und *conditio humana*: die Bedeutung und Funktion von γενεή im Blättergleichnis in Il. 6, 146–149', *Philologus* 150: 3–13.
2010. *The Greeks and their Past*. Cambridge.
2013. 'Choral intertemporality in the *Oresteia*', in Gagné, R. and Hopman, M. (eds.), *Choral Mediations in Greek Tragedy*. Cambridge, pp. 78–99.
- Griffin, J. 2006. 'Herodotus and tragedy', in Dewald, C. and Marincola, J. (eds.), *The Cambridge Companion to Herodotus*. Cambridge, pp. 46–59.
- Griffith, M. 1999. *Sophocles: Antigone*. Cambridge.
- Griffith, R. D. 1991. 'Oedipus' bloodthirsty sons: love and strife in Pindar's *Second Olympian Ode*', *ClAnt* 10: 46–58.
2008. 'Heralds and the beginning of the Peloponnesian War', *CPh* 103: 182–4.
- Grmek, M. D. 1991. 'Ideas on heredity in Greek and Roman antiquity', *Physis* 28: 11–34.
- Grondijs, L. H. 1960. *L'âme, le nous et les hénades dans la théologie de Proclus*. Amsterdam.
- Gronewald, M. 1975. 'Theognis 255 und Pap. Oxy. 2380', *ZPE* 19: 178–9.
- Grotius, H. 1623. *Dicta poetarum quae apud Io. Stobaeum exstant*. Paris.
1625. *De iure belli ac pacis*. Paris.
1626. *Excerpta ex tragoediis et comoediis graecis tum quae exstant, tum quae perierunt*. Paris.
1641. *Annotationes in libros evangeliorum*. Amsterdam.

- Gruppe, O. 1897 1906. *Griechische Mythologie und Religionsgeschichte*. 2 vols. Munich.
1921. *Geschichte der klassischen Mythologie und religionsgeschichte*. Leipzig.
- Guarducci, M. 1978. 'Arai', *Epigrafiā Greca* 4: 222 39.
- Guerrier, O. (ed.) 2012. *Plutarque de l'âge classique au XIXe siècle*. Grenoble.
- Günter, F. 1995. *Die theologische Philosophie Philip Melanchthons (1497 1560)*. Leipzig.
- Gusdorf, G. 1973. *L'avènement des sciences humaines au siècle des Lumières. Les sciences humaines et la pensée occidentale*. Paris.
- Hackett, H. B. 1844. *On the Delay of the Deity in the Punishment of the Wicked*. Andover.
- Hackett, H. B. and Tyler, W. S. 1868. *On the Delay of the Deity in Punishing the Wicked*. New York.
- Hädicke, W. 1937. *Die Gedanken der Griechen über Familienherkunft und Vererbung*. Halle.
- Hadot, P. 1975. 'La théologie de Proclus', *REG* 88: 220 23.
- Hainsworth, B. 1993. *The Iliad: a Commentary*, vol. III: *Books 9 12*. Cambridge.
- Haji, A. 1997. 'Pouvoir de bénir et de maudire: cosmologie et organisation sociale des Oromo Arsi', *Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines* 37: 289 318.
- Hall, E. 1993. 'Political and cosmic turbulence in Euripides' *Orestes*', in Sommerstein, A. H. (ed.), *Tragedy, Comedy and the Polis*. Bari, pp. 263 85.
- Hame, K. J. 2004. 'All in the family: funeral rites and the health of the οἶκος in Aeschylus' *Oresteia*', *AJPh* 125: 513 38.
- Hamilton, C. D. 1993. 'Cleisthenes and the demos', in Cherf, W. J. (ed.), *Alpha to Omega: Studies in Honor of George John Szemler on his Sixty-Fifth birthday*. Chicago, pp. 69 93.
- Hamilton, R. 1977. 'Solon 13.74ff (West)', *GRBS* 18: 185 8.
1978. 'Prologue prophecy and plot in four plays of Euripides', *AJPh* 99: 277 302.
1989. *The Architecture of Hesiodic Poetry*. Baltimore.
- Hammer, D. 2004. 'Ideology, the symposium, and archaic politics', *AJPh* 125: 479 512.
- Hammond Bammel, C. 1989. 'Adam in Origen', in *The Making of Orthodoxy*. Cambridge, pp. 62 93.
- Hampsher Monk, I., Tilmans, K., and Van Vrees, F. (eds.) 1998. *History of Concepts: Comparative Perspectives*. Amsterdam.
- Hankey, W. 2002. 'Aquinas and the Platonists', in Gersh, S. and Hoenen, Mj. F. M. (eds.), *The Platonic Tradition in the Middle Ages: a Doxographic Approach*. Berlin, pp. 279 324.
- Hansen, M. H. 1976. ἀπαγωγή, ἐνδείξις, and ἀφήγησις against κακοῦργοι, ἄτιμοι and φευγόντες. *A Study in the Athenian Administration of Justice in the Fourth Century BC*. Odense.
1989. 'Solonian democracy in fourth century Athens', *C&M* 40: 71 99.
- Hansen, O. 1987. 'On the origin of a Lokrian bronze plaque concerning the settlement of new territory', *StudClas* 25: 89 90.

- Hanson, R. P. C. 1959. *Allegory and Event. A Study of the Sources and Significance of Origen's Interpretation of Scripture*. London.
- Harding, P. 1988. 'Laughing at Isokrates. Humor in the *Areopagitikos*', *LCM* 13: 18–23.
- Hargis, J. W. 1999. *Against the Christians: the Rise of Early Anti-Christian Polemic*. New York.
- Harriot, R. 1969. *Poetry and Criticism before Plato*. London.
- Harris, E. M. 2006. 'Solon and the spirit of the laws in archaic and classical Greece', in Blok, J. H. and Lardinois, A. P. M. H. (eds.), *Solon of Athens: New Historical and Philological Approaches*. Leiden, pp. 290–20.
- Harris Cline, D. 1999. 'Archaic Athens and the topography of the Kylon affair', *ABSA* 94: 309–20.
- Harrison, E. 1902. *Studies in Theognis*. Cambridge.
- Harrison, T. 2000. *Divinity and History: the Religion of Herodotus*. Oxford.
- 2008–9. 'Herodotus on the American empire', *CW* 102: 383–93.
- Hartog, F. 2001. *Le XIXe siècle et l'histoire: le cas de Fustel de Coulanges*. Paris.
- Hasler, F. L. 1959. *Untersuchungen zu Theognis*. Winterthur.
- Hatch, W. H. P. 1908. 'The use of ἀλιτῆριος, ἀλιτρος, αραιοις, εναγῆς, ενθυμιος, παλαμναιοις, and προστροπαιοις: a study in Greek lexicography', *HSPh* 19: 157–86.
- Haubold, J. 2000. *Homer's People*. Cambridge.
- Hauck, R. J. 1989. *The More Divine Proof: Prophecy and Inspiration in Celsus and Origen*. Atlanta.
- Hauschild, H. G. 1999. *Lerhrbuch der Kirchen- und Dogmengeschichte*, vol. 11: *Reformation und Neuzeit*. Gütersloh.
- Havelock, E. 1978. *The Greek Concept of Justice: From its Shadows in Homer to its Substance in Plato*. Cambridge, Mass.
- Hawthorne, K. G. 2009. 'The chorus as rhetorical audience: a Sophoklean *agon* pattern', *AJPh* 130: 25–46.
- Headlam, W. 1906. 'The last scene of the *Eumenides*', *JHS* 26: 268–77.
- Headland, T. N., Pike, K. L., and Harris, M. (eds.). 1990. *Emics and Etics: the Insider/Outsider Debate*. Newbury Park, Calif. and London.
- Heer, C. de 1969. *Makar Eudaimon Olbios Eutuches: a Study of the Semantic Field Denoting Happiness in Ancient Greek to the End of the Fifth Century BC*. Amsterdam.
- Heering, J. P. 2004. *Hugo Grotius as Apologist for the Christian Religion: a Study of his Work De Veritate Religionis Christianae (1640)*. Leiden.
- Heintze, H. von 1977. 'Die erhaltenen Darstellungen der Sieben Weisen', *Gymnasium* 84: 437–43.
- Hellmann, F. 1931. 'Zur Lustration des makedonischen Heeres', *ARW* 29: 202–23.
- Helmbold, W. C. and O'Neil, E. M. 1959. *Plutarch's Quotations*. Baltimore.
- Helmig, C. 2005. 'A Jumble of Disordered Remarks? Structure and Argument of Plutarch's *De sera numinis vindicta*', *Plutarc a la seva època: paideia i societat*. Barcelona, pp. 323–32.

- Henderson, W. J. 1999. 'Men behaving badly: conduct and identity at Greek symposia', *Akroterion* 44: 3 13.
- Hendess, R. 1877. *Oracula graeca quae apud scriptores graecos romanosque exstant*. Halle.
- Henrichs, A. 1984. 'The Eumenides and wineless libations in the Derveni papyrus', *Atti del xvii Congresso internazionale di papirologia*. Naples, pp. 255 68.
1989. 'Zur Perhorreszierung des Wassers der Styx bei Aischylos und Vergil', *ZPE* 78: 1 29.
2003. '*Hieroi logoi* and *Hierai bibloi*: the (un)written margins of the sacred in ancient Greece', *HSPH* 101: 207 66.
2005. 'Sacrifice as to the immortals', in Hägg, R. and Alroth, B. (eds.), *Greek Sacrificial Ritual, Olympian and Chthonian*. Stockholm, pp. 47 60.
2010. 'Mystika, Orphika, Dionysiaka. Esoterische Gruppenbildungen, Glaubensinhalte und Verhaltensweisen in der griechischen Religion', in Bierl, A. and Braungart, W. (eds.), *Gewalt und Opfer. Im Dialog mit Walter Burkert*. Berlin, pp. 87 114.
2011. 'Dionysos dismembered and restored to life: the earliest evidence (OF 59 I II)?', in Herrero de Jáuregui, M. et al. (eds.), *Tracing Orpheus: Studies of Orphic Fragments in Honour of Alberto Bernabé*. Berlin, pp. 61 8.
- Héran, F. 1989. 'De la 'Cité antique' à la sociologie des institutions', *RS* 110: 363 90.
- Hereward, D. 1958. 'The flight of Damaratos', *RhM* 101: 238 49.
- Herrero, M. 2008. 'El Orfismo, el *genos* y la *polis*', in Bernabé, A. and Casadesús, F. (eds.), *Orfeo y la tradición órfica*, vol. 11. Madrid, pp. 1603 22.
2010. *Orphism and Christianity in Late Antiquity*. Berlin.
- Hershbell, J. P. 1973. 'Hippolytus' *Elenchos* as a source for Empedocles re examined', *Phronesis* 17: 97 114.
1992. 'Plutarch and Epicureanism', *ANRW* 2.36.5: 3353 83.
- Hester, D. A. 1977. 'To help one's friends and harm one's enemies. A study in the *Oedipus at Colonus*', *Antichthon* 11: 22 41.
1985. 'The overshadowed bit. Mixed metaphors in Aeschylus and Sophocles', *AUMLA* 64: 112 43.
- Hertz, R. 1922. *Le péché et l'expiation dans les sociétés primitives*. Paris.
- Hicks, R. D. 1925. *Diogenes Laertius: Lives of Eminent Philosophers*. 2 vols. London.
- Hiersche, R. 1958. 'Note additionnelle relative à l'étymologie d'ὄρκος et δ'ὀμνύναι', *REG* 71: 35 41.
- Highbarger, E. L. 1927. 'A new approach to the Theognis question', *TAPhA* 58: 170 98.
1929. 'Literary imitation in the Theognidea', *AJPh* 50: 341 59.
1931. 'Repeated verses in classical poetry with particular reference to the *Theognidea*', *PhQ* 10: 329 47.
1937. 'Theognis and the Persian wars', *TAPhA* 68: 88 111.
- Hirzel, R. 1902. *Der Eid*. Leipzig.
1907. *Themis, Dike und Verwandtes*. Leipzig.

- Höfele, A. and Koppenfels, W. von 2005. *Renaissance Go-Betweens: Cultural Exchange in Early Modern Europe*. Berlin.
- Hofinger, M. 1975. *Lexicon Hesiodicum cum indice inverso*, vol. I: A Δ. Leiden.
- Hölkeskamp, K. J. 1992. 'Written law in archaic Greece', *PCPhS* 88: 87–117.
1999. *Schiedsrichter, Gesetzgeber und Gesetzgebung im archaischen Griechenland*. Stuttgart.
- Holland, L. 2003. 'Πᾶς δόμος ἔρποι: myth and plot in Euripides' *Medea*', *TAPhA* 133: 255–79.
- Hollmann, A. 2011. *The Master of Signs: Signs and the Interpretation of Signs in Herodotus' Histories*. Cambridge, Mass.
- Hölscher, T. 2010. 'Athen: die Polis als Raum der Erinnerung', in Stein Hölkeskamp, E. and K. J. Hölkeskamp (eds.), *Erinnerungsorte der Antike: Die griechische Welt*. Munich, pp. 128–49.
- Hölscher, U. 1994. *Das nächste Fremde: Von Texten der griechischen Frühzeit und ihrem Reflex in der Moderne*. Munich.
- Hommel, H. 1974. 'Schicksal und Verantwortung. Aischylos' *Agamemnon* 1562', in von Hommel, H. (ed.), *Wege zu Aischylos*, vol. 11. Darmstadt, pp. 232–63.
- Hordern, J. 2000. 'Notes on the Orphic papyrus from Gurôb (P. Gurôb 1; Pack2 2464)', *ZPE* 129: 131–40.
- Hornblower, S. 1991. *A Commentary on Thucydides*, vol. 1. Oxford.
- Hose, M. 2010. 'Die *Orestie* des Aischylos: die Götter, das Recht und die Stadt', in Stein Hölkeskamp, E. and Hölkeskamp, K. J. (eds.), *Erinnerungsorte der Antike. Die griechische Welt*. Munich, pp. 418–34.
- How, W. W. and Wells, J. 1912. *A Commentary on Herodotus*. Oxford.
- Hude, C. 1927. *Herodoti Historiae*. Oxford.
- Hudson Williams, T. 1910. *The Elegies of Theognis*. London.
- Hülten Schmidt, E. 1985. 'Wissenschaftliche Kritik: Über eine gemeinsame Grundlage von Altertumswissenschaft und vergleichender Sprachwissenschaft', *Zeitschrift für Phonetik, Sprachwissenschaft und Kommunikationsforschung* 38: 722–8.
- Hume, D. 1987. 'On the populousness of ancient nations', in Miller, E. F. (ed.), *David Hume: Essays, Moral, Political and Literary*. Indianapolis, pp. 432–70.
- Hummel, P. 2000. *Histoire de l'histoire de la philologie: étude d'un genre épistémologique et biographique*. Geneva.
- Humphreys, S. C. 1978. *Anthropology and the Greeks*. London.
1982. 'Fustel de Coulanges and the Greek *genos*', *Sociologia del diritto* 9: 35–44.
2004. *The Strangeness of Gods: Historical Perspectives on the Interpretation of Athenian religion*. Oxford.
2012. 'Ancient theologies and modern times', *Kernos* 25: 149–61.
- Hutchinson, G. O. 1985. *Aeschylus: Septem contra Thebas*. Oxford.
- Ieranò, G. 2006. 'Eschilo in Euripide', *Lexis* 24: 77–93.
- Ierodiakonou, K. 2002. *Byzantine Philosophy and its Ancient Sources*. Oxford.
- Imbach, R. 1978. 'Le (Néo) platonisme médiéval: Proclus latin et l'école dominicaine allemande', *Revue de théologie et de philosophie* 110: 427–48.
- Immerwahr, H. H. 1966. *Form and Thought in Herodotus*. Cleveland.
- Inwood, B. 2001. *The Poem of Empedocles*, 2nd edn. Toronto.

- Irmscher, J. 1982. 'Die Verurteilung des Johannes Italos', *Jahrbuch für Geschichte des Feudalismus* 6: 117–22.
- Irwin, E. 2005. *Solon and Early Greek Poetry: the Politics of Exhortation*. Cambridge.
2006. 'The transgressive elegy of Solon?', in Blok, J. H. and Lardinois, A. P. M. H. (eds.), *Solon of Athens: New Historical and Philological Approaches*. Leiden, pp. 36–78.
- 2008 9. 'Herodotus and Samos: personal or political?', *CW* 102: 395–416.
- Isaac, D. 1977. *Proclus. Trois études sur la Providence*, vol. 1: *Dix problèmes concernant la Providence*. Paris.
1979. *Proclus. Trois études sur la Providence*, vol. 11: *Providence, fatalité, liberté*. Paris.
1982. *Proclus. Trois études sur la Providence*, vol. 111: *De l'existence du mal*. Paris.
- Jacob, R. 1991. 'Anthropologie et histoire du serment judiciaire', in Verdier, R. (ed.), *Le serment*, vol. 1. Paris, pp. 237–64.
- Jacoby, F. 1913. 'Herodotos', *RE* suppl. 2: 205–520.
1931. 'Theognis', *Sitzungsberichte der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften* 31: 90–180.
1949. *Atthis. The Local Chronicles of Ancient Athens*. Oxford.
1950. *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker*, vol. 111 B. Leiden.
1957. *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker*, vol. 1. Leiden.
- Jaeger, W. 1923. 'Tyrtaios über die wahre ἀρετή', *Sitzungsberichte der Berliner Akademie der Wissenschaften* 23: 537–68.
- 1966 [1926]. 'Solon's Eunomia', in *Five Essays*. Montréal, pp. 69–85.
1969. *Paideia: the Ideals of Greek Culture*, 2nd edn. Oxford.
- Jameson, M. H. 1991. 'Sacrifice before battle', in Hanson, V. D. (ed.), *Hoplites: the Classical Greek Battle Experience*. London, pp. 197–227.
- Jameson, M. H., Jordan, D. R., and Kotansky, R. D. 1993. *A lex sacra from Selinous*. Durham, NC.
- Jarcho, J. N. 1990. 'Das poetische Ich als gesellschaftlich kommunikatives Symbol in der frühgriechischen Lyrik', in Slings, S. R. (ed.), *The Poet's I in Archaic Greece*. Amsterdam, pp. 47–55.
- Jebb, R. C. 1893. *Sophocles: Oedipus Tyrannus*. Cambridge.
1900. *Sophocles: Antigone*. Cambridge.
- Jeffery, L. H. 1962. 'The campaign between Athens and Aegina in the years before Salamis (Herodotus VI, 87–93)', *AJPh* 83: 44–54.
- Jenson, R. W. 2009. *Ezekiel*. London.
- Jiménez, A. I. 2008. 'Los orfeotelestas y la vida órfica', in Bernabé, A. and Casadesús, F. (eds.), *Orfeo y la tradición órfica*, vol. 1. Madrid, pp. 771–800.
- Johnson, D. M. 2001 2. 'Herodotus' storytelling speeches: Socles (5, 92) and Leotyichides (6, 86)', *CJ* 97: 1–26.
- Johnston, S. I. 1992. 'Xanthus, Hera and the Erinyes (*Iliad* 19.400–418)', *TAPhA* 122: 85–98.
1999. *Restless Dead: Encounters between the Living and the Dead in Ancient Greece*. Berkeley.
- Jong, I. J. F. de 1987a. 'Paris/Alexandros in the *Iliad*', *Mnemosyne* 40: 124–8.

- 1987b. 'The voice of anonymity. $\tau\iota\varsigma$ speeches in the *Iliad*', *Eranos* 85: 69–84.
1995. 'Narratologia e storiografia: il racconto di Atys e Adrasto in Erodoto 1, 34–45', *QUCC* 80: 87–96.
1999. 'Aspects narratologiques des *Histoires* d'Hérodote', *Lalies* 19: 219–77.
2001. 'The anachronical structure of Herodotus' *Histories*', in Harrison, S. J. (ed.), *Texts, Ideas and the Classics: Scholarship, Theory and Classical Literature*. Oxford, pp. 93–116.
2004. *Narrators and Focalizers: the Presentation of the Story in the Iliad*, 2nd edn. Bristol.
- Jonge, H. J. de and Tromp, J. (eds.) 2007. *The Book of Ezekiel and its Influence*. Aldershot.
- Jordan, B. 1992. 'The *naukraroi* of Athens and the meaning of νῆμω', *AC* 61: 60–79.
- Jouanna, J. 1995. 'Espaces sacrés, rites et oracles dans l'*Œdipe à Colone* de Sophocle', *REG* 108: 38–58.
- Joyce, P. M. 2007. *Ezekiel: a Commentary*. New York.
- Judet de la Combe, P. 2001. *L'Agamemnon d'Eschyle: commentaire des dialogues*. 2 vols. Villeneuve d'Ascq.
- Kaimio, M. 1988. *Physical Contact in Greek Tragedy. A Study of Stage Convention*. Helsinki.
- Kakridis, J. Th. 1929. *APAI*. Athens.
1931. 'Pittakos', *RA* 34: 142–53.
- Kamerbeek, J. C. 1984. *The Plays of Sophocles. Commentaries*, vol. VII: The Oedipus Coloneus. Leiden.
- Kaminsky, J. S. 1995. *Corporate Responsibility in the Hebrew Bible*. Sheffield.
- Kannicht, R. 2004. *Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta*, vol. v: Euripides. Göttingen.
- Käppel, L. 2007. 'Generation als Grenze: zur Konzeption des Geschlechterfluchs in Sophokles' *Oedipus Coloneus*', in Baier, T. (ed.), *Generationenkonflikte auf der Bühne: Perspektiven im antiken und mittelalterlichen Drama*. Tübingen, pp. 29–44.
2009. 'Heroisierung als aitiologische Form in der griechischen Tragödie am Beispiel des sophokleischen *Oedipus Coloneus*', in Schmitz, C. and Bettenworth, A. (eds.), *Mensch Heros Gott: Weltentwürfe und Lebensmodelle im Mythos der Vormoderne*. Stuttgart, pp. 27–34.
- Karageorgos, G. 1979. *Die Arete als Erziehungsideal in den Dichtungen des Theognis*. Frankfurt.
- Karamitrou, C. 1999. 'Aischylos' Cassandra: a human trophy, *entheos eros*, exposure, liminality, madness and theatricality', *Parnassos* 41: 380–94.
- Karavites, P. 1992. *Promise-Giving and Treaty-Making*. Leiden.
- Katz, J. 1998. 'Testimonia ritus Italici: male genitalia, solemn declarations, and a new Latin sound Law', *HSPH* 98: 183–217.
- Keesing, R. 1985. 'Conventional metaphors and anthropological metaphysics: the problematic of cultural translation', *Journal of Anthropological Research* 41: 201–17.

- Kelly, A. 2009. *Sophocles: Oedipus at Colonus*. London.
- Kemeny, P. C. 1991. 'Peter Abelard: an examination of his doctrine of original sin', *JRH* 16: 374–86.
- Kennedy, R. F. 2006. 'Justice, geography and empire in Aeschylus' *Eumenides*', *CLAnt* 25: 35–72.
- Keydell, R. 1935. 'Die Dichter mit Namen Peisandros', *Hermes* 70: 301–11.
- Keys, M. M. 2006. *Aquinas, Aristotle, and the Promise of the Common Good*. Cambridge.
- Kierkegaard, S. 1992 [1843]. 'Ancient tragedy's reflection in the Modern', in *Either/Or: A Fragment of Life*. London, pp. 137–62.
- Kilani, M. 1992. *Introduction à l'anthropologie*, 3rd edn. Paris.
- Kindstrand, J. F. 1976. *Bion of Borysthenes*. Uppsala.
- Kindt, J. 2003. 'The Delphic oracle: a poetics of futures past between history, literature, and religion'. Diss. Cambridge.
2006. 'Delphic oracle stories and the beginning of historiography: Herodotus' *Croesus logos*', *CPh* 101: 34–51.
2009. 'Polis religion: a critical appreciation', *Kernos* 22: 9–34.
2012. *Rethinking Greek Religion*. Cambridge.
- Kingsley, P. 1995. *Ancient Philosophy, Mystery, and Magic. Empedocles and the Pythagorean Tradition*. Oxford.
- Kirchberg, J. 1965. *Die Funktion der Orakel im Werke Herodots*. Göttingen.
- Kirk, G. S. 1985. *The Iliad: a Commentary*, vol. 1: *Books 1–4*. Cambridge.
- Kitts, M. S. 2003. 'Not barren is the blood of lambs: Homeric oath sacrifice as metaphorical transformation', *Kernos* 16: 17–34.
2005. *Sanctified Violence in Homeric Society: Oath-Making Rituals and Narratives in the Iliad*. Cambridge.
- Kitzinger, M. R. 2008. *The Choruses of Sophokles' Antigone and Philoktetes: a Dance of Words*. Leiden.
- Klaerr, R. and Vernière, Y. 1974. *Plutarque: Oeuvres morales*, vol. VII.2. Paris.
- Klawans, J. 2000. *Impurity and Sin in Ancient Judaism*. Oxford.
- Klein, S. T. 1973. *Cleomenes. A Study in Early Spartan Imperialism*. Laurence.
- Klibansky, R. 1939. *The Continuity of the Platonic Tradition during the Middle Ages*. London.
- Klinger, W. 1930. 'Trzy podania z historii Herodota (Trois légendes tirées de l'histoire d'Hérodote)', *Bulletin international de l'Académie Polonaise des sciences et des lettres* 1 2: 16–22.
- Kloekhorst, A. 2008. *Etymological Dictionary of the Hittite Inherited Lexicon*. Leiden.
- Klostermann, E. 1916. *Späte Vergeltung aus der Geschichte der Theodicee*. Strasbourg.
- Knox, B. M. W. 1952. 'The lion in the house (*Agamemnon* 717–736)', *CPh* 47: 17–25.
- Koch, R. 1992. *Die Sünde im Alten Testament*. Frankfurt.
- Kock, E. L. de 1962. 'The Peisandros scholium, its sources, unity and relationship to Euripides' *Chrysippos*', *Aclass* 5: 15–37.
- Kors, J. B. 1930. *La justice primitive et le péché originel selon Saint Thomas*. Paris.

- Koselleck, R. 1985 [1979]. *Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time*. Cambridge, Mass.
2006. *Begriffsgeschichten: Studien zur Semantik und Pragmatik der politischen und sozialen Sprache*. Frankfurt.
- Kovacs, D. 1995. *Euripides*, vol. II: Children of Heracles, Hippolytus, Andromache, Hecuba. Cambridge, Mass.
1998. *Euripides*, vol. III: Suppliant Women, Electra, Heracles. Cambridge, Mass.
1999. *Euripides*, vol. IV: Trojan Women, Iphigenia among the Taurians, Ion. Cambridge, Mass.
2002. *Euripides*, vol. V: Helen, Phoenician Women, Orestes. Cambridge, Mass.
- Kowalzig, B. 2013. 'Transcultural chorality: *Iphigenia in Tauris* and Athenian imperial economics', in Gagné, R. and Hopman, M. (eds.), *Choral Mediations in Greek Tragedy*. Cambridge, pp. 178 210.
- Koyre, A. 1957. *From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe*. Baltimore.
- Kraay, C. M. 1976. *Archaic and Classical Greek Coins*. London.
- Krahmer, S. M. 2002. 'Adam, Eve, and original sin in the works of Bernard of Clairvaux', *Cistercian Studies Quarterly* 37: 3 12.
- Krašovec, J. 1993. 'Plato's and Plutarch's theories of punishment', *ZAnt* 43: 5 30.
1999. *Reward, Punishment, and Forgiveness: the Thinking and Beliefs of Ancient Israel in the Light of Greek and Modern Views*. Leiden.
- Kraus, W. 1977. Review of Hugh Lloyd Jones' *The Justice of Zeus*. *Gnomon* 16: 241 9.
- Krech, V. 2000. 'From historicism to functionalism: the rise of scientific approaches to religions around 1900 and their socio cultural context', *Numen* 47: 244 65.
- Krieter Spiro, M. 2009. *Homers Ilias Gesamtkommentar*, Bd. 3.3, Fasz. 2 (Kommentar). Munich.
- Krischer, T. 1964. 'Solon und Kroisos', *WS* 77: 174 7.
- Kristeller, P. O. 1987. 'Proclus as a reader of Plato and Plotinus, and his influence in the middle ages and in the Renaissance', in Pépin, J. and Saffrey, H. D. (eds.), *Proclus lecteur et interprète des anciens*. Paris, pp. 191 211.
- Kristeva, J. 1969. *Sèmiôtikè. Recherches sur une sémanalyse*. Paris.
- Krumme, L. 1941. *Die Kritik der stoischen Theologie in Ciceros Schrift De natura deorum*. Göttingen.
- Küllenberg, R. 1877. *De imitatione Theognidea*. Strasburg.
- Kullmann, W. 1968. 'Vergangenheit und Zukunft in der *Ilias*', *Poetica* 2: 15 37.
1985. 'Gods and men in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*', *HSPH* 89: 1 23.
- Kümmel, H. M. 1967. *Ersatzrituale für den bethitischen König*. Wiesbaden.
- Kuper, A. 1985. 'The development of Lewis Morgan's evolutionism', *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences* 21: 3 22.
1988. *The Invention of Primitive Society. Transformations of an Illusion*. London.
- Kurke, L. 1989. 'ΚΑΠΗΛΕΙΑ and deceit. Theognis 59 60', *AJPh* 110: 535 44.
1994. 'Crisis and decorum in sixth century Lesbos: reading Alkaios otherwise', *QUCC* 47: 67 92.

1999. *Coins, Bodies, Games, and Gold: the Politics of Meaning in Archaic Greece*. Princeton.
- Kuttner, S. 2004. *Gratian and the School of Law 1140–1234*. Aldershot.
- Kyriakou, P. 1998. 'Menelaus and Pelops in Euripides' *Orestes*', *Mnemosyne* 51: 282–301.
1999. 'The chorus in the *Heracles* and the *Iphigeneia in Tauris* of Euripides', *Hellenica* 49: 7–27.
2006. *A commentary on Euripides' Iphigenia in Tauris*. Berlin.
2009. *The Past in Aeschylus and Sophocles*. Berlin.
- Labarbe, J. 1980. 'La prière "contestataire" dans la poésie grecque', in Limet, H. and Ries, J. (eds.), *L'expérience de la prière dans les grandes religions*. Louvain-la-Neuve, pp. 137–48.
- Labourdette, M. M. 1985. 'Aux origines du péché de l'homme d'après saint Thomas d'Aquin', *Revue thomiste* 85: 357–98.
- Lachenaud, G. 1976. *Mythologies, religion et philosophie de l'histoire dans Hérodote*. Paris.
- Lafage, F. 1998. *Le Comte Joseph de Maistre (1753–1821): itinéraire intellectuel d'un théologien de la politique*. Paris.
- Lagrée, J. 1991. *La raison ardente: religion naturelle et raison au XVII^e siècle*. Paris.
- Lakoff, G. and Johnson, M. 1980. *Metaphors We Live By*. Chicago.
- Lalamantius, J. 1557. *Sophoclis tragicorum veterum facile principis Tragoediae, quotquot extant, septem*. Paris.
- Lamb, W.R.M. 1930. *Lysias*. London.
- Lambert, S. D. 1986. 'Herodotus, the Cylonian conspiracy and the πρυτάνεις τῶν ναυκράρων', *Historia* 35: 105–12.
1999. 'The Attic genos', *CQ* 49: 484–9.
- Lamberton, R. 2001. *Plutarch*. New Haven.
- Lambrinudakis, W. 1986. 'Damia et Auxesia', *LIMC* 3.1: 323–4.
- Lamedica, A. 1987. 'L'eusebeia di Creso. Bacchilide', *SCO* 37: 141–53.
- Landau, P. 2000. 'Der biblische Sündenfall und die Legitimität des Rechts', in Willoweit, D. (ed.), *Die Begründung des Rechts als historisches Problem*. Munich, pp. 203–14.
- Lane Fox, R. 2000. 'Theognis: an alternative to democracy', in Brock, R. and Hodkinson, S. (eds.), *Alternatives to Athens*. Oxford, pp. 35–51.
- Lang, M. 1967. 'The Kylonian conspiracy', *CPh* 62: 243–9.
- Langwitz, S. O. 1973. 'Once again the guilt of Agamemnon', *Erano* 71: 1–11.
1974. 'Poverty in Theognis', *MT* 24: 23–33.
- Lanzi, S. 2000. *Theos anaitios: storia della teodicea da Omero ad Agostino*. Rome.
- Lape, S. 2003. 'Solon and the institution of the "democratic" family form', *CJ* 98: 117–39.
- Laporte, J. 1997. 'From impure blood to original sin', *Studia Patristica* 31: 438–44.
- Lardinois, A. P. M. H. 1992. 'Greek myths for Athenian rituals: religion and politics in Aeschylus' *Eumenides* and Sophocles' *Œdipus Coloneus*', *GRBS* 33: 313–27.
2003. 'The wrath of Hesiod: angry Homeric speeches and the structure of Hesiod's *Works and Days*', *Arethusa* 36: 1–20.

2006. 'Have we Solon's verses?', in Blok, J. H. and Lardinois, A. P. M. H. (eds.), *Solon of Athens: New Historical and Philological Approaches*. Leiden, pp. 15–35.
- Lasaulx, E. von 1854. 'Der Fluch bei den Griechen und Römern', *Studien des classischen Alterthums*. Regensburg, pp. 159–77.
- Lasch, R. 1908. *Der Eid. Seine Entstehung und Beziehung zu Glaube und Brauch der Naturvölker. Eine ethnologische Studie*. Stuttgart.
- Lateiner, D. 1989. *The Historical Method of Herodotus*. Toronto.
2002. 'Pouring bloody drops (*Iliad* 16.459): the grief of Zeus', *ColbyQ* 38: 42–61.
- Latte, K. 1920. *Heiliges Recht. Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der sakralen Rechtsformen in Griechenland*. Tübingen.
- Lattimore, R. 1947. 'The first elegy of Solon', *AJPh* 68: 161–79.
- Lavagnini, B. 1932. 'La patria di Teognide', *ASSO* 4: 87–94.
- Lavelle, B. M. 1991. 'The compleat angler: observations on the rise of Peisistratus in Herodotus (1. 59–64)', *CQ* 41: 317–24.
- Law, L. E. 1935. 'The πόλεμος ἀκήρυκτος', *CPh* 30: 164–7.
- Lawson, E. T. 2000. 'Toward a cognitive science of religion', *Numen* 47: 338–49.
- Lawson, E. T. and McCauley, R. N. 1990. *Rethinking Religion: Connecting Cognition and Culture*. Cambridge.
- Lazzeroni, R. 1989. 'Per l'etimologia di ὄρκος: una testimonianza ittita', *SSL* 29: 87–93.
- Leahy, D. M. 1954. 'Aegina and the Peloponnesian League', *CPh* 49: 232–43.
- Lear, A. 2008. 'Anacreon's "self": an alternative role model for the archaic elite male?', *AJPh* 129: 47–76.
- Lebeck, A. 1963. *Image and Idea in the Agamemnon of Aeschylus*. New York.
1971. *Oresteia: a Study in Language and structure*. Washington, D.C.
- Lebedev, A. 1998. 'The justice of Chiron (*Titanomachia*, fr. 6 and 11 B)', *Philologus* 142: 3–10.
- Leblanc, M. 1993. 'Aspects du péché originel dans la pensée de saint Thomas d'Aquin', *Revue Thomiste* 93: 567–600.
- Lebrun, R. 1980. *Hymnes et prières Hittites*. Paris.
- (ed.) 2001. *Joseph de Maistre's Life, Thought, and Influence: Selected Studies*. Montréal.
- Leclerc, M. C. 1993. *La parole chez Hésiode*. Paris.
- Lefèvre, F. 1995. 'L'amphictionie de Delphes: mythe et réalité', *CCG* 6: 19–31.
- Lehmann, B. 1987. 'Sach und Wortphilologie in der deutschen klassischen Altertumswissenschaft des 19. Jhs', *WZBerlin* 36: 15–19.
- Lemerle, P. 1971. *Le premier humanisme byzantin. Notes et remarques sur enseignement et culture à Byzance des origines au Xe siècle*. Paris.
- Lentini, G. 2000. 'Pittaco erede degli Atridi: il fr. 70 V. di Alceo', *SIFC* 18: 3–14.
2002. 'I simposi del tiranno: sui fr. 70–72 V. di Alceo', *ZPE* 139: 3–18.
- Lenz, L. 1981. 'Zu Aischylos' *Septem*', *Hermes* 109: 415–39.
- Le Rider, G. 2001. *La naissance de la monnaie. Pratiques monétaires de l'Orient ancien*. Paris.
- Leroy, P. 1982. 'Oracles et destin dans l'*Edipodie*', *ConnHell* 12: 16–20.

- Lesky, A. 1961a. *Göttliche und menschliche Motivation im homerischen Epos*. Heidelberg.
- 1961b. 'Eteokles in den Sieben gegen Theben', *WS* 74: 5 17.
1966. 'Decision and responsibility in the tragedy of Aeschylus', *JHS* 86: 78 85.
1967. 'Die Schuld der Klytaimestra', *WS* 80: 5 21.
- Létoublon, F. 1989. 'Le serment fondateur', *Métis* 4: 101 15.
- Leumann, M. M. 1950. *Homerische Wörter*. Basel.
- Lévêque, P. 1959. *Aurea catena Homeri: une étude sur l'allégorie grecque*. Paris.
1982. 'ὄλβιος et la félicité des initiés', in Hadermann Misguich, L. and Raepsaet, G. (eds.), *Rayonnement grec. Hommages à Charles Delvoye*. Brussels, pp. 113 26.
- Levine, D. 1985. 'Symposium and the polis', in Figueira, T. J. and Nagy, G. (eds.), *Theognis of Megara: Poetry and the Polis*. Baltimore, pp. 176 95.
- Lewis, J. 2006. *Solon the Thinker: Political Thought in Archaic Athens*. London.
- Ley, H. de 1981. 'Beware of blue eyes. A note on Hippocratic pangenes (Aer., ch. 14)', *AC* 50: 192 7.
- L'Homme Wéry, L. M. 1994. 'Solon, libérateur d'Éleusis dans les *Histoires* d'Hérodote', *REG* 107: 362 80.
- Li, V. 2006. *The Neo-Primitivist Turn: Critical Reflections of Alterity, Culture, and Modernity*. Toronto.
- Liapis, V. 2013. 'Creon the Labdacid: political confrontation and the doomed *oikos* in Sophocles' *Antigone*', in Cairns, D. (ed.), *Tragedy and Archaic Thought*. Swansea, pp. 81 118.
- Liberman, G. 1988. 'Alcée 384 LP, Voigt', *RPh* 62: 291 8.
1999. *Alcée. Fragments*. Paris.
- Liebero, L. de 1996. *Die archaische Tyrannis*. Stuttgart.
- Linforth, I. 1919. *Solon the Athenian*. Berkeley.
1941. *The Arts of Orpheus*. Berkeley.
- 1946a. 'The Corybantic rites in Plato', *University of California Publications in Classical Philology* 13: 121 62.
- 1946b. 'Telestic madness in Plato, *Phaedrus* 244de', *University of California Publications in Classical Philology* 13: 163 72.
- Livingstone, N. 2001. *A Commentary on Isocrates' Busiris*. Leiden.
- Lloyd, G. E. R. 1989. *The Revolutions of Wisdom*. Berkeley.
2003. *In the Grip of Disease: Studies in the Greek Imagination*. Oxford.
- Lloyd Jones, H. 1956. 'Zeus in Aeschylus', *JHS* 76: 55 67.
1957. 'Notes on Sophocles' *Antigone*', *CQ* 51: 12 27.
1959. 'The end of the *Seven against Thebes*', *CQ* 9: 80 115.
1962. 'The guilt of Agamemnon', *CQ* 12: 187 99.
1983. *The Justice of Zeus*, 2nd edn. Berkeley.
1985. 'Pindar and the afterlife', in Hurst, A. (ed.), *Pindare. Vandoeuvres*, pp. 245 83 (= *Academic Papers*, pp. 80 103).
1989. 'Les Érinyes dans la tragédie grecque', *REG* 102: 1 9.
- 1990a. *Greek Epic, Lyric, and Tragedy: the Academic Papers of Sir Hugh Lloyd-Jones*. Oxford.

- 1990b. 'Erinyes, semnai theai, Eumenides', in Craik, E. M. (ed.), *Owls to Athens: Essays Presented to Sir K. J. Dover*. Oxford, pp. 203–11 (= *Further Academic Papers*, pp. 90–9).
- 1994a. *Sophocles*, vol. 1: Ajax, Electra, Oedipus Tyrannus. Cambridge, Mass.
- 1994b. *Sophocles*, vol. 11: Antigone, Women of Trachis, Philoctetes, Oedipus at Colonus. Cambridge, Mass.
2002. 'Curses and divine anger in early Greek epic: the Pisander scholion', *CQ* 52: 1–14 (= *Further Academic Papers*, pp. 18–35).
2005. *The Further Academic Papers of Sir Hugh Lloyd-Jones*. Oxford.
- Lloyd Jones, H. and Wilson, N. G. 1990. *Sophoclea*. Oxford.
- Lobeck, C. A. 1829. *Aglaophamus, sive de theologiae mysticae Graecorum libri tres*. Königsberg.
- Loeffler, A. 1993. 'La valeur argumentative de la perspective énonciative dans Solon fr. 1 G. P.', *QUCC* 45: 23–36.
- Lomeier, J. 1681. *De veterum gentilium lustrationibus syntagma*. Utrecht (2nd edn 1700: *Epimenides*).
- Long, T. 1974. 'Τε καὶ and κοπίς in Sophocles' *Antigone* 602', *RhM* 117: 213–14.
- Longo, A. (ed.) 2009. *Syrianus et la métaphysique de l'antiquité tardive*. Naples.
- Lonis, R. 1980. 'La valeur du serment dans les accords internationaux en Grèce classique', *DHA* 6: 267–86.
- Loroux, N. 1977. 'La "belle mort" spartiate', *Ktèma* 2: 105–20.
1984. 'Solon au milieu de la lice', in *Aux origines de l'hellénisme: la Crète et la Grèce*. Paris, pp. 199–214.
1988. 'Alors apparaîtront les Érinyes', *EdT* 17: 93–107.
- Lossau, M. 1995. 'Christian August Lobeck (1781–1860)', *Die Albertus Universität zu Königsberg*, pp. 283–93.
- Ludin, J. H. 1969. 'Die Kassandragestalt in Aischylos' *Agamemnon*', *Temenos* 5: 107–19.
- Lupaş, L. and Petre, Z. 1981. *Commentaire aux Sept contre Thèbes d'Eschyle*. Paris.
- Lupu, E. 2005. *Greek Sacred Law: a Collection of New Documents*. Leiden.
- Luraghi, N. 2008. 'The importance of being λόγιος', *CW* 102: 439–56.
- Luria, S. 1928. 'Der Selbstmord des Königs Kleomenes I.', *PhW* 48: 27–9.
- Lurje, M. 2004. *Die Suche nach der Schuld. Sophokles' Oedipus Rex, Aristoteles' Poetik und das Tragödienverständnis der Neuzeit*. Munich.
- Luzzatto, M. J. 1989. 'Plutarco, Socrate e l'Esopo di Delfi', *ICS* 13: 427–45.
- Macan, R. W. 1908. *Herodotus: the Seventh, Eighth, & Ninth Books*. London.
- MacDonald, S. 1999. 'Primal sin', in Matthews, G. B. (ed.), *The Augustinian Tradition*. Berkeley, pp. 110–39.
- Machinist, P. 1978. 'The epic of Tukulti Ninurta I: a study in Middle Assyrian literature'. Diss. Yale.
- Mackenzie, M. M. 1981. *Plato on Punishment*. Berkeley.
- Macleod, C. W. 1973. 'L'unità dell'*Orestea*', *Maia* 25: 267–92.
- Maddalena, A. 1942. 'Per l'interpretazione dell'elegia di Solone alle Muse', *RFIC* 20: 182–92.

- Magdalino, P. 1987. 'Isaac Sebastokrator (III), John Axouch and a case of mistaken identity', *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies* 11: 207-14.
- Magnino, D. 1992. 'La riscoperta di Plutarco nel primo umanesimo italiano', in *El pasado renacido: uso y abuso de la tradición clásica*. Seville, pp. 71-85.
- Maehler, H. 1982-97. *Die Lieder des Bakchylides*. 2 vols. Leiden.
- Maistre, J. de 1816. *Sur les délais de la Justice Divine dans la punition des coupables. Ouvrage de Plutarque, nouvellement traduit, avec des additions et des notes, par M. le comte de Maistre, suivi de la traduction du même traité, par Amyot, sous ce titre: 'Pourquoi la Justice Divine diffère la punition des maléfices'*. Lyon and Paris.
1884. *Oeuvres complètes*, vol. XIII. Paris.
- Malamud, M. 2002. 'Writing original sin', *J ECS* 10: 329-60.
- Mallory, J. P. and Adams, D. Q. 1997. *Encyclopedia of Indo-European culture*. London.
- Manetti, G. 1987. *Le teorie del segno nell'antichità classica*. Milan.
- Manfredini, M. and Piccirilli, L. 1977. *La vita di Solone*. Milan.
- Mangani, G. 1980. 'Sul metodo di Eric Dodds e sulla sua nozione di irrazionale', *QS* 6: 173-205.
- Manton, G. R. 1961. 'The second stasimon of the *Seven against Thebes*', *BICS* 8: 77-84.
- Mantovanelli, P. 2004. 'La mano levata dei Tantalidi: (una tradizione di famiglia)', in De Finis, L. (ed.), *Colloquio su Seneca*. Trento, pp. 89-105.
- Manuwald, B. 1989. 'Zu Solons Gedankenwelt (fr. 3 u. 1 G. P. = 4 u. 13 W.)', *RhM* 132: 1-25.
2000. 'Zur Dialektik von 'alt' und 'neu' in der griechischen Tragödie', *AcA* 46: 76-92.
- Margolis, E. and Laurence, S. 1999. *Concepts: Core Readings*. Cambridge, Mass.
- Mariggio, V. A. 2007. 'Le voyage en Asie des Spartiates Sperthias et Boulis', *LEC* 75: 193-205.
- Marinatos, N. 1982. 'Wahl und Schicksal bei Herodot', *Saeculum* 33: 258-64.
- Marino, Barbara. 2010. 'Alastores: violenza e memoria oltre l'umano', in Andò, V. and Cusumano, N. (eds.), *Come bestie?: forme e paradossi della violenza tra mondo antico e disagio contemporaneo*. Caltanissetta, pp. 63-76.
- Markantonatos, A. 2002. *Tragic Narrative: a Narratological Study of Sophocles' Oedipus at Colonus*. Berlin.
2007. *Oedipus at Colonus: Sophocles, Athens, and the World*. Berlin.
- Marsilio, M. S. 2002. 'Hesiod and Theognis on poverty', *CB* 78: 131-52.
- Martens, P. W. 2008. 'Revisiting the allegory/typology distinction: the case of Origen', *J ECS* 16: 283-317.
- Martin, A. and Primavesi, O. (eds.) 1999. *L'Empédocle de Strasbourg: (P. Strasb. gr. Inv. 1665 1666)*. Berlin.
- Martin, R. 2006. 'Solon in no man's land', in Blok, J. H. and Lardinois, A. P. M. H. (eds.), *Solon of Athens: New Historical and Philological Approaches*. Leiden, pp. 157-74.
2008. 'Literatura mágica y pseudocientífica atribuida a Orfeo', in Bernabé, A. and Casadesús, F. (eds.), *Orfeo y la tradición órfica*, vol. 1. Madrid, pp. 437-58.

- Martina, A. 1968. *Solon. Testimonia veterum*. Rome.
- Martini, W. 2009. 'Ein Krieg zwischen Ägina und Athen und seine modischen Folgen', in Reinholdt, C., Scherrer, P., and Wohlmayr, W. (eds.), *Aiakeion: Beiträge zur klassischen Altertumswissenschaft zu Ehren von Florens Felten*. Vienna, pp. 75–83.
- Martorelli Vico, R. 1990. 'La dottrina della giustizia originale e del peccato originale nel trattato *De peccato originale* di Egidio Romano', *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 1: 227–46.
- Marzillo, P. 2010. *Der Kommentar des Proklos zu Hesiods 'Werken und Tagen'*. Tübingen.
- Masaracchia, A. 1956. 'L'elegia alle Muse di Solone', *Maia* 8: 92–132.
1958. *Solone*. Florence.
- Massa Positano, L. 1947. *L'elegia di Solone alle Muse*. Naples.
- Masson, O. 1950. 'À propos d'un rituel hittite pour la lustration d'une armée: Le rite de purification par le passage entre les deux parties d'une victime', *RHR* 137: 5–25.
- Mastrocinque, A. 1978. 'Ricerche sulla storia greca arcaica: II: La lapidazione dei Ciloniani', *RIL* 112: 3–9.
- Mastronarde, D. J. 1994. *Euripides: Phoenissae*. Cambridge.
- Matteuzzi, M. 2008. 'Sul costume di Cassandra nell'*Agamemnone*: un punto di partenza', *Kleos* 15: 309–18.
- Matthaiou, A. P. 1999. 'Ἐλάστερος Ἀλάστωρος', *Horos* 13: 241–2.
- Matthiessen, K. 1994. 'Solons *Musenelegie* und die Entwicklung des griechischen Rechtsdenkens', *Gymnasium* 101: 385–407.
- Maurach, G. 1983. 'Über der Stand der Forschung zu Solons *Musenelegie*', *GGA* 235: 16–33.
- Maurizio, L. 1993. 'Delphic narratives: recontextualizing the Pythia and her prophecies'. Diss. Princeton.
1997. 'Delphic oracles as oral performances: authenticity and historical evidence', *CLAnt* 16: 308–34.
2001. 'The voice at the center of the world: the Pythia's ambiguity and authority', in Lardinois A. P. M. H. and McClure, L. (eds.), *Making Silence Speak: Women's Voices in Greek Literature and Society*. Princeton, pp. 38–54.
- Mazon, P. 1914. *Hésiode. Les Travaux et les Jours*. Paris.
- Mazzarino, S. 1943. 'Per la storia di Lesbo nel VI° secolo a. C. (A proposito dei nuovi frammenti di Saffo e Alceo)', *Athenaeum* 21: 38–78.
1947. *Fra Oriente ed Occidente, ricerche di storia greca arcaica*. Florence.
1960. 'Incontro con le Eumenidi. Gli Eupatridi, Eschile e Pericle', *Orpheus* 7: 119–22.
- Mazzoldi, S. 2002. 'Cassandra's prophecy between ecstasy and rational mediation', *Kernos* 15: 145–54.
- McCall, M. 1990. 'The chorus of Aeschylus' *Choephoroi*', in Griffith, M. and Mastronarde, D. J. (eds.), *Cabinet of the Muses*. Atlanta, pp. 17–30.
- McCauley, R. N. 2000. 'The naturalness of religion and the unnaturalness of science', in Keil, F. and Wilson, R. (eds.), *Explanation and Cognition*. Cambridge, Mass., pp. 61–85.

- McCauley, R. N. and Lawson, E. T. 2002. *Bringing Ritual to Mind: Psychological Foundations of Cultural Forms*. Cambridge.
- McDevitt, A. S. 1982. 'The first kommos of Sophocles' *Antigone*', *Ramus* 11: 134–44.
1991. 'Wrong again, or who'd be a chorus: (Sophocles' *Antigone*)', *LCM* 16: 71.
- McDowell, D. M. 1989. 'The *oikos* in Athenian Law', *CQ* 39: 10–21.
- McGlew, J. 1993. *Tyranny and Political Culture in Ancient Greece*. Ithaca.
- McInerney, J. 1994. 'Politicizing the past: the Atthis of Kleidemos', *ClAnt* 13: 17–37.
- Méautis, G. 1935. *Des délais de la justice divine*. Lausanne.
- Meier, M. 1999. 'Kleomenes I., Damaratos und das spartanische Ephorat', *GFA* 2: 89–108.
- Meiggs, R. and Lewis, D. 1988. *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions*, 2nd edn. Oxford.
- Meijer, P. A. 2003. 'Proclus' introduction of the One in his *Theologia Platonica*: some unorthodox views on the nature of the One', *AncPhil* 23: 395–414.
- Meijering, E. P. 1977. *Tertullian Contra Marcion: Gotteslehre in der Polemik*. Leiden.
- Meillier, C. 1978. 'La succession d'Édipe d'après le P. Lill. 76a + 73, poème lyrique probablement de Stésichore', *REG* 91: 12–43.
1991. 'Νόωνμοι dans le mythe hésiodique des races (*Travaux*, v. 106–201)', in Woronoff, M. (ed.), *L'univers épique*. Besançon, pp. 105–28.
- Melanchthon, P. 1852. *Opera Omnia. Corpus Reformatorum*, vol. XVIII, ed. Bindseil, H. E. Halle.
1853. *Opera Omnia. Corpus Reformatorum*, vol. XIX, ed. Bindseil, H. E. Halle.
- Melissano, P. 1994. 'Solone e il mondo degli *esthloi*', *QUCC* 47: 49–58.
- Meyendorff, I. 1974. *Byzantine Theology: Historical Trends and Doctrinal Themes*. New York.
- Meyerhoff, D. 1984. *Traditioneller Stoff und individuelle Gestaltung. Untersuchungen zu Alkaios und Sappho*. Hildesheim.
- Michel, M. 1982. *La théologie aux prises avec la culture: de Schleiermacher à Tillich*. Paris.
- Michelet, J. 1847. *Histoire de la Révolution française*, vol. 1. Paris.
- Mignini, F. 1994. 'Gratitudo, tra charis e amicitia: momenti di storia di un'idea', in Galli, G. (ed.), *Interpretazione e gratitudine*. Macerata, pp. 17–84.
- Mikalson, J. 1991. *Honor thy Gods: Popular Religion in Greek Tragedy*. Chapel Hill.
- Miletti, L. 2004. 'L'analisi dei testi oracolari in Erodoto', in Abbamonte, G. et al. (eds.), *L'ultima parola: l'analisi dei testi: teorie e pratiche nell'antichità greca e latina*. Naples, pp. 215–30.
- Miller, M. 1963. 'The Herodotean Croesus', *Klio* 41: 58–94.
1971. 'Solon's coinage', *Arethusa* 4: 25–47.
- Minois, G. 2002. *Les origines du Mal. Une histoire du péché originel*. Paris.
- Mirto, M. S. 1994. 'Salvare il γένος e riformare il culto: divinazione e razionalità nell'*Ifigenia Taurica*', *MD* 32: 55–98.
- Moggi, M. and Osanna, M. (eds.) 2000. *Pausania: Guida della Grecia*, vol. VII: L'Acacia. Milan.

- Momigliano, A. 1970. 'La città antica di Fustel de Coulanges', *RSI* 82: 81 98 (= *Studies on Modern Scholarship*, pp. 162 78).
1971. 'La libertà di parola nel mondo antico', *RSI* 83: 499 524.
1983. 'K. O. Müller's *Prolegomena zu einer wissenschaftlichen Mythologie* and the meaning of "Myth"', *Annali della Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa: Classe di Lettere e Filosofia* 13: 673 89 (= *Settimo contributo*, pp. 271 86).
1984. *Settimo contributo alla storia degli studi classici e del mondo antico*. Rome.
1994. *Studies on Modern Scholarship* (ed. G. W. Bowersock and T. J. Cornell). Berkeley.
2003. 'Presentation', *I Greci e l'irrazionale*, E. R. Dodds, trans. V. Vacca de Bosio. Milan.
- Monbrun, M. 1994. 'Cicéron et le théâtre tragique', in Menu, M. (ed.), *Théâtre et cité: séminaire du CRATA 1992 1994*. Toulouse, pp. 73 85.
- Montgomery, J. W. 1962. *A Seventeenth-Century View of European Libraries: Lomeier's De Bibliothecis, Chapter X*. Berkeley.
- Moors, K. F. 1981. *Glaucon and Adeimantus on Justice. The Structure of Argument in Book 2 of Plato's Republic*. Washington, DC.
- Moreau, A. 1990. 'Déjouer l'oracle ou la précaution inutile', *Kernos* 3: 261 79.
1997. 'Apollon, Oreste et les prédictions énigmatiques: un paradoxe', *CGITA* 10: 139 53.
2008. 'Sanglantes Érinyes: (Eschyle, *Les Euménides*, 225 275)', *ConnHell* 114: 24 33.
- Moreschini, C. 1992. 'Alcuni aspetti degli *Scholia in Phaedrum* di Ermia Alessandrino', in Goulet Cazé M. O., Goulven, M., and O'Brien, D. (eds.), *Σοφίης μαιήτορες: 'chercheurs de sagesse': hommage à Jean Pépin*. Paris, pp. 451 60.
1995. 'Il motivo dell'esilio dell'anima nella filosofia tardoantica', in Rosa, F. and Zambon, F. (eds.), *Pothos: il viaggio, la nostalgia*. Trento, pp. 97 105.
2009. 'Alla scuola di Siriano: Ermia nella storia del neoplatonismo', in Longo, A. (ed.), *Syrianus et la métaphysique de l'Antiquité tardive: actes du colloque international, Université de Genève, 29 septembre-1er octobre 2006*. Naples, pp. 515 78.
- Morin, B. 1996. 'L'enracinement attique d'un héros thébain: *Œdipe à Colone* et la terre', *RPh* 70: 281 303.
2005. 'Pouvoir et religion dans les *Perses*, les *Suppliants* et les *Euménides* d'Eschyle: la convergence des perspectives', *Polifemo* 5: 101 26.
2009. 'Pourquoi des Phéniciennes?', *AC* 78: 25 37.
- Morrison, J. 1992. *Homeric Misdirection: False Predictions in the Iliad*. Ann Arbor.
- Morrison, J. S. 1970. 'Passages from Aristophanes and Euripides', *PCPhS* 16: 83 90.
- Mossé, C. 1978. 'Le thème de la *patrios politeia* dans la pensée grecque du IV^e siècle', *Eirene* 16: 81 9.
1979. 'Comment s'élabore un mythe politique: Solon, "père fondateur" de la démocratie athénienne', *Annales (E.S.C.)* 34: 425 37.
2008. 'La reconstruction de l'histoire d'Athènes au IV^e siècle', in Mezzadri, B. (ed.), *Historiens de l'Antiquité*. Paris, pp. 109 21.

- Most, G. W. 1993. 'Hesiod and the textualization of personal temporality', in Arrighetti, G. and Montanari, F. (ed.), *La componente autobiografica nella poesia greca e latina fra realtà e artificio letterario*. Pisa, pp. 73–92.
1997. 'Hesiod's myth of the five (or three or four) races', *PCPhS* 43: 104–27.
2006. *Hesiod*, vol. 1. Cambridge, Mass.
- Moulinier, L. 1946. 'La nature et la date du crime des Alcéméonides', *REA* 48: 182–202.
1952. *Le pur et l'impur dans la pensée des Grecs d'Homère à Aristote*. Paris.
- Mueller Goldinger, C. 2000. 'Tradition und Innovation: zu Stesichoros' Umgang mit dem Mythos', *AC* 69: 1–19.
- Muir, E. 2005. *Ritual in Early Modern Europe*. Cambridge.
- Mülke, C. 2002. *Solons politische Elegien und Iamben (fr. 1 13; 32 37 West)*. *Einleitung, Text, Übersetzung, Kommentar*. Munich.
- Müller, K. O. 1833. *Aischylos Eumeniden*. Göttingen.
1835. *Dissertations on the Eumenides of Aeschylus; with the Greek Text, and Critical Remarks from the German of C. O. Müller*. Cambridge.
- Münch, M. 1976. *La symbolique de Friedrich Creuzer*. Paris.
- Muñoz Valle, I. 1975. 'La ideología de la aristocracia griega antigua I', *StudOv* 3: 59–71.
1977. 'La ideología de la aristocracia griega antigua II', *Euphrosyne* 8: 43–56.
- Murray, A. T. 1978. *Homer: the Iliad*. London.
- Murray, O. 1983a. 'The Greek symposion in history', in Gabba, E. (ed.), *Tria Corda. Scritti in onore di Arnaldo Momigliano*. Como, pp. 257–72.
- 1983b. 'Symposion and Männerbund', *Concilium Eirene* 16: 47–52.
- 1983c. 'The symposion as social organization', in Hägg, R. (ed.), *The Greek Renaissance of the Eight Century. Tradition and Innovation*. Stockholm, pp. 195–9.
- (ed.) 1990a. *Symptotica: a Symposium on the Symposion*. Oxford.
- 1990b. 'The affair of the mysteries: democracy and the drinking group', in Murray, O. (ed.), *Symptotica: a Symposium on the Symposion*. Oxford, pp. 149–61.
- 1990c. 'The Solonian law of *hybris*', in Cartledge, P. et al. (eds.), *Nomos: Essays in Athenian Law, Politics, and Society*. Cambridge, pp. 139–45.
- Musti, D. 1996. 'La struttura del discorso storico in Pausania', in Bingen, J. (ed.), *Pausanias Historien*. Vandoeuvres, pp. 9–43.
- Musti, D. and Torelli, M. 1986. *Pausania: Guida della Grecia*, vol. 11: La Corinzia e l'Argolide. Milan.
1991. *Pausania: Guida della Grecia*, vol. 111: La Laconia. Milan.
- Myres, J. L. 1943. 'Ἀκήρυκτος πόλεμος (Herodotus, V, 81)', *CR* 57: 66–7.
- Nägelsbach, C. F. von 1840. *Die homerische Theologie in ihrem Zusammenhange dargestellt*. Nuremberg.
1857. *Die nachhomerische Theologie des griechischen Volksglaubens*. Nuremberg.
- Nagy, G. 1982. 'Theognis of Megara: the poet as seer, poet, and revenant', *Arethusa* 15: 109–28.
1983. 'Poet and tyrant: *Theognidea* 39–52, 1081–1082b', *CA* 2: 83–91.

1985. 'Theognis and Megara: a poet's vision of his city', in Figueira, T. J. and Nagy, G. (eds.), *Theognis of Megara: Poetry and the Polis*. Baltimore, pp. 22–81.
1990. *Pindar's Homer: the Lyric Possession of an Epic Past*. Baltimore.
1996. 'Aristocrazia: caratteri e stili di vita', in Settis, S. (ed.), *I Greci*. Turin, pp. 577–98.
2007. 'Did Sappho and Alcaeus ever meet? Symmetries of myth and ritual in performing the songs of ancient Lesbos', in Bierl, A., Lämmle, R., and Wesselmann, K. (eds.), *Literatur und Religion: Wege zu einer mythisch-rituellen Poetik bei den Griechen*, vol. 1. Berlin, pp. 211–69.
- Nawratil, K. 1942. 'Solon bei Herodot', *WS* 60: 1–8.
- Neblung, D. 1997. *Die Gestalt der Cassandra in der antiken Literatur*. Stuttgart.
- Needham, R. 1973. *Belief, Language, and Experience*. Oxford.
- Neitzel, H. 1976. 'Eine versteckte Namensdeutung bei Aischylos. Zur Interpretation von *Ch.* 639–651', *Glotta* 54: 56–61.
- 1985a. 'Zum *Agamemnon* des Aischylos (1603–1611. 1090–1092)', *Hermes* 113: 366–74.
- 1985b. 'Zur Syntax in Aischylos, *Agamemnon* 1468–1474', *Glotta* 63: 33–45.
- 1985c. 'Das Thyestes Mahl im *Agamemnon* des Aischylos (1096–1097. 1217–1222. 1590–1602)', *Hermes* 113: 403–16.
1989. 'Zur Interpretation von Aischylos, *Agamemnon* 1279–1290', *GB* 16: 63–70.
1991. 'Zur Reinigung des Orest in Aischylos' *Eumeniden*', *WJA* 17: 69–89.
- Nelson, M. and Todd, R. B. 2000. 'E. R. Dodds: two unpublished letters on ancient "irrationalism"', *Eikasmos* 11: 401–8.
- Nenci, G. 1994. *Erodoto*, vol. v. Milan.
1998. *Erodoto*, vol. vi. Milan.
- Neri, C. 2009. 'La χάρις degli dèi: (Bacch. 3, 37–39; Aesch. *Ag.* 182 s.; Hdt. I 207, 1)', *Paideia* 64: 253–302.
- Neschke, A. 1986. 'L' *Orestie* de Stésichore et la tradition littéraire du mythe des Atrides avant Eschyle', *AC* 55: 283–301.
1996. 'Dikè. La philosophie poétique du droit dans le "Mythe des Races" d'Hésiode', in Blaide, F., Judet de la Combe, P., and Rousseau, P. (eds.), *Le métier du mythe. Lectures d'Hésiode*. Lille, pp. 111–59.
- Nesselrath, H. G. 1992. 'Solons *Musenelegie*', *MH* 49: 91–104.
- Neuburg, M. 1991. 'Clytemnestra and the *Alastor*: Aeschylus, *Agamemnon* 1497 ff.', *QUCC* 67: 37–68.
1993. 'Atè reconsidered', in Rosen, R. M. and Farrell, J. (eds.), *Nomodeiktēs: Greek Studies in Honor of Martin Ostwald*. Ann Arbor, pp. 491–504.
- Niarchos, C. 1981. 'The philosophical background of the 11th century revival of learning in Byzantium', in Mullett, M. and Scott, R. (eds.), *Byzantium and the Classical Tradition*. Birmingham, pp. 127–35.
- Nietzsche, F. 1867. 'Zur Geschichte der theognideischen Spruchsammlung', *RhM* 22: 161–200.
- Nilsson, M. P. 1906. *Griechische Feste von religiöser Bedeutung, mit Ausschliessung der attischen*. Leipzig.
- 1951–60. *Opuscula selecta*. 3 vols. Lund.

- 1969 [1944]. *Geschichte der griechischen Religion*, vol. 1, 3rd edn. Munich.
- Nitzsch, G. W. 1862. *Beiträge zur Geschichte der epischen Poesie der Griechen*. Leipzig.
- Nocentini, L. 2005. *All'origine del discorso politico moderno: Ugo Grozio teologo e politico*. Pisa.
- North, J. A. 1996. 'Pollution and purification at Selinous', *SCI* 15: 293–301.
- Notopoulos, J. 1938. 'Mnemosyne in oral literature', *TAPhA* 69: 465–93.
- Noussia, M. 2001a. *Solone: frammenti dell'opera poetica*. Milan.
- 2001b. 'Solon's symposium (Frs. 32–34 and 36 Gentili Prato = 38–40 and 41 West)', *CQ* 51: 353–56.
2006. 'Strategies of persuasion in Solon's elegies', in Blok, J. H. and Lardinois, A. P. M. H. (eds.), *Solon of Athens: New Historical and Philological Approaches*. Leiden, pp. 134–56.
- Noussia Fantuzzi, M. 2010. *Solon the Athenian, the Poetic Fragments*. Leiden.
- O'Brien, M. J. 1988a. 'Pelopid history and the plot of *Iphigenia in Tauris*', *CQ* 38: 98–115.
- 1988b. 'Tantalus in Euripides' *Orestes*', *RhM* 131: 30–45.
- Obbink, D. 1992. '“What all men believe must be true”: common conceptions and *consensio omnium* in Aristotle and Hellenistic philosophy', *OSAPh* 10: 193–231.
- Obeyesekere, G. 2002. *Imagining Karma: Ethical Transformation in Amerindian, Buddhist, and Greek Rebirth*. Berkeley.
- Ohlert, K. 1912. *Rätsel und Rätselspiele der Alten Griechen*, 2nd edn. Berlin.
- Olender, M. 1989. *Les langues du paradis. Aryens et sémites, un couple providentiel*. Paris.
- Oliva, P. 1975. 'Die Geschichte von Kroisos und Solon', *Altertum* 21: 175–81.
1988. *Solon – Legende und Wirklichkeit*. Konstanz.
- Olson, R. E. 2006. *Arminian theology: Myths and Realities*. Downers Grove.
- Olson, S. D. 2010. *Athenaeus: The Learned Banqueters*, vol. vi. Cambridge, Mass.
- Oppenheim, E. 1908. 'ARAI', *WS* 30: 146–64.
- Opsomer, J. and Steel, C. 2003. *Proclus: On the Existence of Evils*. London.
- Orwin, C. 1980. 'Feminine justice. The end of the *Seven against Thebes*', *CPh* 75: 187–96.
- Osborne, C. 1987. *Rethinking Early Greek Philosophy*. London.
- Osborne, R. 1996. *Greece in the Making 1200–479 BC*. London.
1997. 'Law and laws: how do we join up the dots?', in Mitchell, L. G. and Rhodes, P. J. (eds.), *The Development of the Polis in Archaic Greece*. London, pp. 74–82.
- Ostwald, M. 2000. 'Popular sovereignty and the problem of equality', *SCI* 19: 1–13.
- Otto, S. A. 2009. '“*Felix culpa*”: the doctrine of original sin as doctrine of hope in Aquinas's *Summa contra Gentiles*', *The Heythrop Journal* 50: 781–92.
- Oudemans, Th. C. W. and Lardinois, A. P. M. H. 1987. *Tragic ambiguity. Anthropology, Philosophy and Sophocles' Antigone*. Leiden.
- Overmark Juul, L. 2010. *Oracular Tales in Pausanias*. Odense.
- Padel, R. 1992. *In and Out of the Mind: Greek Images of the Tragic Self*. Princeton.

- Page, D. 1955. *Sappho and Alkaios. An Introduction to the Study of Ancient Lesbian Poetry*. Oxford.
1962. 'An early tragedy on the fall of Croesus?', *PCPhS* 8: 47–9.
1974. *Supplementum lyricis graecis*. Oxford.
- Pageard, R. 1991. 'Les sanctions du serment. Du mythique au logique. Du social à l'intime', in Verdier, R. (ed.), *Le serment*, vol. 1. Paris, pp. 35–42.
- Pailin, D. 1984. *Attitudes to Other Religions: Comparative Religion in Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century England*. Manchester.
- Palli Bonet, J. 1956. 'Los heraldos, Taltibio y Eurípides', *Helmantica* 7: 345–55.
- Panitz, H. 1935. *Mythos und Orakel bei Herodot.* Greifswald.
- Papadopoulou, T. 2001. 'The prophetic figure in Euripides' *Phoenissae* and *Bacchae*', *Hermes* 129: 21–31.
2005. 'Artemis and constructs of meaning in Euripides' *Iphigenia in Tauris*', *Ariadne* 11: 107–28.
- Papakonstantinou, Z. 2004. 'Justice of the *kakoi*: law and social crisis in Theognis', *Dike* 7: 5–17.
- Papillon, T. L. 1996. 'Isocrates and the use of myth', *Hermathena* 161: 9–21.
- Pardini, A. 1995. 'Aiace, Cassandra e la corresponsabilità dei Greci: (tra l'Ἰλίου πέρσις, Euripide ed Alceo)', *BollClass* 16: 103–17.
- Parke, H. W. 1945. 'The use of other than hexameter verse in Delphic oracle', *Hermathena* 65: 58–66.
1946. 'Citation and recitation. A convention in early Greek historians', *Hermathena* 67: 80–92.
1981. 'Apollo and the Muses, or prophecy in Greek verse', *Hermathena* 130: 1: 99–112.
- Parke, H. W. and Wormell, D. E. W. 1956. *The Delphic Oracle*. 2 vols. Oxford.
- Parker, R. C. T. 1983. *Miasma. Pollution and Purification in Early Greek Religion*. Oxford.
1995. 'Early Orphism', in Powell, A. (ed.), *The Greek World*. London, pp. 483–510.
1998. *Cleomenes on the Acropolis: an Inaugural Lecture Delivered before the University of Oxford on 12 May 1997*. Oxford.
1996. *Athenian Religion: a History*. Oxford.
- 2005a. *Polytheism and Society at Athens*. Oxford.
- 2005b. 'ὥς ἦρῶ ἐναγίζειν', in Hägg, R. and Alroth, B. (eds.), *Greek Sacrificial Ritual: Olympian and Chthonian*. Stockholm, pp. 37–45.
2009. 'Aeschylus' gods: drama, cult, theology', in Jouanna, J. and Montanari, F. (eds.), *Eschyle à l'aube du théâtre occidental*. Vandoeuvres, pp. 127–54.
2011. *On Greek Religion*. Ithaca.
2013. 'Substitution in Greek sacrifice', in Bonnechere, P. and Gagné, R. (eds.), *Sacrifices humains: perspectives croisées et représentations*. Liège, pp. 145–52.
- Parker, V. 1994. 'Some aspects of the foreign and domestic policy of Cleisthenes of Sicyon', *Hermes* 122: 404–24.
2004. 'Two notes on early Athenian history', *Tyche* 19: 131–48.
- Patera, M. 2010. 'Alastores et Elasteroi: à propos de la loi sacrée de Sélinonte', *Mètis* n.s. 8: 277–308.

- Payen, P. 2001. 'Clisthène le Tunisien: éloge d'une lecture buissonnière de la démocratie grecque', *Pallas* 56: 45–56.
- Peabody, A. P. 1885. *On the Delay of Divine Justice*. Boston.
- Pease, A. S. 1955–9. *Marcus Tullius Cicero: De natura deorum*. 3 vols. Cambridge, Mass.
- Peels, S. (forthcoming). 'Evaluating piety in 5th century Greece: the semantics of ὁσιος and near synonyms in literary and epigraphical sources'. Diss. Utrecht/Leiden.
- Pelikan, J. 1997. *What Has Athens to Do with Jerusalem?* Ann Arbor.
- Pelling, C. B. R. 2006. 'Educating Croesus: talking and learning in Herodotus' Lydian logos', *CLAnt* 25: 141–77.
- Peretti, A. 1956. 'Calchi gnomici nella silloge teognidea', *Maia* 8: 197–217.
- Peron, J. 1978. 'Les mythes de Crésus et de Méléagre dans les *Odes* III et V de Bacchylide', *REG* 91: 307–39.
- Peroni, P. 2003. 'Tempo, mesi e sonno nel secondo stasimo dell'*Antigone* di Sofocle', *GIF* 55: 222–34.
- Perotti, P. A. 1985. 'A proposito del sigillo di Teognide', *Vichiana* 14: 335–42.
- Perrotta, G. 1924. 'L'elegia di Solone alle Muse', *Atene e Roma* 5: 251–60.
1935. *Sofocle*. Milan.
- Pertusi, A. 1955. *Scholia uetera in Hesiodi Opera et dies*. Milan.
- Perysinakis, I. 1986. 'Hesiod's treatment of wealth', *Mètis* 1: 97–119.
- Petersmann, H. 1972. 'Zum Schluss von Aischylos' *Sieben gegen Theben*', *ZAnt* 22: 25–34.
- Philipowski, K. 2001. "Und der sune gewinnet nummer teyl an des vatter sunden, noch der vatter an des sunes". Heilsgeschichtliche Freiheit und genealogische Erbschuld im Prosa Lancelot', *Wirkendes Wort* 51: 165–82.
- Philippson, R. 1942a. 'Cicero, *De natura deorum* Buch II und III. Eine Quellenuntersuchung', *SO* 21: 11–38.
- 1942b. 'Cicero, *De natura deorum* Buch II und III. Eine Quellenuntersuchung (Fortsetzung)', *SO* 22: 8–39.
1945. 'Cicero, *De natura deorum* Buch II und III. Eine Quellenuntersuchung', *SO* 24: 16–47.
- Picard, Ch. 1946. 'La triade Zeus Héra Dionysos dans l'Orient hellénique d'après les nouveaux fragments d'Alcée', *BCH* 70: 455–73.
- Piccirilli, L. 1977. *Plutarco: La vita di Solone*. Verona.
- Pichler, K. 1980. *Streit um das Christentum: Der Angriff des Kelsos und die Antwort des Origenes*. Frankfurt am Main.
- Pigeaud, J. 1983. 'Remarques sur l'inné et l'acquis dans le Corpus hippocratique', in Lasserre, F. and Mudry, P. (eds.), *Formes de pensée dans la Collection hippocratique*. Geneva, pp. 41–55.
- Pippidi, D. M. 1960. 'Sur la philosophie de l'histoire d'Hérodote', *Eirene* 1: 75–92.
- Pippin Burnett, A. 1983. *Three Archaic Poets: Archilochus, Alkaios, Sappho*. London.
- Pirckheimer, W. 1513. *De his qui Tarde a Numine Corripiuntur Libellus*. Nuremberg.
- Pittaluga, S. 1997. 'Voce e gesto del teatro medievale', *Doctor Seraphicus* 44: 65–78.

- Pizzagalli, A. M. 1937. 'Un modello orientale dell' episodio di Aristagora e Cleomene in Erodoto (V, 49 sg.)', *RIL* 70: 75–82.
- Planchère, J. Y. 2004. *L'autorité contre les lumières: la philosophie de Joseph de Maistre*. Geneva.
- Plescia, J. 1970. *The Oath and Perjury in the Greek World*. Tallahassee.
- Pociña, A. 2003. 'Virtualités dramatiques d'un banquet effroyable: Thyeste dans la tragédie romaine', *Pallas* 61: 251–70.
- Pocock, J. G. A. 1971. *Politics, Language, and Time: Essays on Political Thought and History*. New York.
- Pocock, L. G. 1962. 'The water of Styx', *AUMLA* 18: 221–28.
- Podlecki, A. J. 1975. 'Reconstructing an Aeschylean trilogy', *BICS* 22: 1–19.
- Podskalsky, G. 1976. 'Nikolaos von Methone und die Proklosrenaissance in Byzanz (11–12 Jh.)', *OCPh* 42: 509–23.
- Poetscher, W. 1958. 'Zum Schluss der *Sieben gegen Theben*', *Erano* 56: 140–54.
1987. 'Zwei wichtige Chorpartien aus dem *Agamemnon* des Aischylos (1331–1342 und 1560–1566) und Solons *Musen-Elegie*', *GB* 14: 55–86.
- Pomtow, H. R. 1881. *Quaestionum de oraculis caput selectum. De oraculis quae exstant Graecis trimetro iambico compositis*. Berlin.
- Pontani, F. 2007. 'Shocks, lies, and matricide: thoughts on Aeschylus *Choephori* 653–718', *HSPH* 103: 203–33.
- Popper, K. 1957. *The Poverty of Historicism*. London.
- Porro, A. 1996. 'Carmi "di Mirsilo" e carmi "di Pittaco": ancora sull'edizione aristarchea di Alceo', *Aevum(ant)* 9: 177–92.
- Porter, D. H. 2005. 'Aeschylus' *Eumenides*: some contrapuntal lines', *AJPh* 126: 301–31.
- 2005–6. 'Some inversions not righted: a note on Aeschylus' *Eumenides*', *CJ* 101: 1–10.
- Porter, J. R. 1994. *Studies in Euripides' Orestes*. Leiden.
- Pòrtulas, J. 1993–5. 'Epimènides de Creta i la saviesa arcaica', *Itaca* 9–11: 45–58.
2002. 'Purificació ritual i concòrdia: Soló i Epimènides a Atenes', *Itaca* 18: 211–22.
- Pouillon, J. 1979. 'Remarques sur le verbe "croire"', in Izard, M. and Smith, P. (eds.), *La fonction symbolique: essais d'anthropologie*. Paris, pp. 43–51.
- Powers, N. 2007. 'Divine providence: origins, context, and significance of the Stoic theory'. Diss. Princeton.
- Praechter, K. 1932. s.v. 'Syrianos', *RE* 4: 1728–75.
- Prandi, L. 1991. 'Tre questioni erodotee', *Aevum* 4: 77–114.
- Pratt, L. H. 1995. 'The seal of Theognis, writing, and oral poetry', *AJPh* 116: 171–84.
- Priest, J. F. 1964. 'Horkia in the *Iliad* and considerations of a recent theory', *JNES* 23: 48–56.
- Primavesi, O. 2001. 'La Daimonologia della fisica empedoclea', *Aevum Antiquum* 1: 3–68.
- 2007a. *Empedokles Physika I*. Berlin.
- 2007b. 'Empedocle: divinité physique et mythe allégorique', *PhilosAnt* 7: 51–89.

- Prinz, J. 2002. *Furnishing the Mind: Concepts and their Perceptual Basis*. Cambridge, Mass.
- Pritchett, W. K. 1971. *The Greek States at War*, vol. 111. Berkeley.
- Puccioni, G. 1957. Review of Masaracchia 1956. *A&R* 2: 117–19.
- Pulley, S. 1997. *The Prayer in Ancient Greek Religion*. Oxford.
- Pym, A. 1996. 'Venuti's visibility', *Target: International Journal of Translation Studies* 8: 165–77.
- Pyysiäinen, I. 2003. *How Religion Works: Towards a New Cognitive Science of Religion*. Leiden.
- Pyysiäinen, I. and Anttonen, V. (eds.) 2002. *Current Approaches in the Cognitive Science of Religion*. New York.
- Quincey, J. H. 1963. 'The beacon sites in the *Agamemnon*', *JHS* 83: 118–32.
- Raaflaub, K. A. 2010. 'Ultior motives in ancient historiography: what exactly, and why?', in Foxhall, L., Gehrke, H. J., and Luraghi, N. (eds.), *Intentional History: Spinning Time in Ancient Greece*. Stuttgart, pp. 189–210.
- Rackham, H. 1933. *Cicero: De natura deorum*; Academica. London.
1934. *Aristotle: the Nicomachean Ethics*. London.
- Rademaker, C. S. M. 1972. 'Books and Grotius at Loevenstein', *Quaerendo* 2: 2–29.
1981. *Life and Work of Gerardus Joannes Vossius (1577–1649)*. Assen.
- Rader, R. 2009. '"And whatever it is, it is you": the autochthonous self in Aeschylus's *Seven against Thebes*', *Arethusa* 42: 1–44.
- Radici Colace, P. 1989. 'L'Elegia alle Muse di Solone nella tradizione gnomologica: antologie tematiche e fonti "minori"', in Garzya, A. (ed.), *Metodologie della ricerca sulla tarda antichità*. Naples, pp. 469–75.
- Radke, G. 1956. 'Aurea funis', *Gymnasium* 63: 82–6.
- Ramelli, I. 2007. 'La "colpa antecedente" come ermeneutica del male in sede storico-religiosa e nei testi biblici', *RSB* 19: 11–64.
- Ramos Jurado, E. A. 1974. 'La posición de Proclo ante el cristianismo', *Habis* 5: 25–35.
- Rattaler, G. 1550. *Sophoclis Ajax Flagellifer, et Antigone Eiusdem Electra Georgio Ratallero interprete*. Lyon.
- Raubitschek, A. E. 1947. 'The Ostracism of Xanthippos', *AJA* 51: 257–262.
1958. 'Ein neues Pittakeion', *WS* 71: 170–2.
- Rausch, M. 1998. 'Kleisthenes, Isagoras, der Rat und das Volk: die athenische Innenpolitik zwischen dem Sturz der Tyrannis und dem Jahr 507 v. Chr.', *Chiron* 28: 355–69.
- Rawson, E. 1970. 'Family and fatherland in Euripides' *Phoenissae*', *GRBS* 11: 109–27.
- Reden, S. von 1995. *Exchange in Ancient Greece*. London.
- Review of Kurke 1999. *CPh* 96: 433–8.
- Redfield, J. M. 2003. *The Locrian Maidens: Love and Death in Greek Italy*. Chicago.
- Regenbogen, O. 1930. 'Die Geschichte von Solon und Krösus', *HG* 41: 1–20.
- Rehm, R. 2006. 'Sophocles' *Antigone* and family values', *Helios* 33: 187–218.

- Reinach, S. 1905. Review of Glotz's *La solidarité de la famille dans le droit criminel en Grèce* (1904), *REG* 17: 204–7.
- Reinhardt, K. 1916. 'Solons Elegie eis heauton', *RhM* 71: 128–35.
- Reuter, Y. 1991. 'Serment et narrativité', in Verdier, R. (ed.), *Le serment*, vol. 1. Paris, pp. 203–20.
- Reverdin, O. 1945. *La religion de la cité platonicienne*. Paris.
- Revermann, M. 2008. 'Aeschylus' *Eumenides*, chronotopes, and the *aetiological mode*', in Revermann, M. and Wilson, P. J. (eds.), *Performance, Iconography, Reception: Studies in Honour of Oliver Taplin*. Oxford, pp. 237–61.
- Rhein, S. 1997. 'Melanchthon and Greek literature', in Wengert, T. J. and Graham, M. P. (eds.), *Philip Melanchthon (1497–1560) and the Commentary*. Sheffield, pp. 149–70.
1999. 'Philipp Melanchthon als Gräzist', in Wartenberg, G. and Hein, M. (eds.), *Werk und Rezeption Philipp Melanchthons in Universität und Schule bis ins 18. Jahrhundert*. Leipzig, pp. 53–69.
- Rhodes, P. J. 1975. 'Solon and the numismatists', *NC* 15: 1–11.
1981. *A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia*. Oxford.
2007. 'Oaths in political life', in Sommerstein, A. and Fletcher, J. (eds.), *Horkos: the Oath in Greek Society*. Bristol, pp. 11–25.
- Richard, S. 1989. 'Archaisch/Archaismus', in Cancik, H., Gladigow, B., and Laubscher, M. (eds.), *Handbuch religionswissenschaftlicher Grundbegriffe*, vol. 11. Stuttgart, pp. 235–9.
- Richardson, N. 1993. *The Iliad: a Commentary*, vol. VI: *Books 21–24*. Cambridge.
- Richter, C. 2004. *Die Religion in der Sprache der Kultur: Schleiermacher und Cassirer: kulturphilosophische Symmetrien und Divergenzen*. Tübingen.
- Richter, M. 1995. *The History of Political and Social Concepts. A Critical Introduction*. New York.
- Richter, M. and Lehmann, H. (eds.) 1996. *The Meaning of Historical Terms and Concepts. New Studies on Begriffsgeschichte*. Washington, DC.
- Ricoeur, P. 1960–3. *Finitude et culpabilité*. 2 vols: vol. 1, *L'Homme faillible* (1960); vol. 11, *La symbolique du Mal* (1963). Paris.
- Riecks, R. 1975. 'Eine tragische Erzählung bei Herodot (Hist. 1, 34–45)', *Poetica* 7: 23–44.
- Riffaterre, M. 1979. *La production du texte*. Paris.
1982. *Sémiotique de la poésie*. Paris.
- Ritoók, A. 2001. 'Enarrat Electram Sophoclis', in Loehr, J. (ed.), *Dona Melanchthoniana*. Stuttgart, pp. 325–37.
- Rivoltella, M. 1993. 'Il motivo della colpa ereditaria nelle tragedie senecane: una ciclicità in crescendo', *Aevum* 67: 113–28.
- Rizzo, J. 1971. *Isaak Sebastokrator's Peri tēs tōn kakōn hypostaseōs* (De malorum subsistentia). Meisenheim am Glan.
- Robert, C. 1915. *Oidipus*. Berlin.
- Robert, L. 1960. 'Recherches épigraphiques: V: Inscriptions de Lesbos', *REA* 62: 285–315 (= *Opera II*: 801–31).
1969. *Opera Minora Selecta II*. Amsterdam.

- Robertson, N. 2010. *Religion and Reconciliation in Greek Cities: the Sacred Laws of Selinus and Cyrene*. Oxford.
- Robinson Hammerstein, H. 2010. 'Bonae litterae and female erudition in early sixteenth century Nuremberg', in Kostick, C. (ed.), *Medieval Italy, Medieval and Early Modern Women: Essays in Honour of Christine Meek*. Dublin, pp. 256–75.
- Rogers, B. B. 1910. *The Knights of Aristophanes*. London.
- Rohde, E. 1925 [1890–4]. *Psyche*, 2nd edn. New York.
- Rohdich, H. 1980. *Antigone. Beitrag zu einer Theorie des sophokleischen Helden*. Heidelberg.
- Rohrbasser, J. M. 2012. 'Les délais de la justice divine: la théologie noire de Joseph de Maistre', in Guerrier, O. (ed.), *Plutarque de l'âge classique au XIXe siècle*. Grenoble, pp. 275–88.
- Roisman, H. 1984. 'Ate and its meaning in the elegies of Solon', *GB* 11: 21–7.
1988. 'Oedipus' curse in Aeschylus' *Septem*', *Eranos* 86: 77–84.
- Rollant, N. 1979. 'ἄρκος et sa famille. Le rituel de la prestation du serment dans l'*Iliade* et l'*Odyssée* d'Homère', *LAMA* 4: 214–304.
- Romer, F. E. 1982. 'The *aisymneteia*: a problem in Aristotle's historic method', *AJPh* 103: 25–46.
- Romilly, J. de 1967. 'L'évocation du passé dans l'*Agamemnon* d'Eschyle', *REG* 80: 93–9.
1968. *Time in Greek Tragedy*. Cornell.
- Römisch, E. 1933. *Studien zur älteren griechischen Elegie*. Frankfurt am Main.
- Rondet, H. 1966. 'Le péché originel dans la tradition. Tertullien, Clément, Origène', *BLE* 67: 115–48.
- Rosán, L. J. 1949. *The Philosophy of Proclus. The Final Phase of Ancient Thought*. New York.
- Rose, P. W. 1992. *Sons of the Gods, Children of Earth: Ideology and Literary Form in Ancient Greece*. Ithaca.
- Roseman, C. H. 1980. 'Loxias and *mantike* in the *Oresteia*', *AncW* 3: 49–54.
- Rosén, H. B. 1997. *Herodoti Historiae*. Stuttgart.
- Rosen, R. 1988. 'Hipponax, Boupalos, and the conventions of the *psogos*', *TAPhA* 118: 29–41.
- Rosenmeyer, T. G. 1952. 'The wrath of Oedipus', *Phoenix* 6: 92–112.
1982. *The Art of Aeschylus*. Berkeley.
- Rosivach, V. J. 1978. 'The "golden lamb" ode in Euripides' *Electra*', *CPh* 73: 189–99.
1987. 'Execution by stoning in Athens', *CLAnt* 6: 232–48.
2008. 'Why seize the Acropolis?', *Historia* 57: 125–33.
- Rösler, W. 1980. *Dichter und Gruppe: eine Untersuchung zu den Bedingungen und zur historischen Funktion früher griechischer Lyrik am Beispiel Alkaios*. Munich.
1990. 'Mnemosyne in the symposium', in Murray, O. (ed.), *Symptica: a Symposium on the Symposium*. Oxford, pp. 230–7.
2009. 'Klytaimestra in der *Orestie* des Aischylos', in Uerscheln, G. (ed.), *Vielleicht ist die Wahrheit ein Weib ...: Frauengestalten des Mythos im Zwielficht*. Cologne, pp. 54–62.

- Rossi, L. E. 1981. 'Gli oraculi come documento d'improvvisazione', in Brillante, C., Cantinella, M., and Pavese, O. (eds.), *I poemi epici rapsodici non omerici e la tradizione orale*. Padova, pp. 203 30.
1983. 'Il simposio greco arcaico e classico come spettacolo a se stesso', *Spettacoli conviviali dall'antichità alle corti italiane del Quattrocento. Atti del VII Convegno di studio*. Viterbo, pp. 41 50.
- Rousseau, P. 1996. 'Instruire Persès. Notes sur l'ouverture des *Travaux d'Hésiode*', in Blaise, F., Judet de la Combe, P., and Rousseau, P. (eds.), *Le métier du mythe. Lectures d'Hésiode*. Lille, pp. 93 168.
- Roussel, D. 1976. *Tribu et cité: études sur les groupes sociaux dans les cités grecques aux époques archaïque et classique*. Paris.
- Rubies, J. P. 1991. 'Hugo Grotius' dissertation on the origins of the American peoples and the uses of the comparative method', *JHI* 52: 221 44.
- Rudhardt, J. 1958. *Notions fondamentales de la pensée religieuse et actes constitutifs du culte dans la Grèce classique*. Paris.
1981. 'Le mythe hésiodique des races et celui de Prométhée. Recherche des structures et des significations', *Revue européenne des sciences sociales* 19: 245 81.
- Ruiz de Elvira y Serra, M. R. 1974. 'Los Pelópidas en la literatura clásica. Estudio de un mito de infanticidio', *CFC* 7: 249 302.
- Ruschenbusch, E. 1966. *ΣΟΛΩΝΟΣ ΝΟΜΟΙ: Die Fragmente des Solonischen Gesetzeswerkes, mit einer Text- und Überlieferungsgeschichte*. Wiesbaden.
- Ryzman, M. 1989. 'The curse, the oracle and the sisters in Aeschylus' *Septem*', *RBPh* 67: 18 29.
- Sabbatucci, D. 1979. *Saggio sul misticismo greco*, 2nd edn. Rome.
1981. 'Il peccato "Cosmico"', in Torelli, M. (ed.), *Le délit religieux dans la cité antique*. Paris, pp. 173 7.
- Saffrey, H. D. 1975. 'Allusions antichrétiennes chez Proclus: le diadoque platonicien', *RSPH* 59: 553 563.
- Saffrey, H. D. and Westerink, L. G. 1968 97. *Proclus. Théologie platonicienne*. 6 vols. Paris.
- Saïd, S. 1978. *La faute tragique*. Paris.
1985. 'Euripide ou l'attente déçue. L'exemple des Phéniciennes', *ASNP* 15: 501 27.
- Samons, L. J. 1998 9. 'Aeschylus, the Alkmeonids and the reform of the Areopagos', *CJ* 94: 221 33.
- Sánchez, P. 1997. 'Le serment amphiotionique [Aeschn. *Legat.* (2) 115]: un faux du IVe siècle?', *Historia* 46: 158 71.
- Sandys, J. E. 1921. *A History of Classical Scholarship*, 3rd edn. 3 vols. Cambridge.
- Sansone, D. 1975. 'The sacrifice motif in Euripides' *IT*', *TAPhA* 105: 283 95.
1985. 'The date of Herodotus' publication', *ICS* 10: 1 9.
- Santamaría, M. A. 2008. 'Píndaro y el orfismo', in Bernabé, A. and Casadesús, F. (eds.), *Orfeo y la tradición órfica*, vol. 11. Madrid, pp. 1161 84.
- Saunders, T. J. 1993. 'Plutarch's *De sera numinis vindicta* in the tradition of Greek penology', *Studi Economico-Giuridici* 54: 63 94.

- Scafuro, A. 2006. 'Identifying Solonian laws', in Blok, J. H. and Lardinois, A. P. M. H. (eds.), *Solon of Athens: New Historical and Philological Approaches*. Leiden, pp. 175–96.
- Scardino, C. 2009. 'Konfliktlösung durch Institutionalisierung: das Ende der *Odyssee*, Aischylos' *Eumeniden* und Euripides' *Orestes*', *WJA* 33: 7–29.
- Scarpato, G. 1989. 'Note sul termine parabola', in *Mnemosynum. Studi in onore di Alfredo Ghiselli*. Bologna, pp. 507–14.
- Schachermeyr, F. 1950. s.v. 'Pittakos', *RE* 20: 1862–73.
- Schadewaldt, W. 1974. 'Ursprung und frühe Entwicklung der attischen Tragödie. Eine morphologische Struktur Betrachtung des Aischylos', in von Hommel, H. (ed.), *Wege zu Aischylos*, vol. 1. Darmstadt, pp. 104–47.
- Schäfer, C. 1973. 'Das Staatsschiff. Zur Präzision eines Topos', in von Baumer, M. L. (ed.), *Toposforschung*. Darmstadt, pp. 259–92.
1998. 'Tragische Schuld im *Theatrum mundi* Plotins', *ABG* 40: 32–55.
- Schafft, G. E. 2004. *From Racism to Genocide: Anthropology in the Third Reich*. Urbana.
- Schaps, D. M. 2004. *The Invention of Coinage and the Monetization of Ancient Greece*. Ann Arbor.
- Scheid Tassinier, É. 2000. 'Recevoir des dieux, donner aux dieux: aspects de la relation avec le divin dans la poésie grecque archaïque', *RPh* 74: 199–230.
- Schein, S. L. 1982. 'The Cassandra scene in Aeschylus' *Agamemnon*', *G&R* 29: 11–16.
2009. 'Narrative technique in the *parodos* of Aeschylus' *Agamemnon*', in Grethlein, J. and Rengakos, A. (eds.), *Narratology and Interpretation: the Content of Narrative Form in Ancient Literature*. Berlin, pp. 377–98.
- Scheppard, C. 1999. 'The transmission of sin in the seed: a debate between Augustine of Hippo and Julian of Eclanum', in Ferguson, E. (ed.), *Doctrinal Diversity: Varieties of Early Christianity*. New York, pp. 233–42.
- Schleiermacher, F. D. E. 1813. 'On the different methods of translating', in Venuti, L. (ed.), *The Translation Studies Reader* (2nd edn 2004). London, pp. 43–63.
- Schlesier, R. (ed.) 1994. *Kulte, Mythen und Gelehrte. Anthropologie der Antike seit 1800*. Frankfurt a.M.
- Schmidt, E. 1882. *Die Ethik der alten Griechen*. 2 vols. Berlin.
- Schmitz, B. 2004. 'Zwischen Achikar und Demaratos: die Bedeutung Achiors in der Juditerzählung', *BiZ* 48: 19–38.
- Schneider, T. 1992. 'Félix Bourriots *Recherches sur la nature du génos* und Denis Roussels *Tribu et cité* in der althistorischen Forschung der Jahre 1977–1989', *Boreas* 15: 15–31.
- Schneidewin, F. W. 1852. 'Die Sage vom Oedipus', *GGA* 5.
- Schneidewin, H. 1878. *De syllogis Theognideis*. Strasburg.
- Scholten, H. 2009. 'Göttliche Vorsehung und die Bedeutung des Griechentums in Plutarchs *De sera numinis vindicta*', *AcA* 55: 99–117.
- Schöpsdau, K. 2011. *Platon: Nomoi*, vol. III. Göttingen.
- Schubert, A. 2002. *Das Ende der Sünde: Anthropologie und Erbsünde zwischen Reformation und Aufklärung*. Göttingen.

- Schubert, C. 2008. 'Die Naukrarien: zur Entwicklung der attischen Finanz administration', *Historia* 57: 38–64.
- Schwabl, H. 2004. 'Gyges und Kroisos bei Herodot: zur "epischen" Technik von Ankündigung und Ausführung', *WS* 117: 31–67.
- Schwartz, E. 1940. 'Der Name Homeros', *Hermes* 75: 1–9.
- Schwindt, J. P. 1998. 'Tragischer und epischer Traum: Euripides, *Iph. Taur.* 42–64 und Homer, *Od.* τ 535–69', *Hermes* 126: 1–14.
- Scodel, R. 2008a. 'Social memory in Aeschylus' *Oresteia*', in Mackay, E. A. (ed.), *Orality, Literacy, Memory in the Ancient Greek and Roman World*. Leiden, pp. 115–41.
- 2008b. 'Zielinski's law reconsidered', *TAPhA* 138: 107–25.
- Scott, M. 1984. 'Χάρης from Hesiod to Pindar', *AClass* 27: 1–13.
- Scott, W. C. 1969. 'The confused chorus (*Agamemnon* 975–1034)', *Phoenix* 23: 336–46.
- Scullion, S. 2000. 'Heroic and chthonian sacrifice: new evidence from Selinous', *ZPE* 132: 163–71.
- Seaford, R. 1994. *Reciprocity and Ritual: Homer and Tragedy in the Developing City-State*. Oxford.
1998. 'Tragic money', *JHS* 118: 119–39.
2003. 'Aeschylus and the unity of opposites', *JHS* 123: 141–63.
2004. *Money and the Early Greek Mind*. Cambridge.
- Sealey, R. 1976. 'The pit and the well. The Persian heralds of 491 BC', *CJ* 72: 13–20.
- Sedley, D. 2003. *Plato's Cratylus*. Cambridge.
- Segal, C. P. 1971. 'Croesus on the Pyre: Herodotus and Bacchylides', *WS* 5: 39–51.
- Seidensticker, B. 2008. 'Tragödie und Polis', in Bennett, M. et al. (eds.), *Christian Meier zur Diskussion*. Stuttgart, pp. 71–85.
- Selle, H. 2008. *Theognis und die Theognidea*. Berlin.
- Semenzato, C. 2006. 'Muses, *enthousiasmos* et *phantasia* chez Plutarque', in Cristante, L. (ed.), *Incontri triestini di filologia classica*. Trieste, pp. 291–300.
- Seng, H. 1988. 'τὰ δίκαια beim Symposion', *QUCC* 59: 123–31.
- Severi, C. 2002. 'Memory, reflexivity and belief. Reflections on the ritual use of language', *Social Anthropology* 10: 23–40.
- Sevieri, R. 1991. 'Linguaggio consapevole e coscienza individuale di Clitennestra nell'*Agamemnone* di Eschilo', *Dioniso* 61: 13–31.
- Sewall Rutter, N. J. 2007. *Guilt by Descent: Moral Inheritance and Decision Making in Greek Tragedy*. Oxford.
- Shapiro, H. A. 1996. 'Cults of Solonian Athens', in Hägg, R. (ed.), *The Role of Religion in the Early Greek Polis*. Jonsered, pp. 127–33.
- Shapiro, S. O. 1996. 'Herodotus and Solon', *CA* 15: 348–63.
- Shipton, K. 2001. 'Money and the elite in classical Athens', in Meadows, A. and Shipton, K. (eds.), *Money and its Uses in the Ancient Greek World*. Oxford, pp. 129–44.
- Sicking, C. M. J. 1998 [1984]. 'Solon on wealth', in Sicking, C. M. J. (ed.), *Distant Companions. Selected Papers*. Leiden, pp. 7–18.

- Sidwell, K. 1996. 'Purification and pollution in Aeschylus' *Eumenides*', *CQ* 46: 44–57.
- Siewert, P. 2002. *Ostrakismos-Testimonien*, vol. 1: *Die Zeugnisse antiker Autoren, der Inschriften und Ostraka über das athenische Scherbengericht aus vorhellenistischer Zeit (487–322 v. Chr.)*. Stuttgart.
- Skinner, Q. 1978. *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought*. Cambridge.
- Slings, S. R. 2000. 'Symposium and interpretation: elegy as group song and the so called awakening individual', *AAntHung* 40: 423–34.
- Slone, D. J. 2004. *Theological Incorrectness: Why Religious People Believe What They Shouldn't*. Oxford.
- (ed.) 2006. *Religion and Cognition: a Reader*. Sheffield.
- Smith, J. Z. 1982. *Imagining Religion. From Babylon to Jonestown*. Chicago.
1987. *To Take Place: Toward Theory in Ritual*. Chicago.
- Smith, M. 2008. *God in Translation: Deities in Cross-Cultural Discourse in the Biblical World*. Tübingen.
- Smith O. L. 1969. 'The father's curse. Some thoughts on the *Seven against Thebes*', *C&M* 30: 27–43.
- Smythe, D. C. 1996. 'Alexios I and the heretics: the account of Anna Komnene's Alexiad', in Mullett, M. and Smythe, D. (eds.), *Alexios I Komnenos: Papers on the Second Belfast Byzantine International Colloquium, 14–16 April 1989*. Belfast, pp. 232–59.
- Snell, B. 1953 [1946]. *The Discovery of the Mind*. Cambridge, Mass.
1964. 'Mnemosyne in der frühgriechischen Dichtung', *ABG* 9: 19–35.
1973. 'Gyges und Kroisos als Tragödienfiguren', *ZPE* 12: 197–205.
- Snell Hornby, M. 2004. 'Venutis 'Foreignization': Das Erbe von Friedrich Schleiermacher in der Translationswissenschaft?', in Müller, I. and Vermeer, H. J. (eds.), *Und sie bewegt sich doch . . . : Translationswissenschaft in Ost und West*. Frankfurt, pp. 333–44.
- Solmsen, F. 1937. 'The Erinyes in Aeschylus' *Septem*', *TAPhA* 37: 197–211.
1949. *Hesiod and Aeschylus*. Ithaca.
- Sommerstein, A. 1971. 'Aeschylus, *Agamemnon* 126–30', *CR* 21: 1–3.
1981. *The Comedies of Aristophanes*, vol. 11: *Knights*. Warminster.
1989. *Aeschylus. Eumenides*. Cambridge.
2008. *Aeschylus*, vol. 1: *Persians, Seven against Thebes, Suppliants*. Cambridge, Mass.
2009. *Aeschylus*, vol. 11: *Oresteia*. Cambridge, Mass.
- Sommerstein, A. and Fletcher, J. (eds.) 2007. *Horkos: the Oath in Greek Society*. Bristol.
- Somos, M. 2011. *Secularisation and the Leiden Circle*. Leiden.
- Somville, P. 1996. 'Fustel de Coulanges et la *Cité antique*', *Kernos* 9: 215–17.
- Soni, V. 2011. *Mourning Happiness: Narrative and the Politics of Modernity*. Cornell.
- Sourvinou Inwood, C. 1989. 'Assumptions and the creation of meaning. Reading Sophocles' *Antigone*', *JHS* 109: 134–48.
1997. 'Tragedy and religion: constructs and readings', in Pelling, C. (ed.), *Greek Tragedy and the Historian*. Oxford, pp. 161–86.

- 2000a. 'Further aspects of *polis* religion', in Buxton, R. (ed.), *Oxford Readings in Greek Religion*. Oxford: 38–55. (First published in 1988 in *Annali dell'Istituto Universitario Orientale di Napoli, Sezione di Archeologia e Storia Antica* 10: 259–74.)
- 2000b. 'What is *polis* religion?', in Buxton, R. (ed.), *Oxford Readings in Greek Religion*. Oxford, pp. 13–37. (First published in Murray, O. and Price, S. (eds.), *The Greek City from Homer to Alexander*. Oxford, 1990, pp. 295–322.)
2003. *Tragedy and Athenian Religion*, Lanham, Md.
- Soury, G. 1945. 'Le problème de la Providence et le *De Sera* de Plutarque', *REG* 58: 163–79.
- Spanheim, E. 1697. *Callimachi hymni, epigrammata, et fragmenta*. Utrecht.
- Spencer, J. 1683–5. *De legibus Hebraeorum ritualibus et eorum rationibus, libri tres*. Cambridge.
- Spencer, N. 1995. 'Early Lesbos between east and west: a "grey" area of Aegean archaeology', *ABSA* 90: 269–306.
- Sperber, D. 1996. *Explaining Culture*. Oxford.
- Speyer, W. 1969. 'Fluch', *RAC* 7: 1160–1288.
- Spira, A. 1981. 'Solons *Musenelegie*', in Kurz, G. (ed.), *Gnomosyne: menschliches Denken und Mandeln in der frühgriechischen Literature. Festschrift für Walter Marg zum 70. Geburtstag*. Munich, pp. 177–96.
- Squire, M. 2009. *Image and Text in Graeco-Roman Antiquity*. Cambridge.
- Stadter, P. and van der Stockt, P. 2002. *Sage and Emperor: Plutarch, Greek Intellectuals, and Roman Power in the Time of Trajan (98–117AD)*. Leuven.
- Stahl, H. P. 1975. 'Learning through suffering? Croesus' conversations in the history of Herodotus', *YCLS* 24: 1–36.
- Staub, M. and Vogel, K. A. (eds.) 1999. *Wissen und Gesellschaft in Nürnberg um 1500: Akten des interdisziplinären Symposions vom 5. und 6. Juni 1998 im Tucherschloss in Nürnberg*. Wiesbaden.
- Ste Croix, G. E. M. de 1977. 'Herodotus', *G&R* 24: 130–48.
- Steel, C. 1986. 'Proclus, philosophy and mythology', *TF* 48: 191–206.
1989. 'Guillaume de Moerbeke et saint Thomas', in Brams, J. and Vanhammel, W. (eds.), *Guillaume de Moerbeke. Recueil d'études à l'occasion du 700e anniversaire de sa mort*. Leuven, pp. 57–82.
2007. *Proclus: On Providence*. London.
- Steffen, V. 1967. 'Die politische Krise in Mytilene in der Zeit des Dichters Alkaios', in Jurewicz, O. and Kuch, H. (eds.), *Die Krise der griechischen Polis*. Berlin, pp. 7–10.
- Stehle, E. 1997. *Performance and Gender in Ancient Greece*. Princeton.
2005. 'Prayer and curse in Aeschylus' *Seven against Thebes*', *CPh* 100: 101–22.
2006. 'Solon's self reflexive political persona and its audience', in Blok, J. H. and Lardinois, A. P. M. H. (eds.), *Solon of Athens: New Historical and Philological Approaches*. Leiden, pp. 79–113.
- Stein, H. 1874. *Herodotos VII*. Berlin.
- Steinberg, B. 2005. 'Rehabilitating Pelagius. Another look at original sin', *Theology* 108: 22.

- Stein Hölkeskamp, E. 1989. *Adelskultur und Polisgesellschaft. Studien zum griechischen Adel in archaischer und klassischer Zeit*. Stuttgart.
1997. 'Adel und Volk bei Theognis', in Eder, W. and Hölkeskamp, K. J. (eds.), *Volk und Verfassung im vorhellenistischen Griechenland*. Stuttgart, pp. 21–35.
- Stemmerdenger, B. 1973. 'Nietzsche et Otfried Müller', *Belfagor, Rassegna di Varia Umanita* 28: 142–5.
- Stengel, P. 1910. *Opferbräuche der Griechen*. Munich.
- Stern, A. 2005. *Eugenic Nation: Faults and Frontiers of Better Breeding in Modern America*. Berkeley.
- Stern, J. 1991. 'Scapegoat narratives in Herodotus', *Hermes* 119: 304–11.
- Stiblinus, G. 1562. *Euripides Poeta Tragicorum princeps, in Latinum sermonem conversus, adiuncto e regione textu Graeco*. Basel.
- Stinton, T. C. W. 1976. 'The riddle at Colonus', *GRBS* 17: 323–328 = *Collected Papers* 265–270.
1986. 'The scopes and limits of allusion in Greek tragedy', in *Greek Tragedy and its Legacy: Essays Presented to D. J. Conacher*. Calgary, pp. 451–62 (= *Collected Papers* 454–92).
1990. *Collected Papers on Greek Tragedy*. Oxford.
- Stocking, G. W. 1987. *Victorian Anthropology*. New York.
- Stoddard, K. 2002. 'Turning the tables on the audience: didactic technique in Solon 13W', *AJPh* 123: 149–68.
- Stoevesandt, M. 2008. *Homers Ilias Gesamtkommentar*. Bd. IV.6, Fasz. 2 (Kommentar). Munich.
- Strasburger, H. 1955. 'Herodot und das perikleische Athen', *Historia* 4: 1–25.
- Strataridaki, A. 1991. 'Epimenides of Crete: some notes on his life, works and the verse "Κρήτες ἀεὶ ψεύσται"', *Fortunatae* 2: 207–23.
- Strauss, B. S. 1993. 'On the mysteries and the theme of the father in late fifth century Athens', in Rosen, R. M. and Farrell, J. (eds.), *Nomodeiktes: Greek Studies in Honor of M. Ostwald*. Ann Arbor, pp. 255–68.
- Strong, A. K. 2009–10. 'Mules in Herodotus: the destiny of half breeds', *CW* 103: 455–64.
- Stroumsa, G. G. 1997a. 'Comparatisme et philologie: Richard Simon et les origines de l'orientalisme', in Boespflug, F. and Dunand, F. (eds.), *Le comparatisme dans l'histoire des religions*. Paris, pp. 47–62.
- 1997b. 'Jewish myth and ritual and the beginnings of comparative religion: the case of Richard Simon', *Journal of Jewish Thought and Philosophy* 6: 19–35.
- 2001a. 'John Spencer and the roots of idolatry', *History of Religions* 40: 1–23.
- 2001b. 'Richard Simon: from philology to comparativism', *Archiv für Religionsgeschichte* 3: 89–107.
2010. *A New Science: the Discovery of Religion in the Age of Reason*. Cambridge, Mass.
- Strubbe, J. 1997. *Arai Epitumbioi: Imprecations against Desecrators of the Graves in the Greek Epigraphs of Asia Minor: a Catalogue*. Bonn.
- Struck, P. 2004. *Birth of the Symbol. Ancient Readers at the Limits of their Texts*. Princeton.

- Stumpf, C. A. 2006. *The Grotian Theology of International Law: Hugo Grotius and the Moral Foundations of International Relations*. Berlin.
- Suárez de la Torre, E. 1990. 'Parole de poète, parole de prophète: les oracles et la mantique chez Pindare', *Kernos* 3: 347–58.
1992. 'Le vocabulaire de la colonisation dans les oracles delphiques', *RPh* 66: 345–50.
1994. 'Sibylles, mantique inspirée et collections oraculaires', *Kernos* 7: 179–205.
- Super, C. 1899. *Between Heathenism and Christianity*. Chicago.
- Sweeney, L. 1982. 'Participation and structure of being in Proclus' *Elements of theology*', in Harris, R. B. (ed.), *The Structure of Being. A Neoplatonic Approach*. Albany, pp. 140–55.
- Swift, L. A. 2009. 'Sexual and familial distortion in Euripides' *Phoenissae*', *TAPhA* 139: 53–87.
- Symes, C. 2003. 'The performance and preservation of medieval Latin comedy', *European Medieval Drama* 7: 29–50.
- Synodinou, K. 1988. 'Electra in the *Orestes* of Euripides. A case of contradictions', *Mètis* 3: 305–20.
- Szegedy Maszak, A. 1993. 'Legends of the Greek lawgivers', *GRBS* 19: 199–209.
- Szlezák, T. A. 2007. 'Der angeklagte Oedipus. Zum Charakter des Titelhelden im *Oedipus Coloneus*', *SemRom* 10: 119–36.
- Taplin, O. 1977. *The Stagecraft of Aeschylus: the Dramatic Use of Exits and Entrances in Greek Tragedy*. Oxford.
- Tarditi, G. 1969. 'L'ᾠσέβεια di Aiace e quella di Pittaco', *QUCC* 8: 86–96.
1989. 'La gratitudine degli dei: l'ὄλβος di Ierone e la vicenda del vecchio Cresio (Bacch. Epin. 3)', *RFIC* 117: 276–85.
- Taufer, M. 1999. 'Er e Tespesio: Plutarco interprete di Platone', *Lexis* 17: 303–18.
2010. *Il mito di Tespesio nel De sera numinis vindicta di Plutarco*. Naples.
- Taylor, C. 1989. *The Sources of the Self: the Making of the Modern Identity*. Cambridge, Mass.
- Taylor, T. 1833. *Two Treatises of Proclus, the Platonic Successor*. London.
- Telò, M. 2004. 'Eupolis, Solone e l'adulterio. Una proposta per la *persona loquens* di Eup. Fr. 101 K. A. (= *P.Oxy.* 863)', *ZPE* 146: 1–12.
- Testart, A. 1991. 'Le lien et le liant (les fondements symboliques du serment)', in Verdier, R. (ed.), *Le serment*, vol. 11. Paris, pp. 244–56.
- te Velde, R. 2005. 'Evil, sin, and death: Thomas Aquinas on original sin', in Van Nieuwenhove, R. and Vawrykov, J. (eds.), *The Theology of Thomas Aquinas*. Notre Dame, pp. 143–66.
- Thalmann, W. G. 1978. *Dramatic Art in Aeschylus' Seven against Thebes*. New Haven.
1982. 'The Lille Stesichorus and the *Seven against Thebes*', *Hermes* 110: 385–91.
- Theander, C. 1952. 'De Alcaei poematis in Hyrrhan, Pittacum, Pentilidas invectivis', *Aegyptus* 32: 179–90.
- Thiel, J. H. 1938. 'Solon und Pittakos', *MN* 6: 204–10.
- Thiel, R. 1993. *Chor und tragische Handlung im Agamemnon des Aischylos*. Stuttgart.

- Thomas, R. 1989. *Oral Tradition and Written Record in Classical Athens*. Cambridge.
 1992. *Literacy and Orality in Ancient Greece*. Cambridge.
 2000. *Herodotus in Context: Ethnography, Science, and the Art of Persuasion*. Cambridge.
- Thompson, C. L. 1979–80. 'Cicero's editing of mythographic material in the *De natura deorum*', *CJ* 75: 143–52.
- Tilg, S. 2004. 'Die Symbolik chthonischer Götter in Sophokles' *Ödipus auf Kolonos*', *Mnemosyne* 57: 407–20.
- Todd, R. B. 1973. 'The Stoic common notions. A re examination and reinterpretation', *SO* 48: 47–75.
- Todd, S. C. 2007. *A Commentary on Lysias, Speeches I–II*. Oxford.
- Todisco, L. 1980. 'Modelli classici per le prime espressioni figurative del peccato originale', *AFLB* 23: 163–86.
- Toorn, K. van der 1985. *Sin and Sanction in Israel and Mesopotamia: a Comparative Study*. Assen.
- Töpffer, J. 1889. *Attische Genealogie*. Berlin.
- Torraca, L. 1991. 'Linguaggio del reale e linguaggio dell'immaginario nel *De sera numinis vindicta*', in D'Ippolito, G. and Gallo, I. (eds.), *Strutture formali dei Moralia di Plutarco*. Naples, pp. 115–35.
- Torrance, I. 2007. *Aeschylus: Seven against Thebes*. London.
- Torricelli, O. 1981. 'Sul gr. ὄρκος e la figura lessicale del giuramento', *RAL* 36: 125–39.
- Touchefeu Meynier, O. 1994. 'Talthybios', *LIMC* 7.1: 837–9.
- Tracy, S. V. 1986. 'The beacon fire in the *Agamemnon*', *CQ* 36: 257–60.
- Traina, C. L. H. 2001. 'A person in the making: Thomas Aquinas on children and childhood', in Bunge, M. J. (ed.), *The Child in Christian Thought*. Grand Rapids.
- Trautmann, T. R. 1987. *Lewis Henry Morgan and the Invention of Kinship*. Berkeley.
- Treston, H. J. 1923. *Poine: a Study in Ancient Greek Blood-Vengeance*. London.
- Triantis, I. 1992. 'Myrtilos', *LIMC* 6.1: 693–6.
- Trieschnigg, C. 2008. 'Iphigenia's dream in Euripides' *Iphigenia Taurica*', *CQ* 58: 461–78.
- Trouillard, J. 1971. 'Réminiscence et procession de l'âme selon Proclus', *RSPH* 69: 177–89.
 1972. *L'un et l'âme selon Proclus*. Paris.
 1980. 'Le lien de l'âme et du corps selon Proclus', *Diotima* 8: 128–33.
- Tsagalis, C. 2008. *The Oral Palimpsest. Exploring Intertextuality in the Homeric Epics*. Washington, DC.
- Tsagarakis, O. 1982. 'The *teichoskopia* cannot belong in the beginning of the Trojan war', *QUCC* 41: 61–72.
- Tuck, R. 1979. *Natural Law Theories: Their Origin and Development*. Cambridge.
 1999. *The Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought and the International Order from Grotius to Kant*. Oxford.
 (ed.) 2005. *Hugo Grotius: De jure belli ac pacis Libri Tres*. Indianapolis.

- Tucker, A. 1999. 'Sins of our fathers: a short history of religious child sacrifice', *ZRGG* 51: 30–47.
- Turner, H. E. W. 2004. *The Patristic Doctrine of the Redemption: a Study of the Development of Doctrine during the First Five Centuries*. Eugene.
- Upala, M. A. et al. 2007. 'Contextualizing counterintuitiveness: how context affects comprehension and memorability of counterintuitive concepts', *Cognitive Science* 31: 415–39.
- Usener, S. 1993. 'Isokrates' *Busiris*: Verschriftlichung des Mythos und Verantwortung des Autors', in Kullmann, W. and Althoff, J. (eds.), *Vermittlung und Tradierung von Wissen in der griechischen Kultur*. Tübingen, pp. 247–62.
- Valckenaer, L. K. 1755. *Euripidis tragoedia*: Phoenissae. Leiden.
1768. *Euripidis tragoedia*: Hippolytus. Leiden.
- Valdés Guía, M. 2002a. 'Areópago y prítanos ton naukaron: crisis política a finales del s.VII a.C. (de Cílón a Solón)', *DHA* 28: 65–101.
- 2002b. 'El culto a Zeus y a las *Semnai* en Atenas arcaica: exégesis eupátrida y purificación de Epiménides', *Ostraka* 1: 223–42.
2004. 'La constitución de la religión cívica en Atenas arcaica I.', *Ilu* 9: 281–348.
2009. '"Bouzyges nomothetes": purification et exégèse des lois sacrées à Athènes', in Brulé, P. (ed.), *La norme en matière religieuse en Grèce ancienne*. Liège, pp. 293–320.
- Valgiglio, E. 1963. 'Edipo nella tradizione pre attica', *RSC* 11: 18–43 and 153–71.
1985. 'Echi cristiani in Plutarco', *AALig* 42: 168–87.
- Vallois, R. 1914. 'Arai', *BCH* 38: 250–71.
- Van den Berg, R. M. 2008. *Proclus' Commentary on the Cratylus in Context: Ancient Theories of Language and Naming*. Leiden.
- (forthcoming). 'A problem concerning Providence: Proclus and Plutarch on inherited guilt and postponed punishment', in d'Hoine, P. and Van Riel, G. (eds.), *Fate, Providence and Moral Responsibility in Ancient, Medieval and Early Modern Thought*. Leuven.
- van den Bruwaene, M. 1981. *Cicéron: De natura deorum, livre III*. Brussels.
1982. 'Approximations sémantiques de ὁμαρτέω, ὀμνυμι, coniurare', *ACD* 18: 99–116.
- van den Hout, T. 2006. 'Muršili's *Second Plague Prayer*', in Chavalas, M. W. (ed.), *The Ancient Near East: Historical sources in Translation*. Oxford, pp. 259–66.
- Van Erp Taalman Kip, A. M. 2000. 'The gods of the *Iliad* and the fate of Troy', *Mnemosyne* 53: 385–402.
- Van Groningen, B. A. 1957. 'Hésiode et Persès', *Mededelingen der Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen*. Amsterdam, pp. 153–66.
1958. *La composition littéraire archaïque grecque*. Amsterdam.
1966. *Théognis*. Le premier livre / édité avec un commentaire. Amsterdam.
- Vanhammel, W. 1989a. 'Biobibliographie de Guillaume de Moerbeke', in Brams, J. and Vanhammel, W. (eds.), *Guillaume de Moerbeke. Recueil d'études à l'occasion du 700e anniversaire de sa mort*. Leuven, pp. 301–83.

- 1989b. 'Notes concernant quelques missions qui auraient été confiées à Guillaume de Moerbeke', in Brams, J. and Vanhammel, W. (eds.), *Guillaume de Moerbeke. Recueil d'études à l'occasion du 700e anniversaire de sa mort*. Leuven, pp. 53–6.
- Van Hook, L. 1945. *Isocrates*, vol. III. London.
- Van Marion, O. 2001. 'The reception of Plutarch in the Netherlands: Octavia and Cleopatra in the Heroic Epistles of J. B. Wellekens (1710)', in Enenkel, K., de Jong, J. L., and De Landtsheer, J. (eds.), *Recreating Ancient History. Episodes from the Greek and Roman Past in the Arts and Literature of the Early Modern Period*. Leiden, pp. 213–34.
- Vannicelli, P. 1992. 'Gli Egidi e le relazioni tra Sparta e Cirene in età arcaica', *QUCC* 70: 55–73.
- (forthcoming). *Erodoto*, vol. VII. Milan.
- Van Noorden, H. 2010. 'Socrates' "Hesiodic" project', in Boys Stones, G. and Haubold, J. (eds.), *Plato and Hesiod*. Oxford, pp. 176–99.
- Van Uytfanghe, M. 1991. 'Du grec et du latin bibliques aux langues romanes: un réexamen du cas de *parabola*: parole et de *parabolare*: parler', in Bartelink, G. J. M. et al. (eds.), *Eulogia*. The Hague, pp. 385–93.
- Vegetti, M. 1998. *Platone: La Repubblica*, vol. II: *Libri II e III*. Naples.
2003. 'Culpability, responsibility, cause: philosophy, historiography, and medicine in the fifth century', in Long, A. A. (ed.), *Cambridge Companion to Early Greek Philosophy*. Cambridge, pp. 271–89.
- Vellacott, P. H. 1984. 'Aeschylus' Orestes', *CW* 77: 145–57.
- Venuti, L. 1991. 'Genealogies of translation theory: Schleiermacher', *Traduction, terminologie, rédaction: études sur le texte et ses transformations* 4: 125–50.
1995. *The Translator's Invisibility*. Berkeley.
- Verbeke, G. 1953. 'Guillaume de Moerbeke traducteur de Proclus', *RPhL* 51: 349–73.
1989. 'Moerbeke, traducteur et interprète: un texte et une pensée' in Brams, J. and Vanhammel, W. (eds.), *Guillaume de Moerbeke. Recueil d'études à l'occasion du 700e anniversaire de sa mort*. Leuven, pp. 1–22.
- Verdenius, W. J. 1960. 'L'association des idées comme principe de composition dans Homère, Hésiode, Théognis', *REG* 73: 345–361.
1985. *A Commentary on Hesiod, Works and Days vv. 1–381*. Leiden.
- Verdier, R. (ed.) 1991. *Le serment*. 2 vols. Paris.
- Vernant, J. P. 1960. 'Le mythe hésiodique des races. Essai d'analyse structurale', *RHR* 157: 21–54.
- 1965a. *Mythe et pensée chez les Grecs*. Paris.
- 1965b [1959]. 'Aspects mythiques de la mémoire', *Mythe et pensée chez les Grecs*. Paris, pp. 109–36.
1966. 'Le mythe hésiodique des races. Sur un essai de mise au point', *RPh* 40: 247–76.
1972. *Mythe et tragédie en Grèce ancienne*. Paris.
1974. *Mythe et société en Grèce ancienne*. Paris.

1990. 'Tensions and ambiguities in Greek tragedy', in Vernant, J. P. and Vidal Naquet, P. (eds.) *Myth and Tragedy in Ancient Greece*. New York, pp. 29–48.
- Vernière, Y. 1964. 'Le Léthé de Plutarque', *REA* 66: 22–32.
- (ed.) 1974. *Plutarque. De sera numinis vindicta*. Paris.
- Versnel, H. 2011. *Coping with the Gods. Wayward Readings in Greek Theology*. Leiden.
- Vetta, M. 1983. 'Introduzione', in Vetta, M. (ed.), *Poesia e simposio nella Grecia antica: guida storica e critica*. Rome, pp. xi–lx.
1984. 'Identificazione di un caso di catena simposiale nel corpus teognideo', in *Lirica greca da Archiloco a Elitis*. Padua, pp. 113–26.
1999. *Symposion. Antologie dai lirici greci*. Naples.
2000. 'Teognide e anonimi nella *Sylloge teognidea*', *AION* 22: 123–41.
- Vian, F. 1963. *Les origines de Thèbes. Cadmos et les Spartes*. Paris.
- Vickers, B. 1973. *Towards Greek Tragedy. Drama. Myth. Society*. London.
- Vilatte, S. 1990. 'Le porc, l'âne, le porcelet et les chefs du peuple des tribus clisthénienes: des emblèmes pour les citoyens de Sicyone', *DHA* 16: 115–33.
- Vinken, H., Soeters, J., and Ester, P. (eds.). 2004. *Comparing Cultures: Dimensions of Culture in a Comparative Perspective*. Leiden.
- Visconti, A. 2001. 'Epiménide Bouzyges', in Federico, E. and Visconti, A. (eds.), *Epiménide Cretese*. Naples, pp. 129–67.
2004. 'Riflessioni sull'azione politica di Pittaco a Mitilene', *IncidAntico* 2: 149–69.
- Visser, E. 2000. 'Herodots Kroisos Logos: Rezeptionssteuerung und Geschichtsphilosophie', *WJA* 24: 5–28.
- Visser, M. 1984. 'Vengeance and pollution. Orestes' trail of blood', *JHI* 45: 193–207.
- Vlastos, G. 1946. 'Solonian justice', *CPh* 41: 65–83.
- Vocatura, R. 1929. *Ricerche intorno al dialogo di Plutarco De sera numinum vindicta*. Rome.
- Vossius, G. J. 1641. *Theologia gentilis sive physiologia christiana*. Amsterdam.
- Waanders, F. M. J. 1976. 'Τέλος in tragedy. Some remarks', in Bremer, J. M., Radt, S. L., and Ruijgh, C. J. (eds.), *Miscellanea tragica in honorem J. C. Kamerbeek*. Amsterdam, pp. 475–82.
- Wächter, Th. 1910. *Reinheitsvorschriften im griechischen Kult*. Giessen.
- Wackernagel, J. 1953–79. *Kleine Schriften*. 3 vols. Göttingen.
- Wagner, A. 2006. 'Griechische Religion als "primäre Religion"?', in *Primäre und Sekundäre Religion als Kategorie der Religionsgeschichte des Alten Testaments*. Berlin, pp. 211–26.
- Walde, C. 2001. *Die Traumdarstellungen in der griechisch-römischen Dichtung*. Munich.
- Wallace, R. W. 1987. 'The origin of electrum coinage', *AJA* 91: 385–97.
- Waters, K. H. 1971. *Herodotus on Tyrants and Despots. A Study in Objectivity*. Wiesbaden.
- Watson, L. 1991. *Arae: the Curse Poetry of Antiquity*. Leeds.
- Wear, S. K. 2008. 'Syrianus the Platonist on eternity and time', *CQ* 58: 648–60.

2009. 'Syrianus' teachings on the soul', in Longo, A. (ed.), *Syrianus et la métaphysique de l'Antiquité tardive*. Naples, pp. 177–200.
- Weaver, D. 1985a. 'The exegesis of Romans 5:12 among the Greek fathers and its implication for the doctrine of original sin: the 5th–12th centuries, part 1', *St Vladimir's Theological Quarterly* 29: 133–59.
- 1985b. 'The exegesis of Romans 5:12 among the Greek fathers and its implication for the doctrine of original sin: the 5th–12th centuries, part 2', *St Vladimir's Theological Quarterly* 29: 231–57.
- Webb, R. 2009. *Demons and Dancers: Performance in Late Antiquity*. Cambridge, Mass.
- Wecklein, N. 1901. 'Die Kyklische Thebais, die Oedipodee, die Oedipussage und der Oedipus des Euripides', *SB der Bay. Akad.*
1906. *Euripides: Orestes*. Leipzig.
- Wehrli, F. 1973. 'Gnome, Anekdoten und Biographie', *MH* 30: 193–208.
- Weil, R. 1985. 'Retour au commencement' *RPh* 59: 195–9.
- Weithman, P. J. 1992. 'Augustine and Aquinas on original sin and the function of political authority', *JHPH* 30: 353–76.
- Welcker, F. G. 1826. *Theognidis reliquiae*. Frankfurt.
1849. *Der epische Cyclus*, vol. 11. Bonn.
- Wéry, L. M. 1966. 'Le meurtre des hérauts de Darius en 491 et l'inviolabilité du héraut', *AC* 35: 468–86.
1967. 'Le fonctionnement de la diplomatie à l'époque homérique', *RIDA* 14: 169–205.
- West, M. L. 1966. *Theogony: Hesiod*. Oxford.
1974. *Studies in Greek Elegy and Iambus*. Berlin.
1978. *Works and Days: Hesiod*. Oxford.
1979. 'The parodos of the Agamemnon', *CQ* 29: 1–6.
1983. *The Orphic Poems*. Oxford.
- 1987a. *Euripides: Orestes*. Warminster.
- 1987b. 'Problems in Euripides' *Orestes*', *CQ* 37: 281–93.
- 1989–92. *Iambi et Elegi Graeci ante Alexandrum Cantati*, 2nd edn. 2 vols. Oxford.
1997. *The East Face of Helicon*. Oxford.
1999. 'Ancestral curses', in Griffin, J. (ed.), *Sophocles Revisited: Essays Presented to Sir Hugh Lloyd-Jones*. Oxford, pp. 31–45.
2003. 'Alcaeus' brother', *ZPE* 145: 6.
- West, S. 2003. 'ὄρκου παῖς ἔστιν ἀνώνυμος: the aftermath of Plataean perjury', *CQ* 53: 438–47.
2004. 'Herodotus and lyric poetry', *LClás* 8: 79–91.
- Westerink, L. G. 1962. 'Notes on the *Tria opuscula* of Proclus', *Mnemosyne* 15: 159–68.
1976. *The Greek Commentaries on Plato's Phaedo*, vol. 1: *Olympiodorus*. Amsterdam.
1977. *The Greek Commentaries on Plato's Phaedo*, vol. 11: *Damascius*. Amsterdam.
- Westerwick, O. 1893. *De Plutarchi studiis Hesiodicis*. Münster.

- Whewell, W. 1853. *Hugonis Grotii De jure belli ac pacis libri tres*. 3 vols. Cambridge.
- Whitehouse, H. 1995. *Inside the Cult: Religious Innovation and Transmission in Papua New Guinea*. Oxford.
2000. *Arguments and Icons: Divergent Modes of Religiosity*. Oxford.
2004. *Modes of Religiosity: a Cognitive Theory of Religious Transmission*. Walnut Creek, Calif.
- Wians, W. 2009. 'The *Agamemnon* and human knowledge', in Wians, W. (ed.), *Logos and Muthos*. Albany, pp. 181–98.
- Wick, C. 2003. 'Le tirage au sort: un "leitmotiv" dans la *Thébaïde* de Lille et les *Sept contre Thèbes*', *MH* 60: 167–74.
- Wickenden, N. G. J. 1993. *Vossius and the Humanist Concept of History*. Assen.
- Wiener, C. 2004. 'Kurskorrektur auf der Jenseitsfahrt: Plutarchs Thespesios Mythos und Kolotes' Kritik an Platons *Politeia*', *WJA* 28: 49–63.
- Wifstrand, A. 1957–58. 'The golden chain', *Lychnos* 21: 1–13.
- Wilamowitz Möllendorff, U. von 1893. *Aristoteles und Athen*. Berlin.
1913. *Sappho und Simonides*. Berlin.
1914. *Aischylos. Interpretationen*. Berlin.
- 1925 'Lese Früchte', *Hermes* 60: 280–316 (= *Kleine Schriften*, vol. IV, pp. 368–403).
1928. *Hesiods Erga*. Berlin.
- 1931 2. *Der Glaube der Hellenen*. 2 vols. Berlin.
1962. *Kleine Schriften*, vol. IV: *Lese Früchte und Verwandtes*. Berlin.
- 1998 [1921]. *Geschichte der Philologie*, 3rd edn. Stuttgart.
- Wildgruber, G. 2007. 'Γένος und Δίκη: Protologik der Medialität in der griechischen Tragödie', in Kittler, F. and Ofak, A. (eds.), *Medien vor den Medien*. Munich, pp. 89–104.
- Williams, J. W. 1951. 'The curse of the Alkmaionidai, I', *Hermathena* 78: 32–49.
- 1952a. 'The curse of the Alkmaionidai: II: Kleisthenes and the Persian wars', *Hermathena* 79: 3–21.
- 1952b. 'The curse of the Alkmaionidai: III: Themistokles, Perikles and Alkibiades', *Hermathena* 80: 58–71.
- Williams, N. P. 1929. *The Ideas of the Fall and Original Sin*. London.
- Williamson, G. S. 2004. *The Longing for Myth in Germany: Religion and Aesthetic Culture from Romanticism to Nietzsche*. Chicago.
- Willink, C. W. 1983. 'Prodikos, meteorosophist and the Tantalos paradigm', *CQ* 33: 25–33.
1986. *Euripides: Orestes*. Oxford.
- Wilson, J. P. 1997. *The Hero and the City: an Interpretation of Sophocles' Oedipus at Colonus*. Ann Arbor.
- Wilson, N. G. 1996. *Scholars of Byzantium*. London.
- Wilson, P. and Taplin, O. 1993. 'The "actiology" of tragedy in the *Oresteia*', *PCPhS* 39: 169–80.
- Winnington Ingram, R. P. 1966. 'Aeschylus, *Septem* 187–190; 750–757', *BICS* 13: 88–93.
1977. 'Septem contra Thebas', *YCS* 25: 1–45.

1980. *Sophocles: an Interpretation*. Cambridge.
- Winroth, A. 2000. *The Making of Gratian's Decretum*. Cambridge.
- Winshemius, V. 1546. *Interpretatio tragoediarum Sophoclis ad utilitatem iuventutis quae studiosa est graecae linguae*. Frankfurt.
- Wippel, J. F. 2003. 'The Parisian condemnations of 1270 and 1277', in Gracia, J. J. E. and Noone, T. B. (eds.), *A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages*. Oxford, pp. 65–73.
- Wolff, C. 1992. 'Euripides' *Iphigenia among the Taurians*: aetiology, ritual, and myth', *ClAnt* 11: 308–34.
- Wolff, H. J. 1944. 'Eherecht und Familienverfassung in Athen', *Traditio* 2: 43–95.
- Wong, K. L. 2001. *The Idea of Retribution in the Book of Ezekiel*. Leiden.
- Woronoff, M. 1994. 'Folie de princes et génocide troyen: de la culpabilité collective à la responsabilité individuelle', in Mactoux, M. M. and Geny, É. (eds.), *Mélanges Pierre Lévêque*. Paris, pp. 389–405.
- Wright, M. 2005. *Euripides' Escape-Tragedies: a Study of Helen, Andromeda, and Iphigenia among the Taurians*. Oxford.
2006. 'Orestes: a Euripidean sequel', *CQ* 56: 33–47.
2008. *Euripides: Orestes*. London.
- Wright, M. R. 1981. *Empedocles: the Extant Fragments*. New Haven.
- Wytttenbach, D. A. 1820 [1772]. *Animadversiones in Plutarchi opera moralia: accedunt animadversiones in librum de sera numinis vindicta et indices*. Leipzig.
- Xylander, W. 1572. *Plutarchi Chaeronensis Moralia quae usurpantur*. Basel.
- Yeshyahu, S. 1999. 'Metaphorical (in)coherence in discourse', *Discourse Processes: a Multidisciplinary Journal* 28: 139–53.
- Young, D. 1964. 'Borrowings and self adaptations in Theognis, with reference to the constitution of the extant sylloge and to the Suda notice of the poet's work', in Irmscher, J. et al. (eds.), *Miscellanea critica Teubner* vol. 1. Leipzig, pp. 307–90.
- Yunis, H. 2011. *Plato: Phaedrus*. Cambridge.
- Zadorojnyi, A. V. 1997. 'Nero's transformation again: Plutarch, *De sera numinis vindicta* 567 F 568 A', *Pegasus* 40: 28–9.
- Zalewska, H. 1986. 'Hesiodi et Theognidis doctrinae de moribus secum comparantur', *Meander* 41: 201–10.
- Zamarou, R. 1994. 'Deadly banquet: a parallel reading of the *Oresteia* and the *Odyssey*', *Hellenica* 44: 285–301.
- Zancani Montuoro, P. and Zanotti Bianco, U. 1951. 'Riflessi di una *Orestia* anteriore ad Eschilo', *RAAN* 26: 270–9.
- Zeitlin, F. I. 1965. 'The motif of corrupted sacrifice in Aeschylus' *Oresteia*', *TAPA* 96: 463–508.
1978. 'The dynamics of misogyny. Myth and mythmaking in the *Oresteia*', *Arethusa* 11: 149–84.
1980. 'The closet of masks. Roleplaying and myth making in the *Orestes* of Euripides', *Ramus* 9: 51–77.

1982. *Under the Sign of the Shield. Semiotics and Aeschylus' Seven against Thebes*. Rome.
- Zerubavel, E. 2003. *Time Maps: Collective Memory and the Social Shape of the Past*. Chicago.
- Zgusta, L. 1984. *Kleinasiatische Ortsnamen*. Heidelberg.
- Zhmud, L. 2012 [1997]. *Pythagoras and the Early Pythagoreans*. Oxford.
- Zhu, R. 2003. 'Equality in worth as a pre condition for justice in Greek thought', *HPTH* 24: 1 15.
- Ziebarth, E. 1895. 'Der Fluch im griechischen Recht', *Hermes* 30: 57 70.
- Ziegler, J. 2001. 'Medicine and immortality in terrestrial paradise', in Biller, P. and Ziegler, J. (eds.), *Religion and Medicine in the Middle Ages*. York, pp. 201 42.
- Zielinski, Th. 1924. 'De Euripidis Thebaide posteriore', *Mn* 24: 189 205.
- Zimmermann, B. 2003a. 'Riflessioni sul coro dell'*Antigone*', in Avezzù, G. (ed.), *Il dramma sofocleo: testo, lingua, interpretazione*. Stuttgart, pp. 371 78.
- 2003b. 'Überlegungen zum Chor in den *Sieben gegen Theben* des Aischylos und der *Antigone* des Sophokles', in Kussl, R. (ed.), *Spurensuche*. Munich, pp. 7 20.
2005. 'Chorprobleme: Überlegungen zum Chor in den *Sieben gegen Theben* des Aischylos und der *Antigone* des Sophokles', *WJA* 29: 47 60.
- Zographou, G. 2007. 'Généalogie et historiographie: une réécriture de la généalogie des rois de Sparte: le cas de Démarate chez Hérodote', *Kernos* 20: 189 204.
- Zuccotti, F. 2000. *Il giuramento nel mondo giuridico e religioso antico: elementi per uno studio comparativistico*. Milan.

Index locorum

- Aeschines
3.110–12, 175
- Aeschylus
Agamemnon
22–39, 395
36–37, 395
40–257, 396
281–316, 396
355–488, 396
681–781, 396
727–8, 414
1072–1177, 397
1072–1330, 406
1096–7, 407
1184–93, 396, 407
1192, 396, 407, 413
1197, 3
1219–22, 407
1226–45, 397
1246, 397
1256–94, 397
1279–90, 404
1282, 463
1407–11, 398
1412–25, 398
1431–47, 398
1448–61, 399
1468–74, 399
1469, 396
1475–80, 399
1480–8, 399
1481–2, 403
1497–1504, 398
1505–12, 400
1507, 400
1521–9, 401
1530–6, 403
1551–9, 401
1565–6, 403
1567–76, 401
1569, 396
1577–1611, 404
1600, 396
1600–1, 405
1600–2, 405
1602, 396
1608, 406
1654–61, 404
- Choephoroi*
471–5, 410
646–52, 410, 412
800–6, 411
912, 413
- Eumenides*
199–200, 413
927–37, 413–16
933, 3
934, 415
- Seven against Thebes*
69–72, 356
653–5, 356
691, 357
695–7, 357
720–91, 351, 373
727–33, 352
729, 356
734–7, 356
734–41, 352
742–9, 352–3
743, 361
743–4, 355
745–52, 353
749, 355
750–7, 353
758–65, 353
760–1, 353
766–71, 354
772–7, 354
785–91, 356
792–802, 357
814–21, 358
1004, 358

- Aeschylus (cont.)
 1005–78, 359
 1059–71, 358
 1066–78, 358
Suppliants
 265, 3
 434–7, 345
- Alcaeus
 F 68 V, 217, 244
 F 70 V, 226
 F 72 V, 214–16
 F 129 V, 217, 221
 F 298 V, 197, 217, 222
- Andocides
 1.130–1, 464
- Antiphon
 5.82, 300
- Archilochus
 F 172–81 W, 174, 205, 220, 223
- Aristophanes
Knights
 445–6, 208, 218, 309, 324
- Aristotle
Athēnaion Politeia
 1, 311–13
 20, 312
Nicomachean Ethics
 133b.16–22, 241
Politica
 1274b, 212
- Bacchylides
Epinician
 3, 331–5
- Bible
 Exodus
 20:5, 178
 Ezekiel
 18, 62, 107–9, 137, 155, 271
 Matthew
 27:25, 95, 118
 Romans
 5:12, 78
- Bion of Borysthenes
 F 27 Kindstrand, 53, 468
- Cicero
De natura deorum
 3.90–1, 50–3
- Damascius
In Phaedonem
 v.1, sect. II.2, 456
- Diogenes Laertius
 1.109–15, 315–17
- 1.74, 212
 1.81.4, 213
 Douris of Samos
 76 F 75 Jacoby, 216
- Empedocles
 B 115 DK, 461–3
- Euripides
Electra
 1306–7, 3
Heracles
 1261–2, 345
Iphigenia in Tauris
 1–9, 420
 44–50, 421
 53–8, 422
 67, 422
 178–202, 420
 179–202, 424
 385–91, 423
 691–4, 422
 695–8, 423
 811–26, 420, 423
 845–9, 423
 939–86, 422
 984, 422
 984–6, 423
 991–3, 424
 991–7, 423
 1414–19, 423
 1415–19, 424
 1441, 423
- Orestes*
 4–10, 425
 6–7, 429
 13, 426
 26–7, 429
 316–47, 433–4
 337, 433
 337–8, 437
 807–43, 434–5
 960–81, 435, 437
 960–82, 431
 963–4, 432
 971–81, 431
 980–1, 432
 981, 432
 982–8, 426
 982–1012, 426, 429, 435–6
 983, 428
 990, 437
 996–7, 427
 1001, 426
 1007, 429
 1009–10, 429

- 1010–12, 429
 1305–7, 425
 1537–48, 436
 1545, 437
 1545–7, 437
Phoenissae
 1–87, 382
 18–20, 377
 202–79, 383
 253–5, 383
 350–4, 382
 379–84, 382
 638–89, 383
 657–8, 379
 784–5, 383
 784–833, 383
 819, 384
 865–95, 377–8
 930–59, 382
 934, 461
 1018–66, 384
 1060–6, 385
 1595–1624, 385
 1611, 385
 Fragments
 F 82 Kannicht, 12, 97, 344
 F 838–43 Kannicht, 345
 F 980 Kannicht, 3, 42, 96–7, 344
 Σ Eur.
Hippolytus 833, 3, 95, 97
Orestes 995, 427
Phoenissae 1760, 348
 Favorinus
De exilio
 9.2, 214
 Hellanicus
 4 F 26b Jacoby, 180
 Hermias
In Platonis Phaedrum
 96.1–97.27, 32–6
 Herodotus
 1.61, 206–7, 309, 311
 1.13, 326, 341
 1.207, 337
 1.5, 325
 1.90–1, 326–31
 1.91, 3, 341
 4.149, 447
 4.150–9, 172
 5.102, 304
 5.66–8, 323
 5.70–3, 206, 306–25
 5.81–9, 290–2
 5.92–3, 322
 5.93, 325
 6.49, 292
 6.52–72, 293–5
 6.73, 292–3
 6.74–84, 293–5
 6.75, 322
 6.86, 58, 278–96, 452
 6.87, 293
 6.91, 292
 6.94, 295
 7.102, 301
 7.133, 341
 7.133–7, 296–306, 316
 7.137, 129, 340
 7.139, 302
 7.197, 138, 299–300, 304, 311–12, 342, 448
 Hesiod
Theogony
 226–32, 200
 231, 284
 271, 174
 383–403, 201
 384, 201
 386–8, 200
 411–52, 201
 453–91, 201
 775–806, 201
 800, 462
Works and Days
 106–201, 161
 127–42, 161
 156–60, 163
 174–8, 164
 190–1, 162
 193–4, 162
 213–73, 166
 219, 281
 235, 166, 174
 238–9, 167
 244, 167
 272–85, 466
 274–85, 159–76
 276–8, 223
 280–5, 17, 239
 282, 131
 284, 57, 91, 253, 287
 285, 278, 280, 452
 287–9, 452
 320–5, 239
 320–34, 168
 322, 281
 325–6, 168
 804, 200, 220
 285, 278

- Hesiod (cont.)
 Fragments
 F 193 MW, 444
 Σ Hes.
 Works and Days 284, 3, 29, 39, 91, 176
 Hippocrates
 De morbo sacro
 2.1–2, 339, 454
 Hipponax
 F 115 W, 220
 Homer
 Iliad
 1.53, 187
 1.233–46, 203
 3.15–20, 181
 3.85–8, 188
 3.103–04, 183
 3.105–10, 183
 3.106–7, 190
 3.121–244, 183
 3.160, 196
 3.245–313, 189
 3.250–8, 183
 3.264–70, 183
 3.272–3, 183
 3.279, 200, 220
 3.295–7, 186
 3.297–301, 184
 3.298–301, 173
 3.302, 195
 3.313–461, 181
 3.320–3, 185
 4.14–19, 181
 4.34–6, 192
 4.67, 193
 4.72, 193
 4.85, 188
 4.85–219, 181
 4.1–84, 181
 4.155–68, 191
 4.158, 195
 4.158–62, 181
 4.160, 131
 4.163–5, 193
 4.234–9, 193
 4.265–71, 193
 4.266–71, 196
 6.200–6, 178
 6.447–9, 197
 6.450–5, 197
 7.67–72, 193
 7.351–2, 194
 8.19, 428
 9.17–28, 187
 9.454–6, 179
 9.565–72, 179
 16.441, 328
 19.255–6, 185
 19.258–60, 184
 19.260, 220
 20.308, 60, 247, 452
 21.157, 163
 21.186, 163
 21.441–60, 180
 24.527–33, 194, 236
 Odyssey
 1.32–4, 195, 236
 6.8, 354
 Isocrates
 Busiris
 25, 465
 Josephus
 De bello Judaico
 2.601, 367
 Lysias
 6.20, 3, 463
 F 195 Carey, 464
 Mimnermus
 F 8 W, 233
 OF 31 Kern 578 Bernabé, 457
 OF 232 Kern 350 Bernabé, 456
 Origen
 Contra Celsum
 8.40, 60–3
 Pausanias
 2.18.2, 58–9, 278
 3.12.7, 299, 305
 7.24.1–2, 300
 8.7.4–8, 56–8
 9.5.14, 447
 Pherecydes
 3 F 37 Jacoby, 225
 3 F 133 Jacoby, 427
 Pindar
 Olympian
 2.35–7, 349, 361
 8.31–52, 179
 Pythian
 1.92–4, 331
 10.30–50, 333
 Fragments
 F 133 Maehler, 457

Plato

Laws

- 630a, 250
- 642d, 317
- 854ac, 466–8
- 854b, 3
- 856cd, 468

Phaedo

- 62b, 456

Phaedrus

- 244d, 33–4, 461
- 265e, 460

Republic

- 362c–367e, 451–5
- 363a–e, 452
- 364b, 452
- 364b–365a, 453
- 364c, 451
- 364cd, 452
- 364d, 339
- 365a, 453

Theaetetus

- 173d, 468

Plutarch

De sera numinis vindicta

- 12: 556d, 278
- 12: 556e–557e, 40–2
- 12: 557c, 448
- 13: 557e–558d, 42
- 14: 558e–f, 42
- 16: 559d–560a, 43
- 17: 560a–b, 43–4
- 19–21: 561c–563b, 44–6
- 30: 566e–f, 46

Life of Solon

- 12, 206, 313–17
- 13, 312

Proclus

In Platonis Cratylum commentaria

- 395c, 30–2

*De decem dubitationibus circa**Providentiam*

- 58, 24
- 59, 25
- 60, 27–8
- 61, 26, 29

Sappho

- F 17 V, 224

Semonides

- F 1 W, 235

Sextus Empiricus

Adversus mathematicos

- 1.287, 62

Sibylline Oracles

- 8.9.18, 62

Solon

- F 13 W, 227–49
- F 13.65–70 W, 254
- F 13.71–6 W, 254–7

Sophocles

Ajax

- 1087, 364

Antigone

- 2–3, 362
- 20–30, 376
- 37–8, 372
- 49–60, 362, 376
- 79, 372
- 582–92, 364–5
- 582–625, 363–76
- 593–603, 366–8
- 603–14, 369
- 614–25, 370
- 618, 364
- 621–5, 370
- 806, 372
- 807, 362
- 842–3, 372
- 853–6, 362
- 853–71, 376
- 857–71, 362–3
- 863–5, 362
- 872–5, 363
- 907, 372
- 921–8, 363
- 941, 372
- 988, 373

Electra

- 502–15, 417
- 1417–21, 416

Oedipus at Colonus

- 258–74, 388
- 270, 391
- 286, 391
- 361–84, 392
- 421–2, 392
- 466, 391
- 510–48, 388
- 600–1, 390
- 944–6, 390
- 960–1013, 386–8
- 988, 391
- 1134, 390
- 1299, 392
- 1432–4, 392
- 1567, 389
- 1600–2, 391

Sophocles (cont.)
 399–402, 310
 400–2, 310

Strabo
 13.2.3, 212

Tertullian
Adversus Marcionem
 2.15, 62

Theognis
 19–38, 257
 19–254, 258
 197–208, 91, 258–67, 288
 227–32, 254–7
 373–400, 268
 585–90, 252–4
 731–52, 267–73, 288
 731–54, 92
 736, 3
 740, 3

Theophrastus
Characters
 16.12, 454

Thucydides
 1.126, 208, 218, 308–11
 1.126–127, 206
 1.127, 309, 324
 2.67, 297
 4.107, 216

Titanomachia
 F 11 Bernabé, 200

Tyrtaeus
 F 12. 30 W, 247

Xenophanes
 F 8 DK, 232

Xenophon
Hellenica
 7.4.34, 467

General index

- Accius, 51–2, 59
 Achilles, 196, 235
 acquisition
 and justice, 285
 and order, 260
 and punishment, 256, 369
 and stability, 264
 and transmission, 288, 356
 and wealth, 242, 250, 252–3, 280
 Adeimantus, 451–5
 Adkins, W. H., 154
 adultery, 59, 396, 398, 407–8, 429
 adversity, 15, 54
 Aegidae, 447
 Aegina, 290–1
 Aegisthus, 52, 58–9, 396, 403–4, 406, 408, 411, 414, 429
 Aerope, 396, 429
 Aeschylus, 14–16, 130, 132, 141, 225, 320–1, 351–62, 394–416, 431, 442
 Aesop, 40
 afterlife
 Croesus, 334
 Hades, 365
 myth of Thespesios, 44
 Oedipus, 389, 391
 poets, 452
 punishment for perjury, 198
Agamemnon, 16, 30, 59, 182, 193, 297, 299, 394–409, 414, 420, 426, 429, 442
 agency
 character, 439
 curse, 408
 and heredity, 225
 and intent, 263, 368, 376, 385, 410
 and perspective, 180, 406
 supernatural, 7, 255, 294, 299, 328, 350, 369, 388, 392, 399, 411, 419, 425, 467, 470
 and wealth, 262
 aggregation, 275, 440, 442, 444, 471
Aglaophamus (1829), 127
agos
 Athens and Aegina, 295–6
 Cylon, 208, 222, 244, 307, 313, 316, 318, 321, 340, 342
 elaunein, 209, 310, 312
 Epimenides, 314–15, 318
 Eumenides, 320
 Pericles, 309
 and perspective, 319, 322
 piaculum, 108, 117
 and sacrifice, 292
aidōs, 326
aiōn, 352–3, 364, 372, 432
 Ajax, 41, 448
 Ajax the Lesser, 221
alastōr, 398–9, 402, 406, 433, 437, 439, 450
 Alcaeus, 210–26, 258, 349
 alchemy, 455
 Alcmaeon, 206, 313
 Alcmaeonids, 4, 144, 206–9, 224, 226, 244, 306–25, 446
 Alexander the Great, 41, 57, 103
 Alexis Comnenus, 68
alitērios, 207, 208, 217, 224, 244, 261, 270, 308–9, 311, 392, 464, 467
 Alos, 117, 448
 Althaea, 179
 ambiguity, 255
 Ammianus Marcellinus, 105
 Amyntor, 178
 Amyot, J., 85
 Anaximander, 240, 245
 Andocides, 463
 Andromache, 197
 Aneristus, son of Sperthias, 297
 Antenor, 183
 Antigone, 362–76, 442
 Antiope, 330
 anxiety, 1, 13, 149, 246, 359
avoidoi, 331

- Apollo, 41, 60, 145, 229, 328, 331, 338, 357, 381,
 413, 422
 Apollonius of Tyana, 48, 65
 Aquinas, T., 73–8, 98–9, 106
 Arcadia, 56, 293
 Archidamos, 324
 Archilochus, 51, 221, 248
 archive, 10, 20, 37, 39, 49, 54, 57, 157, 275,
 469, 471
 archons, 308, 313
 Areopagus, 319, 422, 424
 Ares, 378–9, 382–3, 385, 422, 444
 Argos, 294, 377, 386
 Aristarchus, 192
 Aristotle, 53, 143, 241, 468, 470
 Arminianism, 99, 110, 119
 Arrian, 103
 Artemis, 205, 422–3
 Arthur, M., 383
 assembly, 300
 Assmann, A., 321
astoi, 211, 272
 Astyanax, 197
asylia, 292
atē
 Agamemnon, 142, 396, 403, 407–8, 413
 Antigone, 362, 364–5, 369, 371–2, 374
 and danger, 222–3
 Eumenides, 415
 Homer, 149
 Orestes, 426, 433
 perspective, 237, 254–5, 264
 Phoenissae, 384
 punishment, 229, 231, 236, 256, 336
 release, 36, 253
 and *waštul*, 178
 and wealth, 253, 262, 337, 344
 Athamas, 117, 445, 448
 Athena, 181, 221, 291, 322, 384, 413, 415, 422, 455
 Athens, 290–1, 294, 296–7, 303–4, 306–25, 338,
 389, 415, 446
athlos, 362
atimia, 144
 Atreids, 224
 Atreus, 30, 58, 93, 225, 396, 400, 405, 414, 420,
 423, 426, 429, 434
 Atreidae, 4, 17, 30–1, 51, 58, 94, 133, 138, 223, 225,
 346, 349, 394–445
 Atthis, 321
 audience, 296, 306, 324, 373, 409, 412, 443, 461
 Augustine, 75, 78
 authenticity, 249, 257, 279
 authority, 454, 470
 age, 372
 conflict, 446
 elegy, 232, 245
 group, 234
 oratory, 464
 revolutions of wisdom, 339
 ritual, 451, 453
 science, 428, 432
 theology, 274
 tradition, 373
 tragedy, 441
 autochthony, 380

 Bacchylides, 373
 Bakker, E. J., 234
 barrenness, 167
Batrachomyomachia, 163
Begriffsgeschichte, 8, 19
 belief, 6–8, 14, 139, 150, 339, 342, 439
 condemnation, 113
 doctrine of inherited guilt, 17, 128
 exotic, 136
 new, 11
 popular, 126, 129
 primitive, 131, 133, 146, 469
 text, 18, 153, 156, 470
 tradition, 141
 Bellerophon, 177, 205
 Benedetto, V. di, 216
 Benveniste, E., 189, 203
 Bernabé, A., 456
 Bia, 200
 Bianchi, U., 155
 Bion of Borysthene, 53, 468
Birds, 300
 Blessed Isles, 334
 blood, 368
 human sacrifice, 319
 lust for, 399
 and murder, 367
 and pollution, 11, 114, 352, 401, 410–11
 and punishment, 403, 438
 and sacrifice, 173, 186, 190
 value of, 379
 Bollack, J., 462
 Borges, J. L., 257
 borrowing, 251
 Bouzyges, 208
 Branchidae, 41, 103
 Brisson, L., 455
 Bulis, 303
 Burkert, W., 155, 170

 Cadmus, 372, 380, 382, 384, 443
 Callias, 464
 Callimachus, 95
 Calvinism, 84, 99, 112, 114

- Cassandra, 221, 396, 400, 404, 406, 408, 415, 448, 463
 Castor, 425
 Catholicism, 113, 119
 causality
 divine, 333
 history, 155, 303–4, 307, 328, 341
 knowledge, 469
 law, 241
 natural, 151, 239
 oath, 191, 200
 philosophy, 26
 tragedy, 347, 384, 397, 415, 442
 Celsus, 4, 60, 452
 character
 criminal, 43, 45
 Eteocles, 359
 heredity, 30, 87, 344, 391, 414, 439
 imitation, 74
 Oedipus, 387, 389, 392
 Paris, 182
 perspective, 376, 386
 Sophocles, 443
 and wealth, 265
charis, 329, 333–5
 Chiron, 200
Choephoroi, 409–12
 chorus, 441, 443
 Agamemnon, 398, 400, 403–5, 407, 409, 412
 Antigone, 362, 366, 370–1, 373
 Choephoroi, 410–11
 Damia and Auxesia, 291
 Electra, 417
 Iphigenia in Tauris, 421, 423
 Oedipus at Colonus, 390–1
 Orestes, 426, 431–3, 436
 perspective, 344
 Phoenissae, 383–5
 Seven against Thebes, 351, 354, 356–7, 359, 361
 chronology, 125, 130, 430, 444
 Chrysostom, J., 107–8
 Chrysippus, 345, 349, 372, 377, 381, 385, 388, 444
 Cicero, 50–3
 civic religion, 13, 339, 441, 449
 class, 2
 Cleisthenes, 307, 324, 446
 Cleomenes, 118, 292–4, 306, 309–10, 312, 322–3
 Clinias, 466
 closure, 358, 424
 cloud, 228, 237, 333
 Clytemnestra, 58, 396–411, 415, 426, 434
 cognitive science of religion, 6
 coherence, 10, 250, 272, 326, 342, 350
 coinage, 241–2, 249, 265, 274, 279, 287
 collective responsibility, 4, 123
 Fauconnet, 148
 Glotz, 137, 142–4
 Grotius, 108–9
 length, 1, 100, 102
 primitive, 135
 states, 3
 Common Concepts, 38–9, 48
 comparatism, 105, 111, 113–14, 120, 125
 comprehensive approach, 4–6, 350
 contingency, 24, 43, 45, 139, 198, 236, 253, 273, 298, 425
 Corinth, 324
 corporate responsibility
 biblical, 19, 61, 63, 66, 73, 92, 131, 150, 152, 271
 comparatism, 143, 176
 and original sin, 98, 120, 134, 137, 156
 cosmos
 order, 231
 regularity, 248, 302, 335, 433
 universe, 241, 246, 256, 259, 271, 428, 444
 upheaval, 429
 Cotta, 51
Cratylus, 30
 Creon, 370, 376–83, 386
 Cresphontes, 94, 445
 Creuzer, G. F., 127
 Croesus, 4, 34, 36, 325–43
 Cronus, 30, 159, 163, 193, 267
 crown, 330
 cultural concept, 10
 cultural memory, 20, 275, 318, 320
 cultural translation, 55–6, 63–4, 71, 89, 124–5
 curse(s), 15, 17
 Agamemnon, 403–4, 406, 408
 agency, 54, 58, 225, 350, 380
 Alcmaeonids, 206
 Choephoroi, 410, 413
 definitions, 13, 16, 445
 Electra (Sophocles), 417
 evolution, 146, 154
 Homer, 178
 and invective, 219
 and oath, 117–18, 145, 171, 173, 186, 190, 195, 197, 199, 220–1, 242, 248
 Oedipus at Colonus, 388, 392
 Orestes, 427, 430, 435
 Pelopids, 30, 431
 Phoenissae, 377–8, 381, 385
 Roman, 59
 Seven against Thebes, 352, 354–5, 359
 and time, 205
 tragedy, 439
 Curtius, 103
 custom, 302

- Cylon, 116, 206–9, 222, 292, 306–25
 Cyrene, 171–4, 196

daimōn, 294, 399–400, 402, 404, 406, 408, 419, 462
 Damascius, 457–8
 Damia and Auxesia, 291
 Danaids, 445
 Darbo-Peschanski, C., 155
 debt, 2, 226, 245, 286, 301, 303, 325, 402
De decem dubitationibus circa Providentiam, 22–39
 definition, 10, 20, 22, 33, 38–9, 177, 277
defixiones, 143
 Delphi, 39–40, 48, 56, 154, 290, 308, 315, 326, 331
 Demaratus, 293, 295
 Demeter, 202, 292
 democracy, 324
De morbo sacro, 339
dēmos, 210
De natura deorum, 50–3
 Derveni papyrus, 454, 460
De sera numinis vindicta, 39–49
 desire, 242, 256, 262
deus ex machina, 436, 438
 Diasia, 308
 Didyma, 41
dikē
 community, 160
 evolution, 137, 139
 order, 184, 243, 272, 389
 personification, 166, 264
 perspective, 409, 452
 punishment, 59, 362
 and reciprocity, 248
 and reputation, 288
 and time, 248
 translation, 71, 73
 and wealth, 259
 Diogenes Laertius, 315
 Dionysius of Halicarnassus, 105
 Dionysus, 220, 383, 455, 457, 460
 disease
 city, 377–8
 and curse, 381
 contagion, 42, 75, 77
 and pollution, 422, 460, 470
 punishment, 131, 339
 treatment, 35, 467
 Dodds, E. R., 13, 148–51, 445
 domestication, 63, 67, 73, 80, 83, 90–6, 109, 134
domos, 364, 423, 430, 434, 436, 438
 double determination, 191, 392
 doublets, 250, 258
 Douglas, M., 238

 Dover, K. J., 154
doxa, 214–15, 228, 235, 253, 260, 451
 Dragon, 140, 372, 378–9, 383, 443
 dream, 421–2
 Durkheim, E., 136

 Earth, 183, 201, 356, 365, 379, 458
 Edmonds, R., 455, 459
 Egypt, 465
elasteroi, 403, 448, 450
 Electra, 410–12, 426, 428–9, 432, 435, 438, 444
Electra (Sophocles), 93, 416–17
 Else, G., 373
 Elysium, 333
 emic and etic, 10, 20, 22, 54, 165
 Empedocles, 461–3
 empire, 1, 48, 53, 57, 144, 302, 325, 441
enageis, 206, 306–25
 Enlightenment, 121, 124–5, 135, 149–50, 340, 445
 Epicureans, 39, 48, 50, 92, 116, 469
 Epidaurus, 291
Epigoni, 347
 epilepsy, 27, 45, 339
 Epimenides, 116, 208–9, 226, 312–20
epistia, 307
 equivalence, 240–1, 262, 286, 301, 303–4
 Erechtheus, 291
 Erigone, 210
 Erinyes, 13, 131, 184, 198, 200, 220, 313, 319, 355, 358, 368, 383, 390, 392, 396, 408, 410, 413–16, 422, 424, 434, 439, 447
 Eris, 200–1, 383, 426, 428–9, 434
 eschatology, 46, 147, 459
es meson, 183, 232, 317
 Eteocles, 351, 356, 359, 378, 380–1, 383, 392
 ethics, 261, 263
 etymology, 30, 203
Eumeniden (1833), 127
Eumenides, 133, 320, 408, 412–16, 424, 442, 448
Eunomia, 247
 Eupatrids, 207, 210, 226
 Euripides, 45, 376–86, 416–38, 443–4
 Evans-Pritchard, E. E., 7
 evolution, 18, 126, 135, 144, 148, 150, 184, 261, 345, 469
 exchange, 241, 250, 265, 274, 301, 329
 exile, 86, 101, 118, 144, 202, 207, 220, 294, 313, 321, 389, 462, 467
exōleia, 118, 144–5, 159–205, 221, 286, 312, 464
 expansion, 275, 442, 444, 469, 471
 explicit theology, 20, 23, 53, 56, 156, 277, 454, 468, 472
 Ezekiel, 62, 107, 271, 273

- fate
 Hermias, 34
 Herodotus, 327
 Moerbeke, 65
 philosophy, 53
 Pindar, 349
 Plutarch, 39, 43–4, 83
 Proclus, 27, 32, 48
 Providence, 81
 Solon, 229
 tragedy, 344, 347, 373, 387, 403, 426, 431
 Fauconnet, P., 148
 fear, 289, 355, 359, 462
 feast, 223, 225, 383, 400, 404–5, 407–8, 412, 423, 425, 429, 434
 feet, 283
 fire, 114, 172, 228, 327, 329, 335–6, 369, 395, 436
 floating verses, 251
 focalisation, 193, 278, 282, 322
 Fontenelle, B. de, 111
 foreignisation, 63, 72, 78, 80, 98, 102, 109–10, 120, 124–5, 128, 134–5, 150
 forgetfulness, 235, 262
 foundation, 379, 383, 385
 freedom, 290, 301
 French Revolution, 85, 120, 144
 friendship, 187, 211, 213, 219, 221, 223, 248, 440
 Fustel de Coulanges, N. D., 135

 Gadamer, H.-G., 125
 Gallavotti, C., 216
 Gantz, T., 14
 Gauthier, J.-F., 123
 genealogy, 211, 226, 284, 382, 420, 425
geneē, 160, 162, 165, 167–8, 205, 281, 283, 364, 366, 402
Genesis, 16
 genetics, 2
genos, 168, 170, 281
Agamemnon, 403, 463
Antigone, 370
 and character, 45
 continuity, 160, 312
 evolution, 135, 138, 140
 and *geneē*, 163, 167
 and generation, 34, 36, 45, 336, 361
 gold leaves, 458
 and healing, 36, 47
 and law, 139
 and madness, 461
Oedipus at Colonus, 388, 392
Phoenissae, 379–80
 and pollution, 207, 308, 325, 446
 and punishment, 33
Seven against Thebes, 357, 359
 of Talthybios, 297
 genre, 9–10, 13
 Glaukon, 451
 Glaukos, 57, 59, 278–96
 Glotz, G., 4, 12, 134–48
gnōmai, 251, 265, 344, 370–1, 431, 435, 437
 golden lamb, 421, 423, 427–8, 430
 gold leaves, 457, 459
 Graf, F., 459
 Gratian, 73, 75, 99
 Great Depression, 86
 Grethlein, J., 395
 Griffith, M., 363
 Grotius, H., 81, 95, 97–112, 118–19, 124, 129
 guilt, 11, 17, 24, 44, 51, 54, 70, 73, 79, 99–100, 104, 122, 133, 145, 149, 152, 155, 319, 386, 388
 Gurōb papyrus, 460
 Gyges, 325–8, 335

 Hackett, H. B., 87
 Hades, 184, 365
 Haemon, 371
haereditarium piaculum, 20, 92, 117
 Harrison, T., 155
 healing, 30, 35–6, 43, 45, 47, 51, 66, 73, 146, 339, 467
 Hector, 182, 185, 194
 Helen, 164, 182, 194, 196, 396, 400, 431, 436
 Helios, 183, 418
 Hellenism, 4, 20, 23, 27, 37–8, 48, 54, 60, 62, 79, 452
 Hephaistos, 202
 Hera, 41, 192, 198, 220
 Heracles, 41, 445
 Heraclidae, 326
 herald, 290, 296–306
 heredity, 1, 15, 25, 32, 44, 224, 243, 245, 264
 agency, 225, 248, 273, 284, 339, 344, 467
Antigone, 372
 and crime, 133
 ethics, 469
 and French Revolution, 120
Heracles, 345
 and kings, 203, 440
 and *physis*, 59
 and pollution, 453
 and responsibility, 43
 and time, 87
 and wealth, 227, 375
herkos, 203
 Hermias, 33
 Hermione, 436
 Herodotus, 4, 103, 155, 275–343, 441, 470
 heroes, 161, 167, 449
 Hesiod, 14, 17, 29, 49, 101, 129, 145, 154, 159–77, 281, 285, 373, 466, 471

- hetaireia*, 210, 212, 226
 Hieron, 331, 334
 Hippocrates, 51, 339
 Hippodameia, 421
Hippolytus, 445
 Hipponax, 51, 219, 221
histiē, 284, 289
historiē, 277, 293–4, 306, 321, 325, 340
 historical reparations, 1
 Hittites, 177
 Holy Roman Empire, 83
 Homer, 14, 17, 21, 49, 127, 129, 131, 133, 137–9,
 142, 145, 151–2, 154, 177–99
Homeric Hymn to Hermes, 288
homognios, 25
 honey, 114, 390, 449
 hope, 300, 366, 412, 432, 436
 illusion, 228, 230, 235, 246
 risk, 364, 374
 hostages, 292, 294
 human sacrifice, 114, 300, 319, 396, 398,
 406, 423
 Hume, D., 122
 humour, 466
hybris, 166–7, 169, 231, 262, 269, 272
 hymn, 183, 211
 Hyperactive Agency Detection Device, 7
 Hyperboreans, 333
 Hyrras, 216

 Iamblichus, 27, 33, 68
 iambus, 52
 identity, 49, 86, 249, 284, 321
 ideology, 251, 257, 261, 266
 Idomeneus, 196
Iliad, 152, 177–99
 Immerwahr, H., 302
 implicit theology, 21–2, 156, 277, 393, 440, 445,
 468, 472
 incest, 355, 387
 inconsistency, 10, 16, 229, 238
 inference, 42, 156, 324, 443, 465
 inheritance
 agency, 391
 dynasty, 332
 heritage, 169, 176, 273, 344, 356, 440
 and justice, 2, 265, 349, 359, 374, 385
 Solon, 226, 242, 246
 value, 264, 284
 inherited guilt, 3, 13–15, 18, 20, 22, 45, 54,
 56, 64, 96, 102, 129, 137, 143, 145, 147,
 149, 151, 153, 156, 176, 345, 406, 455
 inherited privilege, 2, 86, 103, 120, 213, 226, 245,
 247, 250, 274, 372, 375
 inherited virtue, 42, 214, 245, 247

 initiation, 36, 38, 48, 71, 314, 318, 451, 453, 456,
 458, 460, 470
 innocents, 24, 40, 239, 245, 262, 309, 338, 386,
 391, 400, 414
 intent, 160, 239, 260, 270, 287, 289, 304, 363,
 369, 386, 391, 467
 interpolation, 358
 intertextuality, 9, 49, 157, 258, 266, 275–6, 281,
 288–9, 336, 342, 362, 373, 375, 393, 440,
 461, 471
 invective, 219
 Io, 385
 Ionia, 279, 286, 296
 Iphigenia, 396, 398, 401, 406, 417–25
Iphigenia at Aulis, 431
Iphigenia in Tauris, 416–25, 444
 irony, 268, 295, 347
 Irwin, E., 257
 Isagoras, 306, 312, 322
isēgoriē, 290
 Ismene, 362, 391–2
 Isocrates, 465–6
 Italos, J., 69

 Jameson, M., 448
 Jocasta, 377, 386
 Johnston, S. I., 459
 Jordan, D., 448
 Justification of Apollo, 327

 Kaikos, 216
kairos, 263, 266
 Kakridis, I., 153
kataskaphē, 144, 294
katharmos, 312, 315–16, 390, 461
 Keydell, R., 348
 Kinesias, 464
 kings
 Alcaeus, 210
 Hesiod, 167, 170
 Iliad, 183, 202
 oath, 171, 176
 Thebes, 353, 356, 372, 381, 392
 Kirk, G., 180
kolossoi, 172
kōmos, 408
konis, 367
 Kotansky, R., 448
kottabos, 215
kratos, 200
 Kurke, L., 241, 265
 Kyrnos, 249

 Labdacids, 4, 17, 28, 133, 138, 344–93, 447, 461
 Labdacus, 380

- Lafitau, J.-F., 111
Laius, 344–93, 447
 lamentation, 268–9, 272, 304
 Laomedon, 180, 198
 law, 74, 137, 139, 141, 143, 146, 226, 240, 246, 302, 320, 375, 387, 451, 463
Laus, 466–8
 Lesbos, 208, 210, 212, 216
 Leutychides, 278, 287, 290, 294–5
lex sacra from Selinous, 399, 403, 448–51, 453, 455
 libation, 184, 330, 449
 light, 366–7
 literacy, 275
 Lloyd-Jones, H., 13, 15, 151–3, 346, 348, 362, 369
 Lobeck, C. A., 127
 Locrian Maidens, 41, 448
logioi, 331
loimos, 315
 Lomeier, J., 11, 81, 112–20, 124, 129
longue durée, 20
 Lurje, M., 92
 Luther, M., 55
 Lycambes, 205
 Lydia, 331, 334–5
 Lydians, 279
 Lysias, 463–5
lysis, 366, 456, 458, 461

 Macedonia, 56, 144, 321
 madness, 360, 368, 371, 424
 agency, 296, 355, 425
 danger, 293
 heredity, 344, 353, 424, 439
 origin, 408
 purification, 33, 35, 460
 release, 253–4, 402, 422–3
 magic, 340, 470
 Maistre, J. de, 84–6, 121
Malleus Maleficarum, 74, 83
mantis, 453–4
 Marathon, 295
 marriage, 224, 310, 362, 416, 423
 mask, 28, 71
 matricide, 434
 Méautis, G., 86
 medical literature, 1, 275, 339
 Megacles, 207
 Megara, 250
 Melanchros, 210, 212
 Melanchthon, P., 91–4, 110, 271
 Meleager, 179
 memory, 232, 234–5, 237, 245, 263, 285, 288, 357
 Menelaus, 181, 193, 402, 434
mēnima, 33, 41, 48, 57, 90, 131, 178, 299, 305, 378, 380, 461

 Menoeceus, 377–8, 380, 384
 Mermnads, 326
 Messa, 219
miasma, 59, 310, 422
 Michelet, J., 120
 microcosm, 246
 Miletus, 278, 286
 Miltiades, 305
 Minimally Counterintuitive Concept, 7
misos, 217, 221, 244
 Mnemosyne, 233
 modernity, 109, 112, 120, 125, 148
 Moerbeke, W. of, 23, 70–3, 78
 Most, G., 162
 mother, 215, 309, 332, 383, 388, 401, 403, 426, 437
 motivation, 182, 187, 260, 391
 Moulinier, L., 11–12
 Müller, K. O., 127
 murder, 450
 Murray, G., 148
 Muršili, 178, 198
 Musaios, 453
 Muses, 228–9, 231, 233
 Myron, 313
 Myrsilos, 210, 212, 214, 218, 225
 Myrtilus, 30, 59, 417, 427, 429, 437, 444
 Myson, 330
 mysticism, 152
 myth, 18, 42, 44, 46, 59, 130, 137, 156, 211, 319, 321, 325, 330, 346, 350, 370, 381, 386, 416, 441

 Nägelsbach, K. F., 128
 Napoleon, 85
 narrator, 298, 311
 nationalism, 2, 125
 natural law, 99, 101, 104, 110, 119
 nature, 31, 77
 Near East, 16, 199, 220
 Needham, R., 7
 Neoplatonism, 22–40, 47, 68, 73, 455, 469
 Neschke, A., 174
 Nestane, 56
 Nicolas, son of Bulis, 297
 Nike, 200
 Nilsson, M. P., 155
 Niobe, 145, 177, 197, 205
 nominal audience, 246
noos, 168, 235–7, 246, 259, 261, 263–5, 270, 272, 274, 288
 Nuremberg, 108

 oath(s), 17, 170–6, 179–205, 209, 219–20, 263, 274, 280, 293, 311, 453, 462, 471

- oath(s) (cont.)
Horkos, 200–4, 284–5
 imprecation, 248, 283, 464
 perjury, 29, 57, 59, 160, 162, 166, 168, 253, 264, 270, 287, 295, 462, 465, 469
 obscurity, 44, 160, 166, 168, 235, 283, 332, 366, 395, 433
 occasion, 9, 250
 Odysseus, 103, 185, 288
Odyssey, 152, 235
Oedipodia, 16, 347, 445
 Oedipus, 28, 65, 132, 140, 164, 344–93, 447
Oedipus (Aeschylus), 351, 360
Oedipus at Colonus, 386–93, 442
Oedipus Tyrannus, 93–4, 347, 444, 456
 Oenomaos, 420
oikos
Agamemnon, 395, 397–8, 400, 402–3, 406–8, 413
Antigone, 366
Choephoroi, 410, 412
Eumenides, 320, 416
 exchange, 241
Iphigenia in Tauris, 420, 422–4
lex sacra from Selinous, 449
 oath, 172, 187, 199, 202, 279, 282, 284
Oedipus at Colonus, 390, 392
Orestes, 427, 430, 434, 436
Phoenissae, 377, 381
 Solon, 246
 tragedy, 440, 470
 wealth, 168–9, 356
 Okeanos, 200
olbos
 abundance, 161, 167
 felicity, 168, 228, 336, 458
 wealth, 160, 244, 286, 332, 335, 354, 356, 433
 oligarchy, 322
 olive tree, 291
 Olympia, 331
 Olympic games, 308
 Olympiodorus, 455
 Olympus, 167, 193, 368
 oracle, 338, 389, 448
 Chaldaean Oracles, 38
 Delphi, 56, 145, 154, 278–9, 288, 290, 308, 326
 Epimenides, 316
 knowledge, 71
 Laius, 381, 387
 Lomeier, 117
 Oedipus, 389
 Orestes, 422
 perspective, 35, 192
 text, 280, 284, 287, 295, 327
 orality, 276
 oratory, 463–6, 470
 Oresteia, 132, 351, 394–416, 431, 442, 448
 Orestes, 30, 139, 210, 224, 347, 397, 410–12, 415, 421–2, 425–38, 444, 463
 Origen, 61–2, 96
 origin(s), 18, 199, 280, 291, 293, 350, 380, 384, 388, 423, 442, 458, 460
 original sin, 3, 19, 55, 63, 67, 75–9, 81, 86, 92, 98, 112, 114, 120, 134, 137, 148, 155–6, 455
 Orpheus, 41, 453–4
 Orphism, 13, 122, 128, 140, 147, 155, 451–60
 Ouranos, 30
paideia, 49, 54, 60
 Pandarus, 181, 187
 Pandora, 170
 Panhellenic, 281, 289
 paradox, 24, 40, 42–3, 85, 122, 132, 245, 269, 283, 339, 352, 415, 441
 Paris, 180, 182, 194, 396
 Parker, R. C. T., 12, 18, 208
 parricide, 353, 355, 387, 390–1
 Pausanias, 4, 56–9, 305
 Peabody, A. P., 87
 Peirithoos, 330
 Peisistratids, 140, 144, 207–9, 323–4
 Peloponnese, 279, 308
 Peloponnesian War, 207, 297, 305, 309, 321, 324, 446
 Pelops, 30–1, 58–9, 278, 377, 405, 417, 420, 423, 425, 427, 430, 435, 438, 444
 Penthilids, 210, 212, 224
 performance, 230, 250, 276, 281
 Pericles, 121, 207, 309, 311
 Persephone, 184, 198, 432, 455, 458
 Perses, 169, 278
 Persia, 297
 Persians, 56, 103, 296–7, 299, 301, 305, 329
persona, 220, 227, 248, 250, 253, 257, 274
 perspective, 236
 chorus, 376, 384, 435
 cognition, 269
 and deception, 264, 283
 and divinity, 188, 194, 234, 262, 310, 336, 443, 451
 focalisation, 195, 236–8, 259, 272, 282, 322, 373–4, 385, 408
 history, 328
 justice, 196
 oppositions, 382, 406, 441
 research, 277
 tragedy, 350, 394
 and wisdom, 251, 258
Phaedo, 457

- Phalaris, 331
 Philip of Macedon, 56
 philology, 124, 128
 Phoenicians, 383
Phoenissae, 46, 93–4, 376–86, 430, 443–4
 Phoenix, 179
 Phrixos, 448
phthonos, 431, 433
Physika (Orpheus), 454
 Pindar, 349, 373, 440
 Pirckheimer, W., 83
 Pisander scholion, 347–9, 377
pistis, 187, 190
 Pittakos, 211, 213–14, 217–18, 220, 223, 226
 Plato, 30, 53, 123, 142, 146, 152, 317, 451–5, 460, 466–8, 470
 Pleisthenes, 402, 405
 Plutarch, 4, 39–50, 74, 77, 80–91, 94, 96, 98, 101–2, 108–9, 111–12, 116, 119, 121, 123, 127, 129, 131, 133, 137, 139, 145, 147, 149, 152–3, 156, 458
 poetic rivalry, 251, 254, 266, 276
 poetics, 9, 246, 275
poinë, 301, 419, 457–8, 461
polis, 170, 210, 239, 241, 247, 250, 274, 281, 314, 354–5, 416, 440
 pollution, 206–9, 300, 306–25, 439, 446–70
 Aegina, 292, 295
 agency, 54, 59, 225, 248, 425
 Alcmaeonids, 222, 244
 Choephoroi, 411
 definition, 11–13
 Epimenides, 116
 Glotz, 139
 and inheritance, 110
 Iphigenia in Tauris, 422
 Oedipus at Colonus, 390–1
 Orphism, 451
 Phoenissae, 379–80, 384
 piaculum, 112
 Seven against Thebes, 352
 and sin, 79
 Polyneices, 357, 378, 380–1, 383, 392
 Polyphemus, 41
 Popper, K., 157
 Poseidon, 179, 422
 prayer, 186
 Priam, 185, 190, 197
 primitive, 122, 128, 130, 132–4, 137–8, 146, 148, 150, 242, 249, 261, 339, 346, 469
 Proclus, 3–4, 22–39, 65–7, 69, 71–2, 74–5, 77–8, 80, 101–2, 109, 134, 458
 professional philology, 20
progonikon hamartēma, 3, 20, 24, 31, 37, 91
Prometheus Bound, 142, 201
 prophecy, 36, 39, 48, 53, 58, 192, 271, 322, 377–8, 395, 407
 proverb, 49, 59
 Proverb of the Mill, 60, 62, 150, 152
 Psellos, M., 68
 purification, 206–9, 306–25
 Choephoroi, 411
 definition, 11
 evolution, 124, 128
 Hippocrates, 339
 and initiation, 453, 460
 Iphigenia in Tauris, 422, 424
 lex sacra from Selinous, 449
 lustrationes, 113–19
 Neoplatonism, 33, 35–6, 38, 48, 71
 Oedipus at Colonus, 390
 release, 381, 451–2, 458
 and sacrifice, 421, 448–9
puthēmēn, 215, 230, 243
 Pylades, 422
 Pythia, 278–90, 294–5, 323

Querelle des Anciens et des Modernes, 81, 111, 121

 rational, 64, 82, 98, 120, 126, 129, 148, 150
 Rattaler, G., 94
 reciprocity, 176, 198, 205, 233, 240–1, 248, 328, 333
 Reden, S. von, 241
 Reformation, 55, 83, 93
 reincarnation, 27, 34, 37, 40, 67, 69, 71, 147, 462
 reperformance, 250
 responsibility
 agency, 262, 391, 398, 410, 415
 duration, 43, 218, 303
 punishment, 239, 245, 267, 287, 307, 386, 388, 400, 413
 transmission, 33, 263, 270, 301
 Rhodes, P. J., 312
 rhythm, 282
 ring composition, 234, 236, 238, 282, 387
 risk, 2, 252, 279, 374, 446, 464
 ritual, 446–61
 and danger, 319
 emotions, 131
 evolution, 136, 155, 275, 469
 Iliad, 199
 and literature, 176, 183
 and punishment, 291
 Solon, 248
 superstition, 113, 124, 130
 and time, 303
 river, 45, 173, 236, 400
 Robertson Smith, W., 136
 Robertson, N., 448

- Rohde, E., 130–3, 180
 Roman Empire, 4, 23, 49, 57, 59, 249
 Roman law, 99
 Roman theatre, 71
 Romanticism, 126, 128, 130, 150–1
 root, 30, 284, 312, 366–7, 373
 Rousseau, J.-J., 98

 sacrifice, 330, 453
 Christian, 114
 corrupted, 396
 Empedocles, 462
 oath, 183, 186, 299
 omens, 300, 314
 and pollution, 292, 316, 319, 422, 448
 salvation, 114, 402, 460
 sanctuary, 41, 219, 297, 299, 304, 307, 315, 335,
 391, 447, 449, 466
 Sardis, 327, 329, 333
 Satan, 115
 Saunders, T. J., 123
 sceptre, 203, 332
 Schleiermacher, F., 63, 125
 sea, 214, 231, 239, 244–5, 334, 354, 359, 365,
 373–4, 438
 Seaford, R., 241
 seal, 257, 281
 seasons, 239, 248
 Sebastokrator, I., 24, 65–70
 secularisation, 98
 self, 4, 64, 104, 124, 469
Semnai Theai, 206, 308, 319, 387, 389–90
 Semonides, 227
 Seneca, 51, 59
Seven against Thebes, 351–62, 442
 Seven Sages, 208, 212, 226, 315
 Sewell-Rutter, N. J., 17
 shame, 214, 217
 ship, 353–4
 ship of state, 213, 353, 355, 374
 Sicily, 331
 Simon, R., 112
 Simonides, 250
skēnē, 396
 slavery, 1, 104, 140, 332, 467
 sleep, 303
 Smith, J. Z., 56
 social mobility, 2
 Socinians, 119
 Socles, 322, 324
 Socrates, 30, 452, 460
 Solon, 17, 34, 129, 139–40, 155, 212, 226–49,
 251–2, 255, 258, 260, 272, 309, 313, 317,
 325–43, 352, 373–6, 403, 453, 471
 Sommerstein, A., 414

 song-culture, 250
 Sophocles, 15–16, 18, 133, 362–76, 386–93, 443
 soul, 27, 32, 34, 43, 71, 131
 Spanheim, E., 95
 Sparta, 285, 287, 293, 296, 299, 301, 304–5, 318,
 322, 446
Spartoi, 45, 372, 378, 380, 382–3
 speech-act, 201
 speed, 57, 283, 352, 355, 464–6
 delay, 35, 43, 82, 177, 196, 198, 245, 258, 264,
 267–8, 298, 338, 361, 364, 410–11
 Spencer, J., 112
 Sperthias, 303
 Sphinx, 355, 383
 Stesichorus, 347
 Stiblinus, G., 94
 Stobaeus, 227, 254
 Stoics, 39, 50–2, 116, 469
 stoning, 217, 222, 313
 storm, 213, 228, 239, 243, 353, 355, 357, 359,
 373–4, 403
 Styx, 173, 200–2, 293, 462
 sun, 239, 419, 421, 428
 Super, C. W., 87
 supplication, 307–8, 319, 387
symbola, 279, 286, 289
 symmetry, 239, 245
 symposium, 21, 211–74, 276, 449, 469
 symptom, 305
 Syriacus, 36

 Talthybios, 129, 296–306, 311, 341
 Tantalus, 30, 58, 225, 420, 423, 425–6, 430,
 433, 444
 Tartarus, 201
 Teiresias, 65
 Tertullian, 62
 Tethys, 200
 Theagenes of Megara, 308
Thebaid, 347, 349
 Thebes, 161, 290, 349, 351, 355, 363, 372, 377,
 380–1, 383–4, 386, 389
 Themistocles, 144
 theodicy, 38, 146, 194
 Theognis, 5, 14, 249–74, 304, 373, 452
 theology, 10, 19, 37, 130, 146, 389
 and conflict, 119
 cultural, 3
 dramatic chorus, 370
 Herodotus, 299, 327, 338, 342
 Lysias, 465
 Proclus, 49
 Solon, 254
 Theognis, 272
 ‘theological deixis’, 63

- tragedy, 441
and translation, 20, 55, 69, 73, 109
Theopompus, 317
theoxenia, 449
Thera, 171, 447
Theron, 349
Thersites, 203
Theseus, 330, 386, 390–1
Thespesios, 46–7, 86
Thoas, 423
Thrace, 216, 365
Thracians, 41
Thucydides, 297, 340, 441, 470
Thyestes, 58, 396, 404, 411–12, 414, 426, 429
thymos, 244, 262–3, 265, 270, 288
Tiresias, 377–83, 430, 444
isis, 228, 240, 245, 294, 301, 326, 335
Titans, 201, 455, 458
tomb, 59, 214, 309
trade, 226
tradition, 276, 370, 389, 451
elegy, 257–8, 271
tragedy, 14, 17, 28, 36, 48, 67, 71, 93, 146, 155, 321, 344–445, 470–1
Tria opuscula, 23
Tritopatores, 169, 447, 449–50, 453, 460
trokosi, 56
Troy, 41, 161, 188, 211
truth, 235, 334
Tukulti-Ninurta I, 178
Tyler, W. S., 87
Tylor, E. B., 130
Tyndareus, 58, 434
tyranny, 211, 335, 349, 372
Tyrtaeus, 247

underworld, 40, 184, 201, 365, 368
unity, 229, 236, 250, 326
unknowability, 34, 45, 198, 246, 253, 465

Valckenaer, L. C., 95
vendetta, 138, 143, 291, 319, 321
vengeance, 29
Venuti, L., 63
Vernant, J.-P., 11, 164, 235, 360
Vernière, Y., 122
Versnel, H. J., 10, 229, 238, 337, 341

wall, 332, 355, 357, 360, 377
wałtul, 178
wave, 353–5, 365
wealth, 32, 36, 168, 230–1, 237, 252, 256, 260, 279–89, 331–5, 369, 440
concentration of, 2

duration, 102, 160, 228, 246, 255, 264, 329, 335, 433
and justice, 245, 337, 356, 369, 375, 453
and madness, 253, 374
money, 241
perspective, 265, 336
and risk, 229, 242, 296, 354, 371, 439
transmission, 33, 167, 170, 265, 274, 355–6, 358, 374, 469
weaving, 423
West, M. L., 17–18, 349, 429, 440, 457
Wilamowitz-Möllendorff, U. von, 154, 259, 399
wind, 228, 365
wine, 186, 294
Winshemius, V., 93
wisdom
archaic, 261
contemporary, 338
cosmological, 428
elegy, 233, 237, 265
exemplary, 289
Hesiod, 281, 285
symposium, 250
traditional, 315, 370–1, 373
transformation, 470
and writing, 276
witness, 183, 310, 412
wrath, 107, 299
agency, 17, 54, 58, 225, 248, 322, 344, 425
Ares, 382, 443
Artemis, 197
delay, 57, 177, 303
duration, 131, 380–1, 391
Erinyes, 319
and justice, 298
Persephone, 458
perspective, 41, 180, 239, 388
punishment, 192
and purification, 315, 390, 464
Talthybios, 305, 341
Wytttenbach, D., 84, 122

Xanthippus, 207, 224
xenia, 301
Xerxes, 296, 302
Xylander, 82

Zagreus, 147, 455–60
Zēlos, 200
Zerubabel, E., 317
Zeus
Agamemnon, 399
Bacchylides, 334

Zeus (cont.)

Celsus, 60

Cratylus, 30

Diasia, 308

Hesiod, 167

Iliad, 181, 194, 220

Laphystios, 117, 138, 299, 302–3

lex sacra from Selinous, 448

Orphism, 455

Seven against Thebes, 356

Solon, 177, 230, 234, 245

Theognis, 264, 268